[2026:RJ-JP:10069] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16479/2023 Panchayat Samiti Jhotwara, Jaipur Through Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Jhotwara, Jaipur. ----Petitioner/Appellant Versus 1. Durga S/o Ruda, 2. Devilal S/o Ruda, 3. Kesarlal S/o Chhitar, 4. Prakash S/o Chhitar, 5. Omprakash S/o Chhitar, 6. Ramchandra S/o Dhanna, 7. Lala S/o Dhanna, 8. Tota Ram S/o Hanuman, 9. Kana Ram S/o Hanuman, 10. Ramswaroop S/o Hanuman, 11. Roopa S/o Birda – Deceased 11/1. Kalyan Sahai S/o Roop Narayan, 11/2. Damodar Lal S/o Roop Narayan, 11/3. Harinarayan S/o Roop Narayan, All are resident of Village Achanchukya, Tehsil & District Jaipur. 12. Gram Panchayat Begus, Tehsil Jaipur District Jaipur Through Sarpanch ----Respondents 13. State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Jaipur District Jaipur. ----Proforma Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, AAG Mr. Ashutosh Udawat For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.B. Mathur, Sr. Adv. With Mr. Dheeraj Kumar Palia [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (2 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI Order 09/03/2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 28.05.2014 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer in Appeal No. Appeal/Decree/T.A./6941/2012/Jaipur. The said order was passed in an appeal filed against the judgment dated 26.06.2008 passed by the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur in Appeal No.119/2004, which was dismissed solely on the ground of delay. 2. Learned counsel Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Udawat, Advocate, appearing for the petitioners submits that a detailed justification explaining the specific cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the learned Board of Revenue was submitted. However, the same has not been considered by the learned Board of Revenue in the right perspective and without considering the facts enumerated in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the appeal has been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel further submits that it was only on account of political reasons that the said delay occured and by not condoning the same, loss to public exchequer and public interest has been caused. Thus, the order dated 28.05.2014 deserves to be set aside and the appeal filed by the petitioners before the learned Board of Revenue against the order dated 26.06.2008 be heard and decided on merits. 4. Learned counsel Mr. R.B. Mathur, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dheeraj Kumar Palia, Advocate, submits that not only the [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (3 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] appeal was filed before the learned Board of Revenue with a delay of 4 years and 50 days, but even the writ petition preferred before this Court has been filed after a colossal delay of around 9 years and no justification whatsoever has been submitted for the said delay in the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel further submits that the said conduct itself demonstrates the lackadaisical approach adopted by the petitioners and they cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the order dated 28.05.2014 duly considers the justification given by the petitioners with respect to the delay, and a specific finding has been recorded that the petitioners have miserably failed to justify the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the order dated 28.05.2014 has been passed strictly in accordance with law and the writ petition deserved to be dismissed on ground of delay and laches as well. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Though the State can expect to be granted some latitude with respect to the action or inaction of its officers, the said inaction cannot travel beyond a particular point so as to defeat the entire legal process. The law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that litigation is initiated within a reasonable time and stale claims are not revived at the whim of a negligent litigant. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, has categorically held that government departments cannot claim [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (4 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] a special privilege in matters of limitation and that bureaucratic delays cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Relevant paras of the judgment read as under: “27.It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28.Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 10. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, reiterated that [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (5 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and the burden lies upon the applicant to establish sufficient cause for the entire period of delay. The Court further observed that stereotyped explanations reflecting merely procedural movement of files cannot justify the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Relevant paras of the judgment read as under: “ 17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined. 18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder: 1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue. 2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (6 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own words: “(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.” 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red- tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (7 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] 4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time. (emphasis ours) 19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders(supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government. 20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.” 11. Similarly, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court disapproved condonation of an inordinate delay of 3966 days and observed that constitutional courts cannot become “surrogates for State lethargy”, emphasizing that the adequacy of explanation for the entire period of delay is the decisive factor and not merely the length of delay. Relevant paras of the judgment read as under: [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (8 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] “261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State- machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (9 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Anr. Vs. D. Narsing Rao & Others, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 has categorically held as under: “31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.” 13. In the present case, not only the appeal before the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer was filed with a delay of more than four years, but even the writ petition challenging the order dated 28.05.2014 has been filed before this Court after a passage of about 9 years. The memo of the writ petition fails to justify the said delay, and no pleading whatsoever has been made, much less any sufficient ground to justify the delay in filing of the present writ petition. 14. It is a trite principle of law that for seeking condonation of delay, each day’s delay has to be explained, however, in the present case no justification whatsoever has even been tendered [2026:RJ-JP:10069] (10 of 10) [CW-16479/2023] for the delay of 9 years in filing the present writ petition. Thus, there is no occasion whatsoever for this Court to entertain the writ petition, much less to interfere with the order dated 28.05.2014 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer and accordingly, the same is affirmed. 15. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed. 16. Pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed. (ANUROOP SINGHI),J VINAY MEENA /47