1 2026:CGHC:15729 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 574 of 2016 Suresh Kumar S/o Late Shankar Lal, Aged About 43 Years R/o Priyadarshini Nagar, At Present Village Lailunga Distt. Raigarh, Civil And Revenue Distt. Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Smt. Janaki Bai W/o Late Mahetaru, R/o Village- Ameri, Tahsil- Takhatpur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2. B.S.Markam, Nayab Tahsildar, Sakari, Tahsil- Takhatpur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4. Mohan Singh S/o Ram Singh, R/o Village- Deepika, Tah. Deepika, Distt. Korba, Chhattisgarh 5. Neelu D/o Late Shankarlal, W/o Ghanaram Solanki, R/o Raisigh Nagar, Tahsil Raisingh Nagar, Distt. Shreeganga Nagar, Rajasthan ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate For Respondent No. 3/ State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L. For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan & Mr. Aishwarya Pandey, Advocate JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.09 11:26:12 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 07.04.2026 1. S.A. No. 574 of 2016 and S.A. No. 575 of 2016 were earlier clubbed together as they arise between the same parties, though out of two separate suits. Therefore, both the appeals are being decided separately by this judgment. 2. The plaintiff/appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 30.08.2016 passed by the Learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 119-A/2015 (Suresh Kumar Vs. Smt. Janaki Bai & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 10.08.2015 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 198-A/2009 (Suresh Kumar Vs. Smt. Janaki & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 3. The plaintiff instituted a Civil suit seeking declaration of title and a decree of permanent injunction pleading inter alia that they are the owners and possessors of the suit land bearing Khasra No.480/1-ख admeasuring 0.55 acres. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs had purchased the said land from its previous owners, Mahetaru and Ghasiram (deceased 3 defendant No. 2), through a registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994, and thereafter obtained title and possession over the same. On the basis of the said transaction, the plaintiffs’ names were duly mutated in the revenue records pursuant to the order dated 28.09.2004 passed by the Court of the Naib Tehsildar, Sakri in Case No. 68/3-6/2003-04. It was further averred that after purchasing the land, the plaintiffs fenced the suit property with barbed wire and pillars. On 23.04.2005, defendant No.2 allegedly came to the suit land along with labourers and attempted to remove the barbed wire fencing claiming that the land had been recorded in his name and that he would take forcible possession thereof. Upon making inquiries from the revenue authorities, the plaintiffs came to know that on the basis of an application dated 07.10.2004 submitted by defendant No.2, the Naib Tehsildar had passed an order on the same day directing deletion of the plaintiffs’ names from the revenue records and restoring the names of defendants. The plaintiffs pleaded that the said order dated 07.10.2004 was passed illegally, without issuing any notice to the plaintiffs or conducting any proper inquiry, and therefore the same is void and without legal effect. It was further alleged that the said order was passed in collusion between defendant No.2 and the concerned revenue authority. The plaintiffs also challenged the subsequent sale deed dated 26.04.2005 executed in favour of defendant Mohan Singh, 4 contending that since the earlier sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs was valid and effective and they were already in possession of the land, the subsequent transfer was illegal and liable to be declared null and void. On these pleadings, the plaintiffs prayed for a decree declaring them to be the owners and possessors of the suit land, declaring the order dated 07.10.2004 passed by the Naib Tehsildar as illegal and void, declaring the sale deed dated 26.04.2005 executed in favour of defendant Mohan Singh as null and void, and for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession over the suit property. 4. Defendant No.5, Mohan Singh, in his written statement denied the entire claim of the plaintiffs and contended that the suit land, along with other adjoining lands bearing Khasra Nos. 479 and 480 admeasuring about 1.70 acres, originally belonged to defendants No.1 and 2 and their names were duly recorded in the revenue records. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs are claiming title on the basis of a forged and fabricated sale deed and that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors ever obtained possession of the suit land. It was further contended that the alleged mutation in favour of the plaintiffs in Case No.68/3-6/2003-04 was obtained fraudulently in collusion with revenue officials and the same 5 was subsequently cancelled by the competent authority. The order dated 07.10.2004 passed by the Tahsildar restoring the names of defendants No.1 and 2 was also affirmed in appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), and therefore the plaintiffs cannot challenge the said revenue proceedings before the civil court. Defendant No.5 further pleaded that he had purchased the suit land from defendants No.1 and 2 through a registered sale deed dated 27.04.2005 after paying full consideration and since then he has been in peaceful possession of the property. According to him, the plaintiffs never remained in possession of the suit land and the alleged transaction dated 08.06.1994 was obtained fraudulently by the plaintiffs’ father, Shankar Lal Dagla, by misusing his official position and influence over revenue authorities. It was therefore prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiffs be dismissed with costs and that compensatory damages be awarded to the defendant for the loss and harassment caused due to the institution of the false and frivolous suit. 5. Defendants No.1 and 2, in their written statement, denied the averments made in the plaint and contended that they had never sold the suit land situated at Village Ameri bearing Khasra No. 479/1 admeasuring 0.10 acres and Khasra No. 480 out of which 0.50 acres is alleged to have been sold to the plaintiffs. It was specifically pleaded that neither any sale 6 transaction had taken place nor possession of the land was ever delivered to the plaintiffs. It was further alleged that the alleged sale deed dated 08.06.1994 was a forged and fabricated document obtained by the plaintiffs’ father, Shankar Lal Dagla, who was a government officer, by misusing his official position and influence over revenue authorities and the Sub-Registrar. According to the defendants, Shankar Lal Dagla fraudulently obtained the sale deed in the benami names of the plaintiffs by taking defendant Mahetaru to Dabhra and getting documents executed in collusion with officials. On the basis of such fraudulent transaction, the plaintiffs have no title or right over the suit property. The defendants further pleaded that the mutation order dated 28.09.2004 passed by the Naib Tehsildar was an ex parte order and the same was subsequently cancelled by order dated 07.10.2004 upon the application submitted by defendant Ghasiram. Consequently, the names of defendants No.1 and 2 continued to be recorded in the revenue records. It was contended that the said order was passed within the jurisdiction of the revenue authority and cannot be said to be illegal. It was also contended that the plaintiffs are not members of the Scheduled Tribe as claimed by them, but belong to the “Dagla” caste and are originally residents of Rajasthan. Since defendants No.1 and 2 belong to the Gond tribe, which is a 7 Scheduled Tribe, any transfer of their land in favour of non- tribals without prior permission of the Collector is prohibited under Section 165(6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. As no such permission was obtained, the alleged sale deed dated 08.06.1994 is void and ineffective and does not confer any right, title or interest upon the plaintiffs. The defendants also asserted that they have always remained in possession of the suit land and have been cultivating the same, and therefore the allegation of interference by them is baseless. On these grounds, defendants No.1 and 2 prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs and damages. 6. The Trial Court, after framing the necessary issues, proceeded to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. The Court observed that the burden to prove ownership and possession over the suit land bearing Khasra No.480/1-ख admeasuring 0.55 acre was upon the plaintiffs. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs relied primarily upon the registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 (Exhibit P- 07). However, the Trial Court held that the said document did not establish a valid transfer of title in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court further observed that the vendors of the said sale deed belonged to the Gond community, which is a Scheduled Tribe, and the suit land is situated within a notified Scheduled Area. In view of the provisions contained in Section 165(6) of 8 the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, any transfer of land belonging to a member of a Scheduled Tribe to a non- tribal person requires prior permission of the Collector. The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish that they belonged to the Scheduled Tribe category within the State of Chhattisgarh or that they had obtained the requisite permission from the Collector prior to purchasing the land. The Trial Court also took note of the admission made by plaintiff Suresh Kumar Dagla during cross-examination that he was originally a resident of Rajasthan, and no documentary evidence was produced to substantiate the claim that the plaintiffs belonged to a Scheduled Tribe recognized in the State of Chhattisgarh. The Court further found discrepancies in the sale deed, particularly that the land was purportedly sold by Mehetaru on behalf of Ghasiram as his attorney, yet no power of attorney authorizing such transaction was produced. Additionally, there was inconsistency regarding the date of registration of the sale deed as mentioned in the plaint and as reflected in the document itself. On the basis of these circumstances, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 was genuine and legally valid. Consequently, the Court concluded that the said sale deed was void and ineffective, and no title or ownership over the suit land accrued to the plaintiffs on the basis of the 9 said document. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiffs had also failed to establish their possession over the suit land. With regard to the challenge to the order dated 07.10.2004 passed by the Additional Tahsildar in the revenue proceedings, the Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs had failed to adduce any evidence to demonstrate that the said order was illegal or erroneous. Accordingly, the said issue was decided against the plaintiffs. In view of the findings that the plaintiffs failed to establish their title as well as possession over the suit property, the Trial Court held that they were not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction against the defendants. However, the Court held that the suit was maintainable before the Civil Court and that the plaintiffs had properly valued the suit and paid the requisite court fee. On the basis of the aforesaid appreciation of evidence and findings, the Trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case on the preponderance of probabilities and accordingly dismissed the suit. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 10.08.2015, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal 10 by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts are illegal, contrary to the evidence on record and unsustainable in law. It is contended that the Courts below have failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs. According to the appellant, the suit land was purchased by them through a registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 (Ex.P/7) and since the date of purchase they have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the suit property. The witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs have also categorically deposed that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land and that the defendants were aware of such possession. It is further submitted that the name of the plaintiffs had also been recorded in the revenue records and, therefore, they were entitled to declaration of title and confirmation of possession. Learned counsel further argues that the Courts committed a serious error in holding the sale deed dated 08.06.1994 to be invalid by applying the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code, particularly when the defendants had not filed any counter claim or independent suit seeking declaration that the said sale deed is null and void. It is also contended that the First Appellate Court itself observed that the Trial Court had not 11 afforded adequate opportunity to the plaintiffs to adduce evidence, yet it failed to grant appropriate relief. Thus, it is urged that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are erroneous and give rise to substantial questions of law as to the applicability of Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code and the legality of the dismissal of the suit and the appeal. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 10. The First Appellate Court considered the record of the Trial Court along with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties and examined the correctness of the judgment and decree dated 10.08.2015. The Court observed that the plaintiffs had claimed ownership and possession over the suit land on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 (Ex.P/7) allegedly executed by vendors Mehetaru and Ghasiram in their favour. The Appellate Court noted that the plaintiffs had produced various documents including the sale deed dated 08.06.1994, the order sheets of the revenue proceedings, the order dated 07.10.2004, statements of witnesses and other related documents. During cross- examination, plaintiff Suresh Kumar Dagla admitted that his 12 father was posted as Sub-Divisional Officer at the time of execution of the sale deed and that he had not produced any documentary evidence to establish that he or his father belonged to the Scheduled Tribe category. He also admitted that prior to purchasing the land no enquiry regarding the status of the land was conducted. On the other hand, defendant No.5 Mohan Singh examined himself and produced several revenue records and documents including the registered sale deed dated 27.04.2005 executed by Mehetaru and Ghasiram in his favour, revenue orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue, as well as revenue records such as B-1 and Khasra Panchshala entries showing the suit land recorded in his name. The Appellate Court observed that the mutation order dated 28.09.2004 passed in favour of the plaintiffs had been cancelled by the Tahsildar by order dated 07.10.2004 and the names of the original vendors Mehetaru and Ghasiram were restored in the revenue records. Thereafter, the suit land was sold by the said vendors to defendant No.5 Mohan Singh through a registered sale deed dated 27.04.2005. The Court further observed that the revenue records produced by defendant No.5 showed that the suit land stood recorded in his name in subsequent years and thus he appeared to be a bona fide purchaser. The Appellate Court also took note of the fact that the plaintiffs 13 had failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish their status as members of a Scheduled Tribe, whereas the sale deed itself reflected that the vendors belonged to the Gond community. The Court further observed that the mutation order earlier obtained by the plaintiffs had already been set aside by the competent revenue authority and the subsequent revenue proceedings had attained finality. The Appellate Court further held that entries in the revenue records constitute relevant evidence regarding possession and title unless successfully rebutted, and in the present case the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish their ownership or possession over the suit land after cancellation of the mutation in their favour. It was also observed that disputes relating to mutation and revenue entries fall within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities under Section 257 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. The Appellate Court also considered the objection raised by the plaintiffs regarding denial of opportunity to lead evidence before the Trial Court and noted that earlier an application under Section 24 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been rejected by the District Judge after examining the record and observing that the plaintiffs themselves had adopted a non-cooperative attitude during the proceedings. The said finding was also upheld by the High Court in a writ petition. In view of the overall appreciation 14 of evidence and the circumstances of the case, the First Appellate Court held that the findings recorded by the Trial Court did not call for interference. Consequently, the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 10.08.2015 passed by the Trial Court were affirmed. 11. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do 15 not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 15. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case 16 is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti