1 CGHC010370512026 2026:CGHC:43800 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1266 of 2026 1 - Brijkishore Tiwari S/o Late Ramdulare Tiwari, Aged About 80 Years R/o 09 Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.) 2 - Rashmi Tiwari D/o Shri Brijkishore Tiwari, Aged About 47 Years R/o 09 Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.) 3 - Swati Tiwari D/o Shri Brijkishore Tiwari Aged About 50 Years R/o 09 Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.) 4 - Deep Kishore Tiwari S/o Brijkishore Tiwari, Aged About 46 Years R/o 09 Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioners versus 1 - Smt. Reeta Tiwari W/o Shri Vicek Tiwari, C/o Vivek Tiwari, Assistant Teacher, Government Primary School, Hiranagar, Sirgitti, Bilha Block, Block, Bilaspur (C.G.) (Address Mentioned In Impugned Order Is No Longer Is Existence, Owing To House Lock) 2 - Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited (C S P D C L ), Through Its Managing Director, Head Office Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Assistant Engineer Link Road Zone, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.10.09 11:35:20 +0530 2 For Petitioners : Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni, Advocate For Respondents No.2 & 3 : Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board 28/09/2026 Heard. 1. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, assailing the order dated 03.01.2026 passed by the learned 7th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bilaspur (C.G.) in M.J.C. Civil No. 29/2021, whereby the application seeking restoration of the civil suit has been allowed. The petitioner prayed for the following reliefs in the writ petition:- “In view of the above submission, the petitioner prays for the following relief(s) :- a) Issue appropriate writ, order, or direction, quashing the impugned order dated 03.01.2026 passed by the learned 7th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bilaspur (C.G.) in the restoration proceedings(MJC Civil No. 29/2021), as the same is illegal, perverse, and bad in law; (b) Hold and declare that the restoration of the Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, which had become infructuous upon the permanent dismantling of the electricity connection on 02.06.2018, is an abuse of the process of law and legally unsustainable; (c) Consequently dismiss the restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 1, and thereby uphold the dismissal of the Civil Suit (A) 3 No. 143/2018, which had already become infructuous; (d) Pass any other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience; and (e) Award costs of the present proceedings to the Petitioners, as they have been unnecessarily dragged into protracted litigation despite the absence of any surviving cause of action. (f) That the entire record of the case may kindly be called for elucidation of the facts of the case. (g) Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 are the owners of the land bearing Khasra No. 5/50, admeasuring 4360 sq. ft., over which a house exists. The property originally belonged to their mother, late Smt. Sharddha Tiwari, who purchased the same by registered sale deed dated 26.04.1985. After her death on 30.11.2019, the property was mutated in favour of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 by order dated 06.03.2021 passed by the Naib Tehsildar, Bilaspur. It is further pleaded that respondent No.1, Smt. Reeta Tiwari, had obtained an electricity connection bearing Service No. 1006141714 on the basis of an alleged consent letter dated 15.09.2016. The said electricity connection was directed to be disconnected by the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Bilaspur, vide order dated 06.09.2017, as corrected on 14.09.2017, and the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 before the Electricity Ombudsman, 4 Raipur, was also dismissed vide judgment dated 03.05.2018. According to the petitioners, the said orders attained finality as they were not challenged before this Court. 3. It is further the case of the petitioners that, instead of pursuing the remedy in accordance with law, respondent No. 1 instituted Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018 on 28.05.2018 against the mother of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, seeking restraint against disconnection of the aforesaid electricity connection. However, pursuant to the orders passed by the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and the Electricity Ombudsman, the electricity connection was permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018, i.e. within five days of institution of the civil suit. By reason of such permanent dismantling, the very subject matter of the suit ceased to exist, and the relief claimed therein became incapable of being granted, thereby rendering the suit completely infructuous. Despite this, respondent No. 1 continued to prosecute the said suit until 16.03.2021, when it was ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 initiated restoration proceedings, in which the petitioners entered appearance and opposed the prayer for restoration. 4. The petitioner’s further case is that throughout the restoration proceedings they repeatedly brought to the notice of the learned Court below that the original suit had already become infructuous on account of permanent dismantling of the electricity connection. An application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC was filed on 08.07.2022, which was rejected, and the matter was proceeded with for evidence. Thereafter, on 23.11.2023, the petitioners specifically informed the 5 Court regarding the permanent dismantling, but the said application was rejected on 14.05.2025. Their subsequent application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was also rejected on 05.07.2025. On 09.09.2025, the petitioners again moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, relying upon the judgment of “Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and Others” reported in (2004) 11 SCC 168, and bringing to the Court's notice the circumstances which, according to them, had rendered the suit infructuous. The said application was rejected on 03.11.2025. The petitioners thereafter preferred a transfer application under Section 24 CPC before the Principal District Judge, Bilaspur, but, despite intimation thereof, the learned Trial Court proceeded with the matter and ultimately, on 03.01.2026, passed the impugned order restoring the suit. The learned Trial Court, despite being apprised of the extinction of the subject matter, has revived a litigation which had ceased to have any surviving cause or effective relief, resulting in perpetuation of an infructuous proceeding and abuse of the process of the Court. 5. Mr. Sunil Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the learned Trial Court has committed a serious error in restoring the civil suit, which had already become infructuous on account of a subsequent event. It is submitted that the electricity connection was the very subject matter of Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, which was permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018 in compliance with the order dated 06.09.2017 passed by the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Bilaspur, as affirmed by the Electricity Ombudsman, Raipur, vide judgment dated 03.05.2018. Thus, the 6 relief sought in the suit, namely, restraint against disconnection of the electricity connection, had become impossible to be granted and the subject matter of the suit stood extinguished. Despite the said fact being specifically brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court, the suit was permitted to remain pending and was ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution on 16.03.2021. The restoration of a proceeding which had already become infructuous amounts to reviving a dead litigation and constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. 6. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the aforesaid subsequent event despite the petitioners having repeatedly placed the relevant material on record, including the Permanent Dismantling Panchnama dated 02.06.2018 and the RTI information dated 05.09.2023. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioners had also moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC on 09.09.2025, relying upon the judgment of Machado Brothers (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognised that the parties may bring to the notice of the Court, by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC, the facts and circumstances which have rendered a pending litigation infructuous. It is argued that instead of examining whether the suit had, in fact, become infructuous, the learned Trial Court mechanically rejected the application by referring to the earlier rejection order of the Order 7 Rule 11 application, although the earlier application concerned the alleged bar of jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and was not directed to the subsequent event rendering the suit infructuous. 7 7. Learned counsel would further submit that the manner in which the restoration proceedings were conducted also suffers from serious procedural irregularities. It is submitted that the restoration application was initially instituted under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC, whereas an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is also found on the record; without clarifying the legal basis of the restoration proceedings, the learned Trial Court passed the order. It is further submitted that the petitioners had informed the learned Trial Court on 06.11.2025 regarding the filing of a transfer application under Section 24 CPC before the Principal District Judge, Bilaspur, yet the matter was proceeded with by treating the said date as the last opportunity for arguments. The petitioners also point out that the subsequent order dated 02.01.2026 allegedly denied the filing of the transfer application despite the earlier intimation. The proceedings culminating in the impugned order dated 03.01.2026, including the alleged discrepancies in the order sheets and absence of signatures, demonstrate that the matter was proceeded with in an irregular and predetermined manner. It is also submitted that the observations made against the petitioners in the order dated 03.11.2025 were based on a misreading of their application and reflect a failure to properly appreciate the issue raised by them. 8. Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the learned Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or restore the suit in view of the express bar contained in Section 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The original suit itself related to the electricity connection and sought an injunction against its disconnection, notwithstanding the orders already passed by the competent electricity grievance redressal 8 authorities. The application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC raising the statutory bar was not properly considered and was rejected without appreciating the effect of Section 145 of the Electricity Act. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that a suit which was otherwise barred by law and, in any event, had become completely infructuous by reason of permanent dismantling of the electricity connection, could not have been restored. The impugned order dated 03.01.2026 is perverse, legally unsustainable and an abuse of the process of the Court, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submissions, he would rely upon the judgments of “Punjab State Electricity Board and Another v. Ashwani Kumar” 1997 (5) SCC 120, “Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and Others” 2004 (11) SCC 168, “A.R.V. Jagadeeshan v. The Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board” 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 140, and “Super Auto Centre v. BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd.” decided by Delhi High Court on 14.09.2011, in RFA (OS) No. 66/2011. 9. Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, opposed the submissions of the petitioner’s counsel and submitted that it is a property dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have already disconnected the electricity connection of the subject premises in the year 2018 itself. He would submit that all the objections raised by the petitioner are about maintainability of the suit and the present is a petition against restoration of the suit which was dismissed for default. The petitioner may raise their objection in the proceedings of 9 the suit. In the present case, the plaintiff satisfied the learned trial court regarding the cause of her non-appearance in the proceedings, and the suit is restored. The suit is for two separate reliefs, i.e., for restraining the defendants from disconnection of electricity connection and also for permanent injunction of her dispossession from the subject premises. Though one relief of the suit is rendered infructuous, the second relief of permanent injunction from dispossession is still survived, and the entire suit cannot be dismissed as infructuous. Therefore, there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 11. The question which arises for consideration is whether, in the facts of the present case, the learned Trial Court was justified in restoring Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, particularly when it is the specific case of the petitioners that the electricity connection, which formed the subject matter of the relief of injunction, had already been permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018. The material placed before this Court shows that the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Bilaspur, had directed disconnection of the electricity connection vide order dated 06.09.2017, as corrected on 14.09.2017, and the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 was dismissed by the Electricity Ombudsman, Raipur, on 03.05.2018. Thereafter, the electricity connection was permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018, whereas the civil suit had been instituted on 28.05.2018. Thus, so far as the relief seeking restraint against disconnection of the electricity 10 connection is concerned, there can hardly be any dispute that the event of permanent dismantling occurred during the pendency of the suit and rendered that particular relief incapable of being granted. The said factual position is also specifically pleaded by the petitioners and is supported by the Permanent Dismantling Panchnama dated 02.06.2018. 12. The legal position about a proceeding becoming infructuous on account of subsequent events is no longer res integra. In Machado Brothers (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the scope of Section 151 CPC, held that where, by reason of a subsequent event, the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae it is the duty of the Court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice, which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the parties can bring such subsequent facts to the notice of the Court by an application under Section 151 CPC, and the Court is required to enquire whether the pending litigation has, in fact, become infructuous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “25. Thus it is clear that by the subsequent event if the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice, which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. For the said purpose it will be open to the parties concerned to make an application under Section 151 CPC to bring to the notice of the court the facts and circumstances which have made the pending litigation infructuous. Of course, when such an application is made, the 11 court will enquire into the alleged facts and circumstances to find out whether the pending litigation has in fact become infructuous or not. 26. Having thus understood the law, we will now consider whether the courts were justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant herein for dismissing the suit on the ground that the same had become infructuous. In this process, we have already noticed that there seems to be no dispute that the original termination notice based on which first suit OS No. 4212 of 1995 was filed, has since ceased to exist because of the subsequent termination notice issued on 23-8-2001, validity of which has already been challenged by the respondent in the third suit.” 13. However, the aforesaid principle has to be applied to the actual reliefs claimed in the suit and not merely to one of them. In the present case, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have submitted that although the electricity connection was disconnected in the year 2018, the original suit did not contain only the prayer relating to electricity connection; according to them, the suit also contained a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing respondent No. 1 from the subject premises. It is their specific contention that while the relief concerning electricity connection may have become infructuous, the relief concerning protection against dispossession continues to survive. This contention cannot be brushed aside at the stage of restoration proceedings, particularly when determination of whether the entire suit has become infructuous would require examination of the pleadings and the 12 nature and scope of each relief claimed therein. The principle laid down in Machado Brothers (supra) itself requires the Court, upon such an application, to enquire into the alleged subsequent facts and determine whether the pending litigation has actually become infructuous. Therefore, the mere fact that one of the reliefs has ceased to survive does not, by itself, establish that the entire suit has become infructuous. 14. It is necessary here to note the relief claimed in the suit, which appears from the copy of the plaint filed by the petitioner in the present petition as Annexure P-8. In para 14 of the plaint, the plaintiff has claimed the following reliefs:- “14. यह कि वादिनी मानीनी य न्ययलय से किनीम्नीलिलखित अनीतष यचनी रत ह :- (अ) प्रकितवा क्र. 01 एवा! 02 किवारुद्ध इसे आशय शश्वत व्याश जार किय जावा कि प्रकितवा क्र. 01 एवा! 02, वादिनी कि*जा किवावादित परिरसेर मानी पर लगे हुए किवाद्युत मा टर एवा! नीक्शनी किवाच्छेदित नी र। (*) प्रकितवा क्र. 03 किवारुद्ध इसे आशय शश्वत व्याश जार किय जानी यग्य ह कि प्रकितवा क्र. 03 वादिनी कि*जा किवावादित परिरसेर मानी पर स्वाय! य अन्य किसे व्याक्ति7त सेहयगे से कि*नी न्ययलय नी आश श!कितप8र्ण: ब्जा प्रभाकिवात नी र। (से) वादिनी प्रकितवागेर्ण से वा व्याय दिलय जावा। () अन्य सेहयत जा मानीनी य न्ययलय उलिचत सेमाझे।” 15. The proceedings for restoration of a suit dismissed for default have a limited scope. Under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC, the consideration is whether the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. The Hon’ble 13 Supreme Court has recognised that the scope of a restoration proceeding is distinct from an adjudication of the merits of the suit. In Nathuprasad v. Singhai Kapurchand, AIR 1976 MP 136 (FB), the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that in a restoration proceeding the applicant has to establish sufficient cause for non-appearance and the scope of such proceeding is different from an appeal on merits. Consequently, while a defendant may certainly bring to the notice of the Trial Court a subsequent event which may have a bearing upon the maintainability of the suit, the question whether the entire suit has become infructuous, particularly where another substantive relief is asserted to be surviving, ordinarily requires adjudication in the suit itself and cannot necessarily be treated as conclusively determinative of the plaintiff's entitlement to restoration. The learned Trial Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed jurisdictional error merely because it restored the suit after being satisfied regarding the plaintiff's explanation for non-appearance. 16. In the present case, the record further indicates that the petitioners had, during the restoration proceedings, raised objections concerning the alleged bar under Section 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003 as well as the subsequent event of permanent dismantling. Their application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC was rejected, and thereafter they again brought the alleged subsequent event to the notice of the learned Trial Court by an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC. The latter application was rejected on 03.11.2025. The petitioners' grievance that the learned Trial Court ought to have finally adjudicated the question of infructuousness before restoring the suit cannot, however, be accepted in its entirety because the 14 respondent's assertion that the suit contains an independent relief of protection against dispossession raises a factual and legal issue concerning the survival of the entire cause of action. The contention regarding Section 145 of the Electricity Act also relates to the maintainability of the suit and is a matter which can appropriately be considered in the substantive proceedings. The material placed before this Court does not establish that, merely because the electricity connection was permanently dismantled, no relief whatsoever survived in the suit. 17. As regards the other allegations concerning the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, including the alleged irregularities in the order sheets, the filing of the transfer application under Section 24 CPC, absence of signatures and the observations made in the order dated 03.11.2025, this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, is required to examine whether the impugned order suffers from patent jurisdictional error, perversity or such material irregularity as would warrant supervisory interference. The power under Article 227 is supervisory and is not intended to substitute the view of this Court for that of the Trial Court merely because another view may be possible. In the present case, the learned Trial Court considered the restoration application and, upon being satisfied with the explanation furnished by the plaintiff for her non-appearance, restored the suit. The petitioners' objections regarding the ultimate survival of the cause of action and the bar under Section 145 of the Electricity Act remain available to them in the substantive suit. Therefore, notwithstanding the force in the petitioners' submission that the relief relating to the electricity 15 connection has become incapable of enforcement, the restoration of the suit cannot, on the present material, be characterised as an exercise of jurisdiction wholly without jurisdiction or as an order so perverse as to warrant interference under Article 227. 18. The decision in Machado Brothers (supra) does not advance the petitioners' case to the extent contended. The said decision undoubtedly recognises that continuation of a suit which has completely become infructuous by disappearance of the cause of action amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But the same judgment also makes it clear that the Court must enquire whether the pending litigation has, in fact, become infructuous. Here, the respondent's submission is that the suit contains a separate and surviving prayer for protection against dispossession. Thus, the Court cannot proceed on the assumption that the disappearance of the electricity connection has necessarily extinguished every relief claimed in the suit. The question whether such relief is legally and factually sustainable is required to be decided on the pleadings and evidence in the suit. 19. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely, Ashwani Kumar (supra), Machado Brothers (supra), A.R.V. Jagadeeshan (supra), and Super Auto Centre (supra), do not render any assistance to the petitioners in the facts of the present case. In Ashwani Kumar (supra), the issue was essentially about the maintainability of a civil proceeding in relation to an electricity dispute and the availability of remedy under the statutory mechanism; whereas in the present case, the impugned order is one restoring a 16 suit dismissed for default and an independent relief of protection against dispossession continues to survive. Likewise, Machado Brothers (supra) lays down the principle that where, on account of subsequent events, the entire subject matter and cause of action of a pending proceeding have completely disappeared, the Court may, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, bring such infructuous litigation to an end; it does not lay down that restoration of a suit is impermissible merely because one of the reliefs claimed therein has become infructuous. The decisions in A.R.V. Jagadeeshan (supra) and Super Auto Centre (supra) are also distinguishable on their respective facts and do not deal with a situation where, despite the extinction of one relief, another substantive relief claimed in the suit is asserted to be surviving. Consequently, no benefit can be extended to the petitioners on the basis of the aforesaid judgments. 20. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has not committed such jurisdictional error or perversity in passing the order dated 03.01.2026 as would justify interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 21. The petitioners shall, however, be at liberty to raise all their objections in the suit before the learned Trial Court, which shall consider the same in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made herein. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved