JUDGMENT : MOHAMMED NIAS C.P, J. 1. The petitioner challenges the Ext.P10 order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Palakkad, whereby a fresh regular stage carriage permit was granted to the 3 rd respondent on an inter- district route overlapping the petitioner’s existing regular permit. It is the specific contention of the petitioner that the Regional Transport Authority failed to consider the objections raised by the petitioner regarding substantial route overlap and timing clash, and proceeded to grant the permit in derogation of the statutory scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules. According to the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed without a proper assessment of the existing services on the route and without recording any cogent reasons justifying the grant. 2. Against the order impugned in the writ petition, the petitioner has an alternate efficacious statutory remedy under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the judgment of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ], submits that since statutory violations are alleged, this Court can entertain the writ petition. 4. The law is well settled that the existence of an efficacious alternate remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Equally settled is the distinction between cases where the High Court may interfere despite the availability of an alternate remedy and cases where the High Court alone can decide, like a challenge to legislative action, a lack of inherent jurisdiction, or constitutional infirmities. As held by the Supreme Court in United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others [ 2010 (8) SCC 110 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned the High Courts against entertaining the writ petitions in the teeth of statutory remedies, particularly having regard to docket explosion and institutional discipline. Therefore, while the High Court's constitutional power remains plenary, the consistent judicial policy mandates that, in matters where efficacious alternate remedies are available, parties ought ordinarily to be relegated to pursue the same, reserving writ jurisdiction for cases that fall within the recognised exceptions or require exclusive consideration by the High Court. 6. Therefore, while the High Court's constitutional power remains plenary, the consistent judicial policy mandates that, in matters where efficacious alternate remedies are available, parties ought ordinarily to be relegated to pursue the same, reserving writ jurisdiction for cases that fall within the recognised exceptions or require exclusive consideration by the High Court. 6. As rightly held by this Court in Tolin Rubbers (P) Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2003 SCC ONLINE KER 432), the crucial question is whether this Court is justified in exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the face of the alternative remedies available. If this Court entertains writ petitions on the ground of jurisdictional error, unmindful of the existence of an alternative remedy, this Court will be doing a great disservice to public interest. The efficacy of this Court has been considerably compromised owing to the docket explosion. This Court's precious time should be preserved for those matters which this Court alone is competent to deal with. 7. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanubhai Bhahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat [1989 Supp (2) SCC 310] , wherein the Apex Court underscored that despite the fact that the right to approach the Apex Court is a fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner should first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, instead of directly knocking at the doors of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court cautioned as follows: “Reasons, good and substantial, exist for directing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the first instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straightway. And these need to be spelled out. 2. An illustration may tell more effectively, what otherwise may not be told as effectively, and perhaps, only with some embarrassment suppose there is only One National Hospital established especially for performing open- heart- surgery which cannot be performed elsewhere in any of the eighteen Regional Hospitals. What will happen to the patients needing such surgery, if the National Hospital which alone is specially equipped for this type of surgery, throws its doors wide open also for patients suffering from other ailments who can be treated by any and every one of the eighteen Regional Hospitals? What will happen to the patients needing such surgery, if the National Hospital which alone is specially equipped for this type of surgery, throws its doors wide open also for patients suffering from other ailments who can be treated by any and every one of the eighteen Regional Hospitals? More particularly when the patients already admitted for such surgery by the National Hospital are already lying unattended to, on its floors, and in its corridors, for an unconscionably long time? Showing sympathy for a patient with other than a heart problem who can also be treated equally effectively, and perhaps much more quickly, may well constitute cruelty to the heart patients who can be treated only by the National Hospital established especially and exclusively for the treatment of such patients. Will it not be more merciful to all concerned (by being firm enough) to tell those suffering from other than heart problems to go to Regional Hospitals, instead of insisting on being treated at the National Hospital, which also can of course treat them, but only at the cost of neglecting the heart patients who have nowhere else to go? More so as the patients going to the Regional Hospital may well benefit much more by securing more personalized and urgent attention threat. On the other hand, not to do so may well amount to being engaged in trying to relieve the distress of those whose distress can be removed by anyone else at the cost of refusing to treat those who cannot be treated by anyone else. 3. If this Court takes upon itself to do everything which even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone can do under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, and other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of writ petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of writ petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more than ten years old civil appeals and criminal appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently realized. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed government servant has to wait for nearly ten years for redress in this Court. A litigant whose appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14 years before his wrong is righted by this Court. The time for imposing self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some amount of institutional ego, or raising of some eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level, and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierachy of courts and the institution as a whole, not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the same being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court.” 8. The above reasoning of the Apex Court will squarely apply to the cases where the petitioners directly come to this Court without invoking the effective statutory remedies available to them. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court.” 8. The above reasoning of the Apex Court will squarely apply to the cases where the petitioners directly come to this Court without invoking the effective statutory remedies available to them. Accordingly, where efficacious statutory remedies are available, parties are ordinarily to be relegated thereto, reserving this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction for cases which it alone is competent to decide. The rule of alternate remedy is not merely a question of the availability of another forum, but a principle of constitutional allocation of judicial responsibilities. In a constitutional system, where High Courts are increasingly burdened with matters that fall into the class of cases, where the High Court alone can decide, prudence dictates that matters where there is an efficacious statutory remedy should ordinarily be relegated to those remedies. This Court protects the statutory fora from being bypassed and safeguards the High Court from being overwhelmed, while disputes can be effectively resolved elsewhere. 9. Judicial restraint in entertaining the writ petitions where an alternate remedy exists is not merely desirable but is institutionally imperative. Relegating parties to statutory remedies in such cases is not the application of jurisdiction, but a disciplined exercise of it, consistent with the constitutional design. Given the above, I do not find any ground to entertain this writ petition as the questions raised before this Court can be raised before the Tribunal, which can consider both questions of fact and law. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to avail the alternate remedy on all available grounds.