1 CGHC010379222026 2026:CGHC:42848 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1280 of 2026 1 - Anil Kumar Agrawal S/o Shri Madan Lal Agrawal, Aged About 58 Years, R/o House No. 93 / 94, Govind Kunj, Behind Krishan Edlabs, Samta Colony, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Varun Shukla S/o Rajbali Shukla, Aged About 44 Years, R/o Plot No. 4 / 5 Professor Colony, Nehru Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioners versus 1 - Gulab Singh S/o Shitla Parasad Singh, Aged About 79 Years, R/o Quarter No. 1 / B, Steet No. N.P.A. Sector 4, Bhilai Nagar, Tehsil and District Durg Chhattisgarh. 2 - Raghuraj Singh S/o Shri Nath Singh, Aged About 81 Years, R/o Plot No. 02, Block No. 61 / 8, Maitrikunj Risali, Bhilai, Tehsil and District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners: Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate with Ms. Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 01-10-2026 1. Heard. 2. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners against the impugned order dated 30-07-2026 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Durg (C.G.) in Misc. Civil Appeal No.05/2026 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioners has been Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.10.09 11:29:10 +0530 2 dismissed and the order dated 13-01-2026 passed by First Additional Judge to the Court of learned First Civil Judge Senior Division, Durg in Civil Suit No.223A/2025 has been affirmed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners are defendants No.1 and 2 before the learned trial Court where the present respondents, who are plaintiffs, are prosecuting the suit for eviction of the defendants from the suit property and for permanent injunction. The plaintiffs are claiming in the suit that they purchased the suit property of Khasra No.1972/02 old Khasra No.230 situated at Kohka, Tahsil and District Durg area 4000 sq. ft. having four corners with road at northern side, plot No.85 in the southern side, plot No.103 in eastern side and plot No.101 in western side which they purchased on 23-01-1980 from Sharda Devi and came into possession of the same by raising boundary wall. Due to typographical mistake the number of the land was mentioned as 293/74 by which the a correction deed was also executed on 25-12-2009. The plaintiffs have filed the suit with allegation that defendant No.2 tried to possess the suit land by saying that it is the suit land belongs to plot No.101 which is his property and defendant No.2 has also filed a civil suit in which he claimed over plot No. 102 in that civil suit the present plaintiffs have been made as defendants. In that civil suit a demarcation report was submitted by Revenue Inspector on 25-01-2023 in which it has been clearly mentioned that on the spot the plot No.101 is not available and the subject land is plot No.102. Thereafter, the said civil suit filed by defendant No.2 was dismissed for want of prosecution on 13-01-2025. Thereafter, defendant No.2 tried to alienate the said property for which the plaintiffs have made a complaint to the police authorities. He would further submit that along with the suit the plaintiffs have filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC for restraining the defendants for aliening the suit property till the final adjudication of the suit. The learned trial Court without assigning any reason came into conclusion 3 that prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiffs and has granted temporary injunction with respect to alienation of the suit property till final adjudication of the suit. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has not recorded any finding and has not discussed the material available in the case to satisfy the prima facie case available in favour of the plaintiffs. It is only one line order that on the basis of the material produced before it prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs is made out. He would further submit that the learned appellate Court has also affirmed the said finding which was without any discussion or reason while giving detailed reason for which the appellant Court is not having any jurisdiction to put their own view while exercising the appellate jurisdiction. The learned trial Court was required to deal with the material available in the case before coming into conclusion that prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are in favour of the plaintiffs and then only proceed to grant order or not to grant the order relating to the temporary injunction in favour of the parties. The said requirement to pass the order under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC is missing in the present case and therefore, the order passed by the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court may be set aside and the application for grant of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs may be rejected. 4. I have heard the counsel for the petitioners and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 5. In the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil”, 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC 141], wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person 4 could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and Nagendra Nath [Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398] discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC 717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898]. 43*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], a two-Judges Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in * Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 26- 08-2010. 5 Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and they are set out: "38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], SCC pp. 695-96) "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 6 (6) * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the 7 history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215], followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the 8 tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of 9 interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 6. In The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited in nature and is to be exercised sparingly only in cases of patent perversity, gross jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or failure of justice. The power under Article 227 does not confer the jurisdiction upon this Court the status of an appellate forum to reappreciate facts or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. In the present case, both the learned State Commission and learned National Commission concurrently recorded a finding that the petitioner is liable for deficiency in service. In the case of “Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel”, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 15 of its judgment that :- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of 10 India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69] The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” 7. From perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that before passing the order dated 13-01-2026 the learned trial Court has considered the material available in the case and the documents produced by the parties. Though in para 7 of its order the learned trial Court has not made any specific consideration, however, the trial Court found on the basis of the documents available on record and pleadings of the parties that there is prima facie case exist in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court has also considered the balance of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of the plaintiffs and then passed the order that the defendants shall be restrained from aliening the suit property till final adjudication of the suit or till any further orders. The said order passed by the learned trial Court is affirmed by the learned appellate Court vide its order dated 30-07-2026 by passing a detailed order after having discussion of the evidence available on record and material produced by the parties. 11 8. True it is that before passing the order granting or rejecting the temporary injunction the trial Court is required to examine the evidence and discuss the same while considering the case and before reaching at any conclusion, but under the facts and circumstances of the present case, when the temporary injunction with respect to the alienation of the suit property till final adjudication of the suit property or till further orders has been passed, even if there is no specific reason assigned by the learned trial Court to reach a conclusion that prima facie case exist in favour of the plaintiffs, yet there are sufficient consideration there in the order passed by the learned trial Court to reach at the said conclusion that there exist a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. Even otherwise, the learned trial Court is empowered to pass such order of restraining the suit property being alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree. 9. After having gone through the entire material produced by the petitioners in present writ petition, I do not find any jurisdictional error or perversity in the impugned order passed by the learned appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court. Consequently, the present writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil