CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT ( 113) M/S GRETIS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) 1. of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 12.01.2026 (Annexure P Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by respondent No.3 solely on the ground o restore the petitioner's statutory appeal to its original number and decide the same afresh on merits. CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 02.09.2026 M/S GRETIS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED Versus PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Salil Dev Singh Bali, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep Dhanda, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Abhilaksh Gaind, Advocate and Mr. R.S. Kalra, Advocate, for respondent No.1-PUNSUP. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 12.01.2026 (Annexure P Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by respondent No.3-Controlling Authority was dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, and for a direction to respondent No.2 to restore the petitioner's statutory appeal to its original number and decide the same afresh on merits. - IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 02.09.2026 M/S GRETIS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED ......Petitioner Versus PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Salil Dev Singh Bali, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep Dhanda, Advocate, Mr. Abhilaksh Gaind, Advocate and PUNSUP. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 12.01.2026 (Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.2 Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated Controlling Authority was dismissed f limitation, and for a direction to respondent No.2 to restore the petitioner's statutory appeal to its original number and decide the The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing by respondent No.2- Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated Controlling Authority was dismissed f limitation, and for a direction to respondent No.2 to restore the petitioner's statutory appeal to its original number and decide the SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) 2. petitioner is a manpower outsour respondent No.1 had entered into agreements dated 14.06.2012 and 01.12.2013 for deployment of outsourced manpower. It is submitted that respondent No.4 was deployed with respondent No.1 on 18.02.2013 and resigned from ser proforma invoice dated 15.03.2019 for Rs.68,316/ of gratuity, which was not released by respondent No.1. Respondent No.4 thereafter preferred a claim before respondent No.3 which, vide order dated 07.10.2024, held the petitioner and respondent No.1 jointly and severally liable and directed them to deposit Rs.59,182/ with applicable interest in favour of respondent No.4. 3. preferred a statutory appeal on 27.03.2025, along with an application seeking condonation of delay, explaining the delay. However, the same was dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, by way of the impugned orde Learned Senior counsel contends that the Appellate Authority failed to properly consider the explanation furnished by the petitioner for the delay, which was bona fide and arose from a genuine dispute regarding the respective contractual liability of th reimbursement of gratuity, and that the said explanation ought to have been examined on merits, more particularly when the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 arising from the very same order dated 07.10.2024 came to be entertained and allowed on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -2- Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a manpower outsourcing service provider, with which respondent No.1 had entered into agreements dated 14.06.2012 and 01.12.2013 for deployment of outsourced manpower. It is submitted that respondent No.4 was deployed with respondent No.1 on 18.02.2013 and resigned from service on 31.12.2018, whereafter the petitioner raised a proforma invoice dated 15.03.2019 for Rs.68,316/ of gratuity, which was not released by respondent No.1. Respondent No.4 thereafter preferred a claim before respondent No.3 which, vide order dated 07.10.2024, held the petitioner and respondent No.1 jointly and severally liable and directed them to deposit Rs.59,182/ with applicable interest in favour of respondent No.4. It is submitted that besides respondent No.1, the petitioner also preferred a statutory appeal on 27.03.2025, along with an application seeking condonation of delay, explaining the delay. However, the same was dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, by way of the impugned orde Learned Senior counsel contends that the Appellate Authority failed to properly consider the explanation furnished by the petitioner for the delay, which was bona fide and arose from a genuine dispute regarding the respective contractual liability of the petitioner and respondent No.1 for reimbursement of gratuity, and that the said explanation ought to have been examined on merits, more particularly when the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 arising from the very same order dated 07.10.2024 came to entertained and allowed on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. - Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the cing service provider, with which respondent No.1 had entered into agreements dated 14.06.2012 and 01.12.2013 for deployment of outsourced manpower. It is submitted that respondent No.4 was deployed with respondent No.1 on 18.02.2013 and vice on 31.12.2018, whereafter the petitioner raised a proforma invoice dated 15.03.2019 for Rs.68,316/- towards reimbursement of gratuity, which was not released by respondent No.1. Respondent No.4 thereafter preferred a claim before respondent No.3-Controlling Authority, which, vide order dated 07.10.2024, held the petitioner and respondent No.1 jointly and severally liable and directed them to deposit Rs.59,182/- along with applicable interest in favour of respondent No.4. s respondent No.1, the petitioner also preferred a statutory appeal on 27.03.2025, along with an application seeking condonation of delay, explaining the delay. However, the same was dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, by way of the impugned orde Learned Senior counsel contends that the Appellate Authority failed to properly consider the explanation furnished by the petitioner for the delay, which was bona fide and arose from a genuine dispute regarding the e petitioner and respondent No.1 for reimbursement of gratuity, and that the said explanation ought to have been examined on merits, more particularly when the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 arising from the very same order dated 07.10.2024 came to entertained and allowed on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the cing service provider, with which respondent No.1 had entered into agreements dated 14.06.2012 and 01.12.2013 for deployment of outsourced manpower. It is submitted that respondent No.4 was deployed with respondent No.1 on 18.02.2013 and vice on 31.12.2018, whereafter the petitioner raised a towards reimbursement of gratuity, which was not released by respondent No.1. Respondent No.4 olling Authority, which, vide order dated 07.10.2024, held the petitioner and respondent No.1 along s respondent No.1, the petitioner also preferred a statutory appeal on 27.03.2025, along with an application seeking condonation of delay, explaining the delay. However, the same was dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, by way of the impugned order. Learned Senior counsel contends that the Appellate Authority failed to properly consider the explanation furnished by the petitioner for the delay, which was bona fide and arose from a genuine dispute regarding the e petitioner and respondent No.1 for reimbursement of gratuity, and that the said explanation ought to have been examined on merits, more particularly when the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 arising from the very same order dated 07.10.2024 came to SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) 4. impugned order is legal, and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. through the record. 6. present writ petition is whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct restoration statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, when the said appeal was filed beyond the maximum period within which delay could be condoned under the said provision. 7. period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order for preferring an appeal against the order of the Controlling Authority. The proviso thereto empowers the Appellate Authority, upon being satisfied that the app was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period, to extend the period by a further period of 60 days. Thus, the statutory scheme itself provides an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an appeal, including the f cause being shown. Once the said outer limit expires, the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to condone any further delay. 8. of the recor Controlling Authority had been conveyed/intimated to the petitioner on 11.10.2024 and that the certified copy thereof had been applied for and CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -3- Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the impugned order is legal, and does not warrant any interference by this Court. I have heard learned counsel for the through the record. The principal question which arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct restoration statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, when the said appeal was filed beyond the maximum period within which delay could be condoned under the said provision. Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribes a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order for preferring an appeal against the order of the Controlling Authority. The proviso thereto empowers the Appellate Authority, upon being satisfied that the app was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period, to extend the period by a further period of 60 days. Thus, the statutory scheme itself provides an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an appeal, including the further period which may be granted on sufficient cause being shown. Once the said outer limit expires, the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to condone any further delay. In the present case, the Appellate Authority, upon examination of the record, found that the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Controlling Authority had been conveyed/intimated to the petitioner on 11.10.2024 and that the certified copy thereof had been applied for and - Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the impugned order is legal, and does not warrant any interference by this Court. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone The principal question which arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct restoration of the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, when the said appeal was filed beyond the maximum period within which delay could be condoned under the said ment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribes a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order for preferring an appeal against the order of the Controlling Authority. The proviso thereto empowers the Appellate Authority, upon being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period, to extend the period by a further period of 60 days. Thus, the statutory scheme itself provides an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an urther period which may be granted on sufficient cause being shown. Once the said outer limit expires, the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to condone any further delay. In the present case, the Appellate Authority, upon examination d, found that the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Controlling Authority had been conveyed/intimated to the petitioner on 11.10.2024 and that the certified copy thereof had been applied for and Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the impugned order is legal, and does not warrant any interference by this Court. parties and have gone The principal question which arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, when the said appeal was filed beyond the maximum period within which delay could be condoned under the said ment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribes a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order for preferring an appeal against the order of the Controlling Authority. The proviso thereto ellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period, to extend the period by a further period of 60 days. Thus, the statutory scheme itself provides an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an urther period which may be granted on sufficient cause being shown. Once the said outer limit expires, the Appellate In the present case, the Appellate Authority, upon examination d, found that the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Controlling Authority had been conveyed/intimated to the petitioner on SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) received on 18.10.2024. The statutory appeal, however, ca only on 27.03.2025. Even if, for the benefit of the petitioner, 18.10.2024 is taken as the relevant date for computation of limitation, the maximum period of 120 days expired on 15.02.2025, whereas the appeal was filed on 27.03.2025. Thus, i 11.10.2024 or 18.10.2024, the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act. The precise controversy regarding the starting point of limitation, therefore, does not al 9. the delay by submitting that the order of the Controlling Authority had fastened joint and several liability upon the petitioner and respondent No.1; that, under the contra understood respondent No.1 to be liable to reimburse the gratuity amount; and that, accordingly, the petitioner addressed a communication dated 13.11.2024 to respondent No.3 and thereafter pursued the i contractual reimbursement with respondent No.1. It is submitted that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing the question of its contractual liability and reimbursement and, therefore, the delay ought to have been condoned. 10. which the petitioner did not prefer the appeal within time, but it cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Authority to condone delay beyond the period expressly permitted by Section 7(7) of the Act. The issue be the Appellate Authority was not merely whether sufficient cause had been shown for the delay, but whether, after expiry of the statutory outer limit, it had jurisdiction to condone the delay at all. Once the maximum period CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -4- received on 18.10.2024. The statutory appeal, however, ca only on 27.03.2025. Even if, for the benefit of the petitioner, 18.10.2024 is taken as the relevant date for computation of limitation, the maximum period of 120 days expired on 15.02.2025, whereas the appeal was filed on 27.03.2025. Thus, irrespective of whether limitation is reckoned from 11.10.2024 or 18.10.2024, the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act. The precise controversy regarding the starting point of limitation, therefore, does not al Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has sought to explain the delay by submitting that the order of the Controlling Authority had fastened joint and several liability upon the petitioner and respondent No.1; that, under the contractual arrangement between the parties, the petitioner understood respondent No.1 to be liable to reimburse the gratuity amount; and that, accordingly, the petitioner addressed a communication dated 13.11.2024 to respondent No.3 and thereafter pursued the i contractual reimbursement with respondent No.1. It is submitted that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing the question of its contractual liability and reimbursement and, therefore, the delay ought to have been condoned. The aforesaid explanation may explain the circumstances in which the petitioner did not prefer the appeal within time, but it cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Authority to condone delay beyond the period expressly permitted by Section 7(7) of the Act. The issue be the Appellate Authority was not merely whether sufficient cause had been shown for the delay, but whether, after expiry of the statutory outer limit, it had jurisdiction to condone the delay at all. Once the maximum period - received on 18.10.2024. The statutory appeal, however, came to be filed only on 27.03.2025. Even if, for the benefit of the petitioner, 18.10.2024 is taken as the relevant date for computation of limitation, the maximum period of 120 days expired on 15.02.2025, whereas the appeal was filed on rrespective of whether limitation is reckoned from 11.10.2024 or 18.10.2024, the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act. The precise controversy regarding the starting point of limitation, therefore, does not alter the result. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has sought to explain the delay by submitting that the order of the Controlling Authority had fastened joint and several liability upon the petitioner and respondent No.1; ctual arrangement between the parties, the petitioner understood respondent No.1 to be liable to reimburse the gratuity amount; and that, accordingly, the petitioner addressed a communication dated 13.11.2024 to respondent No.3 and thereafter pursued the issue of contractual reimbursement with respondent No.1. It is submitted that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing the question of its contractual liability and reimbursement and, therefore, the delay ought to have been condoned. tion may explain the circumstances in which the petitioner did not prefer the appeal within time, but it cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Authority to condone delay beyond the period expressly permitted by Section 7(7) of the Act. The issue before the Appellate Authority was not merely whether sufficient cause had been shown for the delay, but whether, after expiry of the statutory outer limit, it had jurisdiction to condone the delay at all. Once the maximum period me to be filed only on 27.03.2025. Even if, for the benefit of the petitioner, 18.10.2024 is taken as the relevant date for computation of limitation, the maximum period of 120 days expired on 15.02.2025, whereas the appeal was filed on rrespective of whether limitation is reckoned from 11.10.2024 or 18.10.2024, the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act. The precise controversy regarding Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has sought to explain the delay by submitting that the order of the Controlling Authority had fastened joint and several liability upon the petitioner and respondent No.1; ctual arrangement between the parties, the petitioner understood respondent No.1 to be liable to reimburse the gratuity amount; and that, accordingly, the petitioner addressed a communication dated ssue of contractual reimbursement with respondent No.1. It is submitted that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing the question of its contractual liability and tion may explain the circumstances in which the petitioner did not prefer the appeal within time, but it cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Authority to condone delay beyond fore the Appellate Authority was not merely whether sufficient cause had been shown for the delay, but whether, after expiry of the statutory outer limit, it SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) prescribed by the statute h could enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the statute. 11. The Punjab State Cooperative Supply & Marketing Feder Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others 1226-2025 considering the scope of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, held that an appeal could extended by a further 60 days on sufficient cause being shown, thereby making 120 days the maximum permissible period. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in LTU, Kakinada and others v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681 Court cannot, as a matter of course, disregard the statutory period and entertain a writ petition so as to defeat was taken by this Court in Marketing Federation Limited (Markfed) v. Appellate Authority and others, 2023(176) FLR 73, specifically p the Appellate Authority has no power to condone delay beyond such period. 12. that respondent No.1 had preferred an appeal against t dated 07.10.2024 and that the said appeal was subsequently entertained and decided on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. This circumstance, however, CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -5- prescribed by the statute had expired, no amount of bona fide explanation could enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the This position has consistently been recognised by this Court. In The Punjab State Cooperative Supply & Marketing Feder Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others 2025 and connected matters, decided on 27.08.2025, considering the scope of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, held that an appeal could be preferred within 60 days and the period could be extended by a further 60 days on sufficient cause being shown, thereby making 120 days the maximum permissible period. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in LTU, Kakinada and others v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care , (2020) 19 SCC 681, the Division Bench further held that the High Court cannot, as a matter of course, disregard the statutory period and entertain a writ petition so as to defeat the legislative scheme. A similar view was taken by this Court in The Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited (Markfed) v. Appellate Authority and , 2023(176) FLR 73, wherein it was held that where the statute specifically prescribes an outer limit up to which delay may be condoned, the Appellate Authority has no power to condone delay beyond such period. No doubt, learned Senior counsel has also relied upon the fact that respondent No.1 had preferred an appeal against t dated 07.10.2024 and that the said appeal was subsequently entertained and decided on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. This circumstance, however, - ad expired, no amount of bona fide explanation could enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the This position has consistently been recognised by this Court. In The Punjab State Cooperative Supply & Marketing Federation Limited v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others, LPA decided on 27.08.2025, this Court, while considering the scope of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, held be preferred within 60 days and the period could be extended by a further 60 days on sufficient cause being shown, thereby making 120 days the maximum permissible period. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT LTU, Kakinada and others v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care , the Division Bench further held that the High Court cannot, as a matter of course, disregard the statutory period and the legislative scheme. A similar view The Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited (Markfed) v. Appellate Authority and wherein it was held that where the statute rescribes an outer limit up to which delay may be condoned, the Appellate Authority has no power to condone delay beyond such period. earned Senior counsel has also relied upon the fact that respondent No.1 had preferred an appeal against the very same order dated 07.10.2024 and that the said appeal was subsequently entertained and decided on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. This circumstance, however, ad expired, no amount of bona fide explanation could enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon the Appellate Authority by the This position has consistently been recognised by this Court. In ation Limited v. , LPA- this Court, while considering the scope of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, held be preferred within 60 days and the period could be extended by a further 60 days on sufficient cause being shown, thereby making 120 days the maximum permissible period. Relying upon the Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and others v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care , the Division Bench further held that the High Court cannot, as a matter of course, disregard the statutory period and the legislative scheme. A similar view The Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited (Markfed) v. Appellate Authority and wherein it was held that where the statute rescribes an outer limit up to which delay may be condoned, the Appellate Authority has no power to condone delay beyond such period. earned Senior counsel has also relied upon the fact he very same order dated 07.10.2024 and that the said appeal was subsequently entertained and decided on merits vide order dated 28.04.2026. This circumstance, however, SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) cannot extend the period of limitation available to the petitioner for preferring its 7(7) operates independently qua each person aggrieved by the order, and the subsequent filing or adjudication of an appeal by another aggrieved party cannot extend the statutory period available 13. seeks to achieve indirectly what the petitioner could not obtain directly before the Appellate Authority, namely, condonation of delay beyond the period permissib statutory appeal for adjudication on merits. The jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is undoubtedly wide and may be exercised in an appropriate case where there i violation of principles of natural justice, patent illegality or other exceptional circumstance warranting interference. However, no such exceptional circumstance has been shown in the present case. The petitioner essentially seeks reconsideration of the explanation furnished for the delay and restoration of an appeal which was filed beyond the statutory outer limit. 14. question of limitation, recorded the relevant d was filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days permitted under Section 7(7) of the Act. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority is consistent with the statutory scheme and the law noticed hereinabove. No jurisdictional error, perversity or patent illegality in the impugned order dated 12.01.2026 has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -6- cannot extend the period of limitation available to the petitioner for preferring its own statutory appeal. The limitation prescribed under Section 7(7) operates independently qua each person aggrieved by the order, and the subsequent filing or adjudication of an appeal by another aggrieved party cannot extend the statutory period available It is also significant that the present writ petition, in substance, seeks to achieve indirectly what the petitioner could not obtain directly before the Appellate Authority, namely, condonation of delay beyond the period permissible under Section 7(7) of the Act and restoration of the statutory appeal for adjudication on merits. The jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is undoubtedly wide and may be exercised in an appropriate case where there i violation of principles of natural justice, patent illegality or other exceptional circumstance warranting interference. However, no such exceptional circumstance has been shown in the present case. The petitioner essentially s reconsideration of the explanation furnished for the delay and restoration of an appeal which was filed beyond the statutory outer limit. In the present case, the Appellate Authority has considered the question of limitation, recorded the relevant d was filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days permitted under Section 7(7) of the Act. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority is consistent with the statutory scheme and the law noticed hereinabove. No onal error, perversity or patent illegality in the impugned order dated 12.01.2026 has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this - cannot extend the period of limitation available to the petitioner for own statutory appeal. The limitation prescribed under Section 7(7) operates independently qua each person aggrieved by the order, and the subsequent filing or adjudication of an appeal by another aggrieved party cannot extend the statutory period available to the petitioner. It is also significant that the present writ petition, in substance, seeks to achieve indirectly what the petitioner could not obtain directly before the Appellate Authority, namely, condonation of delay beyond the le under Section 7(7) of the Act and restoration of the statutory appeal for adjudication on merits. The jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is undoubtedly wide and may be exercised in an appropriate case where there is a jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice, patent illegality or other exceptional circumstance warranting interference. However, no such exceptional circumstance has been shown in the present case. The petitioner essentially s reconsideration of the explanation furnished for the delay and restoration of an appeal which was filed beyond the statutory outer limit. In the present case, the Appellate Authority has considered the question of limitation, recorded the relevant dates and found that the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days permitted under Section 7(7) of the Act. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority is consistent with the statutory scheme and the law noticed hereinabove. No onal error, perversity or patent illegality in the impugned order dated 12.01.2026 has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this cannot extend the period of limitation available to the petitioner for own statutory appeal. The limitation prescribed under Section 7(7) operates independently qua each person aggrieved by the order, and the subsequent filing or adjudication of an appeal by another aggrieved party It is also significant that the present writ petition, in substance, seeks to achieve indirectly what the petitioner could not obtain directly before the Appellate Authority, namely, condonation of delay beyond the le under Section 7(7) of the Act and restoration of the statutory appeal for adjudication on merits. The jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is undoubtedly wide and may s a jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice, patent illegality or other exceptional circumstance warranting interference. However, no such exceptional circumstance has been shown in the present case. The petitioner essentially s reconsideration of the explanation furnished for the delay and In the present case, the Appellate Authority has considered the ates and found that the appeal was filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days permitted under Section 7(7) of the Act. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority is consistent with the statutory scheme and the law noticed hereinabove. No onal error, perversity or patent illegality in the impugned order dated 12.01.2026 has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. to interfere with the impugned order dated 12.01.2026, whereby the petitioner’s application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the statutory appeal was consequently dismissed as barred by limi delay having travelled beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the same could not have been condoned by the Appellate Authority and, in the facts and circumstances of the present be invoked to circumvent the said statutory bar. 16. dismissed 17. September 02, 2026 SwarnjitS Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable CWP No. 28252 of 2026 (O&M) -7- Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 12.01.2026, whereby the petitioner’s application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the statutory appeal was consequently dismissed as barred by limi delay having travelled beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the same could not have been condoned by the Appellate Authority and, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to circumvent the said statutory bar. The present writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. September 02, 2026 Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No - Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 12.01.2026, whereby the petitioner’s application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the statutory appeal was consequently dismissed as barred by limitation. The delay having travelled beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the same could not have been condoned by the Appellate Authority and, in the facts and case, the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to circumvent the said statutory bar. The present writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 12.01.2026, whereby the petitioner’s application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the tation. The delay having travelled beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the same could not have been condoned by the Appellate Authority and, in the facts and case, the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot The present writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.09.08 18:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document