01.09.2026 Ct. No.655 Sl. No. 83 Subadip CO 154 of 2026 M/s. Amtek Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. M/s. Shakambhari Overseas Trades Pvt. Ltd. Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee, Mr. Souvik Das, Mr. Rudranil Don. …for the petitioners Mr. Debraj Sahu, Mr. Hareram Singh Saptorshi, Mr. Ranjan Chatterjee. ... for the opposite party 1. Heard learned Advocate for the parties. 2. The instant revisional application has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order dated 13th November, 2025 passed by the learned Trial Court in connection with Commercial Suit No. 21 of 2024, whereby the learned Trial Court declined to accept the written statement filed on behalf of the present petitioners/defendants on the ground that the same was filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to commercial disputes. 3. The opposite party herein, as plaintiff, instituted the aforesaid Commercial Suit No. 21 of 2024 against the present petitioners/defendants praying, inter alia, for a decree for recovery of a sum of Rs.14,92,379/- 2 together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum. 4. During the pendency of the said suit, the plaintiff/opposite party filed an application under Order IX Rule 6(a) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking appropriate relief on the ground of non-filing of the written statement by the defendants. On the other hand, the present petitioners/defendants filed an application praying for acceptance of their written statement. 5. It appears from the materials on record, as also from the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, that the writ of summons was issued to the defendants on 15th October, 2024 and the same was duly served upon them on 18th October, 2024. There is no dispute that the defendants received the summons and, thereafter, entered appearance in the suit on 8th November, 2024 by filing their Vakalatnama. At the time of entering appearance, the defendants prayed for time to file their written statement and such prayer was allowed by the learned Trial Court. 6. The matter was thereafter fixed for filing of the written statement. The defendants ultimately filed their written statement on 12th March, 2025. In the meantime, on 4th April, 2025, the plaintiff/opposite party filed an application praying for fixation of the suit as an ex parte matter. The learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and 3 the chronology of events, declined to take the written statement on record, holding that the same had been filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under the law governing commercial disputes. 7. The principal question which therefore arises for consideration is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned Trial Court was justified in refusing to accept the written statement filed by the defendants after expiry of the statutory period of 120 days from the date of service of summons. 8. In this regard, it is necessary to notice the legislative scheme governing the filing of written statements in a suit involving a commercial dispute of specified value. By Section 16 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, as amended by Act 4 of 2016, the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were specifically modified in their application to commercial disputes of specified value. The substituted proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC provides that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the initial period of thirty days, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded in writing and upon payment of such costs as it deems fit, permit the defendant to file the written statement on such other day as may be specified by the Court, but such period shall not extend beyond 120 days from the 4 date of service of summons. The proviso further expressly mandates that upon expiry of the said period of 120 days, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. 9. The language employed by the legislature is significant. The provision does not merely prescribe an ordinary period of limitation capable of being extended in appropriate circumstances. Rather, it incorporates a specific outer limit coupled with a consequence of forfeiture of the right to file the written statement. The legislative intent is therefore manifest that, in commercial litigation, the defendant cannot claim an indefeasible right to file the written statement after expiry of 120 days from the date of service of summons. 10. The object behind such a provision is also discernible from the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act. Commercial disputes are intended to be adjudicated upon expeditiously and within a time- bound framework. The legislature, therefore, consciously imposed a stricter regime with regard to pleadings so that a defendant cannot indefinitely delay the progress of a commercial suit by withholding the written statement. The requirement of expeditious adjudication is an essential component of the special procedure prescribed for commercial disputes and cannot be diluted by invoking general procedural 5 considerations which stand excluded or modified by the special statutory scheme. 11. In the present case, the summons was admittedly served upon the defendants on 18th October, 2024. Consequently, the statutory period of 120 days has to be reckoned from the date of service of summons. The defendants entered appearance on 8th November, 2024 and sought time to file the written statement. Their prayer for time was allowed by the learned Trial Court. However, the mere grant of time by the Trial Court cannot have the effect of enlarging the statutory outer limit prescribed by the amended Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. The Court itself does not possess jurisdiction to extend the period beyond the maximum period expressly fixed by the statute. 12. The written statement was admittedly filed only on 12th March, 2025. Thus, the same was filed after expiry of the period of 120 days calculated from the date of service of summons. Once the statutory period had expired, the defendants forfeited their right to have the written statement taken on record, and the learned Trial Court was statutorily prohibited from accepting the same. 13. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has relied upon certain judicial pronouncements in support of the proposition that a Court, in appropriate circumstances, may accept a belated written statement. However, on consideration 6 of the authorities cited, it appears that the decisions relied upon by the petitioners were rendered in the context of the unamended provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC or prior to the statutory amendment governing commercial disputes. The legal position applicable to an ordinary civil suit cannot be mechanically applied to a commercial suit where the legislature has consciously introduced a stricter and mandatory regime with an express outer limit of 120 days. 14. The distinction is material. Under the general provisions applicable to ordinary civil suits, the Court may, depending upon the circumstances of the case, have a wider discretion in dealing with delay in filing the written statement. However, the position is materially different in the case of a commercial dispute governed by the amended provisions. The legislature has expressly provided that after expiry of 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not permit the same to be taken on record. Therefore, the discretion available to the Court under the ordinary procedural regime stands substantially curtailed by the special statutory provision. 15. The learned Trial Court has also rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private 7 Limited, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the amended provisions applicable to commercial disputes and authoritatively held that the Court has no power to extend the period for filing the written statement beyond the outer limit of 120 days from the date of service of summons. The said decision squarely governs the issue involved in the present case. 16. The subsequent judicial approach of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently recognised that the amended provisions governing commercial suits are intended to ensure expeditious disposal and that the consequence of forfeiture prescribed by the statute cannot ordinarily be defeated by resorting to the inherent or discretionary powers of the Court. The expression “shall forfeit” and the further mandate that the Court “shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record” leave little scope for judicial discretion once the outer limit has expired. 17. It is also relevant to note that the defendants had admittedly received the summons on 18th October, 2024 and were thus fully aware of the institution and pendency of the suit. They entered appearance on 8th November, 2024 and sought time for filing the written statement. There is, therefore, no question of want of knowledge of the proceeding or non-service of summons. The subsequent delay in filing the written statement cannot, in the face of the express statutory 8 embargo, confer jurisdiction upon the Trial Court to accept the same after expiry of 120 days. 18. The fact that the learned Trial Court had earlier granted time to the defendants to file their written statement also does not alter the legal position. An order granting time cannot override a statutory prohibition. Once the legislature has prescribed an absolute outer limit within which the written statement may be received, neither consent of the parties nor an earlier procedural order of the Court can extend such period beyond the statutory ceiling. 19. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is intended to keep subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction and to ensure that the judicial process is exercised in accordance with law. Such jurisdiction is discretionary and is not intended to function as a regular appellate jurisdiction. Interference is warranted only where there is a patent lack of jurisdiction, manifest perversity, gross dereliction of duty, or a material illegality resulting in failure of justice. Where the subordinate Court has considered the relevant statutory provisions and has passed an order consistent with the binding law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, interference under Article 227 would not be justified merely because another view is sought to be urged by a party. 9 20. Upon consideration of the impugned order, the materials placed before this Court and the statutory scheme governing the filing of written statements in commercial disputes, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the legal position. The written statement was filed after expiry of the mandatory outer period of 120 days from the date of service of summons. The learned Trial Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to take the said written statement on record. The reliance placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners upon decisions rendered under the pre-amended legal regime does not assist the petitioners in view of the specific statutory amendment and the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited (supra). 21. Accordingly, this Court finds no patent illegality, material irregularity, jurisdictional error or perversity in the impugned order dated 13th November, 2025 warranting interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court finds no merit in the revisional application. No ground has been made out warranting interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court. 23. Accordingly, the revisional application stands dismissed. 10 24. There shall be no order as to costs. 25. The learned Trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law and, having regard to the nature of the proceeding as a commercial suit, endeavour shall be made to dispose of the same expeditiously, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. 26. Let a copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court forthwith for information and necessary action. 27. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)