1 CGHC010321492017 2026:CGHC:42465 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1738 of 2017 1 - Manoj Bind (Abated) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 17-02-2026. 2 - Chotelal Bind, S/o Fekuram, Aged About 58 Years R/o Village Nagpura, Thana Balooda, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Smt. Sudama Bai, W/o Chotelal Bind, Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Nagpura, Thana Balooda, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Balooda, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Vivek Singhal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Karan Kumar Baharani, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 29/09/2026 1. The appeal has been listed for further orders; however, with the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard finally. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.10.05 18:32:50 +0530 2 2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24.10.2017 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa in Sessions Case No. 12 of 2017, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 306/34 of IPC and sentenced for R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 15 days. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Uma Bai was the wife of appellant No. 1 Manoj Bind (since deceased). The appellant No. 2 is the father-in-law of the deceased and appellant No. 3 is the mother-in-law of the deceased. The marriage between the deceased Uma Bai and appellant No. 1 Manoj Bind was solemnized in the year 2007. In the intervening night of 18th and 19th November, 2016, the deceased insecticide in her house. She was immediately taken to hospital where she died on 19.11.2016 at about 3:45 AM. The MLC intimation (Exhibit P-2) and her death intimation (Exhibit P-1) were sent by the doctors to the Police Outpost, District Hospital, Janjgir. Thereafter, an unnumbered Marg intimation was recorded at Police Station, Janjgir, which is Exhibit P-3. The Marg intimation was forwarded to the jurisdictional police at Police Station, Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa, which is Exhibit P-7. ******* The inquest of the dead body of the deceased (Exhibit P-19) was prepared in the presence of witnesses, and the dead body was sent for its post-mortem to District Hospital, Janjgir, where the post-mortem of 3 the dead body of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Pal Hussain, who gave the post-mortem report (Exhibit P-4) and opined that the cause of death is suspected poison ingestion and its complications. As regards the manner of death, the post-mortem doctor opined that, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence available at that stage, the final opinion would be given after receipt of the reports of the chemical and histopathological examinations from the FSL. The said post-mortem report (Exhibit P-4) was admitted by the defense as provided under Section 294 of the CrPC. One insecticide bottle and one steel glass having smell of insecticide have been seized from the spot vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-6). The FIR (Exhibit P-9) was registered against the appellants for the offence under Section 306/34 of IPC. When the victim was referred from Community Health Centre, Baloda to District Hospital, Janjgir, the police requested to give the MLC report of the deceased. Dr. N. Mahobia has given the MLC report (Exhibit P-8), opining that with the history of poisoning on 18.11.2016 at 9:00 PM, the case was referred from Baloda. ******* Spot map (Exhibit P-12) was prepared by police. The viscera of the deceased have been seized vide seizure memo Exhibit P-13. The viscera was sent for its chemical examination to FSL, where report (Exhibit P-20) was received. According to the FSL report, Organophosphorus insecticide Imidacloprid was found in the viscera of the deceased. The accused persons were arrested on 30.11.2016. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC have been recorded, and after completion of usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants before the learned 4 Judicial Magistrate First Class, Akaltara for the offence under Section 306/34 of IPC. The case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa for its trial. 4. The learned trial court has framed charge against the appellants for the offence under Section 306/34 of IPC. The appellants denied the charge and claimed trial. In order to prove the charge against the appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses. Statements of the appellants under Section 313 of CrPC have also been recorded, in which they denied the circumstances that appeared against them, pleaded innocence, and stated that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial court convicted and sentenced the appellants as has been mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. 6. In the present appeal, all three accused persons were convicted by the learned trial court; however, during pendency of the present appeal, appellant No. 1 Manoj Bind has died on 18.08.2022, and by order dated 17.02.2026, the appeal against appellant No. 1 Manoj Bind is abated. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. No offence is made out against the appellants as alleged. There is no harassment given by the present appellants to the deceased Uma Bai and she was not treated with cruelty at any point of time. There is no instigation or abetment to commit suicide by the present appellants. The 5 evidence of the witnesses is omnibus and general in nature; there is no specific instance alleged against the present appellants that they committed the offence of abetment to commit suicide or instigated the deceased to commit suicide. In the absence of any material with respect to abetment or instigation to commit suicide, the appellants cannot be convicted on the basis of general and omnibus allegations. The allegation that the deceased was being harassed merely because she had given birth to female children, which allegedly continued from the birth of her second daughter, by itself, is not sufficient to hold the appellants guilty of the offence of abetment of suicide. In the absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained and they are entitled to their acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the continuous course of harassment given to the deceased Uma Bai led her to ultimately consume poison, considering no other way except to commit suicide. Such continuous course of harassment dragged her to commit suicide, for which the appellants are liable. There is no other defense taken by the appellants as to the reason for her suicide. He would further submit that a day before the date of incident, the deceased visited her maternal uncle's house where she met with her mother and other family members as well as her neighbors, and the deceased disclosed about the harassment which she was suffering from the act of the appellants. Thus, the close proximity of time of her death, she made a complaint to her family 6 members as well as neighbors that she is suffering from harassment by the appellants, which is unbearable to her. Therefore, the parents of the deceased supported the continuous harassment from the appellants. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants and sentenced them for the alleged offense. The judgment passed by the trial court does not suffer from perversity or illegality and the same is liable to be maintained. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial court. 10. PW-1, Jainarayan, is the neighbor of the appellants. He stated in his evidence that at the time of 6th day celebration of birth of the 5th daughter of the deceased, there was an altercation between father of the deceased and one Shobharam. Since his house was adjacent to the house of the deceased, he was he is acquainted with her family affairs. Appellants regularly harassing the deceased on the ground that she is procuring female child. The deceased also made complaint to him about her harassment. On 18-11-2016 also, he visited to the maternal uncle's house of the deceased at village Barbhata, where the deceased informed him about her harassment. In the evening, they came back to their respective houses, and in the next morning, he came to know that the deceased consumed insecticides and committed suicide. ******* In cross-examination, he admitted that there was no community meeting with respect to any harassment to the deceased. The family meeting was gathered after birth of second daughter of the deceased, but he could not tell what was the date and month. He admitted that 7 when the deceased informed about the harassment on 18.11.2016 at Barbhata, some other community members were also gathered, but the matter was not put before them to call a community meeting. He further stated that the information given by the deceased to him on 18.11.2016 has been disclosed by him in his police statement (Exhibit D-1), and if it is not there, he could not tell the reason. ******* From the evidence of this witness also, there is no specific instance of any harassment and only a general and omnibus allegation has been leveled against the appellants that the deceased was being harassed by the accused persons and thereby she consumed insecticide and committed suicide. 11. PW-2, Indrapal is a villager, who stated in his evidence that after 4-5 years of marriage of the deceased, she usually came to him and made a complaint that the accused Manoj beating her after consuming liquor and she does not want to live there. She stayed in his house for some days and when the accused Manoj came there to take her back, he convinced him and sent them back together. The deceased Uma Bai was being harassed on the issue that she gave birth to a female child. This witness has declared hostile and not supported the prosecution case against the present appellants. 12. PW-3, Gajadhar Prasad is another villager. He stated in his evidence that deceased Uma Bai was married with the appellant Manoj since 9- 10 years back. After gave birth to a second female child, the deceased was being harassed by the accused Manoj, for which she made complaint to him against accused Manoj. He convinced him and sent 8 them back together. On 18.11.2016, the deceased came to his shop along with her child and again made a complaint that the harassment of the accused persons are now become unbearable and she does not want to live. He again convinced her that he will try to convince the accused persons, however on the next day, the deceased committed suicide. In cross-examination he admitted that, after birth of his second female child, when the deceased made complaint to him, she gave birth to three more female children. He has not made any complaint in the community with respect to the harassment to the deceased. He admitted that the accused persons are taking proper care of all the children. He further admitted that the incident of 18.11.2016 has not been informed to anyone by him, even no complaint was made to the police. He also had not tried to convince the accused persons. He voluntarily stated that, it was the evening time and on the next morning, the deceased committed suicide. He admitted that on 18.11.2016, the deceased had gone to village Barbhata and he had not gone there. He further stated that the incident of 18.11.2016 that the deceased came to his shop and said that she does not want to live have disclosed by him in his police statement (exhibit D-2), but if it is not there, he could not tell the reason. 13. PW-4 is the stepmother of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that her daughter had married with accused Manoj since 9-10 years back. Till birth of her first daughter, she was living happily with her husband. When she procured her second daughter, the harassment started that she is procuring only the female child. The accused Manoj used to beat her after drinking liquor. About 7 months back, when they 9 visited to village Barbhata, her daughter also came there. She disclosed that she is fed up by the harassment of the accused persons and she does not want to live. She came back to her house in the night and informed the incident to her husband. Then her husband convinced her that in the next morning they will convince the accused persons. At about 10:00 o’clock in the night, the aunt-in-law of the deceased, Uma Bai, informed them that her daughter consumed poison. Then she had gone to the house of her daughter. She was lying on the floor. The appellant Manoj insisted her to consume more poison which was remaining in the bottle. Despite her request, the accused persons did not take her to hospital and started abusing her. The cousin brother of the appellant Manoj took her to Baloda hospital and from where she was referred to Janjgir hospital. In the next morning, she received information of her death. ******* In cross-examination, she stated that in her police statement she disclosed that after birth of her second daughter, the appellants started harassing her daughter and the appellant Manoj committing marpeet after consuming liquor. She also disclosed in her police statement that at village Barbhata, the deceased informed her about harassment by the accused persons and if all this narration is not there in her police statement (Exhibit D-3), she could not tell the reason. She admitted that before the incident she has not visited to the house of the appellants. She also did not tell as to when the deceased informed her about the harassment by the accused persons. Till birth of her fifth daughter, the deceased was in her matrimonial house. From the evidence of this witness, it appears that there is no specific instance of harassment, but 10 she makes a general allegation against the accused persons that her daughter was being harassed by the accused persons. 14. PW-5, Rajeshwar Narayan is a head constable posted at police station Baloda. He conducted initial investigation with respect to merg intimation and inquest of the dead body of the deceased. He also seized one plastic bottle and one steel glass from the spot having smell of insecticide. 15. PW-6, Dr. Neelesh Mahobia is a medical officer, who treated the deceased at District Hospital, Janjgir. He stated in his evidence that on 19.11.2016, the deceased Uma Bind was referred from CHC Baloda and he gave MLC intimation to the SHO Janjgir, which is exhibit P-2. After her treatment, he gave MLC report (exhibit P-8). During treatment she died on 19.11.2016 and he also informed her death to the Janjgir police. 16. PW-7, Santosh Kumar Sarivan is the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, who also conducted part of the investigation. PW-8, Leelakant Kashyap, PW-9, Ajay Bhanu are the seizure witnesses of exhibit P-6 and P-13. 17. PW-10, Jama Bai, is the aunt-in-law of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that at the time of incident, appellant Manoj informed that the deceased Umabai consumed insecticide. Then she had gone to her house and thereafter she and her family members took her to hospital. The family members of appellant Manoj were also with them. She did not know as to why she consumed poison. At this stage, she was declared hostile and denied the allegations against the appellants. From her evidence, nothing is there against the appellants that they instigated 11 the deceased to commit suicide or any act done which amounts to abetment or suicide. 18. PW-11, Vishwanath Kashyap is the brother of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that, his sister was married with the accused Manoj Bind since 10 years back and out of their wedlock, she procured 5 daughters. The accused Manoj was in habit of drinking liquor and used to beat his sister under the influence of liquor. The accused persons harassed his sister that she is procuring only the daughters. On 18.11.2016, his sister consumed insecticide and committed suicide. In cross-examination he admitted that before death of the deceased, there was no report to the police with respect to harassment given by the accused persons to her. Till her death, his sister was resided in her matrimonial house. In his evidence also, there is no specific instance, which led her to commit suicide and only general and omnibus allegations have been leveled by him. 19. PW-12, Munni Bai is the mother of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that her daughter was married with accused Manoj since 10 years back. Accused Manoj beat and harassed her daughter by saying that she is procuring only daughters. Due to the harassment given by the accused Manoj, her daughter committed suicide. A day before the date of incident, she met with her daughter at Barbhata and her daughter informed her about the harassment by the accused persons and said that she does not want to live. She tried to convince her that she will discuss in her house and then will convince the accused persons. On the next day, she received information of death of her daughter. In her cross-examination, she stated that the harassment to her daughter was for the reason that she 12 is procuring daughters only, which she informed her at Barbhata and she does not want to live, have been disclosed in her police statement (exhibit D-3) and if it is not there, she could not tell the reason. She admitted that with respect to the harassment of her daughter she has not made any complaint to the police station and even no panchayat meeting was convened. 20. PW-13 is the father of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that his daughter was being harassed by the accused Manoj that she is procuring daughters only and he used to beat and abuse her. Due to the harassment of accused Manoj, she committed suicide. In cross- examination, he admitted that with respect to the harassment given to his daughter by the accused Manoj, they have not lodged any report to the police, even no panchayat meeting was convened. From the evidence of this witness, the allegation is only against the accused Manoj and not against the present appellants. 21. Having gone through the evidence on record, it surfaced that the prosecution has sought to prove its case by introducing the fact and allegation that the accused persons harassed the deceased by saying that she is procuring daughters only and the appellant Manoj used to beat her. There is substantial inconsistency in the evidence of the witnesses and the witnesses have mainly raised allegation against the appellant Manoj, however there is general and omnibus allegations against the present appellants namely; Chhotelal Bind and Smt. Sudama Bai. 13 22. In the matter of Hansraj v. State of Haryana, 2004 (12) SCC 257, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: “12. The question then arises as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant can be convicted of the offence under Section 306 IPC with the aid of the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Any person who abets the commission of suicide is liable to be punished under Section 306 IPC. Section 107 IPC lays down the ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing or engaging with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal omission to the doing of that thing. In the instant case there is no direct evidence to establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide. In the absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act under which the court may presume on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the accused. The explanation to Section 113-A further clarifies that cruelty shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 which means: "498-A. (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the 14 woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 13. Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, the prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the court is not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word "cruelty" in Section 498-A IPC. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the 15 presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh^1 wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 12) Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh1 wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 12) "12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman 1 (2001)9 SCC 618 16 has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression 'may presume' suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to 'all the other circumstances of the case'. A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression – 'the other circumstances of the case' used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause- and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the 17 presumption. The phrase 'may presume' used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says – 'Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.'" (emphasis in original) 14. The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju v. State of M.P. 2 15. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal3 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 89-90, para 15) "15. We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question 2 (2002)5 SCC 371 3 (1994)1 SCC 73 18 whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater4(All ER at p. 459) has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject-matter." 23. In the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2017 (1) SCC 433, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “20. Section 306 of the code prescribes the punishment for abetment of suicide and is designed thus: “306. Abetment of suicide- if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 21. it is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or 4 (1950)2 All ER 458 19 instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualise the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of section 306 IPC. Contiguity,continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts and omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitment for suicide. 22. Section 107 IPC defines “abetment” and is extracted hereunder: 107. Abetment of a thing- a person abets the doing of a thing, who- First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omisssion takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the ding of that thing. Explanation. 1- A person, who by willful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a materia; fact which he is bound to diclose, voluntarily causes or procures,or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing. 20 Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of the act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that acts.” Not only the acts and omissions defining the offence of abetment singularly or in combination are enumerated therein, the explanations adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct of the offender relatable thereto. 23. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 permits a presumption as to the abetment of suicide by a married woman by her husband or any relative of his, if it is proved that she had committed the act within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of his had subjected her to cruelty. The explanation to this section exposits “cruelty” to have the same meaning as attributed to this expression in section 498 A IPC. For ready reference, section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 is quoted hereunder as well. "113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may 21 presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860." 24. In the legislative backdrop outlined hereinabove, Section 498-A of the Code also demands extraction: "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 22 25. This provision, as the quote hereinabove reveals, renders the husband of a woman or the relative of his, punishable thereby with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also fine, if they or any one of them subject her to cruelty. The Explanation thereto defining "cruelty" enfolds: (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman, where it is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her, to meet such demand. 26. Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the first limb of the explanation is otherwise germane, proof of the wilful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, is the sine qua non for entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged. 27. The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab 5 and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder: (SCC p. 134, paras 12-13) "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding 5 (2004)13 SCC 129 23 that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." (emphasis supplied) 28. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing 24 the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B.6 29. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan7 . 30. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat,8 this Court, with reference to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or forced to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as 6 (2010)1 SCC 707 7 (2010)12 SCC 190 8 (2013)10 SCC 48 25 ingrained therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised.” 24. On careful consideration of the evidence available on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of abetment as contemplated under Section 107 of the IPC. In Hansraj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Section 107 IPC requires proof of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, and that even where the circumstances for invoking Section 113-A of the Evidence Act are established, the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide was abetted by the husband or his relatives. The nature of the cruelty and all other circumstances of the case are required to be considered. In the present case, the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-4, PW-11, PW-12 and PW-13, even if accepted in its entirety, establishes at the highest that the deceased was allegedly subjected to harassment on account of giving birth to female children and that she had made complaints regarding such harassment. However, there is no specific and cogent evidence of any particular act, conduct or utterance on the part of the appellants whereby they instigated, provoked, incited or intentionally aided the deceased to commit suicide. The allegations are general and omnibus in nature and do not disclose the requisite ingredients of Section 107 IPC. 25. The principle laid down in Gurcharan Singh (supra) is also directly applicable to the facts of the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court 26 has held that the offence under Section 306 IPC proceeds on the existence of a live link or nexus between the conduct of the accused and the suicide, with abetment being the propelling and causative factor. Intention and involvement of the accused in aiding or instigating the commission of suicide are imperative; mere remoteness of the alleged culpable acts would not constitute abetment. The Court has further observed that contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the acts or omissions are the concomitant indices of abetment. In the present case, no such live link or proximate nexus has been established. The evidence does not disclose any immediate act of the appellants which could reasonably be regarded as the propelling cause for the deceased to take the extreme step. PW-2 and PW-10 have not supported the prosecution case, while the other witnesses have admitted that no complaint was lodged before the police and no community or panchayat meeting was convened in respect of the alleged harassment. 26. Thus, even assuming that the deceased had suffered some matrimonial discord or harassment, such evidence by itself would not be sufficient to hold the appellants guilty of abetment of suicide unless the prosecution further establishes that the accused had the requisite intention and had committed some positive or intentional act falling within the ambit of Section 107 IPC, having a proximate nexus with the suicide. A statement attributed to the deceased that she was fed up with her circumstances or did not wish to live cannot, in the absence of evidence of instigation or intentional aid by the accused, automatically lead to the conclusion that the accused had abetted her suicide. The prosecution 27 has failed to establish any such act of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid. Consequently, the essential link between the alleged conduct of the appellants and the commission of suicide remains unproved. Applying the principles laid down in Hansraj (supra) and Gurcharan Singh (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the evidence on record does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 107 IPC and, therefore, the charge under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. 27. For the foregoing reasons, by giving them benefit of doubt, the appeal filed by the appellants- Chhotelal and Smt. Sudama Bai is allowed and they have been acquitted from the alleged offence. The judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24.10.2017 against Chhotelal and Smt. Sudama Bai is set aside. 28. The appellants Chhotelal and Sudama Bai are reported to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for the further period of six months as provided under Section 481 BNSS, 2023. 29. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved