07.09.2026 Court No. 12 ML 1, 5 &6 September 2026 Sandip/gc MAT 1423 of 2026 With CAN 1 of 2026 CAN 2 of 2026 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Innovicts Transporters Private Limited & Ors. With MAT 1428 of 2026 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Innovicts Transporters Private Limited & Ors. With MAT 1429 of 2026 With CAN 1 of 2026 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Innovicts Transporters Private Limited & Ors. Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Sr. Adv., Mr. Sarosij Dasgupta, Ms. A. Mukherjee, Mr. Nilankan Banerjee, Mr. Arkadeep Mr. Sarbajit Choudhury, Mr. Pradipta Bose …for the Appellants. Mr. Kishore Datta, Sr. Adv., Mr. Rajarshi Dutta, Mr. Neelesh Choudhury, Ms. Anuradha Poddar … for the Respondent no. 1. Mr. Ayan Poddar, Ms. Binsy Susan, Mr. Soham Dutta, Mr. Akshay Sharma, Ms. Shweta Sahu, Ms. Ayushi Jain, Ms. Anjali Shaw …for the respondent no. 4(GEM). 2 1. MAT 1423 of 2026, MAT 1428 of 2026 and MAT 1429 of 2026 are taken up together, as they arise out of orders passed in W.P.A. 12345 of 2026. 2. CAN 1 of 2026 filed in connection with MAT 1423 of 2026, is an application for condonation of delay of 47 days in preferring the appeal. 3. The appellants are Eastern Coalfields Limited (ECL) and the General Manager, Contract Management Cell of ECL. 4. The appellants are aggrieved by an order dated June 09, 2026 passed in the writ petition being WPA 12345 of 2026. The said writ petition was taken up analogously with W.P.A. 12340 of 2026. 5. Considering the averments made in Paragraphs 17 to 19 of the said application, we are satisfied that the delay has been sufficiently explained. Under such circumstances, as the delay is of only 47 days, we condone the same. 6. Accordingly, CAN 1 of 2026 is allowed. 7. MAT 1423 of 2026 is regularised. 8. CAN 1 of 2026 arising out of the MAT 1429 of 2026 has been filed for condonation of delay of 25 days in preferring the appeal arising from the order dated June 30, 2026 passed in W.P.A. 12345 of 2026. 9. Upon perusal of the averments in paragraphs 12 to 14 and paragraphs 17 to 19, we are satisfied that the delay has been sufficiently explained. Under such circumstances, CAN 1 of 2026 is allowed. 10. MAT 1429 of 2026 is regularised. 3 11. MAT 1428 of 2026 is an appeal from the order dated August 17, 2026 passed in W.P.A. 12345 of 2026, which was the last order passed by His Lordship. 12. The appellants are aggrieved by the order of extension of interim order dated June 09, 2026. 13. According to the appellants, by extension of the interim order which was originally passed by the learned Single Judge without indicating sufficient reasons for the same, the appellants have been wrongly prevented from proceeding with the tender and finalising the same. The order has not only caused delay in the work, but the interim order will lead to price escalation and breach of the contracts which the appellants have with the power sector. The coal to be loaded, was for supply to those plants. 14. The issue before us is whether the interim order passed by the learned single Judge, which has been extended from time to time and over a period of three months, can be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. The first order passed in this regard by the learned single Judge is dated June 09, 2025. Paragraph 2 of the said order is quoted below :- ‘The only question in the present writ applications whether in between 12.30 p.m. and 1.40 p.m. on May 28, 2026 the GeM portal automatically logged out due to which the petitioners could not able to submit the technical bid document in respect of the tender-in-question.” 4 16. Thus, in the understanding of the learned single Judge, the issue was restricted to the question whether the GeM portal had automatically logged out, on account of which the writ petitioners could not submit their bids in respect of the tender in question. The alleged glitch occurred between 12.30 P.M. and 1.40 P.M. on May 28, 2026. From the issue which was framed by His Lordship, we, prima facie, find that His Lordship was of the view that the issue of technical glitch was for consideration by the writ Court. His Lordship decided to hear the matter upon exchange of affidavits. On the first day, GeM i.e. respondent No. 4 was not represented. His Lordship directed that status quo should be maintained with regard to the process of tender, till the next date of hearing. We do not find any reasons in support of such interim order. 17. The matter came up before His Lordship on June 12, 2026 and His Lordship extended the interim order till the next date of hearing. The GeM authorities prayed for time to file a report. The matter was once again taken up on June 18, 2026 and the respondent no. 4, that is, GeM authorities filed a report by way of an affidavit and enclosed a pen drive. His Lordship directed filing of exceptions to the report by the writ petitioners. The matter was to be listed on June 23, 2026. The interim order was extended till the next date of hearing. On June 23, 2026, the exceptions to the report was filed by the respondents/writ petitioners and by order dated June 23, 2026 the 5 interim order was extended upto June 30, 2026. On June 30, 2026, the authorities were permitted to analyse the bids, but not to finalise the same till the next date of hearing. On July 10, 2026, the writ petitioners were directed to make a representation to ECL and the interim order was extended. This direction was presumably given, pursuant to a request made by ECL to the writ petitioners for an amicable settlement. On July 15, 2026, July 22, 2026, July 29, 2026 and August 05, 2026 the interim order was extended. We find that the writ petition could not be taken up due to paucity of time. By an order dated August 17, 2026, the writ petition was made returnable on September 10, 2026. We find that affidavits have been exchanged by and between the parties. 18. From the orders which have been passed in W.P.A. 12345 of 2026, we find that His Lordship identified the issue as a presumable technical glitch which might have occurred either on the part of the GeM Portal or at the end of the writ petitioners, which allegedly prevented the writ petitioners from submitting their bid. 19. Although submission of the bids ended at 3 P.M. on May 28, 2026, the writ petitioners raised the issue of technical glitch for the first time at 3.14 P.M. on that day, before the GeM authorities. It appears from the NIT that the tender was with regard to loading of 6 2,38,54,500 tonnes of coal, to be supplied to the power sector and the time for completion of the work was 1825 days. The fact that the writ petitioners sought to participate a couple of hours before the end time and date, was in itself a risk and a chance taken at the last moment. 20. We also prima facie, find that the dispute is between the writ petitioner and the GeM Portal. If the writ petitioners are ultimately successful in establishing that the glitch was due to operational fault at the end of the GeM Portal and not at the end of the writ petitioners, they have adequate remedy by way of damages. The tender process involves a greater public interest. The same could not have been stalled. This view is supported by several decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Moreover, the scope of interference by a writ court is limited. 21. In Tata Cellular vs Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. 7 Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696] , Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, “consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention”. 80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680] , per Lord Greene, M.R.)” 81. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned. (1) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment [(1980) 41 P & CR 255] , the 8 Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident's bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, L.J. said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex p Johnson [(1989) 88 LGR 73] the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down.” 22. In Silppi Constructions Contractors vs Union of India and Anr. reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “19. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court in all the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical 9 issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the judgments cited above the courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. 20. The essence of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the State instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should be minimal. The authority which floats the contract or tender, and has authored the tender documents is the best judge as to how the documents have to be interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. With this approach in mind we shall deal with the present case.” 23. In Tata Motors Limited vs The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST) and Ors. reported in (2023) 19 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “55. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To 10 set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India [Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India, (2005) 1 SCC 679] . 56. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617] and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. 57. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] , that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in 11 public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.” 24. We also find that the Notice Inviting Tender dated May 13, 2026 provides under the second note under serial no.2 that, the buyer shall not be allowed to extend the Bid after “Bid End Date/Time”. It can be auto extended only if the buyer extends it suo motu or on request. Such extension can be done before the “Bid End Date/Time”. No corrigendum can be issued, once “Bid End Date/Time” has expired. 25. Thus, the first contention of Mr. Datta, learned Senior Advocate for the writ petitioners that as the Notice Inviting Tender provides for issuance of corrigendum, the request of the writ petitioners to extend the end time and end date could have been accepted by GeM, upon appreciating the technical difficulty faced by them, is not supported by the terms of the Notice Inviting Tender. We also find that the request of the writ petitioners before the learned Court to be allowed to file the bid document manually, has been prohibited by the NIT under Clause 15(b). Clause 16 speaks about the deadline and it is stated that the bid should be submitted online and through the GeM Portal only. 26. Under such circumstances, we are, prima facie, of the view that the prayer for manual submission was not 12 available to the writ petitioners in terms of the NIT. The clauses in the NIT prohibited extension of end date and time, as also manual submission. Thus, no, prima facie, case had been made out by the writ petitioners for stay of the entire tender process. The stay is adverse to public interest. In this connection, we also refer to clause (k) of the General Terms and Conditions of GeM dated February 28, 2025, which stipulates that the buyer/GeM would not be held responsible for consequential damages in case of non- availability of internet connection, non-availability of power supply, system problems, loss of electronic information, power interruption, etc. 27. Although, Mr. Datta submits that the GeM authorities had shifted their stand on each date of hearing but, upon a holistic reading of the emails sent by the GeM Portal, we find that the GeM authorities had not accepted that any glitch had occurred from their side. Only because they had offered to look into the matter, that itself does not amount to an admission. Secondly, a specific information was given by the GeM authorities to the writ petitioners that, the video recording of the uploading process of the bid documents supplied by the writ petitioners, had been considered and looked into and it was found that the bidder had not saved the uploaded information and the documents at the relevant stages. Thus, there was an error and the same resulted in automatic logging out. 13 28. Under such circumstances, the decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Bombay High Court, which have been relied upon by Mr. Datta are distinguishable. We deal with the said judgments hereunder:- 29. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Vishwa Traders and another vs Government E- Marketplace (GEM) through its DY. CEO and Anr. decided in W.P.(C) 11785/2021 & CM Appl. 36476/2021 is distinguishable on facts. The respondent No.1 (GeM) Portal, did not dispute the fact that the technical glitch was at the end of the portal and such glitch disabled the bidder from participating in the tendering process. Under such circumstances, the Delhi High Court was of the view that the portal developed by GeM should be flexible enough to deal with a situation which prohibited a bidder from participating in the process on account of a technical fault or any other kind of operational hazard from the end of the platform conducting the process. 30. In the case before the Delhi High Court, the bidder had approached the authority prior to the last date for participation. In the said case, the court was persuaded by the facts and held that fundamental rights of the citizens to participate in a tendering process could not be sacrificed only because the system developed by the GeM 14 Portal had limitations. It was the responsibility of the GeM Portal to remove such shortcomings or inadequacies in the system. 31. In Anusuchit Jati Jamati Shikshan vs State of Maharashtra decided in Writ Petition No. 10131 of 2024, the Bombay High Court held that the subject tender was not a commercial tender. The court held that there was no question of any prejudice to any institute. The training was in batches, for new students, and for a limited duration. Even if the bid documents of the person aggrieved were considered at the stage when the order was passed by the said court, no prejudice would be caused. It was held that, when the tendering authority could not establish that the glitch was from the end of the bidder or that it was due to the problem in the system operated by the bidder that the documents could not be submitted, an order allowing participation could be passed. Moreover, the bidder approached the authority seeking rectification, well within the scheduled time. The said case is also distinguishable on the facts. 32. The issue of technical glitch, in our prima facie view, is a disputed question of fact and has to be established on the basis of evidence. A tender process can be stayed by a writ court in exercise of power of judicial 15 review, only on the ground of mala fide, arbitrariness, favouritism, procedural impropriety, lack of transparency and if the process adopted by the tendering authority was contrary to public interest. 33. We are informed that seventeen other bidders have successfully uploaded their documents and none of them faced any glitch. We find that the writ petitioners/respondents took a chance to upload the documents around 12.40-12.50 p.m. of the end date, that is, May 28, 2026. When they got automatically logged out, they approached the GeM authorities after the time for submission of the bid was over, that is, after 3.00 p.m., precisely at 3.14 p.m. The GeM authorities had already informed the writ petitioners that they would not be able to provide any assistance because the end time and date had expired. 34. Mr. Datta submits that the right to practice a trade and calling, includes participation in a tender process. It is a fundamental right, and is enjoyed by the citizen. Such right must be protected by the writ court. This submission in not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Neither the GeM authorities nor ECL had acted in a manner that has curtailed the right of participation of the writ petitioners. We find that the writ petitioners did not have any allegation against ECL, apart from a feeble excuse that the ECL could have accepted that bid document manually. 16 35. We are conscious of the power of the writ court and we hold that the writ court cannot go beyond the covenants in the tender document. Secondly, the writ court has not provided any reason as to why, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the balance of convenience and inconvenience was in favour of stalling the entire tender process. Moreover, the decision in the writ petition would also depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances, primarily, with regard to the operation of the GeM Portal. We do not find that the tendering process suffers from any procedural infirmity. The question of not allowing a level playing field to the writ petitioners, in our prima facie view, does not arise. No act of malice, either in law or in fact has been exposed, which prevented the participation of the writ petitioners. 36. We now refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh:- 37. In Maharashtra Housing Development Authority vs Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited and ors. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 13, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that lack of timely response of the bidder when the system had failed to generate an acknowledgement of the bid documents was an important reason for not entertaining the writ petition. It was further held that, the generation of acknowledgement in respect of other bidders and the absence of any 17 glitch in respect of those bidders, would strongly indicate that the bidder who had moved the writ petition had not validly submitted the bid. Thus, the directions issued by the High Court in favour of the bidder virtually conferring upon the said bidder a second opportunity to submit the bid, was not acceptable. This proposition is, prima facie, applicable in this case. 38. In Mythri Infrastructure and Mining India Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Odisha and Ors., reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1028, the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed that, if other bids were received and uploaded in the portal up to 3 p.m. on the relevant date, on the principle of preponderance of probability, the High Court had rightly arrived at a conclusion that the technical glitch was at the end of the bidder. 39. In Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Others versus Amr Dev Prabha and Ors. reported in (2020) 16 SCC 759, a three-judges bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, when a writ petition was filed before the High Court challenging award of a contract by a public authority or the state, the court must be satisfied that some element of public interest was involved in entertaining such a petition. The court's intervention in the proposed project/tender, should not cause any delay in 18 the process, resulting in escalation of the cost and a burden on the public exchequer. 40. Therefore, unless the court was satisfied that substantial amount of public interest was involved or that the transaction was entered into malafide, the court should not interfere under Article 226. It was held that the power of judicial review could not be exercised in order to protect private interest, at the cost of the public exchequer. The courts would not be entitled to decide contractual disputes. The contractor could always seek damages in a civil court. Here, loading of coal for supply to the power sector has been stalled. 41. In Rajeev Singh and others vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 1740, the Hon’ble Apex court held that lack of reasons was indicative of non- application of mind by the court. Such orders would not meet the standard of a proper judgment/order. 42. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that ECL, being ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, had the mandate to process the tender through the GeM Portal and the fact was made known to the bidders, by a specific covenant in the NIT itself. The ultimate decision in the writ petition would also require interpretation of the contractual terms which, 19 in our view, could not be embarked upon at the interim stage. There cannot be any justification in stalling the tender, as the industries in the power sector to whom the coal was to be supplied by ECL, will suffer. 43. The interim order against the ECL, restraining them from finalizing the tender process is set aside. 44. The appellants are at liberty to issue work order in favour of the eligible bidder in accordance with the tender terms and conditions. It is made clear that all steps to be taken by the appellants shall abide by the result of the writ petition. 45. Accordingly, the appeals and the connected applications are allowed and disposed of. 46. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties, upon usual undertakings. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) (Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)