1 2026:CGHC:15910 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 313 of 2022 State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station AJK, District Korba Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Shiv Prasad Kewat S/o Shri Mayaram Kewat, Aged About 33 Years, 2 - Ramprasad Kewat S/o Shri Mayaram Kewat Aged About 37 Years Both Are Resident Of Village Kothari, Police Station Urga, District Korba Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Appellant/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. Advocate General appears along with Ms. K. Radhika, Panel Lawyer for the Appellant/State. For Respondents : Mr. Praveen K. Dhurandhar, counsel for the Respondents. Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal Order On Board 07.04.2026 1. Heard on I.A.No.1/2022, an application for condonation of delay of 268 days in preferring this appeal. SUNITA GOSWAMI Digitally signed by SUNITA GOSWAMI Date: 2026.04.08 16:15:05 +0530 2 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that immediately after passing of the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2021, the copy of the same was communicated by the concerned Government Pleader to the Law Department through the Collector and after receiving the same, the Department of Law has accorded its sanction for preferring an appeal on 29.07.2022 and, after obtaining the sanction as such, it was sent to the office of Advocate General in the month of August, 2022. It is contended further that after receiving the communication from the Department of Law, the same has been intimated to the District Magistrate and also asked for appointment of the Officer-in- Charge for sharing the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. Further contention of the counsel appearing for the appellant is that, the copy of deposition and exhibited documents are required to be filed along with memo of appeal as per the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007, therefore, the Officer-in-Charge, who was appointed in the month of August, 2022, is requested to provide the same, which have subsequently been provided and after receiving the same, the appeal has been filed on 16.11.2022. Therefore, the delay of 268 days in preferring the appeal, which has been occurred bonafidely in view of the aforesaid circumstances, may be condoned in order to provide substantial justice to the parties. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the delay in preferring the appeal has not been explained properly, as the copy of the impugned judgment has been communicated to the Law Department only in the month of June, 2022, i.e. much after the expiry of the period of limitation in preferring the 3 appeal. It is contested further on the ground that despite the sanction was accorded by the Law Department on 29.07.2022, yet the appeal was not filed immediately thereafter and instead, it was filed only on 16.11.2022 even without any explanation to this effect. The application as framed, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 4. From perusal of the record, it appears that by virtue of the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2021, the Special Judge, SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Korba, District Korba has acquitted the respondents with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 456/34, 354, 354- A, 354-B and 323/34 of IPC read with Sections 3(1)(w), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1989’). 5. It appears that after passing of the impugned judgment on 23.11.2021, the communication of the said order was sent by the concerned Government Pleader through the Collector to the Department of Law on 09.06.2022, where permission for preferring an appeal was accorded on 29.07.2022 and, thereafter sent to the office of the Advocate General only in the month of August, 2022 for preferring an appeal and, the Officer-in-Charge was appointed sometimes in the month of August, 2022 even without disclosing the date when he was appointed. 6. What is, therefore, reflected from the aforesaid facts that no explanation, whatsoever, has virtually been offered by the appellant before the expiry of the limitation period and, instead, what was offered 4 was much after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation of 90 days provided under sub-section (3) of Section 14-A of the Act, 1989 for preferring an appeal and, that too without proper explanation. 7. In view of such circumstances, the inordinate delay of 268 days cannot be held to be sufficient, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine 3612, wherein, at para 7, it has been held as under :- “7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or 5 circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0109/1981 1981:INSC:9: AIR 1981 SC 733)”. 8. Consequently, the application (I.A.No.1/2022) seeking condonation of delay in preferring this appeal is rejected and, consequent upon that, the appeal is dismissed. SD/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) JUDGE sunita