- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12923 OF 2024 BETWEEN: SRI. MUNENDRA S/O NARAYANASWAMY AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS RESIDING AT KURUBARAHALLI 2ND STAGE, KASABA HOBLI DODDABALALPURA TALUK, BANGALORE RURAL DIST - 561 203. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. SUBRAMANYA H.V, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY DODDABALLAPUR RURAL POLICE, REPRESETNED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE - 560 001. 2. XXXX XXXX XXXX . …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1; SRI. S. RAJU, ADVOCATE FOR R2) Digitally signed by RAKESH S HARIHAR Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 30.11.2022 ON THE APPLICATION FILED BY THIS PETITIONER U/S 227 OF CR.P.C. IN SPL.C.NO.505/2021 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. DIST. AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT THEREBY ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION AND DISCHARGE THE PETITIONER FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 420, 376, 504, 506 R/W SEC. 34 OF IPC AND SEC. 3(1)(r)AND(s) AND SEC. 3(2)(v) OF SC/ST (POA) ACT, FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner – accused No.1 is before this Court calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.505/2021 registered for offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, pending on the file of II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District. - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 2. Heard Sri. Subramanya H.V., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Sri. K. Nageshwarappa, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. S. Raju, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: The petitioner is accused No.1 and respondent No.2 is the complainant. The fulcrum of the complaint is that the petitioner is the owner of a particular property and the complainant is a tenant therein. The two fall in love and have a relationship for over two years, which gets physical as well. On the score of breach of promise of marriage and the acts of consensual relationship being alleged to have been done on the pretext of marriage, the complainant registers a crime in Crime No.187/2021. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. The filing of the charge sheet in Special Case No.505/2021 is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the relationship between the two was for a period of two years. They, in fact, loved each other for two years, but now the complainant has married someone else and the petitioner is yet to get married. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant would submit that, in the light of the complainant having married someone else, she is not interested in pursuing the matter any further, as her marriage with someone else would be in doldrums if the matter is pursued any further. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. In the light of the submission and contra-submission, the only issue that falls for consideration is whether the afore-mentioned offences alleged against the petitioner in the case at hand would stand made out. The issue need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 matter. The Apex Court has consistently held that consensual acts between two adults, would not amount to rape. 7.1 The Apex Court in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM MURALIDHAR SONAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775, this Court was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, had given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was held thus : (SCC pp. 56-57, paras 21 & 23) “21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the 1 (2019) 18 SCC 191 - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. *** 23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.” 19. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253], the Court framed the following two questions relating to consent : (SCC p. 104, para 30) - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 (1) Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of the act she was asked to indulge in? (2) Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her? In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police stating that she and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love with each other. One day in February 1988, the accused forcibly raped her and later consoled her by saying that he would marry her. She succumbed to the entreaties of the accused to have sexual relations with him, on account of the promise made by him to marry her, and therefore continued to have sex on several occasions. After she became pregnant, she revealed the matter to her parents. Even thereafter, the intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents and other relations who were under the impression that the accused would marry the girl, but the accused avoided marrying her and his father took him out of the village to thwart the bid to marry. The efforts made by the father of the girl to establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she was constrained to file the complaint after waiting for some time. 20. With this factual background, the Court held that the girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus: (Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 8 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253], SCC p. 106, para 35) “35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant.” 21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , the Court has drawn a distinction between rape and consensual sex. This is a case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the incident. She had an inclination towards the accused. The accused had been giving her assurances of the fact that he would get married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore, left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to go with the accused to get married to him. She called the accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived, she went with him to a place called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went to - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court held that the physical relationship between the parties had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the fact that she had been living with the accused for several days and had travelled with him from one place to another. The Court further held that it is not possible to apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused. 22. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , disposed of on 6-4-2018, has observed that it is difficult to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years is “rape”, especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife. It was held as under: (Shivashankar case [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , SCC p. 205, para 4) “4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife.” 23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.” The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment has considered and elucidated upon the interplay between the offence of rape and consensual acts. The facts obtaining in the case at hand are strikingly similar to what the Apex Court has held in the afore-quoted judgment. 7.2 Later, the Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASTHRA2, holds as follows: “…. …. …. 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528. - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No. 2's claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No. 2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No. 2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married. …. …. …. 27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made: “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 (underlining by us) 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious. …. …. …. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. …. …. …. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) In the light of the issue standing completely answered and the complainant herself, who has now got married to someone else, submitting that she is not wanting to pursue the matter any further, and finding no allegations that would touch upon the ingredients of the offences, permitting further proceedings would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in Special Case No.505/2021 pending on the file of II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District stands quashed. (iii) The order of the concerned Court dated 13-11-2022 rejecting the discharge application of the petitioner – accused No.1 stands quashed. - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010650672024 NC: 2026:KHC:47383 CRL.P No. 12923 of 2024 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed as a consequence. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4