1 2026:CGHC:15866-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPPIL No. 113 of 2021 Shri Krishna Shukla S/o Late Jagannath Prasad Shukla Aged About 79 Years Retired Forest Officer Resident of HIG Dx - 32, Mahismati West Arvind Vihar Bagmugaliya, Bhopal Madhya Pradesh Pin 462043. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Chhattisgarh Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Secretary Department of Forest, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Principal Chief Conservator of Forest Aranya Bhavan, North Block, Sector - 19, Kotara Bhantha, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Managing Director Chhattisgarh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj (Vyapar Evam Vikas) Sahkari Sangh Maryadit, Van Dhan Bhavan, Sector - 24, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents _________________________________________________________ For Petitioner : Mr. Rohit Sharma, Advocate For State/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Animesh Tiwari, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 07 . 04 .202 6 1. Heard Mr. Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 appearing for the State / respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Animesh Tiwari, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.4. 2. The petitioner who happens to be a retired Indian Forest Service officer has approached this Court in public interest seeking the following reliefs : “10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue direction to the Respondents to fix purchase price of tendupatta in accordance with the provisions of Tendupatta Adhiniyam 1964, and pay the same to tendupatta SANGRAHAK, at the time of purchase. 10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue direction to Respondents to fix Notional purchase price for the year 2007 to 2021 and calculate the payable amount for tendu leaves sold by each individual Sangrahak separately for each year and compare it with the amount actually paid in cash, and the amount of short payment if any may be paid with interest to the beneficiary within a stipulated fixed period under the supervision of Hon'ble Court. 10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to annul/quash the impugned missive dated 03-11-2009 (Annexure P-2), in the interest of justice. 10.4 That, the Hon'ble Court may be kindly pleased to call for the entire records in the possession of the respondents in respect of subject matter, for its kind perusal. 10.5 This Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to issue any other order/direction writ as it deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, including cost of the petition.” 3 3. The brief facts of the case are that the then State Government of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Tendupatta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1964 to protect growers of tendupatta (other than the State Government) from the clutches of middlemen. After the creation of the State of Chhattisgarh, the new State Government adopted this Adhiniyam and renamed it as the Chhattisgarh Tendupatta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the “Adhiniyam, 1964 ”). 4. As per Section 2(d)(ii) of the Adhiniyam, 1964 a “grower” is a person on whose private land tendu leaves are grown. Section 4 provides for the appointment of an agent by the State Government. Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1964 stipulates that no one other than the State Government or its authorized agent can purchase or transport tendupatta within the State. Section 6 of the Adhiniyam, 1964 provides that the State Government shall appoint a Committee ( मंत्रणा समिमति ) to recommend the “purchase price” every year. 5. Under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964, the State Government is obliged to fix the purchase price after considering the recommendations of the Committee, or otherwise, while taking into account the specified guidelines for fixing the purchase price of tendu leaves presented for sale by growers for each year. According to Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 1964, the State Government or its authorized agent is bound to purchase tendu leaves presented at the Collection Centre by growers (other than 4 the State Government) after paying the purchase price fixed under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964. Section 12 of the Adhiniyam, 1964 provides that the State Government is at liberty to dispose of tendu leaves purchased under the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964. 6. In 2006, the Central Government enacted the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (for short, the Act, 2006’). As per Section 3(1)(c) of this Act, forest rights in respect of Non-Wood Forest Produce (NWFP), which includes tendu patta, are defined as the right of ownership, access to collect, use, and sell. These rights are vested in Scheduled Tribes and other forest dwellers as per Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, 2006. 7. In 1984, the State Government of Madhya Pradesh established the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj (Vyapar Evam Vikas) Sahkari Sangh Maryadit, a cooperative organization, and appointed it as an agent to carry out tendu patta trade on behalf of the State Government. The primary objective of its creation was to obtain working capital for the tendu patta trade by borrowing funds from banks, thereby allowing the State budget to be used for other developmental works. Every year, the Vanopaj Sangh borrowed funds from banks to procure tendu patta and meet administrative expenses. After the disposal of tendu leaves, the bank loans were repaid from the sale proceeds, and the net savings were deposited in the Government exchequer as royalty. The Vanopaj Sangh received a nominal amount of Re. 1 per year and had no 5 other source of income. Subsequently, in 1989, Zila Unions were created at the Territorial Forest Division level, and Primary Vanopaj Samitis were established at the tendupatta unit level. All Sangrahaks of the unit were made members of these Samitis. The Territorial Divisional Forest Officer was appointed as the Managing Director of the Zila Union, and the Territorial Conservator was appointed as the ex-officio Regional General Manager of the Vanopaj Sangh. 8. In the year 2000, after the reorganization of States, the State of Chhattisgarh was created. The Madhya Pradesh Vanopaj Sangh was also divided, and the Chhattisgarh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj (Vyapar Evam Vikas) Sahkari Sangh Maryadit (hereinafter referred to as the “Vanopaj Sangh”) came into existence. The new State Government directed that 70% of the net profit from the tendupatta trade be distributed to the Sangrahaks, and the remaining 30% be utilized for developmental works, as was the practice in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. The Vanopaj Sangh also began using profits from tendu leaves as working capital instead of borrowing funds from banks. 9. The respondent State Government, vide order No. 13-37/2009/10- 2 dated 03-11-2009, directed that 80% of the net profit be distributed to Sangrahaks, 15% be utilized for the purchase of other minor forest produce, and the remaining 5% be used to compensate for losses in the tendupatta trade. 6 10. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner, through a letter dated 16-03-2017, requested the Chief Secretary of the State to direct the authorities to purchase tendu leaves by paying the “purchase price” ( क्रय मूल्य) instead of the “collection rate” (संग्रहण दर). The Secretary, Forest Department, replied vide letter No. 2317 dated 03-06-2017 with the remark : “ ेंदू पत्ता का व्यापार लघु वनोज संघ राज्य शासन के मात्र अभि#क ा$ के रूप में कर ा है, नीति यों का मिनर्धाा$रण नहीं कर ा। संघ/ मिव#ाग से परामश$ उपरान् नीति का ” मिनर्धाा$रण राज्य शासन द्वारा मिकया जा ा है। 11. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Hon’ble Forest Minister through a letter dated 14-01-2019, requesting appropriate action to ensure that tendu leaves are purchased by paying the purchase price ( क्रय मूल्य) instead of the collection rate ( संग्रहण दर). The petitioner also submitted representations to the Secretary (Forest), the PCCF, and the Managing Director of the Vanopaj Sangh through a joint email dated 13-08-2020, followed by additional suggestions via email dated 04-09-2020, requesting that tendu leaves be purchased at the prescribed purchase price. However, no response was received from the authorities. Further, the petitioner addressed a request to the Principal Secretary (Forest) through an email dated 25-08-2020, seeking to stop the alleged illegal practice of purchasing tendu leaves at the collection rate and to ensure that all purchases are made only at the purchase price ( क्रय मूल्य). As no response was received, the petitioner has filed the present 7 petition styled as Public Interest Litigation, seeking the aforementioned reliefs. 12. Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the impugned order dated 03-11-2009 completely abrogates the legislative mandate of the Adhiniyam, 1964. He has further submitted that the State Government is not fixing the rates in accordance with Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964. He has also contended, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Orissa Mining Corporation Limited vs. Ministry of Environment and Forests and Others, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 476, that after the coming into force of the Act, 2006 and in light of the aforesaid judgment, a forest dweller is recognized as the owner of the “forest produce.” Therefore, the sale of tendupatta cannot be carried out by the Government through the creation of cooperative societies under Respondent No. 4, the Minor Forest Produce Cooperative Society. As such, with the enactment of the Forest Rights Act, 2006, the entire Adhiniyam, 1964 has been rendered repugnant in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. 13. Shri Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also contended that the State, in its Return, has failed to explain the inconsistency created by the impugned order dated 03-11-2009, which renders the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964 redundant. He has specifically referred to paragraph 17 of the State’s Return 8 to submit that the State has not been able to satisfy the Court on the issue of overreach committed by the impugned order dated 03-11-2009 over the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964, and the apparent repugnancy between the Adhiniyam, 1964 and the Act, 2006. Accordingly, Shri Sharma has submitted that the order dated 03-11-2009 deserves to be quashed, and that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to implement the mandate of the Act, 2006, thereby permitting forest dwellers to directly conduct the sale and purchase of tendupatta, with the consideration being transferred to them directly. 14. Per contra, Shri Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General has opposed to submissions advanced by Shri Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. In his submissions, Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has made two principle arguments; firstly, the Adhniyam, 1964 is neither redundant nor is overreached by the order dated 03-11-2009 and secondly; there is no compelling public interest reflected form the writ petition and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 15. While elaborating his submissions Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General has referred to the legislative scheme of the Adhiniyam, 1964. He has referred to Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Adhiniyam which creates a monopoly in the trade of tendupatta in favour of the State. He has referred to Section 2 9 (a) definition of “agent”, Section 2 (c) definition of “dealer”, wherein a cooperative society is also included, he has referred to Section 4 which deals with “Appointment of agents” and to Section 5 which relates to Restriction on purchase and transportation of tendu leaves. He has specifically referred to sub- section (1), clause (c) of Section 5 to submit that under the said sub-section (1), clause (c), an agent is authorised to purchase and transport tendu leaves. In support of this submission, he has referred to pleadings made in paragraph 2 of the Return of the State wherein it has been submitted that the Respondent No. 4 Cooperative Society is agent under terms of the Section 4 of the Adhiniyam, 1964 and therefore, it is not the case, that the Government has been conducting purchase and sale of tendu leaves by a method unknown to law. 16. It has been submitted and argued by Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General referring to paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Return of the State that, the Cooperative Society is functioning not only for purchase and sale of tendupatta, but it has an overall function to support economy of forest and persons whose livelihood is dependent upon forest produce. He has copiously referred to the fact in paragraph 12 of the Return at page 08 of the Return, that the State government charges only a mere sum of Rupees 01/- as commission from Respondent No. 4 Society and that the entire earnings are transferred directly to the collectors. 10 17. Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has also contended that since 2008 season onwards the proceeds are shared on the following basis – a). 80% of profit as incentive wages to the collectors of the tendu leaves. b). 15% of profit for purchasing, processing and storage of non-nationalized MFPs by primary societies. c). 05% of the profit for the funds created to temporarily meet the loss from trade of the societies. He has adverted to paragraph 13 of the Return at pp. 11-12 of the Return of the State in this regard. 18. Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has submitted that, the petitioner has failed to point out and plead any kind of serious loss to public exchequer caused due to prevailing purchase model of tendupatta by cooperative societies, the petitioner has failed to point out any kind of grievous and glaring lapses in management of its affairs and trading by the respondent no. 4 society, that the petitioner has failed to make out a case that any forest dweller’s fundamental or legal right is violated by following the prevailing model for sale purchase of tendupatta and he has also contended that the issues raised in the writ petition are not in public interest but are hypothetical in nature. 19. Lastly, Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that, not only is the sale and purchase of tendupatta by Cooperative Society a decision in the realm of economic policy, 11 but owing to the fact that tendupatta is the major forest produce of Chhattisgarh which sustains forest economy and livelihood of the forest dwellers it is a question of socio-economic policy as well and in such situations the Courts are cautious not to interfere, he has relied on Supreme Court decision of Akola Municipal Corporation and another vs. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain and another [2025 SCC Online SC 2279]. He has vehemently urged that any indulgence shown in this case would revert the forest dwellers at mercy of scrupulous forest contractors and tendupatta traders who are economically powerful and have better bargaining power, thus rendering the forest dwellers with unequal bargaining power reducing to them to a state of misery, poverty and exploitation. 20. Shri Animesh Tiwari, learned counsel, appering for the respondent No.4 Society has adopted the submisisons advanced by Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General. 21. Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, in rejoinder has argued that, the case law cited at Bar by Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General is not applicable to the case as it relates to issue of property tax, whereas, the case law cited by him is directly covering the issue. He has contended that in view of the fact that he has made out a clear case of compelling public interest involved the writ deserves to be allowed. 12 22. We have heard the learned counsels for the appearing parties, perused the record with utmost circumspection and caution. 23. After having given our anxious thought and considerations to the submissions advanced at the Bar as also pleadings of the case, we find that in order to proceed the first step is to satisfy ourselves regarding any public interest being really involved in the writ petition. The Supreme Court in the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) 7 SCC 546: at paragraph 50 has summarized 11 principles governing interference in public interest litigation cases, paragraph 50 reads as sunder - “50. The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may be suitably summarized as under: (i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court. The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfil its constitutional promises. (See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 262] , Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1638 : (1964) 1 SCR 561] and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] .) 13 (ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-à- vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail [(1978) 4 SCC 104 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 542] and Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] .) (iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial. In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani [(1979) 4 SCC 167 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 934 : AIR 1979 SC 468] it was held: (SCC p. 169, para 2) “2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini- grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner's grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused 14 cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.” (See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal [(2003) 6 SCC 230 :(2003) 5 Scale 138] .) (iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, the depraved (sic), the illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right. [See Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344] , S.P. Gupta [1981 Supp SCC 87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 262] , D.C. Wadhwa (Dr) v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 378] and BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC 333] .] (v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of the petition. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] .) (vi) Although procedural laws apply to PIL cases but the question as to whether the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would apply depends on the nature of the petition as also facts and circumstances of the case. [See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] and Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) [(1986) 1 SCC 100] .] 15 (vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India [1989 Supp (1) SCC 251] .) (viii) However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved a court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr Mahesh Madhav Gosavi [(1987) 1 SCC 227] .) (ix) The Court in special situations may appoint a Commission, or other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and finding out facts. It may also direct management of a public institution taken over by such Committee. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] , Rakesh Chandra Narayan v. State of Bihar [1989 Supp (1) SCC 644] and A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu [(1999) 2 SCC 718] .) In Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. [(1987) 2 SCC 295] this Court held: (SCC pp. 334-35, para 61) “61. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action on when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does 16 not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self- imposed restraint on public interest litigants.” In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] this Court opined: (SCC p. 348, para 109) “109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.” The Court will not ordinarily transgress into a policy. It shall also take utmost care not to transgress its jurisdiction while purporting to protect the rights of the people from being violated. In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [(2000) 10 SCC 664] it was held: (SCC pp. 762-63, paras 229 & 232) “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill- equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon 17 except to the extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means overrun in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of laches if the petitioner had the knowledge of such a decision and could have approached the court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Laches is one of them. *** 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's jurisdiction.” (x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have a power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India. (xi) Ordinarily, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by way of public interest litigation questioning the constitutionality or validity of a statute or a statutory rule.” 24. Having adverted to the facts of the present case as also the submissions advanced at the Bar, we have no hesitation in holding that the present case is essentially in the domain of 18 economic policy of the State regarding sale and purchase of tendu leaves. A focused study of the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964 puts it beyond any scintilla of doubt that the Respondent no. 4 society is an agent and as such is authorized in law to trade into tendupatta. The order dated 03-11-2009 is a mere executive instruction which in no manner overreaches the mandate of the Adhiniyam, 1964. Thus, reverting to the 11 point test evolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee (supra) wherein in point No. (ix) aspect of policy decision has been dealt by referring the Narmada Bachao Andolan case as follows – In Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India [(2000) 10 SCC 664] it was held in para 229 as under – “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means overrun in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of laches if the petitioner had the 19 knowledge of such a decision and could have approached the court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Laches is one of them.” 25. When the ratio of Guruvayoor Dewaswom Managing Committee case (supra) as also Narmada Bachao Andolan case (supra) is applied to the present case, we are also confronted with issue of delay, undoubtedly, the order dated 03-11-2009 has been challenged after more than a decade in 2021 by way of this public interest litigation, in paragraph 07 of the writ petition no explanation to that affect has been offered by the petitioner, neither are any substantive pleadings made to that affect. We thus, hold that, the petition suffers from delay and laches and as it also questions a policy decision of the government there is no compelling and overwhelming public interest involved and therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merit. 26. On the aspect of economic policy and scope of judicial interference we are bound by the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 in paragraph 57 observed thus - “57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The court does not supplant the “feel of the expert” by its own views. When the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such 20 findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works [1987 Supp SCC 476, 481 : (1988) 68 STC 407]: (SCC p. 479, para 4) “… the court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an income tax officer. The court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.” (Emphasis supplied). 27. In the case of Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695 the Apex Court held as below:— “54. The doctrine of judicial restraint, which is central to this discussion, emphasizes that courts should exercise caution and avoid involvement in policy decisions, as these are complex judgments that require a balancing of diverse and often competing interests. Policies are crafted based on thorough analysis of social, economic, and political factors, considerations beyond the court's purview. The court is tasked with ensuring that policies do not breach constitutional provisions or statutory limits; however, they should not replace policymakers' judgments with their own unless absolutely necessary. 55. Policy decisions often require the expertise of professionals and specialists in fields such as economics, public health, national security, and environmental science. These domains involve specialized knowledge that judges, as generalists in legal matters, may lack. For instance, in economic policy, the executive may decide on trade tariffs or 21 subsidies based on extensive data and projections that aim to balance domestic industry support with global trade commitments. The courts, lacking the same level of economic expertise and without the authority to make trade- offs among competing policy objectives, is typically not equipped to second-guess these kinds of decisions. 56. While courts have the power of judicial review to ensure that executive actions and legislative enactments comply with the Constitution, this power is not absolute. Judicial review is meant to act as a safeguard against actions that overstep legal boundaries or infringe on fundamental rights, but it does not entail a comprehensive re-evaluation of the policy's wisdom. The judicial review of policy decisions is limited to assessing the legality of the decision making process rather than the substantive merits of the policy itself. For example, if a government policy infringes on fundamental rights or discriminates against a particular group, the courts have a duty to strike down such policies. However, in the absence of constitutional or legal violations, the courts should respect the policy choices made by the executive or legislature. 57. The duty of the court in policy-related cases is primarily to determine whether the policy falls within the scope of the authority granted to the relevant body. If the policy decision is within the executive's legal authority and has been made following proper procedures, the courts should defer to the expertise and discretion of the policy-makers, even if the policy appears unwise or imprudent. This restraint ensures that the courts do not impose its own perspective on policy matters that are rightly the responsibility of other branches. 22 58. Economic and social policies often involve significant redistribution of resources, prioritization of interests, and balancing of public needs, which requires careful consideration by those with specialized knowledge and broad perspectives. In the realm of economic policy, for instance, questions regarding the allocation of subsidies, fiscal deficits, or budget allocations are best managed by the executive, which has access to economic data and is accountable to the public for its financial management. Judicial interference in such areas risks creating disruptions in the economic balance that policymakers are trying to achieve. 59. Courts should assume that policy-makers act in good faith unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. As long as the policy does not contravene the Constitution or violate statutory provisions, it is not the role of the courts to question the wisdom or fairness of such policy. 60. While judicial restraint is essential in respecting the boundaries of each branch of government, it does not mean that courts abdicate their responsibility to protect constitutional rights. The courts must still intervene if a policy infringes on fundamental rights, discriminates unfairly, or breaches statutory provisions. The role of the court in such instances is to protect individuals and groups from unlawful actions while maintaining the overall integrity of the policy-making process. This balance ensures that while courts do not interfere in matters of policy wisdom, they remain vigilant guardians of constitutional rights.” [Emphasis supplied] 28. We have also considered the fact that, no patent or apparent case of exploitation caused by the prevailing policy of sale and 23 purchase of tendupatta could be brought on record by the petitioner. The petitioner also failed to point out any serious issues warranting our indulgence towards functioning and administration of the Respondent No. 4 society. 29. We have considered the argument advanced by the State that the present prevailing model of purchase and sale of tendupatta has created a level playing field for those forest dwellers who have unequal bargaining power and we also hold without hesitation that it is in the interest of these persons that the Government created monopoly in its favour as mentioned in the Statement and Objects of the Adhiniyam, 1964. 30. Therefore, we hold that the action of the Respondent State in issuing the order dated 03-11-2009 is in public interest and is not in violation to the Adhiniyam, 1964 or any constitutional provision. 31. We also hold that, the present method of purchase and sale of tendupatta is a valid economic policy for betterment of forest dwellers, in fact, we find force in submissions of the learned State counsel that it is more of a socio-economic policy decision than economic and we uphold the said contention advanced by the State. 32. As a result, considered in light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court this Court is of the firm opinion that it would not be justified on our part in invoking powers of judicial review in a public interest litigation so as to interfere in 24 the economic policy decision taken by the respondent State regarding purchase and sale of tendupatta. 33. Thus, we hold that the writ petition lacks any public interest and is also hopelessly delayed. We dismiss the writ petition. 34. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra 25 Head – Note Courts, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will not ordinarily interfere in economic or socio- economic policy decisions of the State, particularly in the absence of violation of statutory or constitutional provisions, and a Public Interest Litigation challenging such policy is liable to be dismissed on grounds of delay, laches, and lack of genuine public interest.