varsha 20-wp-10927-2026.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.10927 OF 2026 Kotawdekar Zaheer Latif .. Petitioner V/S. Canara Bank Thru Officer and Ors .. Respondents ------------------- Mr. Neeraj Pandey (VC), with Heena Maniyar, for petitioner. Mr. Hamid Mulla, AGP, for the State. -------------------- CORAM : MANISH PITALE & SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ. DATE : 25th AUGUST 2026. PC: 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner claims to be third party in possession of the secured asset on the basis of leave and licence agreement. The respondent No. 1 bank (secured creditor) has proceeded in respect of the secured asset as per the provisions of section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets And Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (Securitisation Act) culminating in order dated 25.03.2026 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane. 3. This writ petition has been filed and urgently circulated on the ground that in terms of notice dated 04.08.2026 issued by the Court Commissioner appointed by order of the Magistrate, physical possession of the secured asset is to be taken on 29.08.2026. 1 of 4 VARSHA DEEPAK GAIKWAD Digitally signed by VARSHA DEEPAK GAIKWAD Date: 2026.08.25 18:14:11 +0530 varsha 20-wp-10927-2026.doc 4. We are not inclined to entertain this writ petition, in the light of the alternative efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner under the provisions of the Securitisation Act. 5. The Supreme Court in the case of 'United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others1, held as follows: 42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression `any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto 1 2010 (8) SCC 110 2 of 4 varsha 20-wp-10927-2026.doc themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance". 6. It appears that thereafter also the High Courts were entertaining such writ petitions under the Article of 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of 'Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors'.2, was constrained to make the 2 (2024) 2 SCC 1 3 of 4 varsha 20-wp-10927-2026.doc following observations: "101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra), it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act". 7. In view of the above, we are clear that the present cannot be entertained, and accordingly, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to take recourse to the statutory remedy by approaching DRT under the provisions of Securitisation Act, strictly in accordance with law. 9. Needless to say, further action being taken by respondent No. 1 bank under the provisions of Securitisation Act would be tested in the proceedings that may be initiated by the petitioner in accordance with law. 10. This Court is not commenting on the merits of the matter. All the rights and contentions of the parties are kept open. (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.) 4 of 4