1 CGHC010202052016 2026:CGHC:42654 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1077 of 2016 1 - Manoj S/o Punniram Aged About 22 Years, R/o Sisodiya Nagar, Pandariya, Tahsil and Police Station Pandariya, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2 - Dhanraj S/o Shivkumar Aged About 23 Years, R/o Sisodiya Nagar Pandariya, Tahsil and Police Station Pandariya, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh --- Appellants versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Pandariya, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 1138 of 2016 1 - Motilal S/o Shri Banshilal, Aged About 22 Years, R/o Village Sisodia Nagar Pandaria Tahsil Pandaria Police Station Pandaria District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Pandaria, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh --- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. C.R. Sahu, Advocate (in CRA No.1138/2016) and Mr. Ravi Maheshwari, Advocate (in CRA No.1077/2016). For State : Mr. Manish Kashyap, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 30-09-2026 Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.10.05 18:07:09 +0530 2 1. In CRA No.1138 of 2016 bailable warrant was issued against appellant Motilal vide order dated 15-09-2026 and in pursuance thereof he has appeared in person before this Court and he has been identified by his counsel, Mr. C.R. Sahu, Advocate. 2. Though the matter is listed for further orders, with the consent of the parties both the appeals are being heard finally. 3. As these appeals arise out of a common judgment dated 17-08-2016 passed by the learned trial Court, they are being heard and decided together. 4. Both these appeals filed under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. arise out of the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17-08-2016 passed by the learned Special Judge, Protection of Children from Sexual Offices Act, 2012, Fast Track Court, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No.24/2016 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run all the jail sentences concurrently:- Conviction and sentence awarded to Appellants Manoj and Dhanraj - Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of the IPC R.I. for 04 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month, U/s 366 of the IPC R.I. for 04 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month. Conviction and sentence awarded to Appellant Motilal - Conviction Sentence U/s 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’) R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 2 months, U/s 363 of the IPC R.I. for 04 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month, U/s 366 of the IPC R.I. for 04 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month. 3 5. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 30-11-2015 the mother of the victim, PW-1 lodged a missing report that her minor daughter is missing and her whereabouts could not be traced out and on being searched they came to know that her minor daughter was kidnapped by appellant Motilal. On the report made by mother of the victim, the FIR Ex.-P/10 was registered for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC against unknown person. During investigation the victim was recovered on 21-12-2015 from the possession of appellant Motilal from Bechraji, Ahmedabad and recovery panchnama Ex.-P/2 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Kabirdham where she was medically examined by PW-4 Doctor Sangeeta Bhatia, who gave her report Ex.-P/6. While medically examining the victim the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on body of the victim and opined that she was habitual of sexual intercourse. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for its chemical examination. The victim was also referred for Radiological examination for age determination. The petticoat of the victim has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/1. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim her middle school progress report card has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/4. The school record has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/20 and after retaining attested true copy of the school register Ex.-P/28C the original school register was returned back to the school. Spot map Ex.-P/3 was prepared by police and Ex.-P/9 was prepared by Patwari. The accused persons were arrested on 21-12-2015 and accused Motilal was also sent for his medical examination to Community Health Center, Pandariya where he was medically examined by the doctor who gave his report Ex.-P/15 and found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. From accused Dhanraj his motorcycle has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/5. From accused Motilal his underwear has been 4 seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/11. The vaginal slides of the victim, petticoat and underwear of the appellant Motilal were sent for chemical examination to State FSL, Raipur from where report Ex.-P/26 was received and no semen and sperm were found present in the sent articles. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. has been recorded and the statement of other witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. have also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons for the offence under Section 363, 366A, 376, 506, 34 of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of POCSO Act before the learned trial Court. 6. The learned trial Court has framed the charge against appellant Motilal for the offence under Sections 363/34, 366/34 and 506 of the IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, in alternative Section 376 of the IPC, whereas, the charge against accused Manoj Kumar and Danraj have been framed under Sections 363/34 and 366/34 of the IPC. The accused persons/appellants denied the charge and claimed trial. 7. In order to prove the charge against the appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. The statement under section 313 of CrPC of the appellants were also recorded in which they denied the circumstances that appears against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence 8. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence these appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants Manoj and Dhanraj submits that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses are inconsistent and are not sufficient to hold these appellants guilty for the offence under Section 363 and 366 of 5 the IPC. Only because of the reason that they are friends of other accused Motilal they have been implicated in the offence. He would further submit that present appellants Manoj and Dhanraj were not named in the FIR. There is no allegation that they committed rape upon the victim and it is only alleged that they took the victim with them and then the accused Motilal took her to Ahmedabad and committed rape upon her. He would further submit that there is no legally admissible evidence on record that the victim was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age and she being a major girl having love affair with appellant Motilal, she voluntarily accompanied him and traveled upto Ahmedabad without raising any objection or protest throughout their journey. She resided there for about 15 days and has not made any complaint to anyone who were residing in the same vicinity. No offence against the present appellants are made out as alleged and therefore, they may be acquitted from the alleged offence. 10. Learned counsel appearing for appellant Motilal would also submit there is no legally admissible evidence against appellant Motilal to convict him for the alleged offence. The victim is a major girl having love affair with appellant Motilal, she herself on her own will eloped with him and both of them had gone to Ahmedabad where they were earning their livelihood. It is only on the instance of the father of the victim they were taken back to their village by the police and under the pressure of her father the victim made statement against him. He would refer the love letters allegedly written by the victim to appellant Motilal which supported the defence taken by the appellant. The prosecution has failed to prove its case that the victim was minor. The school record has not been proved in accordance with law by examining its author and by producing the material on the basis of which the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the school record. Since the victim has made consensual physical relation without raising any objection and without any protest, no offence either of kidnapping or rape are made 6 against appellant Motilal and therefore, he may be acquitted from the alleged offence. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are sufficient evidence against the appellants in the case to convict them for the alleged offence. As per the school record, the victim was found to be minor on the date of incident and the school record has been proved by PW-9 who is the Assistant Teacher of the school. The appellant Motilal along with appellants Manoj and Dhanraj kidnapped the minor victim and compelled her for marriage and she was subjected to sexual intercourse by appellant Motilal. The victim being minor, her consent, if any, is immaterial. The victim and her family members have duly supported the prosecution’s case and stated about involvement of the appellants in the alleged offence. The learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the victim as well as other evidences and convicted the appellants for the alleged offence. In the present case there are overwhelming evidence against the appellants and both these appeals are liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court carefully. 13. The first and foremost question arose for consideration would be age of the victim as to whether on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age or not. 14. The prosecution has mainly relied upon school record Ex.-P/28C which is sought to be proved by PW-9, who is the Assistant Teacher of the school. He stated in his evidence that police has seized the school register with respect to date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.-P/20 and after retaining its attested true copy Ex.-P/28C the original school register was returned to the school. In the school register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded 7 as 09-10-1999. In cross-examination he admitted that he has not made the entry in the school register. He further admitted that the birth certificate of the victim is not annexed with the school register and he did not tell as to who had taken her to the school for her admission. He also did not know as to on what basis her date of birth was recorded in the school register. In further cross-examination he admitted that there is difference of colour of ink which has been endorsed in the school register at the time of her admission in class 3 and there is overwriting in the said date written in it. From the evidence of this witness it is quite apparent that he is neither the author of the school register nor the basis on which the entry was made in the school register has been produced by the prosecution to prove the school register, which is the document relating to the date of birth of the victim. 15. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 16. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a 8 document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584] held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 17. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 9 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 10 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 18. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : ““14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be 11 determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2022 (8) SCC 602] this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be 12 given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [2019] 9 SCR 735] that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3) (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal [(2012) 9 SCR 224], this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 19. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim PW-5 has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 09-10-1999. In cross-examination she stated that she alone is the daughter of her father and her sisters are daughters of her step father. She did not know the date of their birth. She also did not know as to what date of her birth was recorded in Kotwari 13 register. She admitted that her actual date of birth could have been told by her parents. 20. PW-1 is the mother of the victim, she stated in her evidence that the date of birth of the victim is 09-09-1999. In cross-examination she admitted that at the time when the victim was aged about 1 year, her husband died, thereafter, she remarried in the year 1994. She admitted that she has got recorded the date of birth of her three children with Kotwar of the village, but has not produced kotwari panji before police in support of date of birth of the victim. 21. PW-2 is step father of the victim. He did not disclose any date of her birth. From the evidence produced by the prosecution it is found that the school record has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law, the victim herself stated that the actual date of birth could have been properly disclosed by her parents and the evidence of her mother is not sufficient to hold that the victim’s date of birth is 09-10-1999, as there is material discrepancy in the date of birth disclosed by her mother also. In view of the aforesaid consideration, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 22. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, I again examine the evidence of the victim, PW-5. 23. The victim, PW-5 has stated in her evidence that on the date of incident her parents had gone to vegetable market. She along with her younger brother and sisters were in the house, at that time the appellants came to her house. Manoj and Motilal entered inside her house and threatened her and thereafter by giving threatening they took her with them by dragging her. They took her forcefully by their motorcycle. Manoj had gone somewhere and Dhanraj was driving the motorcycle and Motilal was pillion rider. She 14 was forced to sit between Dhanraj and Motilal. They took her to Bilaspur and at Bilaspur Dhanraj went somewhere. Thereafter, Motilal took her to Ahmedabad by train and kept her in a vicinity for about 15 days and made physical relation with her. Thereafter, she made a mobile call to her mother and informed her that she is at Ahmedabad and thereafter, her mother along with police persons came there and took her back. In cross-examination she stated that she knew appellant Motilal since 1 and ½ year back. She denied the letters Ex.-D/1 to Ex.-D/9 in her own handwriting. She admitted that on the date of incident there was market day at Pandariya and while going with the appellants she has not raised alarm and has not shouted to inform anyone. She further admitted that at the time when she was taken by the appellants her hands and mouth were not tied up, but it was open. She could not tell as to from which train they had gone to Ahmedabad, but she stated that they had gone Ahmedabad by changing the trains. She further stated that in the railway platform she has not made any complaint to co- passengers or persons who were present and even to railway police she had not made any complaint. She admitted that while residing at Ahmedabad she acquainted with other ladies of the vicinity there, but she has not disclosed about any incident to them. She further admitted that she had not tried to inform her parents by borrowing the mobile phone from the ladies with whom she acquainted there in the vicinity. In para 20 of her cross-examination she admitted that while traveling with appellant Moti towards Ahmedabad she made with police persons in the train and in also railway station, but she has not made any complaint to them. She further admitted that number of labourers were working at Bechraji colony where they were resided. 24. From the evidence of the victim it does not come on record that while traveling with appellant Motilal upto Ahmedabad she either made any complaint, raised alarm or protested with the act of appellant Motilal rather 15 her conduct clearly suggests that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant Motilal and both of them had gone to Ahmedabad. Appellant Motilal put the suggestion that she was in love affair with appellant Motilal and had written letters to him, produced the said letters allegedly written by the victim to him, though she denied the suggestion given by the defence, but said letters are available in the record as Ex.-D/1 and the content of the said letters apparently shows the intimacy of the victim towards appellant Motilal. When the victim was a major girl having love affair with appellant Motilal, she voluntarily accompanied him on her own will, it cannot be said that she was kidnapped by the accused persons and appellant Motilal committed rape upon her. 25. The offence of kidnapping and eloping with accused have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:- “9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 16 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 26. Recently in the matter of Tilaku alias Tilak Singh Vs. the State of Uttrakhand, the judgment passed in the matter of S. Varadarajan (supra) has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.183 of 2014 decided on 06.02.2025. 27. PW-1 is the mother of the victim, she stated in her evidence that on the date of incident when she came back from the vegetable market her younger daughter was crying and informed her that the victim was kidnapped by Motilal and his two friends. In the night itself they had gone to the house of accused Motilal, but his house was found locked. Thereafter, they lodged the report. After about 10-15 days her daughter informed her from mobile phone and then they had gone to Gujarat, Ahmedabad and took her back. The victim disclosed that she was kidnapped by appellants and appellant Motilal took her to Ahmedabad and committed rape upon her. In cross-examination she disclosed that she stated whatever the victim disclosed about the incident to her. There are various omissions and contradictions brought by the defence with that of her 161 Cr.P.C. statement. 28. PW-2 is step father of the victim, he has turned hostile and has not supported 17 the prosecution’s case. 29. PW-3 is younger sister of the victim who was alleged to be present there at the time of alleged incident. She stated in her evidence that on the date of incident appellant Motilal came to her house, threatened her sister and took her with them. In cross-examination she stated that she could not remember as to after how many days her statement was recorded by police. At the time when the accused persons came to her house she silently saw them. Immediately after the incident she has not informed the incident to her parents. She admitted that she was being tutored by her parents and she made statement accordingly. She also admitted that her house is situated in dense locality and it was the market day in Pandariya. She also admitted that she and her brother had not informed the incident to her neighbours also. Her neighbours were also present at the time of alleged incident. 30. PW-4 Doctor Sangeeta Bhatia who medically examined the victim has not found any external injury on her body and has not found any sign of protest. Even otherwise, when the victim herself was found to be a consenting party in eloping with appellant Motilal and making physical relation with him, the evidence of the doctor does not have much significance as the victim herself engaged in making consensual physical relation with appellant Motilal. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the conduct of the victim and the quality of her evidence which she made before the court, it cannot be said that the evidence of the victim is that of sterling quality which is required for holding the appellants guilty for the alleged offences. 32. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the 18 victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home charges levelled against the appellants beyond reasonable doubts, which prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 33. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts against the appellants and therefore, by giving benefit of doubt to the appellants both these appeals filed by the appellants are allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentences are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the alleged offences. 34. The appellants are reported to be on bail, their bail bonds shall continue for a further period of six months as provided under Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 35. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil