R R NEW TOWN DEVELOPERS (P A N no. A A P F R 9 2 2 3 D) v. RAHUL DUBEY
CRMP/2489/2026 · 2026-09-29
Shri Parth Prateem Sahu
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 38164 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 38164 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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CGHC010367352026
2026:CGHC:42874
AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2489 of 2026 1 - R R New Town Developers (P A N No. A A P F R 9 2 2 3 D) A Partnership Firm Registered Under Relevant Provisions Of The Indian Partnership Act, 1936 Through Its Partner Shri Ramawtar Agrawal, Aged About 59 Years S/o Late Radheshyam Agrawal, Sanjeevni Hospital Campus, Umda Road, Bhilai- 3, Tahsil Bhilai-3 And District. Durg, (C.G.). 2 - Ramawtar Agrawal S/o Late Radheshyam Agrawal Aged About 59 Years R/o Shop No. 8 A, Zone-1, Market Sector 11, Khursipaar Bhilai, Tahsil And District Durg, (C.G.) 3 - Raja Jain S/o Shri Nemichand Jain Aged About 48 Years R/o Sanjeevni Hospital Campus, Umda Road, Bhilai-3, Tahsil Bhilai-3 And District Durg, (C.G.)
--- Petitioners versus 1 - Rahul Dubey S/o Shri Kamal Kishore Dubey Aged About 48 Years R/o Mukhya Sadhak, Narmada Nagar, Vill. Kududand, P.S. Civil Lines, Distt. Bilaspur, (C.G.) 2 - Authorised Officer (District Magistrate Durg) District Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Nitin Srivastava S/o Satendranath Srivastava Aged About 49 Years Borsi District Durg (C.G.) 4 - Amit Srivastava S/o S.P. Srivastava Aged About 49 Years Kohka Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 5 - Yash Dream Estate Ltd. Through Director, Nitin Srivastava, Nehru Nagar Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 6 - Yash Dream Real Estate, Ltd. Through Director, Nitin Srivastava, Priyadarshini Parisar, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 7 - Neeta Srivastava S/o R.C. Srivastava Aged About 53 Years Bhilai District Durg (C.G.) 8 - Amit Kumar Srivastava S/o S.K. Srivastava Aged About 52 Years Yash Dreams Real Estate Limited, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 9 - Maa Sharda Developers Partner Anurag Srivastava, Kotma Kalri Dist- Anuppur (M.P.) BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN
2 10 - Maa Sharda Developers Partner Amrita Srivastava Kotma Kalri Dist- Anuppur (M.P.) 11 - Laxmi Builders And Colonizer Partner Sanktha Prasad Pathak Kailash Nagar Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 12 - Saraju Ram S/o Jhaduram Sahu, Aged About 45 Years Khursuni Dist- Balod (C.G.) 13 - Kapil Uppal S/o I.C. Uppal, Aged About 46 Years 19/b/20/02/02, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 14 - Anaarkali W/o Rameshwar Yadav, Aged About 52 Years Mahamra District Durg (C.G.) 15 - Surajram Verma S/o Damodar Prasad Verma Aged About 51 Years Jamgaon M, District Durg (C.G.)
--- Respondents (Cause title is taken from CIS system) For Petitioners : Mr. B.P. Sharma, Advocate along-with Mr.
B.P. Sharma, Advocate along-with Mr. Pushpa Kumar Gupta, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice
Parth Prateem Sahu
Order On Board 30/09/2026
1. The petitioners have filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking recall of the order dated 18.08.2026 passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2024, whereby this Court allowed the said criminal appeal and set aside the order dated 14.07.2023 passed in Cr.M.J.C. No. 28 of 2026 by the learned Special Judge (Chhattisgarh Protection of Depositors Interest Act), Durg, whereby the interim order of attachment dated 23.04.2016 had been made absolute.
2.
Learned counsel for petitioners would submit that petitioner No.1 is a partnership firm registered under the provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and petitioner No.2 and 3 are partners of petitioner No.1/firm
3 and are engaged in the business of town developers. He submits that petitioners are invoking the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court, as they have been prejudiced by the act of respondents of suppressing material facts and presenting false and misleading facts before this Court, which resulted in the passing of the impugned order dated 18.08.2026 in Cr. Appeal No. 765 of 2024.
3. He submits that properties belonging to Maa Sharda Developers were attached by the learned Sessions Judge/Special Judge under the Chhattisgarh Protection of Depositors’ Interests Act initially vide interim
order dated 23.04.2016, which has been subsequently made absolute vide order dated 14.07.2023. The said properties were included in the auction proceedings. The petitioners participated in the said auction in respect of the land comprised in 23 different Khasra numbers, situated at Village Umda, P.H. No. 4, R.I. Circle, Bhilai-3, Tahsil and District Durg. Upon acceptance of their bid, a sale deed was duly executed through the Court of the learned Tahsildar, Bhilai, for a valuable
consideration of Rs. 12,75,20,000/- vide registered sale deed dated
27.05.2024. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners were put in possession of the aforesaid land, and their names were duly entered in the relevant revenue records. Thereafter, petitioners applied for diversion of the land before the competent State authorities, pursuant to which a demand notice was issued, and petitioners duly deposited the requisite amount through challan with the State Treasury. He next contended that respondents herein were fully aware of the execution of the aforesaid sale deed, mutation of the name of petitioners in the revenue records, and proceedings for diversion of land, as public
4 notices were issued and objections were invited before the completion of these transactions and official proceedings.
4. He also submits that aggrieved by the order dated 14.07.2023, whereby the interim order of attachment dated 23.04.2016 was made absolute, respondent No. 1 herein preferred Cr. A. No. 765 of 2024, mainly on the ground that he was not afforded a proper opportunity of hearing before passing the said order. The said Criminal Appeal was filed on 03.04.2024 and, upon the matter being taken up for hearing, no interim order was passed by this Hon’ble Court.
5. He submits that, in the said appeal, appellant/respondent No.1 herein did not disclose the material fact that sale deed in respect of the attached property had already been executed in favour of the present petitioners and that the petitioners were in possession of the said land. It is further submitted that the present petitioners were also not impleaded as parties in the said appeal, despite having a direct and substantial interest in the property in question. He submits that, considering the direct interest in the property in question, petitioners were necessary parties in the criminal appeal and ought to have been impleaded before passing the impugned order. He further submits that the material facts relating to the right and interest of petitioners ought to have been brought to the notice of this Court and petitioners herein are required to heard before passing the impugned order, whereby the
order of attachment was set aside.
6. In support of his contention, counsel has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. M/s. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., reported in (1970) 3
5 SCC 573, in case of State of Punjab (Now Haryana) & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr., reported in (1974) 2 SCC 70, in case of P. Udayani Devi Vs. V.V. Rajeshwara Prasad Rao & Anr., reported in (1995) 3 SCC 252, in case of Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr. Vs. Farida Khatoon & Anr., reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403 and prays that the
order dated 18.08.2026 passed by this Court in Cr. A. No. 765 of 2024 be recalled, and the appellant therein be directed to implead the petitioners as party respondents. It is further prayed that, after affording the petitioners an opportunity of hearing, the appeal be decided afresh in accordance with law.
7. I have heard learned counsel for petitioners and perused the documents placed on record.
8. Perusal of the order dated 18.08.2026 passed by this Court in Cr.A. No. 765 of 2024 reveals that respondent No. 1 had challenged the
order dated 14.07.2023 passed in Cr.M.J.C. No. 28 of 2019, whereby the learned Special Judge under the Chhattisgarh Protection of Depositors Interest Act, Durg, had made absolute the interim order of attachment dated 23.04.2016. The record further reveals that respondent No. 1 had challenged the said order mainly on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him by learned Special Judge before passing the order. This Court, upon due consideration of the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for respective parties, allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Court of learned Special Judge for passing a fresh order after affording an opportunity of hearing to appellant therein.
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9. The main issue before this Court is whether, after passing the order dated 18.08.2026 in Cr. A. No. 765 of 2024, whereby the order dated 14.07.2023 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the learned Special Judge (under Chhattisgarh Protection of Depositors’ Interests Act), Durg, for passing a fresh order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant therein, this Court can recall the said order in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
10. Section 403 and 528 of BNSS are relevant, which reads as under for ready reference :
“Section 403. Court not to alter judgment- Save as otherwise provided by this Sanhita or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”
“Section 528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.- Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
11. The provisions contained in Section 403 of BNSS envisages once the Court has signed a judgment or final order disposing of a case, it cannot alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, similar provision is under Section 362. 7
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500, while considering the scope of review has observed thus :-
“4. The sole question before us is whether the High Court was right in refusing to entertain Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 5127 of 1978 on the ground that it had no power to review its order dated September 1, 1970. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declares: “Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error” It is apparent that what the appellant seeks by the application is not the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. What she desires is a declaration that the High Court order dated September 1, 1970 does not affect her rights in the house property and that the direction to restore possession to Pyare Lal is confined to that portion only of the house property respecting which the offence of trespass was committed so that she is not evicted from the portion in her possession. The appellant, in fact, asks for an adjudication that the right to possession alleged by her remains unaffected by the order dated September 1, 1970. Pyare Lal disputes that the order is not binding on her and that she is entitled to the right in the property claimed by her. Having considered the matter, we are not satisfied that the controversy can be brought within the description
“clerical or arithmetical error”. A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which the court never intended to say.
It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery
8 on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing. Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1047 : (1966) 3 SCR 99 :
(1966) 17 STC 360].”
13. In case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437, Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed thus :
“7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under Section
362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [(1981) 1 SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 188] , that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.”
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169, has considered jurisdiction of High Court to alter or review its own order as held thus :-
“10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error.
The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in
9 the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. …….”
15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of M.P. v. Man Singh, (2019) 10 SCC 161, while considering the power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to recall or review its order, held as under:-
“7. It is well settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to review its order either under Section 362 or under Section 482 CrPC [State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair, (2001) 4 SCC 752 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 808] . The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used by the High Court to reopen or alter an order disposing of a petition decided on merits [State v. K.V. Rajendran, (2008) 8 SCC 673 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 600 : 2009 Cri LJ 355] . After disposing of a case on merits, the Court becomes functus officio and Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review and specifically provides that no court after it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error [Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] . Recall of judgment would amount to alteration or review of judgment which is not permissible under Section 362 CrPC.
It cannot be validated by the High Court invoking its inherent powers [Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500 :
1981 SCC (Cri) 188 : AIR 1981 SC 736] .” (Emphasis supplied)
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16. Further Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor, (2020) 13 SCC 172, while reiterating its earlier decision in case of Suraj Devi (supra) and in case of Mostt. Simrikhia (supra) has observed that criminal justice delivery system does not cloth criminal court with power to alter or review the judgment or final order disposing the case except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error. After the judgment delivered by a criminal Court or passing final order disposing the case the Court becomes functus officio and any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by appropriate forum in accordance with law. 17. Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vikram Bakshi & Ors. Vs. R.P. Khosla & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/1136/2025 has observed thus :-
“34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well- settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of
11 an order or judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review” where the bar as contained in Section “362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu.”
18.
In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the law laid down therein, it is well settled that the power of correction can be exercised only in respect of clerical or arithmetical errors and cannot be invoked for the purpose of reconsidering, reviewing, or altering the merits of an order already passed by the Court. The inherent jurisdiction conferred under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, cannot be exercised as a substitute for the power of review, particularly where the exercise of such jurisdiction would have the effect of re- appreciating the matter and modifying or recalling an order on merits. The submissions and arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners are devoid of merit. If petitioners are aggrieved by the order passed by this Court, he is at liberty to challenge the same before the appropriate forum having jurisdiction, in accordance with law. 19. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, this petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram