IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIRCUIT BENCH AT JALPAIGURI CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION (APPELLATE SIDE) CRM (NDPS) 388 of 2026 Manoyara Beowa @ Manwara Bewa v. The State of West Bengal With C.R.M. (NDPS) 337 of 2026 Labkush Kaul @ Kanl v. The State of West Bengal With C.R.M. (NDPS) 336 of 2026 Anil Pradhan v. The State of West Bengal With CRM (NDPS) 390 of 2026 Sri Bishnu Roy v. The State of West Bengal Before: The Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee For the petitioner in CRM (NDPS) 388 of 2026 : Mr. Sourav Ganguly, Adv. Ms. Rishita Chakraborty, Adv. Mr. Gopal Roy, Adv. 2 For the State in CRM (NDPS) 388 of 2026 and C.R.M. (NDPS) 336 of 2026 : Mr. Jagriti Mishra, Ld.AAAG., Mr. Avrajyoti Das, Ld.APP. Mr. Atul Dong, Adv. Mrs. Panchali Deb Sikder (Nag), Adv. For the petitioner in C.R.M. (NDPS) 337 of 2026 and C.R.M. (NDPS) 336 of 2026 : Mr. Rounak Ghosh, Adv. For the State in C.R.M. (NDPS) 337 of 2026 : Mr. Avrojyoti Das, Ld. APP., Mr. Gobinda Ghosh, Adv. Ms. Baishali Chakrabarty, Adv. For the petitioner in CRM (NDPS) 390 of 2026 : Mr. Kalipada Das, Adv., Ms. S. Roy Dakua, Adv. For the State in CRM (NDPS) 390 of 2026 : Mr. Avrajyoti Das, Ld.APP., Mr. Gobinda Ghosh, Adv. Ms. Baishali Chakraborty, Adv. For Judgment : 03.09.2026 Arijit Banerjee, J. :- 1. These four applications for bail have been taken up together for consideration and disposal since they involve common questions of fact and law. 2. The essential fact in each of the applications is that commercial quantity of narcotics drugs/psychotropic substance was seized from them. They seek bail notwithstanding the restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, on the ground that they have been in custody for a long time and there 3 has been no progress in the trial. They say that Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees to every citizen the fundamental right of speedy trial. If there is inordinate delay in the process of trial, not attributable to the under-trial, and in the meantime if the under-trial has suffered prolonged incarceration, he should be enlarged on bail on the touch stone of Article 21 of the Constitution. In such a case the restrictions in Section 37 will be overridden by the constitutional guarantee in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 3. Be it noted that no argument was advanced on the merits of the case in aid of the prayer for bail. 4. In CRM (NDPS) No. 388 of 2026, the applicant is in custody for more than one year four months. In CRM (NDPS) 390 of 2026, the applicant is in custody for about one year eleven months. In CRM (NDPS) 336 of 2026, the applicant is in custody for about one year nine months. In CRM (NDPS) 337 of 2026, the applicant is in custody for about two years one month. 5. Learned Advocates for the petitioners relied on various orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of the submission that a citizen’s fundamental right to speedy disposal of a criminal case instituted against him overrides restrictions on grant of bail as in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Section 43D-(5) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the like. Learned Advocates relied on an order dated May 15, 2026, passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Ashray @ Ramsare Rajbhar v. The State of Chhattisgarh [SLP (CRL.) No. 7206/2026]. In that case the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail to the accused person noticing that he 4 had been in custody for about one year six months and that he had no criminal antecedents. 6. Learned Counsel then relied on an order of a Division Bench of this Court in Anjali Mondal v. The State of West Bengal [CRM (NDPS) No. 1606 of 2024]. In that case the accused person had been in custody for more than one year three months. Witness action had not begun. There were 16 chargesheet named witnesses. The Court observed that there was no chance of an early conclusion of the trial and granted bail on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 7. Reliance was also placed on an order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nitish Adhikary alias Bapan v. State of West Bengal, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2068. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the applicant had undergone detention for one year seven months. The trial was at a preliminary stage as only one witness had been examined. The petitioner did not have criminal antecedents. On those considerations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail. 8. In Naeem Ahmed alias Naim Ahmad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, reported at 2024 SCC OnLine SC 220, the applicant had been in custody for more than one year eleven months. Although investigation was complete, charge was yet to be framed. Primarily noticing the period of custody undergone by the applicant, the Supreme Court granted bail to him. 9. Learned Counsel then referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim alias Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported at (2023) 18 SCC 166. This was also a case under the NDPS Act and involved the question as to whether or not bail should be granted to the 5 accused person. Reliance was placed on paragraphs 19 to 25 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “19. The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie determination. That places the court's discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails (Sections 436, 437 and 439 CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the classification of offences under the Special Acts (the NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. 20. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused cooperating with the investigation, not fleeing from 6 justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such Special Acts, has to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This Court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens has to—in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws—be balanced against the public interest. 21. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section 37 (i.e. that court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions as enacted under Section 37 can be considered within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other interpretation would result in complete denial of the bail to a person accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 22. The standard to be considered therefore, is one, where the court would look at the material in a broad manner, and reasonably see whether the accused's guilt may be proved. The judgments of this Court have, therefore, emphasised that the 7 satisfaction which courts are expected to record i.e. that the accused may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials collected during investigation (as held in Union of India v. Rattan Mallik (2009) 2 SCC 624: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 831]). Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436-A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Satender Kumar Antil (2022) 10 SCC 51: (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1]). Having regard to these factors the Court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail. 23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12- 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India <https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI- 8 2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>.]. Of these 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials. 24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127 : 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner : (SCC OnLine Ker para 13) “13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community” published in 1940) [Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”, available at:https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sobecki_sk lad.pdf(accessed on 23-3-2023).]). Incarceration has further 9 deleterious effects—where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.” 10. Learned Counsel then referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb, reported at (2021) 3 SCC 713. In support of his submission that restrictions on grant of bail in special statutes like the NDPS Act, 1985 or the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, do not affect the power of a constitutional court to grant bail on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In particular, reference was made to paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the reported judgment, which read as follows:- “10. It is a fact that the High Court in the instant case has not determined the likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or whether rigours of Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA are alien to him. The High Court instead appears to have exercised its power to grant bail owing to the long period of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime in the near future. The reasons assigned by the High Court are apparently traceable back to Article 21 of our Constitution, of course without 10 addressing the statutory embargo created by Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA. 11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Assn. [(1996) 2 SCC 616:1996 SCC (Cri) 366], laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622, para 10) “10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899], on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) which too 11 have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 9 SCC 252 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1156], Babba v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 11 SCC 569 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 118] and Umarmia v. State of Gujarat [(2017) 2 SCC 731 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 114] enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians. 15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39], it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible 12 and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. 17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.” 11. Learned Counsel for the applicants finally referred to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881. Reference was made to paragraphs 3, 23.3-23.5 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- 13 “3. The above question arises in the context of the challenge by the appellant to the judgment and order dated 19.08.2025 passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) in Criminal Appeal (D.) No. 20/2024 (Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu). 23.3. As regards the decision of this Court in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, the Bench analysed the decision in K.A. Najeeb where the three-Judge Bench had critically examined the decision in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali. While agreeing with the reasoning given in K.A. Najeeb qua the decision in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, the Bench observed that Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali has to be read and understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a precedent to deny bail to an accused undertrial suffering long incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial. Relevant portion of the judgment in Shaikh Javed Iqbal reads as under: 33. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning given in K.A. Najeeb regarding the decision in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali. This decision i.e. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali has to be read and understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a precedent to deny bail to an accused-undertrial suffering long incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial. 14 23.4. As to the restrictions imposed on granting bail to an accused under the stringent provisions of the UAP Act, this Court declared that such statutory restrictions would not come in the way of a constitutional court from granting bail to an accused if it finds that the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. The Bench reiterated that the decision in K.A. Najeeb was rendered by a three-Judge Bench and, therefore, would be binding on a Bench of two Judges. It has been held as under: “42. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused- undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would 15 run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb being rendered by a three-Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us.” 23.5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court held that continued incarceration of the appellant would not be justified and therefore granted bail to the appellant.” 12. Learned State Counsel submitted that in NDPS cases, jail is the rule and bail is the exception. When commercial quantity of narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is involved, the Court will not grant bail unless the twin conditions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act are satisfied, i.e., the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely not commit any offence while on bail. In this connection learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif reported at (2024) 11 SCC 372. In particular reliance was placed on paragraphs 9 to 14 of the judgement which read as follows: - “Compliance with the mandate under Section 37 9. There has been consistent and persistent view of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is punishable with minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally be not released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are 16 mandatory in nature. The recording of finding as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act. 10. Apart from granting the opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor, the other two conditions i.e. (i) the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence, and that (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, are the cumulative and not alternative conditions. 11. In State of M.P. v. Kajad [(2001) 7 SCC 673 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520] , this Court while considering the scope of Section 37 in the light of the scheme of the Act, had observed that: (SCC pp. 675-76, para 5) “5. … A perusal of Section 37 of the Act leaves no doubt in the mind of the court that a person accused of an offence, punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more, shall generally be not released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of Section 37(1). For granting the bail the court must, on the basis of the record produced before it, be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences with which he is charged and further that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It has further to be noticed that the conditions for granting the bail, specified in clause (b) of sub- 17 section (1) of Section 37 are in addition to the limitations provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force regulating the grant of bail. Liberal approach in the matter of bail under the Act is uncalled for.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Similarly, recently a three-Judge Bench in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal [Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, (2022) 18 SCC 374], considering the earlier judgments on the parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the said Act held that: (SCC p. 381, para 19) “19. … The length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” 13. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it appears that a complaint case has been filed by the NCB against the respondent and six others before the Special Court, for the offences under Sections 8, 22(c), 23(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The respondent-accused filed the bail application directly in the High Court without first approaching the Special Court, and curiously the High Court without considering as to whether the twin conditions mentioned in clause (b) sub-section (1) of Section 37 18 were fulfilled or not, concluded without any material on record that Section 37 was not attracted as there was non-compliance with Section 52-A of the said Act within reasonable time. 14. The appellant NCB having opposed the bail application, it was obligatory on the part of the High Court to record a satisfaction on the cumulative conditions, namely, that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent-accused was not guilty of the alleged offences and that he was not likely to commit any offence while on bail, as contemplated in Section 37(1)(b) of the said Act. The non-recording of such satisfaction which is mandatory in nature, has rendered the impugned order [Kashif v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2881] of the High Court fallacious and untenable.” 13. Learned State Counsel then referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh alias Gora reported at 2026 SCC Online SC 671. In particular, reliance was placed on paragraphs 5, 9 and 10 of the judgement, which read as follows: “5. By the impugned order, the High Court enlarged the respondent on regular bail recording, in paragraph 8 thereof, that the respondent had remained in custody for 2 years, 1 month and 2 days; that he was “not involved in any other case”; that charges had been framed on 20.07.2024 but only 2 prosecution witnesses out of 24 had been examined; that the trial was likely to take considerable time; that further incarceration would be violative of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution; and that, in the 19 words of the High Court, “the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.” 9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a mandatory pre-condition, the non-observance of which vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held in no uncertain terms that the recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra). 10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an 20 approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37, has in this Court's view, committed an error.” 14. Learned State Advocate then referred to the Apex Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh alias Billa, reported at 2026 SCC Online SC 1058. Particular reference was made to paragraphs 14, 17 and 19 of the reported judgment which read as follows: “14. As rightly submitted by the appellant State, this Court, in Lalrintluanga Sailo (Supra) while setting aside the bail granted by the High Court therein had held that consideration on the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is essential by the concerned Court. It was observed: “5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or 21 psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus: “37. (1) (b)(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” … … … 7. In the decision in Collector of Customs v. Ahmadalieva Nodira [Collector of Customs v. Ahmadalieva Nodira, (2004) 3 SCC 549 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 834], the three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. … … … 22 10. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra revealing the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under the NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. Keeping in view the above expositions of law, we now proceed to examine the impugned order. The abovementioned decisions of this Court display the consistent view that when it comes to cases involving commercial quantity of narcotics, the mandatory requirements of Section 37 ought to be considered. It is not in dispute that the case at hand, involves commercial quantity. In such a scenario, consideration and reference to the twin conditions enumerated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act was mandatory. Upon a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that there has been no consideration at all by the High Court on the twin conditions. In such a scenario, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 19. Moreover, the respondent has only undergone 1 year 7 months, and if found guilty a maximum sentence of twenty years 23 may be imposed upon him. Therefore, it cannot be said that he has suffered incarceration for a long period, warranting interference in view of Article 21 of the Constitution.” 15. The salient principles of law that emerge from the aforesaid decisions, read together harmoniously, are as follows: - (i) In a case involving seizure of commercial quantity of narcotic drug and/or psychotropic substance, bail is not be granted unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed the offence and that he is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Such a finding must be recorded in the order granting bail. (ii) Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes within its fold a citizen’s right to speedy trial in a criminal case. However, to start with, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, insofar as the said right is concerned, must operate within the framework of the NDPS Act. Some delay in progress of the trial, is not ground enough to grant bail to the accused ignoring the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. (iii) If the accused/under-trial is in custody for a ‘prolonged period’ and there is no possibility of an early conclusion of the trial, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution will operate with its full might and override the restriction in Section 37 of the NDPS Act entitling the Courts to enlarge the accused person on bail without recording its satisfaction on the two aspects mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 24 (iv) The observation at paragraph 9 of the two-Judge Bench judgment in Sukhwinder Singh’s case (Supra) that ‘in matters involving recovery of contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of trial.’, seems to be contrary to the observation of the Supreme Court in the three-Judge Bench decision in the case of K. A. Najeeb’s case (Supra) to the effect that ‘whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigors of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence’. K.A. Najeeb’s case also clarifies that the constitutional courts, in appropriate cases, has the power to grant bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity of contraband notwithstanding the restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. (v) What constitutes ‘prolonged incarceration’ justifying grant of bail has not been expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or any relevant statute as is noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Balraj Singh alias Billa, (Supra). In that context, paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgement in that case is worth noticing:- 25 “21. While judicial discretion is an important facet of justice dispensation, this Court cannot overlook the fact that similarly situated persons in custody may receive different outcomes, dependent on the approach adopted by the respective bench. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to a chart of decisions by coordinate benches of this Court, including a chart submitted by Mr. Mr. Shadan Farasat, learned senior counsel on this aspect:- Case Name Period of Incarceration Outcome Bench Statute involved Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat [2025 INSC 662] 2 years 9 months Bail not granted 2JB NDPS & UAPA Union of India v. Vigin K. Varghese [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2440] More than 3 years Order granting bail set aside 2JB NDPS Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade [2025 SCC OnLine SC 3049] More than 2 years Order granting bail set aside 2JB NDPS Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109] 3 years 6 months Bail granted 2JB NDPS Ankur Chaudhary v. State of M.P. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2730] More than 2 years Bail granted 2JB NDPS Narcotic Control Bur- eau v. Lakhwinder Singh [2025 SCC OnLine SC 366] 4 years 6 months Bail granted 2JB NDPS Badsha Sk. v. State of W.B. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1867] 2 years 4 months Bail granted 2JB NDPS 22. However, we note that recently this Court in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi [Crl. A. @ SLP (Crl.) No. 26 2867/2026] has referred the question concerning the approach of constitutional Courts in bail matters under special statutes, where “Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect”. In view of the said reference, we do not wish to deliberate on this issue further, save and except that in our view paramount consideration is nothing but interest of justice for all. Should there be any conflict between the sovereignty of country and personal liberty, undoubtedly, the former shall prevail, particularly, when a war is waged against the nation, be it in the form of supply of drugs, which vitally affects the national economy and health of the people. (Emphasis Supplied)” 16. Keeping in mind the above principles of law and coming back to the facts of the present cases, we see that the petitioners are in custody for periods ranging from one year four months to two years one month. Considering that the minimum sentence of imprisonment that will be attracted in case of conviction is ten years and the maximum is twenty years, in my opinion it cannot be said that there is prolonged incarceration of the petitioners. 17. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that practically no progress has been made in the trials in all the four cases. This factor coupled with the period of custody should persuade me to allow the prayer for bail. I do not agree. None of the petitioners has been in custody for a period which 27 exceeds a substantial part of the maximum sentence prescribed for the offence. It cannot also be said that there is absolutely no possibility of early conclusion of the trials in the four cases. The number of witnesses in the four cases are not very large. The Trial Court should make all efforts to ensure speedy disposal of the trials without granting unnecessary adjournments and if necessary, by fixing frequent schedules for examination of witnesses. The Trial Court should not hesitate to issue appropriate orders for securing the presence of recalcitrant witnesses, in exercise of power under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). 18. In my considered opinion, in none of the four cases before me, the stage has come yet for Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to come into play overriding the restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 19. In view of the aforesaid all the four applications stand dismissed. The petitioners in each case will be at liberty to renew his/her prayer for bail in the event the trial in his/her case does not conclude within 15 months from the next date fixed for hearing. 20. CRM (NDPS) 388 of 2026, CRM (NDPS) 337 of 2026, CRM (NDPS) 336 of 2026 and CRM (NDPS) 390 of 2026 are accordingly disposed of. 21. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgement and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities. (Arijit Banerjee, J.)