1 CGHC010254452021 2026:CGHC:42552 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4182 of 2021 Smt. Shobha Sharma W/o Shri Pawan Kumar Sharma Aged About 70 Years R/o D-37, Hospital Sector Bhilai, Dist. Durg (C.G.). ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Public Works Department Mahanadi Bhavan Atal Nagar, New Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Executive Engineer Public Works Department Division 1 Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - The Collector Rapur (C.G.). 4 - The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Sub Divisional Officer (Rev.) Raipur (C.G.). ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Shivam Mishra, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Kishan Lal Sahu, Advocate For State/Respondents : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 30.09.2026 1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the inaction on the part of the respondent authorities in not returning the land bearing Khasra No.417, admeasuring 0.146 hectare, which was acquired for construction/widening of Saddu-Dhaneli bypass road YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.10.01 18:24:39 +0530 2 pursuant to the land acquisition proceedings culminating in the award dated 17.05.2007. The petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings under Section 101 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘Act of 2013’), contending that the acquired land has not been utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “10.1 To call for the records of the case for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. 10.2 To issue an appropriate writ or order to respondents to initiate the proceeding under section 101 of The Right of Fair Compensation & Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act 2013. 10.3 Any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted.” 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that though the land in question was acquired as far back as in the year 2007 and compensation was awarded to and received by the petitioner pursuant to the award dated 17.05.2007, the acquired portion of the land has not, till date, been utilised by the State for the purpose for which it was acquired. It is contended that the petitioner is willing to refund the compensation amount received 3 by her and, therefore, the acquired land, having remained unutilised, deserves to be returned to her in accordance with law. 3. Per contra, learned State counsel, opposing the petition, submits that the acquisition proceedings were initiated on the proposal of the Executive Engineer, National Highways Division, Raipur, for acquisition of private land situated at Village Baroda for construction and widening of Saddu-Dhaneli bypass road. Pursuant thereto, proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’), and the requisite notifications under Sections 4(1), 17(1) and 6 of the said Act were duly published. Thereafter, notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued and, after considering the objections received from the land oustees, the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award dated 17.05.2007. In respect of the petitioner’s land bearing Khasra No.417, admeasuring 0.146 hectare, compensation of Rs.1,27,875/- was determined and the same was accepted by the petitioner without any protest or demur. 4. Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner, having accepted the compensation pursuant to the award passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and having permitted the acquisition proceedings to attain finality, cannot now seek restoration of the acquired land merely on the ground that, according to her, the land has not been utilised for the intended purpose. It is submitted that upon completion of the acquisition 4 proceedings and payment of compensation, the acquired land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. It is further submitted that the acquisition proceedings had been completed in the year 2007, much prior to the enactment of the Act of 2013, and the provisions of the said Act cannot be invoked so as to reopen a concluded acquisition which had attained finality under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Learned State counsel, therefore, submits that the petitioner has no enforceable right to seek return of the land merely because the same has allegedly remained unutilised and prays for dismissal of the petition. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 6. The undisputed facts emerging from the record are that the land acquisition proceedings in question were initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The requisite notifications were issued and published, objections were invited and considered, and thereafter the award dated 17.05.2007 came to be passed. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, land bearing Khasra No.417, admeasuring 0.146 hectare, was acquired and compensation of Rs.1,27,875/- was determined in her favour. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner accepted the compensation awarded pursuant to the said award and did not challenge the acquisition proceedings or the award within the statutory framework available under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 5 7. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that the acquired land has subsequently not been utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired and, therefore, the petitioner claims restoration of the land by placing reliance upon Section 101 of the Act of 2013. The said contention, however, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. The acquisition of the petitioner’s land was completed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and culminated in the award dated 17.05.2007. The petitioner accepted the compensation determined under the said award and allowed the acquisition proceedings to attain finality. The mere subsequent non-utilisation of the acquired land, even assuming the same to be factually correct, does not by itself have the effect of divesting the State of the title which stood acquired pursuant to the concluded acquisition proceedings. Once the acquisition had been completed in accordance with the then prevailing statutory regime and the land had vested in the acquiring authority in accordance with law, the petitioner cannot claim restoration of the land as a matter of course merely by offering to refund the compensation received nearly two decades ago. 9. Equally, the subsequent enactment of the Act of 2013 cannot be utilised as a mechanism to reopen a concluded acquisition of the year 2007 in the absence of any statutory provision conferring such a right in the facts of the present case. Section 101 of the Act 6 of 2013 operates within the statutory scheme of that enactment and cannot, merely on the allegation of subsequent non-utilisation, be invoked to unsettle an acquisition which had already been completed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and had attained finality. 10. It is also significant that the petitioner has not challenged the legality of the acquisition proceedings or the award dated 17.05.2007. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the acquisition itself was vitiated by fraud, lack of jurisdiction, violation of mandatory statutory provisions, or any other legally sustainable ground warranting interference at this belated stage. The petitioner’s case essentially rests on the subsequent alleged non-utilisation of the acquired land. Such subsequent circumstance, by itself, cannot revive a right in favour of the erstwhile landowner after the acquisition has become final and the compensation has been accepted. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Govt. of A.P. and another v. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558, while considering the issue of restitution of acquired land on the ground of its subsequent non- utilisation, has reiterated the settled legal position that once the land has been acquired and has vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, mere non-utilisation of the acquired land for the purpose for which it was initially acquired does not confer any right upon the erstwhile owner to seek restitution or 7 reconveyance of such land. Referring to its earlier decisions, including Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405 and Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh, (2003) 1 SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that land acquired for a public purpose may be utilised for any other public purpose and that mere non- utilisation does not entitle the erstwhile owner, who has already received adequate compensation, to seek restitution of the acquired land. The relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow:- “12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 406) “2. … We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended 8 that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” 13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [(2003) 1 SCC 335] referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil [(1996) 6 SCC 405] and other cases held that: (SCC p. 340, para 12) “12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land.” Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340) “10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification. 11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] it is 9 held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose.” 14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order.” 12. The aforesaid legal position has been further reiterated and authoritatively explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others, (2020) 8 SCC 129, while considering the scope and applicability of Section 101 of the Act of 2013. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after examining the scheme of the Act of 2013, has categorically held that Section 101, which provides for return of unutilised land, operates only in respect of land acquired under the Act of 2013 and cannot be invoked in relation to an acquisition made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The relevant 10 observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are extracted hereinbelow:- “Return of Unutilised Land under the 2013 Act 363. It was submitted that Section 101 provides for return of unutilised land under the 2013 Act. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilised for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 101 reads as under: “101. Return of unutilised land.—When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilised for a period of five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “Land Bank” means a governmental entity that focuses on the conversion of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilised acquired lands and 11 tax-delinquent properties into productive use.” 364. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return of unutilised land. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the 1894 Act. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the 2013 Act as the expression used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilised”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the 1894 Act. Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 101 of the 2013 Act. Five years' logic has been carried into effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the land remaining unutilised under Section 24(2).” 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid judicial precedents, it is quite vivid that the land in question was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, pursuant to the acquisition proceedings which culminated in the award dated 17.05.2007. The petitioner 12 accepted the compensation determined under the said award and did not challenge either the acquisition proceedings or the award within the permissible statutory framework. Consequently, the acquisition attained finality and the acquired land stood vested in the State in accordance with law. 14. In such circumstances, the subsequent alleged non-utilisation of the acquired land, by itself, does not confer any enforceable right upon the petitioner to seek restitution or reconveyance of the land, nor can Section 101 of the Act of 2013 be invoked to reopen or unsettle an acquisition which had already been completed under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The mere willingness of the petitioner to refund the compensation received by her also cannot alter the legal consequence flowing from a concluded acquisition and vesting of the land in the State. 15. The contention that the petitioner is ready and willing to refund the compensation also does not alter the legal position. The validity and finality of a completed acquisition cannot be made dependent upon the unilateral willingness of the erstwhile landowner to refund the compensation. The question whether acquired land is presently required by the State or whether it should be utilised for any particular public purpose falls within the domain of the competent authority, and mere non-utilisation at a particular point of time does not confer an automatic right of re-conveyance upon the erstwhile owner. 13 16. Thus, having regard to the admitted position that the acquisition proceedings were initiated and concluded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the award was passed on 17.05.2007, compensation was determined and accepted by the petitioner, and the acquisition has remained unchallenged for all these years, this Court finds no legally enforceable right in favour of the petitioner to seek return of the acquired land merely on the ground of its alleged non-utilisation. 17. In view of the fact that the land in question was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the acquisition proceedings stood concluded with the passing of the award dated 17.05.2007, therefore, the provisions of Section 101 of the Act of 2013, which specifically contemplate return of land acquired under the said Act, have no application to the acquisition in question in the present matter. 18. Consequently, the prayer seeking a direction to the respondents to initiate proceedings under Section 101 of the Act of 2013 for return of the acquired land cannot be granted. The petitioner has not been able to establish any statutory or constitutional right warranting issuance of a writ in the nature sought for. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Sd/-d/- Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh