Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
D/L.6. September 2, 2026. MNS.
FMAT No. 25 of 2026 + CAN 1 of 2026
Sri Kamaljit Singh Vs. Sri Sanat Ray and another
Mr. Sobham Majumder, Ms. Kalpita Paul, Advs.
… for the appellant.
1. The present appeal has been preferred against an
order of temporary injunction granted in connection with a suit for specific performance of contract filed by the plaintiffs/respondents.
2.
Learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant submits that the foundational facts required to get an injunction in a suit for specific performance were not satisfied to make out a prima facie case.
3. First, learned counsel points out that in the agreement-in-question, the time of one year from the date of the agreement was stipulated for payment of the balance consideration. However, nowhere in the plaint has it been averred that any attempt was made by the plaintiffs/respondents to make such payment within the said period.
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4.
Learned counsel further urges that in the absence of any pleadings to that effect, the suit for specific performance is not maintainable at all.
5.
Learned counsel further submits, by placing reliance on the agreement, a copy of which is handed over to us at the time of hearing, that no proof of the plaintiffs having tendered the balance consideration during the relevant period has been furnished before the trial court. 6. Moreover, it is vague as to when the plaintiffs first got information that the defendant has arranged vacant possession of the suit property. 7. Thus, it is submitted that the timeline stipulated in the agreement was not met. 8. However, on a plain reading of the agreement-in- question, we find that the stipulation of one year for payment of the balance consideration amount by the plaintiffs/respondents was circumscribed by the further rider that the defendant/appellant had to vacate the suit premises from the occupants thereon within a period of one year. 9. In the event no such vacant possession could be handed over, the stipulated time of one year would be further extended and only after the property was fully vacated, the deed would be registered pursuant to the agreement. 10. Also, we find in paragraph no. 7 of the plaint that the plaintiffs averred that they got information that the defendant had arranged vacant possession of the property
3 and effected boundary walls and accordingly the plaintiffs requested the defendant to execute and register the deed. Finding no other way, upon the defendant having refused to do so, as per paragraph no. 8 of the plaint, the plaintiffs issued a notice on August 14, 2019. 11. In paragraph no. 10 of the plaint, it has been alleged that in spite of the receipt of the notice, the defendant did not respond to the same; rather, the plaintiffs got information that the defendant is going to sell the property mentioned in the schedule to third parties in spite of the existence of the agreement. 12. It may be noted that the entire cause of action as pleaded in the plaint took place within the limitation period of three years even from the date of the agreement. 13. We also take note of the change of law in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Whereas previously it was mandatory for the plaintiffs to plead in the plaint as to their readiness and willingness (which they have, in any event, done in the present case), it is now for the plaintiffs only to prove at the time of trial such readiness and willingness. 14. As such, non furnishing of any particular document at the time of obtaining the injunction, regarding balance
consideration having been tendered to the defendant, does not vitiate the prima facie case made out on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the injunction application.
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15. Thus, we find that the learned Trial Judge was justified in granting injunction on the premise that a prima facie case was made out and the other tests governing the grant of injunction were satisfied on the averments made on oath in the plaint and the injunction application.
16. Hence, there is no scope of interference in the present appeal.
17. Accordingly, FMAT No. 25 of 2026 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
18. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is also disposed of as well.
19. We make it clear that the observations made above are tentative and shall not influence the learned Trial Judge in any manner while deciding the suit.
20. There will be no order as to costs.
21. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.
(Sandip Kumar De, J.) (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)