01.9.2026 Sl. 12 Subadip Court No.655 CRA 112 of 1999 In the matter of : Dr. Subrata Basu, Food Insp. C.M.C. ….Appellant Mr. Kusal Kumar Mukherjee ….for the appellant/ (KMC) Mr. Sukanta Das, Smt. A. Bera Maiti ….for the respondent/O.P. 1. Learned Advocate representing the Kolkata Municipal Corporation/appellant/complainant is present. 2. Accused/opposite party is also represented by the learned Advocate. 3. The instant appeal has been preferred challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 12th November, 1997 passed by the learned Senior Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta, in connection with Case No. ID of 1986, whereby the learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the materials and evidence on record, found the accused opposite party not guilty of the charge under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and consequently acquitted him from the said charge. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal, the present appeal was 2 preferred at the instance of the appellant/complainant in the year 1999. It appears from the record that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal was pronounced by the learned Trial Court on 12th November, 1997, whereas the appeal came to be filed only on 1st March, 1999. Thus, there is a substantial delay in preferring the appeal. 5. At the very outset, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant fairly submits that the appeal was not preferred within the period prescribed by the relevant statutory provision. It is further apparent from the record that neither in the memorandum of appeal nor by way of any separate application has the appellant/complainant sought condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. There is, therefore, no application before this Court explaining the delay or seeking exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction for condoning the same. 6. It is true that, by an order dated 4th May, 1999, a Coordinate Bench of this Court granted leave to the complainant to prefer the appeal. However, the grant of leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal cannot, by itself, be construed as condonation of the delay in filing such appeal. The two requirements operate in different fields. Leave to appeal concerns the statutory requirement for maintaining an appeal against an order of acquittal, whereas limitation concerns the period within which the appellate remedy has to be invoked. Compliance with the former requirement does not automatically dispense with the latter. 7. The question of limitation is not a mere technicality which can be ignored where the statute prescribes a definite period for 3 preferring an appeal. A party seeking to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Court after expiry of the prescribed period is required to satisfy the Court as to the cause of such delay and, where the law permits, to seek condonation by making an appropriate application. 8. In the present case, the chronology of events assumes significance. The judgment and order of acquittal was passed on 12th November, 1997, whereas the appeal was filed on 1st March, 1999. The record does not disclose any application seeking condonation of the intervening delay. There is also no explanation placed before this Court from which it can be ascertained as to why the appellant/complainant could not prefer the appeal within the statutory period of limitation. 9. It appears from the report dated 10.03.1999 submitted by the learned Assistant Registrar of the Department that the application seeking special leave to prefer the appeal has been found to be within time and otherwise in proper form. However, the mere endorsement or report of the Department that the application for special leave is “in time and in form” cannot, by itself, have the effect of condoning or otherwise curing any delay that may have occurred in the filing of the appeal itself. The question of limitation is a matter governed by the applicable statutory provisions and cannot be dispensed with merely on the basis of an administrative report. 10.It is further relevant to note that the order dated 4th May, 1999 granting leave to prefer the appeal was passed after the appeal had already been lodged. Therefore, such order granting leave cannot, in the absence of any specific adjudication on the 4 question of delay, be construed as an order extending, enlarging or condoning the statutory period of limitation prescribed for preferring the appeal. 11.Learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party has also fairly conceded the aforesaid position and submits that, in the absence of any application for condonation of delay, the appeal cannot be proceeded with on merits. 12.This Court is conscious of the fact that ordinarily procedural provisions are intended to advance the cause of justice and that a litigant should not, in an appropriate case, be deprived of a remedy merely on account of a procedural lapse. However, the question before this Court is not merely one of procedural irregularity. The appellant seeks to invoke a statutory appellate remedy after expiry of the prescribed period, without making any prayer for condonation of the delay and without placing before the Court any explanation whatsoever for the delay. The Court cannot, in the absence of a proper application and a satisfactory explanation, condone the delay suo motu and thereby enlarge the period of limitation. 13.Having considered the entire factual and procedural position, this Court finds that the present appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and that no application has been filed seeking condonation of the delay. In the absence of any prayer for condonation and any explanation for the delay, the appellate Court cannot overlook the statutory bar of limitation and proceed to examine the appeal on its merits. 14.Accordingly, this Court holds that the present appeal is barred by limitation and is not maintainable in its present form. Since 5 the statutory period of limitation had already expired before the appeal was presented and there is no application seeking condonation of the delay, no further consideration of the merits of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is called for. 15.Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed as barred by limitation. 16.Let a copy of this order be sent down to the learned Trial Court forthwith for information and necessary action. 17.The records, if any, be transmitted to the learned Trial Court in accordance with law. 18.Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)