L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 Serial No. 2 Suppl Cause List IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR LPA No. 27/2026 in HCP No. 339/2024 Reserved on: 31.08.2026 Pronounced on: 01.10.2026. Uploaded on: 01.10.2026. Whether the operative part or full judgment is pronounced: Full Sami Ullah Dar Through his Father Mohammad Ramzan Dar R/o. Dogripora Awantipora, District Pulwama …Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s). Through: Mr. Syed Sajad Geelani, Advocate Vs. 1. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir through Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar 2. District Magistrate, Pulwama ...Respondent(s). Through: Mr. Jahangir Ahmad Dar, GA CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE JUDGMENT (Per-Mohd Yousuf Wani-J) 1. Impugned in this Letters Patent Appeal is the judgment dated 29.12.2025 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of this Court in HCP No. 339/2024 titled “Sami Ullah Dar vs. UT of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr”, whereby the petition impugning the detention order No. 33/DMP/PSA/24, dated: 09.09.2024 issued by the respondent No. 2, in respect of the appellant, was dismissed as meritless. L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 2 2. The appellant came to be detained by the respondent No. 2 [hereinafter referred to as the “Detaining Authority” for short] in exercise of its powers under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 [hereinafter referred to as the “PSA” for short] with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. 3. Aggrieved by the detention order No. 33/DMP/PSA/24, dated: 09.09.2024 of the Ld. Detaining Authority, the appellant/detenu assailed the same before this Court through HCP No. 339/2024 which, however, came to be dismissed by the Ld. Single Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 29.12.2025 as meritless. 4. The impugned judgment has been assailed in this Letters Patent Appeal on the grounds inter alia that the Ld. Writ Court has not appreciated the case of the appellant/detenue as the impugned detention order was not passed on any legally justifiable grounds. That the impugned detention order was issued by the respondent No. 2 on the basis of a mere apprehension that the appellant/detenue may cause any interruption in the peaceful conduct of the Assembly Elections of 2024, when there was no plausible or a reasonable cause for the respondent No. 2 to proceed on such an assumption. That the representation filed by the appellant/detenue through his father against his unjustified detention was rejected on the sole ground of the then forthcoming Assembly Elections. L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 3 That the Assembly Elections came to be conducted smoothly and without any sort of interruption especially in the local constituency of the appellant/detenue where more than 65% voters exercised their right to vote. That the appellant/detenue was falsely and frivolously implicated in two case FIRs bearing Nos. 160/2018 of Police Station, Awantipora and 90/2018 of Police Station, Kralgund, Handwara, in both of which he was released on bail by the court of competent jurisdiction. That after his release in the two case FIRs in the year 2018, no fresh anti-social, anti-national or any other subversive activity was alleged against him. That the appellant/detenue after his release on bail in the aforesaid FIR Nos. started his business as a shopkeeper in Awantipora market where he is running a textile shop for earning his livelihood. That, however, he subsequently in view of Holy Amarnath Ji Yatra and Independence Day celebrations, came to be bound down by the Executive Magistrate concerned in terms of provisions of Sections 107, 151 of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure. That subsequently in view of the General Assembly Elections of September, 2024, he was again bound down in terms of the provisions of Section 128/170 BNS by the concerned Executive Magistrate. That he has never violated the terms and conditions of the bail orders or has ever violated the terms and conditions of the bonds executed by him and on his behalf for keeping good behavior. L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 4 That on 09.09.2024, the appellant/detenue was called by the local police station and was straightway booked under the provisions of the PSA vide impugned detention order dated 09.09.2024. That the impugned detention order came to be passed by the respondent No. 2 in a routine manner without application of mind. That the ld. Detaining Authority while issuing the impugned order has wholly and solely acted on the police dossier, which is evident from the grounds of detention being the replica of the police dossier. That the ld. Writ Court has not appreciated the aforementioned facts and passed the impugned judgment which suffers from patent illegality and perversity. That there was no proximity or live-link between the alleged incidents of 2018 and the passing of the impugned detention order in September, 2024, which aspect was not appreciated by the ld. Writ Court. That the Ld. Writ Court also did not appreciate the fact that the respondents, instead of invoking the powers under PSA to illegally justify the appellant’s detention, could have thrown challenge to the bail orders. That there was no whisper in the grounds of detention that the appellant/detenue has violated any condition of the bail orders or of personal/surety bonds executed by him before the Executive Magistrate assuring the keeping of good behavior. That the Detaining Authority while passing the impugned detention order, observed the mandatory constitutional guarantees in breach by not providing the copy of the detention record in full to the L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 5 detenue and also by not informing him at an earliest that he has a right to make representation to the Detaining Authority as well as to the Government. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties in respect of the matter. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/detenue while reiterating his stand taken in detail in the memo of the LPA contended that the impugned judgment of the ld. Writ Court dated 29.12.2025 suffers from patent illegality and perversity as the Ld. Single Bench has not appreciated the facto legal scenario of the case. He contended that there was no justification under law for detention of the appellant under the provisions of PSA. He contended that the appellant was falsely involved in two case FIRs in 2018 in which he was bailed out by the competent Special Court after being satisfied that there appear no reasonable grounds of his involvement in the said cases. He contended that in view of the bar created under Section 43D of the ULA(P) Act, the ld. Designated Court could not have bailed the appellant out unless observing that there appear no reasonable grounds of his involvement in the cases pending trial. The learned counsel further contended that there was nothing on record available with the ld. Detaining Authority to the effect of violation of any bail conditions by the appellant/detenue. He contended that the bail orders granted in favour of the appellant were not at all thrown to challenge, in accordance with the law, by the respondents. L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 6 The learned counsel contended that the appellant’s detention came to be ordered only on the mere apprehension of his disturbing the peaceful holding of the then forthcoming Assembly Elections, 2024. He further contended that the appellant, on the requirement of the respondents, voluntarily executed the bonds before the Ld. Executive Magistrate concerned for assuring his good behavior and he never broke such assurance. He further contended that the appellant/detenue, after his release in 2018, started his business in Awantipora market and there was no allegation of his involvement in any anti-national or anti-social activity. The learned counsel contended that the detention of the appellant/petitioner on unjustified grounds is violative of his fundamental rights guaranteed to him under Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as also of this Court cited as: i. Dhanya M vs State of Kerala & Ors Criminal Appeal No. 2897/2025 decided on 6th June, 2025. ii. Tahir Riyaz Dar vs UT of J&K and Ors in LPA No. 121/2025 decided on 06.11.2025 8. The learned counsel prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment as well as the impugned detention order. L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 7 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the impugned judgment of the Ld. Writ Court is manifestly in accordance with the law and does not suffer from any sort of illegality. He contended that the activities of the appellant/detenue upon being found prejudicial to the security of the State, his detention order was issued by the Detaining Authority on the recommendation of the District Police Office made through dossier. He contended that the case against the appellant/detenue was examined by the Detaining Authority in accordance with the law and the detention order was issued upon proper application of the mind by the Detaining Authority. He contended that the grounds urged by the appellant in this LPA are legally misconceived, untenable and without any merit and, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. That there was no vagueness or staleness in the grounds of detention. The learned counsel further contended that the object of preventive detention is ‘preventive’ rather than ‘punitive’. He further contended that the preventive detention is not a parallel of the criminal proceeding as the object of the two is almost different. He further contended that whole of the materials relied upon by the Detaining Authority was furnished to the appellant/detenue and the same was read over and explained to him in his local language also. That the appellant/detenue was also informed that he can make a L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 8 representation to the Government as well as to the Detaining Authority against his detention. He further contended that all statutory requirements and constitutional guarantees have been complied with by the Detaining Authority and the impugned order was issued validly and legally. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contentions placed reliance on the judgments cited as “Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198”; “Borjahan Gorev vs. State of West Bengal (1972) 2 SCC 550”; “Ashim Kumar Ray vs. State of West Bengal (1973) 4 SCC 76”; “Abdul Aziz vs District Magistrate, Burdwan (1973) 1 SCC 301”; “Debu Mahato vs. State of West Bengal 1974 AIR (SC) 816”; “Secretary to Govt, Public (Law and Order) and Anr. Vs. Nabila and another (2015) 12 SCC 127”. 11. We have perused the record of the instant intra-court appeal especially the impugned judgment dated 29.12.2025, the impugned detention order dated 09.09.2024 and the grounds of detention dated 09.09.2024. The detention record made available by the respondents has also been gone through. 12. We are of the opinion that there was no proximity or live-link between the incidents of 2018, which led to the registration of case FIR Nos. 160/2018 of Police Station, Awantipora & 90/2018 of Police Station, Kralgund Handwara and the need for passing the impugned detention order. The appellant came to be bailed out in L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 9 both the said FIR Nos. whereafter he reportedly started running a shop at Awantipora market. That, however, he was bailed out in those cases and the respondents did not challenge or sought the cancellation of the said bail orders before the competent court. It is inter alia mentioned in the grounds of detention that the appellant/detenue was subsequently bound down twice by the Executive Magistrate concerned for keeping good behaviour. There is no specific mention in the grounds of detention of any subsequent act or any omission of the appellant/detenue revealing the breach of either any of the bail conditions or of the bonds furnished by and on his behalf before the Executive Magistrate for keeping good behaviour. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant very vehemently pleaded that the impugned detention order was issued without any basis only to facilitate his detention during the period of Assembly Elections of 2024. 14. The order of detention issued on the basis of vague allegations to take care of apprehensions is not justified under law. 15. The respondents have not placed on record anything specific and concrete regarding the involvement of the appellant subsequent to his release in 2018. 16. The Ld. Writ Court has not appreciated the important legal aspect that there was no proximity/live-link between the incidents of 2018 L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 0 and the need for passing of the impugned detention order in September, 2024. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in “Rajinder Arora versus Union of India and Others, AIR (2006) 4 SCC 796”, inter alia, observed: "The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarized thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention are proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. 18. In our opinion, we feel fortified with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case titled “Rameshwar Shaw versus District Magistrate, Burdwan and Another, AIR 1964 SC 334”, the relevant portion whereof is reproduced as under: "In deciding the question as to whether it is necessary to detain a person, the authority has to be satisfied that the said person if not detained may act in a prejudicial manner and this conclusion can be reasonably reached by the authority generally in light of evidence about past prejudicial activities of the said person. When evidence is placed, the Detaining Authority has to examine the said evidence and decide whether it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 1 manner. Thus, it was held that the past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account in making the detention order and it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further the past conduct or history of the person on which the authority purports to act should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have the rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary, that it would be irrational to take into account the conduct of a person which took the place years before the date of detention". 19. We are however conscious of the law as already laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Naresh Kumar Goyal vs. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 276” and “Haradhan Saha vs. State of W.B. (1975) 3 SCC”, to the effect that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-national, anti-social and subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquility or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc. “The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during the prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 2 the prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. The order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution”. “Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of the proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenue”. 20. We are also of the opinion that it is not the number of acts that are determined for detention of an individual but it is the impact of the act which is material and determinative. As hereinbefore mentioned, the impugned detention order appears to have been passed on vague, unverifiable and bald allegations unsupported with any evidence or material. It is unsafe to consider such vague allegations as constituting a past act for deriving any inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of detenue. 21. The grounds of detention basing the impugned detention order apparently look as a “ditto” or “verbatim” of the police dossier, which speaks of the non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. No doubt, the police dossier has to be the basic input and information to the Detaining Authority for consideration of the powers vested in it under the provisions of the PSA. Yet, the application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority is a sine qua non for the passing of the detention order. The Detaining Authority is required under law to make some verification at its own level too by setting into motion its own machinery L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 3 for its subjective satisfaction before proceeding to curtail one's liberty which is only permitted in accordance with law. All the grounds of detention framed by the detaining authority and basing the impugned detention order start by reference to the police dossier. The dossier of the police concerned submitted to the detaining authority and the grounds of detention framed by the latter, when both are kept and perused in juxtaposition, clearly reveal that the detaining authority has followed the police dossier in its entirety. Thus, there is reason to believe that the impugned detention order is bereft of subjective satisfaction and non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. 22. In “Jai Singh and Others v. State of J&K, AIR 1985 SC 764, decided on 24.01.1985”, the Hon'ble Apex Court, inter alia, observed: "First taking up the case of Jai Singh, the first of the petitioners before us, a perusal of the grounds of detention shows that it is a verbatim reproduction of the dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Udhampur, to the District Magistrate requesting that a detention order may kindly be issued. At the top of the dossier, the name is mentioned as Sardar Jai Singh, father's name is mentioned as Sardar Ram Singh and the address is given as village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi. Thereafter it is recited "The subject is an important member of ......" Thereafter follow various allegations against Jai Singh, paragraph by paragraph. In the grounds of detention, all that the District Magistrate has done is to change the first three words "the subject is" into "you Jai Singh, S/o Ram Singh, resident of village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi". Thereafter word for word the police dossier is repeated and the word "he" wherever it occurs referring to Jai Singh in the dossier is changed into "you" in the grounds of detention. We are afraid it is difficult to find greater proof of non-application of mind. The liberty of a subject is a serious matter and is not to be trifled with in this casual, indifferent and routine manner." L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 4 23. A Division Bench of this Court, in similar facts and circumstances, in “Showkat Ali versus Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors, LPA No. 19 of 2024, decided on 26-07-2024”, while deliberating upon the necessity of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on the basis of supporting material, has, in paras 10 to 14, made the following observations: “10. There is a plethora of judgements of the Supreme Court and the various high Courts of the country on the aspect of "subjective satisfaction" to be arrived at by the detaining authority which would reflect the application of mind on its part. The main grounds for setting aside an order of preventive detention are the non-application of mind of the detaining authority or the denial of opportunity or material to the detenue to enable him to make an effective representation against his detention. That brings this court to the question as to whether subjective satisfaction can be arrived at by the detaining authority only based on bald allegations in the police dossier, without there being any facts/material in support of those allegations? 11. Before proceeding further, certain questions come to the mind of this Court. (a) Firstly, is there any difference between an "Allegation" and "Charge"? and (b) secondly, if there is a difference between the two, is there a variation in their application qua a criminal trial and in proceedings under the preventive detention laws? And (c) thirdly, what is required in the grounds of detention, an allegation or a charge? 12. An allegation is an imputation. It need not be verifiable. Charge on the other hand is also an imputation, albeit verifiable. An imputation without material in support is an allegation and an imputation with supporting material is a charge which prima facie reflects that what is imputed, maybe true. Thus, allegation is the genus and charge its species. By analogy, the concept can be understood at the stage of framing charge in a criminal trial. The chargesheet filed by the police may level several allegations against the accused in the chargesheet but, the Trial Court frames charge for only those L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 5 allegations for which prima facie evidence exists in the chargesheet. While an allegation may be generalised, non- specific and broad based, a charge must be specific, precise and accord a reasonable opportunity to the person so charged to conduct his defence or proffer an explanation. Thus, a verifiable allegation/imputation is a charge. 13. To answer the second question that this Court has posed to itself, this Court is of the opinion that there is a marked difference in the operation of "charge" in a criminal trial and in proceedings under the preventive detention laws. In a criminal trial, the one who imputes i.e., the prosecution, bears the onus probandi of proving every single charge against the accused which if not proved beyond reasonable doubt, may result in the acquittal of the accused. While, in proceedings under the preventive detention laws, the onus probandi of giving a convincing explanation to the imputations levelled by the detaining authority, is on the detenue and if the same satisfies the detaining authority or the advisory board, his detention may be revoked. 14. As regards the third question as to what is required to be stated in the grounds of detention viz., allegations or charge, this Courtis of the view that the grounds of detention must lay down the charge against the detenue. It must be precise, unequivocal and unambiguous. The detenue must be in a position to give a specific reply/rebuttal to the charge and that is only possible where charge is specific and precise. Else, the detenue is only able to give a bare denial by stating that the allegation is false. However, if the charge is specific regarding the date, time and the specific act of the detenue which requires him to be taken into preventive detention then, the detenue is able to give a specific response of denial rather than a bare denial. Thus, this Court is of the view that the grounds of detention must lay down the specific charge against the detenue rather than unsubstantiated and unverifiable allegations. If the grounds of detention are based on unsubstantiated allegations, the same, along with the order of detention can be quashed as the detenue has not been given an opportunity to make a viable representation either to the detaining authority or to the advisory board. The opportunity to represent to the abovementioned authorities is not a hollow L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 6 formality. To detain a person only based on allegations without there being any material to substantiate those allegations would imperil the fundamental right of the individual enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution. 24. It has been averred in the instant LPA and was also pleaded in the learned Writ Court that the Detaining Authority did not furnish to the appellant/detenue the copies of the detention record in full at the time of his arrest pursuant to the impugned detention order, which prevented him from making an effective and meaningful representation at the earliest. 25. It is the case of the appellant/detenue that the result of the representation made by him through his father was not communicated to him. A careful perusal of the detention order dated 09-09-2024 as also of the following communication order, conjointly reveals that the appellant/detenue has not been informed in clear and unambiguous terms regarding his right to make a representation at an earliest to the detaining authority as also to the Government. 26. Non-supply of the entire set of documents basing and referred to in the detention order at an earliest contravenes the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The Constitutional mandate regarding information to the petitioner/detenu that he has a right to make representation to the detaining authority or to the Government in respect of his preventive detention is not to be taken as a mere formality by making mention of the words, "the detenu was also informed that he can make a representation to the detaining authority or to the government in respect of his preventive detention" in the previously cyclostyled/ computerized receipts but is meant to be followed with utmost fairness, responsibility and accountability L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 7 having regard to the fact that detenu's fundamental right to life and personal liberty is being curtailed on account of his apprehended conduct. The detaining authority and the government in case of making any representation by the detenu to them as regards his detention are under a constitutional obligation to accord due consideration under law to the same and to intimate the result of the consideration to the detenu through the concerned jail authority or through his home people. 27. The relevant portion of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled "Shalini Soni Vs. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 544", deserves a needful mention as under: - "The Article 22 (5) has two facets (1) communication of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; (2) opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Communication of the grounds pre-supposes the formulation of the grounds and formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say to pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case and excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism (if one may be permitted to use the word to describe a mechanical reaction without a conscious application of the mind). It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision but the grounds on which the decision is founded. It is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the decision to detain a person depends on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 8 detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu. From what we have said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the second facet of Article 22(5). An opportunity to make representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but of all the factual material which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. Whatever angle from which the question is looked at, it is dear that "grounds" in Article 22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The 'grounds' must self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies documents to which reference is made in the 'grounds' may be supplied to the detenu as part of the 'grounds'." 28. In “Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1999 (1) SCC 417”, it has been held that: "It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be in clause (5) of Article 22 convey the message that the representation. should be considered and disposed of at the earliest." 29. In "K. M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Unio of India (1991) 1 SCC 476", it has been held as follows: ".... it is settled law that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would be breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal." L P A N o . 2 7 / 2 0 2 6 i n H C P N o . 3 3 9 / 2 0 2 4 P a g e N o . 1 9 30. In “A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271”, it was held at para 70 of the judgment as under: - "70. We have the authority of the decisions in... for saying that the fundamental rights conferred by the different articles of Part III of the Constitution are not mutually exclusive and that therefore, a law of preventive detention which falls within Article 22 must also meet the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21." 31. In the backdrop of the foregoing facto legal scenario of the case, we allow the instant Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated 29.12.2025 of the ld. Writ Court passed in HCP No. 339/2025. Consequently, the impugned detention order bearing No. 33/DMP/PSA/24, dated: 09.09.2024 passed by the respondent No. 2- District Magistrate, Pulwama in respect of the appellant also stands quashed. 32. As a result, the appellant/detenue- Sami Ullah Dar, S/o. Mohammad Ramzan Dar R/o. Dogripora Awantipora, District Pulwama is directed to be released from his preventive detention in this case, if not already released. 33. The detention record is directed to be returned back. (MOHD YOUSUF WANI) (SANJEEV KUMAR) JUDGE JUDGE SRINAGAR 01.10.2026 Shahid Manzoor Whether the Judgment is Speaking Yes Whether approved for reporting Yes