Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Chhattisgarh · body

2026 DAILYLAW 37889 (CHH)

BAJRANG LAL v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRMP/2540/2026 · 2026-09-27

Shri Parth Prateem Sahu

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

-1- CGHC010378332026 2026:CGHC:42264 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2540 of 2026 Bajrang Lal S/o Shri Radhe Lal, Aged About 54 Years R/o. Village - Dudga Katghora, Tahsil- Katghora, Distt.- Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate Korba, Distt.- Korba (C.G.) 2 - Puniram S/o. -Bhujbal Aged About 65 Years R/o. Village -Dudga Katghora, Tahsil- Katghora, Distt.- Korba (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Samir Singh, Advocate For State : Mr. Avinash Singh, Govt. Advocate S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Order On Board 28/09/2026 1. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) has been filed by the petitioner against order dated 07.09.2026 passed in Criminal Revision No.15/2026 by learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District- Korba whereby revision filed by the petitioner against order dated 07.07.2026 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora framing charges against him under Sections 420, 467, 468 of Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.10.01 11:06:22 +0530 -2- IPC, has been dismissed. 2. Facts necessary for disposal of the present petition, in brief, are that respondent No.2/complainant instituted a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora, alleging that land bearing Khasra No.169/3-A, admeasuring 0.20 acre, situated at Village Junadihi, originally belonged to the complainant and was acquired by SECL in the year 1985-86. It was further alleged that the said land had been purchased by the complainant from one Phagundas and that, upon subsequent subdivision of the original Khasra No.169 into 15 separate khasras, khasra No.169/3-A was recorded in the name of the complainant and was thereafter acquired by SECL. According to the complainant, petitioner was never in possession of the said land and he secured employment in SECL against the acquisition of the said land by manipulating the revenue records and submitting forged and fabricated documents. 3. On the basis of the allegations made in the complaint, the complaint case was registered against the petitioner, whereafter notices were issued and statements were recorded. Upon consideration of the material available on record, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora, vide order dated 07.07.2026, found prima facie material to proceed against the petitioner and accordingly framed charges for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Criminal Revision No.15/2026 before the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 07.09.2026, which is under challenge in this petition. -3- 4. Assailing legality and validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that land bearing khasra No. 169/3-A, admeasuring 0.20 acre, acquired by SECL in 1985-86, is entirely different from the petitioner's land bearing khasra No. 169/16, the original khasra No. 169 having subsequently been divided into 15 separate khasras; hence, the complaint lodged against the petitioner was not maintainable. Learned jurisdictional Magistrate framed charges without any material disclosing the essential ingredients of the alleged offences, while the learned Revisional Court failed to properly consider the petitioner's grounds and prima facie case. The complaint was filed in 2015, registered in 2020, and charges were framed only on 07.07.2026, resulting in prolonged and unwarranted harassment. It is further submitted that SECL has neither initiated any departmental inquiry nor alleged that the petitioner obtained employment or continued in service on the basis of forged documents, and therefore, the prosecution of the petitioner is wholly unsustainable and liable to be quashed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent would oppose the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and would further submit that material collected during the course of inquiry/investigation, coupled with the statements and documents available on record, prima facie disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner and were sufficient for framing of charges. Impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with this petition. -4- 7. Before proceeding to consider the merits of the case, it would be apposite to refer to the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (similar to Section 482 of old Cr.P.C), which reads as under: “528. Saving inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 8. The aforesaid provision preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to pass appropriate orders for securing the ends of justice and for preventing abuse of the process of any Court. However, such jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised sparingly, with due caution and circumspection, particularly when interference is sought against an order framing charge. 9. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to consider only the material available on record, to see whether it discloses grounds for proceeding against the accused. The correctness of the allegations is not to be appreciated at this stage. The Court is only to look into the material placed before it, to determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding, that is, whether the prosecution has made out a case for trial. It is not required to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or to weigh and balance evidence and probabilities, which is the function of the Court once the trial begins. At the stage of charge, the Court need only be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against -5- the accused. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander & anr, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has laid down the guidelines for considering the challenge to framing of charge and the same are extracted below for ready reference:- “27.Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be : 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the -6- documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. -7- 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11.Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The -8- Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution. 27.13.Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173 (2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.” 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu By Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Vs. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors. and connected matter (2014) 11 SCC 709 has observed thus:- “29. …..... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our -9- opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 12. Applying the settled legal position to the present case, and on perusal of the documents annexed to the petition, this Court finds that the allegations and the material on record prima facie disclose sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioner for the alleged offences. The petitioner's contentions concern the distinction between Khasra No.169/3- A and Khasra No.169/16, the subdivision of the original Khasra No.169, the genuineness of, or manipulation in, the revenue entries, and the documents relied upon by the petitioner. These raise disputed questions of fact which require appreciation of evidence. They cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of framing of charge, or in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS challenging such framing. The learned Magistrate, on considering the material on record, found sufficient ground to frame charges under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC, and the Revisional Court rightly declined to interfere. The absence of any departmental proceeding by SECL, or the outcome of any revenue proceedings, does not by itself exonerate the petitioner or negate the alleged criminal liability. Likewise, delay in the institution or registration of the complaint and in the framing of charge is not, by itself, sufficient to quash proceedings where prima facie material exists on record. Its effect -10- may be considered by the trial Court after appreciation of evidence. This Court cannot, at the stage of framing of charge, substitute its own appreciation of the disputed factual material for that of the trial Court. The allegations, taken at their face value along with the material relied upon by the complainant and the prosecution, are sufficient to warrant the petitioner's trial. The defence raised by the petitioner may be considered by the trial Court at the appropriate stage, after the parties adduce their evidence. No ground is therefore made out for exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. 13. Consequently, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, perversity or patent illegality in the impugned order dated 07.09.2026 passed by revisional Court affirming order of framing of charge against the petitioner passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora, Korba. 14. Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed. Sd/-/-/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Praveen