1 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 CGHC010469922025 2026:CGHC:41934-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 1. Sushil Agrawal S/o Late Hetram Agrawal, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Baradwar Sakti, District Sakti C.G. 2. Satish Agrawal S/o Late Hetram Agrawal, Aged About 62 Years, R/o Baradwar Sakti, District Sakti C.G. 3. Shantanu Agrawal S/o Shri Satish Agrawal, Aged About 35 Years, R/o Naya Baradwar, Police Station Naya Baradwar Sakti, District Sakti C.G. ... Petitioners versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Baradwar, District Sakti C.G. 2. Dhruw Kumar Agrawal S/o Mahaveer Prasad Agrawal, Aged About 53 Years, R/o Ward No. 5, Baradwar, Police Station Baradwar, District Sakti C.G. ... Respondents For Petitioners :- Mr. Manoj Paranjape, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Mayank Gupta, Advocate. For State :- Mr. Amit Buxy, Dy. Government Advocate. For Respondent No.2 :- Mr. Sunil Otwani, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Prashant Dansena, Advocate. (Division Bench) (Hon’ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas, Hon’ble Shri Justice Sudhir Kumar) ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Digitally signed by ANKIT KUMAR SINGH 2 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 Order on Board 26.09.2026 1. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the petitioners assailing the registration of FIR bearing Crime No.373/2020 dated 24.12.2020, registered at Police Station Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa, now Sakti, Chhattisgarh, for commission of offence under Section 409, 420 and 120 of IPC as well as charge-sheet/final report bearing No.34/2025 submitted by the prosecution before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant has lodged the complaint alleging that petitioner No.1, Shushil Agrawal, who was the then Councillor of Ward No.6 of Baradwar, misusing his power and allotted the shop to his nephew Shantanu Agrawal, petitioner No.3 herein, which was issued by the State Government under Mukhyamantri Swawlamban Yojana. Thereafter, prosecution after investigation submitted charge-sheet. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that petitioner No.3 has already returned the shop on 11.06.2012, much prior to registration of the FIR which was registered on 24.12.2020 i.e. after 8 years of returning the shop. Thus, he would submit that registration of FIR is nothing but abuse of the process of law. He 3 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 would further submit that inter se dispute is going on between the complainant and petitioner No.1, therefore, he filed complaint after 8 years of returning of shop. As such, he would pray for quashing of FIR as well as charge-sheet subsequently filed. 4. Learned counsel for the State and complainant would submit that the material collected by the prosecution prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner which cannot be ignored. It has further been submitted that surrendering the shop and subsequently the cancellation of whole allotment are not relevant ground for quashing of charge-sheet at this juncture, even these are the relevant factor while considering the quantum of the offence committed by the petitioner. Thus, they would pray for dismissal of the present CRMP. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions made herein above and gone through the records precisely. 6. Considering the submissions made by petitioner in his defence and the fact that the petitioner has subsequently, returned shop and also considering the prima facie involvement of the petitioners in the crime in question, this Court is of the opinion not to interfere in the proceedings which is going on against the petitioners as it is well settled position of law that normally High 4 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 Court can only interfere where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice in light of decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Accamma Sam Jacob vs. The State of Karnataka & Another Etc.1. Their Lordships have held in paragraphs 52, 54 and 56 as under:- “52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse complainant the and application examine filed whether by the facts disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in interfering with such an exercise of power and ought to intervene only where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice. 54. The facts in the case at hand manifest that the High Court proceeded to examine documents relied upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same as determinative of the dispute and observed that the sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first, before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope of 1 2026 INSC 362 5 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section 482 of CrPC. Consideration of defence material, including sale deeds or other title documents would necessarily involve adjudication on disputed questions of fact, which fall squarely within the domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of CrPC would amount to conducting a mini-trial and would be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence material to be weighed at the threshold would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an investigation by the police. 56. In the facts and circumstances noted above, it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.” 7. Coming to the facts of the present case in light of principles of law laid down in the aforementioned judgment, we are of the view that the submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners are defence and same can be taken before the trial Court only. Thus, the instant CRMP stands disposed off by granting liberty to the petitioners to raise all their defence before the concerned trial Court and also directed the trial Court shall consider and decide the petitioners’ case without being prejudiced by the disposal of this CRMP. 8. It is made clear that this Court has not stepped into the merits of 6 CRMP No. 3394 of 2025 the case, as such, the trial Court has directed to go through the contention made by parties and decide the case on its own merit. The interim relief granted earlier, stands vacated. 9. However, petitioners are at liberty to move application for grant of exemption from appearance under Section 228 of the BNNS or 205 of the CRPC as the petitioners have already granted bail. 10. With the aforesaid observation / direction the instant CRMP stands disposed off. Sd/- Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge (Sudhir Kumar) Judge Ankit