IN THE HIGH Court OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (i) CM-16337-CII-2026 in/and FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) Jaswant and another . . . Appellants vs. Sandeep . . . . Respondent * * ** (ii) CM-16365-CII-2026 in/and FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) Jaswant and another . . . Appellants vs. Sonu . . . . Respondent * * ** Reserved on: August 26, 2026 Pronounced on: August 27, 2026 Pronounced fully/operative part : Fully * * * * CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued By:- Mr. Dushyant Rana, Advocate for the appellants. DEEPAK GUPTA, J. These two appeals have been filed by the driver and owner of the offending vehicle assailing the common award dated 21.08.2024 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhiwani (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’). Both the appeals are accompanied by separate applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 633 days in filing the appeals. 2. Since the appeals are admittedly delayed, the applications seeking condonation of delay are required to be considered before examining the appeals on merits. SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that appellant No.1- owner had been proceeded against ex parte before the Tribunal and, therefore, had no knowledge of the passing of the award. According to the explanation furnished, he came to know about the award only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings. Thereafter, he obtained the certified copy of the award, collected the necessary documents and sought legal advice, whereafter the present appeal came to be filed. It is submitted that the resultant delay of 633 days was neither intentional nor deliberate and deserves to be condoned in the interest of substantial justice. 4. The explanation furnished does not, however, inspire confidence. 5. The record reveals that appellant No.1 was proceeded against ex parte during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, vide order dated 23.02.2023. There is no material placed on record to show that, after having knowledge of the proceedings, appellant No.1 took any steps before the Tribunal for setting aside the order, whereby he was proceeded against ex parte. More importantly, the application does not disclose the date on which he allegedly received notice of the execution proceedings, nor does it satisfactorily explain the time consumed thereafter in obtaining the award, collecting documents, seeking legal advice and filing the appeal. 6. It is settled that length of delay is not, by itself, decisive and the expression ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to receive a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation. At the same time, such liberal approach cannot dispense with the requirement of furnishing a reasonable, bona fide and satisfactory explanation covering the period of delay. The applicant must disclose sufficient cause for the entire period of delay and cannot claim condonation as a matter of right merely by invoking the expression ‘substantial justice’. 7. In the present case, the explanation is conspicuously deficient. The applicants have not placed on record any circumstance beyond their SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) control which prevented them from approaching the Tribunal or this Court within the prescribed period. Mere assertion that the certified copy was subsequently obtained, documents were collected and legal advice was sought does not, in the absence of particulars and dates, constitute sufficient cause for condoning a delay as long as 633 days. 8. There is an additional difficulty in the case of appellant No.2 - driver. The explanation furnished in the applications is essentially with reference to appellant No.1 - owner. No independent or satisfactory explanation has been furnished as to why appellant No.2, who had appeared before the Tribunal could not pursue the proceedings or challenge the award within the prescribed period. Thus, the explanation furnished for one appellant cannot automatically constitute sufficient cause for the other. 9. It is also relevant that an appellant seeking to challenge an ex parte award after an inordinate delay cannot completely ignore the fact that an appropriate remedy was available before the Tribunal for setting aside the ex parte proceedings. The appellants have not explained why no such remedy was pursued and why, instead, they chose to approach this Court after such a substantial lapse of time. 10. The Court is conscious that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is to be construed with a view to advance substantial justice and that a pedantic approach to limitation is not warranted. However, condonation of delay cannot be granted where the explanation is vague, incomplete and does not satisfactorily account for the entire period of delay. A litigant who remains inactive for a substantial period must demonstrate circumstances constituting sufficient cause for such inaction. 11. In the facts and circumstances noticed above, this Court is unable to accept that the appellants have disclosed sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 633 days. 12. Consequently, CM-16337-CII-2026 and CM-16365-CII-2026, filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the respective appeals, are dismissed. SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) 13. In view of dismissal of the applications seeking condonation of delay, the appeals themselves are barred by limitation and are liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed as barred by limitation. 14. In view of the dismissal of the appeals on the ground of limitation, this Court would ordinarily not be required to examine the merits. Nevertheless, since the learned counsel for the appellants has addressed arguments on merits and the matters have been heard at some length, this Court has also examined the challenge to the award. Even on merits, no ground for interference is made out for the reasons recorded hereinafter. On Merits: 15. These two appeals, filed by driver & owner of the offending vehicle, have arisen out of the same motor vehicular accident and are directed against the common award dated 21.08.2024 passed by the Tribunal, whereby compensation of ₹3,46,161/- has been awarded to Sonu in MACP No.89 of 2020/2023; and compensation of ₹73,763/- has been awarded to Sandeep in MACP No.88 of 2020/2023, along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the respective claim petitions till realization. The liability has been fastened jointly and severally upon the driver and owner of the offending motorcycle. 16. Briefly stated, on 21.03.2020 at about 6.00 p.m., Sonu and Sandeep were travelling on motorcycle No. RJ-49SA-9768, with Sandeep riding the motorcycle and Sonu travelling as pillion rider. Near village Rupana, motorcycle No. HR-20AB-5749, driven by respondent No.1-Rangila (appellant No.2 herein), allegedly in a rash and negligent manner, collided with their motorcycle. Both sustained injuries and were taken to Satija Healthcare Hospital, Hisar, where they remained admitted from 21.03.2020 to 24.03.2020. FIR No.90 dated 22.03.2020 under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC was registered against respondent No.1. The offending motorcycle was admittedly not insured. The owner was proceeded against ex parte before the Tribunal. SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) 17. Learned counsel for the appellants has primarily assailed the finding on negligence. It is contended that appellant No.2-driver had already been acquitted by the criminal Court and, therefore, the finding of rash and negligent driving could not have been returned against him. It is further submitted that, as per the testimony of the claimant himself, he was unable to state the speed at which the offending motorcycle was being driven and, therefore, the necessary element of rashness or negligence was not established. The award towards medical expenses has also been questioned on the ground that the bills relied upon by the claimants were not proved in accordance with law. 18. Having considered the submissions and examined the record, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the finding regarding negligence. 19. The fact that the driver may have been acquitted in the criminal proceedings, by itself, cannot result in exoneration from civil liability arising out of a motor accident. The proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are neither criminal proceedings nor governed by the standard of proof applicable to a criminal trial. The claimant is required to establish the accident and negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Strict proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that, once the occurrence of the accident is established, the Tribunal has to take a holistic view of the evidence and the claim cannot be rejected merely because the prosecution may have failed to establish the criminal charge beyond reasonable doubt. 20. In the present case, the Tribunal has noticed the testimony of Sonu as PW4 and Sandeep as PW5. Both are injured witnesses and have consistently deposed regarding the manner in which the accident took place. Their specific case was that the offending motorcycle was being driven rashly and negligently and collided with their motorcycle. The Tribunal specifically recorded that nothing material could be elicited in their cross-examination so as to discredit their testimony and that their version remained consistent. SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) 21. The evidentiary value of the testimony of an injured witness cannot be lightly discarded. Such a witness is ordinarily a natural witness to the occurrence and his presence at the spot is established by the injuries suffered in the very accident. In the present case, the testimony of the injured claimants is further corroborated by the contemporaneous police and medical record. The Tribunal noticed the FIR, the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the statement of Sandeep recorded by the police and the medical record generated immediately after the accident. 22. The submission that the claimant could not specify the exact speed of the offending motorcycle also does not advance the case of the appellants. Proof of a particular numerical speed is not a sine qua non for establishing negligence. The question is whether, on an overall appreciation of the circumstances, the manner of driving was such as to establish negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The inability of an injured person, particularly in the circumstances of a sudden accident, to state the exact speed of a vehicle cannot, by itself, demolish an otherwise credible account of the occurrence. 23. Another important circumstance is that appellant No.2, who was admittedly the driver of the offending motorcycle and was the person best placed to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, did not enter the witness box to rebut the specific allegations made against him. The Tribunal has noticed this aspect while appreciating the evidence. 24. Thus, the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending motorcycle is based upon appreciation of the testimony of the injured witnesses read with the contemporaneous documentary evidence. No perversity or material misreading of evidence has been demonstrated before this Court. 25. The argument based upon acquittal also does not merit acceptance. Apart from the fact that the judgment of acquittal itself was not produced before the Tribunal, as noticed in the award, an acquittal in a SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) criminal case does not automatically wipe out the evidentiary material available in a claim proceeding. The two proceedings operate in different fields and are governed by different standards of proof. 26. Coming to the challenge regarding medical bills, the same also deserves rejection. In the case of Sonu, the Tribunal has specifically noticed that PW1-Mayank, Pharmacist, Nandita Medicos, situated inside Satija Hospital, was summoned and examined for proving the medical bills, which were exhibited and totalled ₹96,161/-. The Tribunal thereafter awarded the said amount towards medical expenses. 27. Likewise, in the case of Sandeep, the medical bills exhibited as Ex.P4 to Ex.P6, Ex.P-9 to Ex.P-11, Ex.P-15A, Ex.P-16B, Ex.P-17 and Ex.P-18, totaling ₹48,763/-, were proved through the same witness. The Tribunal accordingly included the said amount in the compensation awarded to him. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out any specific bill which is forged, fabricated, unrelated to the treatment received in consequence of the accident, or otherwise inadmissible. Merely contending that the bills were not proved in accordance with the strict rules applicable to an ordinary civil trial is insufficient in proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, where the approach is required to be just, pragmatic and consistent with the beneficial object of the legislation. 29. It is also relevant that the medical records show that Sonu suffered a fracture of the right femur and remained admitted in the hospital from 21.03.2020 to 24.03.2020, whereas Sandeep was also medically examined and treated pursuant to the accident. Thus, the medical expenditure claimed has a clear nexus with the injuries sustained in the accident. 30. Before parting, it is noticed that the learned Tribunal, while assessing compensation, has referred to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The accident in the present case occurred on 21.03.2020. Therefore, the said reasoning, insofar as it treats Section 164 as the SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO No.4610 of 2026 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:120761 FAO No.4617 of 2026 (O&M) substantive basis for determination of compensation for this accident, cannot be endorsed. Nevertheless, the appellants have not shown that the amounts actually awarded towards the proved medical expenses or the other components of compensation are otherwise legally unsustainable. The compensation awarded can be examined and sustained on the basis of the claim petitions under Section 166 and the evidence available on record, without giving effect to the Tribunal's reference to Section 164. 31. In any event, the appellants have not been able to demonstrate any perversity, misreading of evidence or patent illegality in the ultimate award warranting interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction. The finding of negligence is supported by the testimony of the two injured witnesses and the contemporaneous documentary evidence, while the medical expenditure has been duly supported by the evidence of the pharmacist and the medical record. 32. Thus, even on merits, the appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity or illegality in the impugned award warranting interference by this Court. 33. Accordingly, both the appeals stand dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. The common award dated 21.08.2024 passed by the Tribunal is upheld. 34. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. August 27, 2026 Sarita (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? : Yes/No Whether reportable? : Yes/No Uploaded on: August 27, 2026 SARITA RANI 2026.08.27 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document