1 CGHC010377062026 2026:CGHC:42093 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4960 of 2026 1 - Chainu Nishad S/o Shri Pardeshi Nishad Aged About 62 Years R/o Ward No. 1, Near Durga Mandir, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Collector Kabirdham, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (R), Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 4 - Tahsildar, Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 5 - Station House Officer, Police Station- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 6 - Chhannu Nishad S/o Shri Pardeshi Nishad Aged About 43 Years R/o Ram Nagar, Ward No. 01, Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Sushil Dubey, Advocate For State : Mr. Vivek Siddharth Ojha, PL Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 28/09/2026 1. The petitioner, in this Writ Petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:- “10.1 It is therefore prayed that, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner. PRIYANKA VERMA Digitally signed by PRIYANKA VERMA Date: 2026.10.01 10:52:32 +0530 2 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/order/direction in nature of mandamus whereby to set aside/quash the impugned dated 22.07.2026 (ANNEXURE P/1) as well as Order dated 31.07.2026 (ANNEXURE P/2) issued by the Respondent No. 4 Tehsildar, Kawardha, District-Kabirdham (CG). 10.3 That, any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.” 2. Facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 22.07.2026 passed by the Tahsildar, Kawardha, directing stoppage of construction over Khasra No. 272/5, admeasuring 0.283 hectare along with the consequential memorandum dated 31.07.2026. The dispute arises from a complaint by Respondent No. 6 alleging fraud in the registered sale deed dated 01.08.2025 executed in favour of the petitioner’s wife. The petitioner contends that the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to restrain construction and that the dispute regarding title and validity of the sale deed can only be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court. Hence, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is in possession of his own land bearing Khasra No. 272/5, admeasuring 0.283 hectare which is recorded in the revenue records in his name. He submits that while the petitioner was raising construction over the said land, Respondent No.6- Chhannu Nishad raised an objection and filed a 3 complaint before the concerned Tehsildar alleging that the registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner was obtained by way of fraud. On the basis of the said complaint and the FIR submitted by Respondent No. 6, the Tahsildar directed stoppage of the construction being raised by the petitioner. He further submits that the said direction amounts to an order of injunction, which the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to pass. He, therefore, prays that the impugned order be set aside. 4. Learned State counsel has no objection to the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. From the perusal of the complaint as well as the order dated 22.07.2026, it is quite vivid that the complainant has made a complaint alleging execution of the sale deed on the basis of fraud played against the concerned seller. The said issue can be adjudicated before the competent Civil Court, as the allegation is made against a registered sale deed and the issue regarding its validity is required to be adjudicated by the competent Court. The concerned Tehsildar is not having any jurisdiction to consider the same or to pass any order in the shape of injunction. Such an order cannot be passed by the concerned Tehsildar and, as such, the impugned order dated 22.07.2026 is per se illegal on the face of it. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed, as it is without jurisdiction. The challenge to any sale deed and the allegation of fraud played in the execution of the sale deed cannot be taken into consideration by the concerned Tahsildar in revenue jurisdiction. 4 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Khursheed and Another vs. Shaqoor, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2929 passed in Special Leave Petition (C) No.26454 of 2019 on 10.09.2024, held in para 10 as under:- “10. This Court, in Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 216: AIR 1990 SC 1173 relying upon the law laid down in Ningawwa v. Byrappa, (1968) 2 SCR 797 and Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 535, had held that a "voidable" document continues to be in force until it is set aside and such a document can only be set aside by a competent civil court. Further, such documents were held to be binding upon the Consolidation Authorities so long as they are not cancelled or set aside by a Court vested with the jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, in Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi, (1997) 5 SCC 192 this Court has held that the consolidation authorities do not have the jurisdiction and power to cancel a document, which is required to be set aside or cancelled and the document will continue to be valid till it is cancelled by a Competent Court i.e. a Civil Court. This court also held that if the document is void, it would be open for the Consolidation Authorities to disregard such a document & in such a case, they would get the exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. But if the document is voidable, the Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the same to be voidable. In the case of voidable documents, not only would the Consolidation Authorities have no power to cancel such documents, but even the proceedings pending before any competent Civil Court would not abate.” 8. It is trite law that Revenue Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any application or to initiate proceedings or to grant interim injunctions with respect to a house constructed over a residential land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts is confined to agricultural or revenue assessed land and does not extend to residential land over which constructions have been erected. 5 Once the property in dispute includes a permanent structure or built up area, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is ousted. The Civil Court alone possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as well as to grant temporary and permanent injunctions under Sections 37 and 39 of the said Act read with Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC. A Coordinate Bench of this Court has affirmed this view in WP227 No.800/2015 {decided on 19.07.2018}, relying upon the principle laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others reported in (2009) 3 MPLJ 660. In light of this settled legal position, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Tahsildar has acted in excess of jurisdiction are well founded and the contention raised by respondent No.4 is not in accordance with law. 9. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others 2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. The said judgment was based on Maya Lalchandani (supra). Relevant part of the decision is reproduced herein below: “2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary injunction for which he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. He relies upon a decision of the High Court of 6 Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which the M.P. High Court has held as under: 4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions sisued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in no case would authorise a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to be seen from the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be granted only by civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Courts where they are required to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The powers under Section 32 can be exercised within the Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the Revenue Authority does not have the power to grant injunction then the Board 7 of Revenue also could not grant injunction. 3. The order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the order passed by the revenue authority granting temporary injunction restraining transfer following the principle of law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Supra) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the Sub-Divisional officer (Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with law, expeditiously, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 10. The aforementioned decision was referred with approval in the case of Vandana Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPC No. 235/2020 and has observed thus:- “9. Considering the nature of stay order, certainly it would show that the Tahsildar has exceeded its jurisdiction which is vested under the Land Revenue Code and therefore, the order of the nature would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Since the order is without jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even if has not availed the remedy of appeal, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into such issue when jurisdictional issue is involved in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 wherein, it has been held as under: 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo quarranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose”. 8 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition.But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son V. Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse or to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however qualified by the significant words, “unless there are good grounds therefor”, which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional cases. 11. When the case is examined in the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, the view stands fortified. 9 Accordingly, it is concluded that the Revenue Courts are not having jurisdiction or authority to entertain a complaint alleging that a registered sale deed was got executed by playing fraud and, as such, the prayer for stopping the construction raised by respondent No.6 is unwarranted. Further, in view of the fact that, as per the application, the matter is already seized by the competent Civil Jurisdictional Court, the relief claimed by respondent No.6 for stopping the construction, which is in the nature of an injunction and restraint against alienation cannot be ordered by the Revenue Courts. 12. So far as the allegation of the petitioner that the FIR was also directed to be lodged by order dated 31.07.2026 is concerned, the petitioner is at liberty to file an appropriate petition before the concerned Court having jurisdiction. 13.It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 14. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present petition stands disposed of. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Priyanka