- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10398 OF 2025 BETWEEN: DR. RAHUL SHETTY, S/O DR. SATHISH SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, R/AT NO.1215, HIG, 8TH B CROSS, YELAHANKA NEW TOWN, BENGALURU NORTH, BENGALURU 560064. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. D. KRISHNAMOORTHY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE BY YELAHANKA NEW TOWN POLICE STATION, BENGALURU, REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT, BANGALORE 560001. 2. SUMA R, D/O RANGAIAH, AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, R/AT AMBEDKARBEEDI, MASANAPURA, CHAMARAJA NAGAR 571117. ALSO AT DURGA WOMENS PG, NO.24, KODIGEHALLI MAIN ROAD, Digitally signed by CHETAN B C Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 OPP. TO MANAPURAM GOLD LOAN, SAHAKARA NAGAR POST, SANJEEVINI NAGAR, BANGALORE 560092. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. WAHEEDA M.M, HCGP FOR R-1; SRI. ARUNA KUMAR.A, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 [ABSENT]) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE TRIAL COURT RECORDS AND AFTER PERUSAL OF THE SAME, BE PLEASED TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIME NO.324/2025 BEFORE THE YELAHANKA NEW TOWN P.S. FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S. 417, 420, 376, 427, 504, 506 OF IPC ON THE FILE OF THE 7TH ADDL. CJM, BANGALORE AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court seeking the following prayer: "Wherefore it is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to call for the Trial Court records and after perusal of the entire proceedings in Crime No.324/2025 before the Yelahanka New Town Police Station for the Offence Punishable Under Section 417, 420, 376, 427, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code on the file of the 7th Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore against the petitioner herein in the interest of justice and equity." - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 2. Heard Sri.D.Krishnamoorthy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Smt.Waheeda M.M., learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1 and have perused the material on record. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: 3.1. The petitioner is the accused, second respondent- the complainant. It is the case of the complainant that she enters the clinic of the petitioner as a patient and develops friendship, friendship blossoms into relationship and the relationship continues between two for a period of three years. 3.2. The complaint comes to be registered on the score that the petitioner has had physical relationship with the complainant on the pretext of marriage and has breached the promise of marriage. Therefore, it amounts to rape and offences punishable under Sections 417 and 420 of the IPC. The registration of the crime is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner at no point in time had promised marriage nor has indulged in any act that would become forcible physical relationship, it was all consensual acts for a period of three years. This cannot be termed as rape, is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. The counsel for respondent No.2 had remained continuously absent and therefore, the matter was passed over in the forenoon and again in the afternoon and even now, there is no representation on behalf of the complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned HCGP Smt.Waheeda M.M. is heard in the matter. 6. Learned HCGP would however contend that the matter is still at the stage of investigation and the matter must be permitted to be investigated into and should not be obliterated at this stage. - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The aforesaid narrated facts are a matter of record. The relationship between the two is narrated in the petition which is a patient and doctor. The patient and the doctor get intimate for about three years and after about three years when the relationship turned sour comes the impugned complaint against the petitioner by the complainant. Since the entire issue is triggered from the registration of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. "ರವೆ, ೕ ಉಪ ೕಕರು ಯಳಂದೂರು ೕ ಾೆ ಯಳಂದೂರು ಇಂದ, ಕು|| ಸುಮ ಆ ! ರಂಗಯ#, 33 ವಷ%. &ಾ'(ನ% *ೆಲಸ, ಅಂ-ೇಡ/ ೕ0, ಮಸಾಪ1ರ ಾ2ಮ, 3ಾ॥ ನಗರ 4ಾ:- 571117 5ಾ 6ಾಸ- ಸು5ಾ 7ಂ8 # 3/5, 09 9ೇ *ಾ2 ರ&ೆ:, ಪಂ;ಾ ಎ=>?ೆನ>!, *ೆಂ;ಾಪ1ರ, 5ೆ-ಾ@ಳA, -ೆಂಗಳBರು-560024 - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 ೕ! ನಂ.-6360713109. Cಾನ#Dೆ, Eಷಯ:- ನನFನುF ಮದು6ೆGಾಗುವ1HಾI ನಂ J ನನF Kೊ4ೆ HೈMಕ ಸಂಪಕ% CಾN ಈಗ ಮದು6ೆGಾಗಲು DಾಕJ ನಮP ಮದು6ೆೆ &ಾQGಾIದR ನನF S-ೈT ೕನನುF 5ೊUೆದು 5ಾV ನನೆ ಅ6ಾಚ# ಶಬRಗZಂದ ಂ0Jರುವ Uಾ| DಾಹುT \ೆ]' ಎಂಬುವರ Eರುದ^ ಪ2ಕರಣ Hಾಖ ಸಲು *ೋ. >>>><<<< 9ಾನು aೕಲ/ಂಡ Ebಾಸದ c 6ಾಸ6ಾIದುR ಕbೆದ 06 ವಷ%0ಂದ &ಾ'( ನ% ಆI *ೆಲಸ CಾN *ೊಂNದುR 9ಾನು 2018 ಂದ 2019 ರ ವDೆೆ -ೆಂಗಳBನ ಯಲಹಂಕ ಓT7 ?ೌ! ನ cರುವ ಶುಶfಷ ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯ c ಇHೆ. ನಂತರ 9ಾಗರ-ಾEಯ cರುವ ೕ]ೕ% ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯ c *ೆಲಸ*ೆ/ &ೇ*ೊಂNದುR ಅವರು *ೆಎಂJ ಸ]%i*ೇj *ೇZದುR ಅದು ಶುಶfಷ ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯ ckೕ ಇದR *ಾರಣ ಮ4ೆ: 6ಾಪ ಶುಶfಷ ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ &ೇ*ೊಂUೆ. 9ಾನು ಈ ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯ c ಸುCಾರು 03 ವಷ%ಗಳ *ಾಲ *ೆಲಸ CಾNHೆ ಆ ಸಮಯದ c ನಮP ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ Uಾ॥ DಾಹುT\ೆ]' ಎಂಬುವರು (ಸುCಾರು 48 ವಷ%) ;ಾcJ'= ಸಜ% &ೆgmಾ ' ಆI ಬರುn:ದRರು 5ಾಗೂ ಇವರ ತಂHೆಯವರು ತಮP ಮ9ೆಯ c J/! &ೆgಷ ' ಆI V= ಇಟು'*ೊಂಡು DೋIಗಳನುF 9ೋಡುn:ದRಂದ ಇವರೂ ಕೂಡ J/! DೋIಗಳನುF 9ೋಡುn:ದRರು. 9ಾನು ಶುಶfಷ ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯ c *ೆಲಸ 'CಾNದ ನಂತರ ಮp;ಾT ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ Kಾq! ಆI ಅ c *ೆಲಸ CಾN*ೊಂNHೆR. ಅ cೆ Kಾq! ಆದ 3-4 nಂಗಳ ನಂತರ ನನೆ J/! ಅಲr% ಮತು: ಫಂಗT ಇ!> ;ೆ! ಆI ?ೆ2ೕjaಂj 4ೆೆದು*ೊಂಡರೂ 6ಾJGಾIರ tಾc ಆಗ ನನF uೆ2ಂv ಒಬ@ರು Uಾ॥ DಾಹುT\ೆ]' ರವರ c 4ೋJ*ೋ ಎಂದು ಸಲ5ೆ *ೊಟ'ರು 9ಾನು ಆಗ ಎಂದು ಸುಮPHೆR ಒaP Uಾ| DಾಹುT\ೆ]' ರವರು 9ಾನು ಡೂ#] Cಾಡುn:ದR ಮp;ಾT ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ ಬಂ0ದRರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 ಅವರನುF -ೇ] CಾN ನನF ಸಮ&ೆ#ಯನುF 5ೇZ ಮP Vc=ೆ ಬರ-ೇಕು &ಾ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ ಅವರು ತಮP S-ೈT ನಂಬ *ೊಟು' ೕವ1 Gಾ6ಾಗ -ೇ*ಾದರೂ ಬF ಮ9ೆ ಮತು: Vc= ಎರಡೂ ಒಂHೇ ಕUೆ ಇHೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ 5ೋIದRರು. 9ಾನು ಒaP ಅವೆ ೕ! 9ಾನು ಒaP ಅವೆ ೕ! ]ೕjaಂj ಬೆx *ೇZದR*ೆ/ ಅವರು ೕನF c 5ೇಳಲು ಆಗುವ10ಲc ೕವ1 Vc=ೆ ಬF ಎಂದು tೊ*ೇಷ! ಕಳAMJದRರು ಆ ಸಮಯದ c yೕಯv ಕೂಡ ಆIHೆR ನನೆ ತುಂ-ಾ ಸಮ&ೆ#ಯುಂ?ಾIದRಂದ 23-10-2022 ರ zಾನು6ಾರ Uಾಕ' ೆ ೕ! CಾNದR*ೆ/ ಅವರು -ೇDೆ ಜನDಾದDೆ ಇವತು: 9ೋಡವ10ಲc ೕವ1 &ಾ'( ಆIರುವ1ದಂದ 9ೋಡು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಮ9ೆಯ aೕ ರುವ Vc= &ಾಯಂ*ಾಲ 7-00 ಗಂ?ೆೆ ಬF ಎಂದು 5ೇZದRಂದ ಆ 0ನ 9ಾನು Uಾಕ' DಾಹುT \ೆ]'ಯವರ #121 089ೇ *ಾ2 ರ&ೆ:, ಯಲಹಂಕ &ಾ#j tೈj ?ೌ! , ಯಲಹಂಕ ನೂ# ?ೌ! , -ೆಂಗಳBರು-56006 Ebಾಸದ Vc=ೆ ಸಂKೆ 7-00 ಗಂ?ೆೆ 5ೋHೆ ನನೆ ಸKೆ' CಾNದR &ೆFೕM4ೆೆ ಕೂಡ ಬರಲು 5ೇZHೆ ಆದDೆ ಆ 0ನ ಅವಳA ಬರ tಾc. ಆ 0ನ 9ಾನು Uಾಕ'ರವರ c ನನF ಗು;ಾ:ಂಗದ c ಆIದR J/! ಸಮ&ೆ#ಯನುF 5ೇZ*ೊಳA{6ಾಗ Uಾ॥ DಾಹುT\ೆ]' ರವರು ನನF ಬ?ೆ'ಯನುF |}J ?ಾ~%ನ c 9ೋN ನೆ ಸಮ&ೆ# ಇHೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ಓy Jc• ಬDೆದು*ೊಟು' 9ಾನು ಬ?ೆ' 5ಾV*ೊಳA{6ಾಗ Mಂ0ಂದ ಬಂದು ನನFನುF ಬಲವಂತ6ಾI ತ @*ೊಂಡರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು NJ*ೊಳ{ಲು ಪ2ಯnFJHಾಗ ಅವರು ನನFನುF ಡHೆ ನನF ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನುF ಮು]' 9ಾನು ನF9ೆFೕ ಮದು6ೆGಾಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ನನೆ ಇನೂF ಮದು6ೆGಾIಲc ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ನಂ J ನನF Kೊ4ೆ ಬಲವಂತ6ಾI HೈMಕ ಸಂಪಕ% CಾNದರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು ೕೆ ದೂರು *ೊಡು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ Dಾn2 10-00 ಗಂ?ೆ ವDೆಗೂ ನನFನುF ಇJ*ೊಂಡು 9ಾನು rೕವನಪ€n% ನF Kೊ4ೆ ಇರು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ !ನ ಕಷ'*ೆ/ ಆಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು *ೈ *ಾಲು MNದು -ೇN*ೊಂಡರು 5ಾಗೂ ಅ ckೕ ಇದR ಗೇಶ Hೇವರ ೕ?ೋ ಮತು: ಅವರ ತಂHೆಯ •ೕ?ೋ ಮುಂHೆ ;ಾ2‚ CಾN 5ೇZ ಮದು6ೆGಾಗಲು 02 ವಷ%ಗಳ *ಾtಾವ*ಾಶ *ೇZದRರು. ನಂತರ 9ಾನು ಆ?ೋದ c 5ಾ&ೆ'Tೆ 5ೋಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ ಅವDೇ ತಮP *ಾನ c ನನೆ Uಾ2• *ೊಟ'ರು ಇHಾದ ನಂತರ 02 ವಷ% ನನF Kೊ4ೆ - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 3ೆ9ಾFIkೕ ಇದುR ಇಬ@ರೂ S-ೈTಗಳ c Cಾತ9ಾN*ೊಂಡು, a&ೇƒ CಾN*ೊಂಡು ಇHೆವ1. ಅವರ ಮ9ೆಯ c ನUೆಯುವ ಪ2n„ಂದು *ಾಯ%ಕ2ಮಕೂ/ ನನFನುF ಕDೆದು*ೊಂಡು 5ೋಗುn:ದRರು ಈ E3ಾರ Uಾಕ' ರವರ 4ಾq 5ೇಮಲ4ಾ\ೆ]' ಮತು: ಅಕ/ ರ…P ರವಗೂ ೊn:ತು:. ಇದಲcHೆ ಇವರ ಇ9ೊFಂದು ಮ9ೆ Dಾಜನಕುಂ?ೆ ಹn:ರ ಇರುವ ನಂ-236, Jಟ2, ಅ†% Etಾcೆ ಸಮಯ J*ಾ/ಗtೆtಾc ನನFನುF ಕDೆದು*ೊಂಡು 5ೋI ನನF Kೊ4ೆ HೈMಕ ಸಂzೋಗ Cಾಡುn:ದRರು 5ಾಗೂ ಆದಷು' -ೇಗ ನF Kೊ4ೆ ಮದು6ೆGಾಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ನನೆ ಬ‡% ಕಂ?ೊ2ೕT yT> Cಾ4ೆ2ಯನುF *ೊಡುn:ದRರು. ಇದನುF 9ಾನು ಪ2n&ಾಯೂ 4ೆೆದು*ೊಳಳAn:ದR *ಾರಣ yೕಯv ;ಾ2ಬcಂ ಉಂ?ಾqತು ಆಗ Uಾಕ' DಾಹುT\ೆ]'ಯವDೇ ನನFನುF 2-3 ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ ಕDೆದು*ೊಂಡು 5ೋI |V4ೆ> *ೊNJದRರು. ಅಲcHೆ Jಲˆ tೈ! ಡGಾಾFJ'=>, ಕtಾ#‰ನಗ, -ೆಂಗಳBರು ಮತು: ಆಸ' tಾ#Š Jಂಗ9ಾಯಕನಹZ{ ಮತು: ನೂ#ಬ8% ಆನಂ‹ tಾ#Š, ಯಲಹಂಕ, ;ೆŒಮ ಡGಾಾFJ'=>, -ಾ#y'' ಆಸg4ೆ2ಗಳ c 5ೆT: 3ೆ=ಅ• CಾNJದRರು ಆ ಸಮಯದ c ನನF 5ೆಸನ ಮುಂHೆ ಗಂಡನ 5ೆಸರು ಎಂಬುHಾI ತಮP 5ೆಸರನೂF ಮತು: ಅವರHೇ S-ೈT ನಂಬ 9739879732 ಅನುF rಸ' CಾNJದRರು. 09ಾಂಕ 20-06-2024 ರ c ನನF ಹು]'ದ ಹಬ@ ಇHಾRಗ ಅವರು Dಾn2 11-35 *ೆ/ 9ಾದR 5ಾ&ೆ'Tೆ ಬಂದು ಅವರ Eಲcೆ ಕDೆದು*ೊಂಡು 5ೋI *ೇ= ಕj CಾNJ. ಊಟ CಾNJದRರು ನಂತರ 9ಾನು ಮಲI*ೊಂUೆ ಆಗ ಅವರು ;ೆ2Ž ಅ• ಆI ಬಂದು ನನF Kೊ4ೆ HೈMಕ ಸಂಪಕ%*ೆ/ ಮುಂHಾದರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು *ೋಪೊಂಡು ಪ2n-ಾಯೂ Gಾ*ೆ ಇದtಾc 9ಾನು yೕಯv ಆI ಸು•ಾJ*ೊಳA{n:HೆRೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ 059ೇ 0ನ 4ಾ9ೆ ಅಂತ 5ೇZ ಬಲವಂತ6ಾI HೈMಕ ಸಂಪಕ% CಾNದರು. 09ಾಂಕ 20-06-24 ರಂದು 9ಾನು ಒಂದು ಉಂಗುರ 4ೆೆದು*ೊಳ{-ೇಕು ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ ಅವರು ಮtೆcೕಶˆರಂೆ ಕDೆದು*ೊಂಡು 5ೋIದುR &ೈƒ ಮತು: N&ೈ! JಗHೆ ಇದುRದಂದ 6ಾಪ&ಾIದುR ಆ 0ನ yೕಯvನ 05 9ೇ 0ನ6ಾIದRಂದ Hೇವ&ಾ•ನ*ೆ/ 5ೋಗುವ1ದು -ೇಡ ಎಂದು ನನF Kೊ4ೆkೕ ಇ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ 02 0ನ0ಂದ ನನF Kೊ4ೆkೕ ಇ0Rೕ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 *ೋಪೊಂಡರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು 2 0ನ*ೆ/ೕ ಈ ೕn ಆದDೆ ಇನುF ಮದು6ೆGಾದ aೕtೆ 5ೇೆ ಎಂ0ದR*ೆ/ ನನೆ HೈMಕ ಹtೆc CಾN ಮ9ೆqಂದ ಆ3ೆ ಎbೆದು*ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಟು' ನನೆ ಅ6ಾಚ#6ಾI -ೈದರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು ಅವರ ಮ9ೆಯ ಒಳೆ ರೂಂ ೆ 5ೋI ಸೂ&ೈv ಅ?ೆಂ•' CಾNHೆ ಮ4ೆ: ಅ cಗೂ ಬಂದು ಹtೆc CಾNದರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು 5ೈ;ೆ9ಾ=-y Cಾ4ೆ2ಯನು &ಾಯಲು 4ೆೆದು*ೊಂUೆ ಆಗ ಅವರು ನನFನುF ಅಧ% Hಾಯ c ಟು' 5ೋದರು. ನಂತರ 9ಾನು ಆಸg4ೆ2ೆ 5ೋI |V4ೆ> ಪUೆದು*ೊಂUೆ. ನಂತರ 9ಾನು ಅವರ ಮ9ೆೆ 5ೋI 02 ವಷ% ಆqತು ನನFನುF Gಾ6ಾಗ ಮದು6ೆ CಾN*ೊಳA{n:ೕ ಎಂ0ದR*ೆ/ *ೋಪ0ಂದ ನನೆ -ೈದರು. ಜುtೈ-01 ರಂದು ನನFನುF ತಮP ಮ9ೆೆ ಬರCಾN*ೊಂಡು 60,000 -ೆtೆ-ಾಳAವ ನನF &ಾ#’ಸಂ8 ಎ-22 S-ೈT ಅನುF ಪUೆದು*ೊಂಡು ಅದರ cದR ನ‚Pಬ@ರ ಒUಾ9ಾಟ*ೆ/ ಇದR &ಾQಗಳನುF ಇಲcದಂ4ೆ Cಾಡಲು S-ೈಲನುF ಒUೆದು5ಾVದರು. ಇHಾದ 15 0ನಗಳ ಬZಕ ೕ! CಾNHಾಗ 60,000 *ೊಡು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ -ೇDೆ S-ೈT 4ೆೆದು*ೋ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ದುಡು7 *ೊಟ'ರು ಅHೇ Cಾದ S-ೈT Jಗದ *ಾರಣ ದುಡ7ನುF 6ಾಪ ೕ! ;ೇ ಮೂಲಕ 40,000 *ೊಟು' 20,000 ಹಣವನುF ನಗದು *ೊ?ೆ'. ನಂತರ ಅವDೇ ಆ!tೈ!ನ c &ಾ#’ಸಂ8 ಎ- 23 S-ೈT ತಂದು*ೊಟ'ರು. ನಂತರ ಅದನೂF ಕೂಡ 09ಾಂಕ 27-01- 2025 ನ c 5ೊUೆದು5ಾVರು4ಾ:Dೆ. ಒಂದು 0ನ ಅವರ 4ಾq ಮತು: ಅಕ/ಳ Kೊ4ೆ ಇವbೇ ಬಂದು ಬ?ೆ' |} ಂತು*ೊಮಡಳA 9ಾನು ಗಂಡ&ಾI ಸುಮPರಲು ಆಗುವ1Hೇ ಇವಳA ಸqಲc ಸೂbೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದರು ಆಗ 9ಾನು ಅವCಾನ 4ಾಳtಾರHೆ …ವ ಂಗ*ೆ/ ತtೆ5ೊUೆದು*ೊಂUೆ ಆಗ Uಾಕ' ರವDೇ ಆಸg4ೆ2ಯವರುಗZೆ, ನಮP ತಂHೆ-4ಾqೆ ೕ! CಾN Eಷಯ nZJದRರು. ಅಲcHೆ 9ಾನು *ೆಲಸ*ೆ/ 5ೋಗದಂ4ೆ *ೆಲಸ0ಂದ 4ೆೆJದರು. ಈಗ ನನFನುF ಮದು6ೆGಾಗುವಂ4ೆ *ೇಳಲು 5ೋದDೆ ಅವರ ಮ9ೆಯ ಬZ 5ೋದDೆ 112 ೕ ಕDೆJ ನನೆ ಅವCಾನ Cಾಡುn:ರು4ಾ:Dೆ. ನನೆ ಸುCಾರು 04 -ಾ ೕ &ೆ'ೕಷ!ೆ ಕDೆqJರು4ಾ:Dೆ. 15-06-2025 ರಂದು ನನೆ ೕ! CಾN Cಾತ9ಾNದುR 9ಾನು -ೇDೆ ಕUೆ 5ೋಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದR*ೆ/ ೕನು ಏ9ಾದರೂ CಾN*ೋ 9ಾ9ೇನು ನೆ 4ಾZ ಕ]'0Rೕನ, - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 ನFನುF ಹು]'J0Rೕ9ಾ? ನೆ ಎಷು' ದುಡು7 -ೇಕು *ೇಳA *ೊಡು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ. ನF aೕtೆ ೕಸೆ ದೂರು *ೊಡು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZದುR Cಾರ9ೆ 0ನ ಯಲಹಂಕ ೕಸರು ನನFನುF ಕDೆqJದುR 5ೋHಾಗ ಅ c Gಾವ1Hೇ ಕಂ;ೆcಂj ಇಲc ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ಎ!J 5ಾV ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ಕಳAMJದRರು. ಇHಾದ aೕtೆ 09ಾಂಕ 03-06-2025 ರಮದು ಖುದುR ಮMbಾ ಆ„ೕಗ*ೆ/ Uಾಕ' EರುದR ದೂರು ಅr% ೕNHೆR. ಆದRಂದ ನನFನುF ಮದು6ೆGಾಗು4ೆ:ೕ9ೆ ಎಂದು 5ೇZ ನಂ J ನನF Kೊ4ೆ HೈMಕ ಸಂಪಕ% CಾN ನಮP ಒಡ9ಾಟ*ೆ/ &ಾQGಾIದR S-ೈಲನುF 5ೊUೆದು5ಾVರುವ Uಾ| DಾಹುT\ೆ]' ರವರ aೕtೆ *ಾನೂನು ಕ2ಮ ಜರುIಸಲು ಈ ಮೂಲಕ *ೋ*ೆ. 9ಾನು ಈ 0ನ ಊೆ ಬಂ0ದುR ನನF ತಂHೆ-4ಾq Kೊ4ೆ ಚ|%J ಈ 0ನ ತಡ6ಾI ದೂರು ೕಡುn:HೆRೕ9ೆ. ಸ•ಳ: ಮಸಾಪ1ರ ತಮP E\ಾˆJ, 09ಾಂಕ: 14-07-2025" 9. A perusal at the complaint would indicate all consensual acts between the petitioner and complainant for over three years. The breach of promise of marriage or otherwise would not amount to offence of rape as is held by the Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASTHRA1. The judgment reads as follows: "25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No. 2's claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No. 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No. 2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married. 26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September 2022, when respondent No. 2 found out that she was pregnant with the appellant's child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and I will live my life”. At that time, the appellant again assured her that they would get married and asked for some time from respondent No. 2, to which she refused. However, despite her refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No. 2 continued to meet him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations with him. 27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made: “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” (underlining by us) 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious. 33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. 35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. 34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. 35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23- 3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxx 39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us) 36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us) 39. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate: “102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. xxx” 40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No. 2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery." (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot constitute rape and cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. 10. In the light of the afore-quoted judgment, I deem it appropriate to close the proceedings against the petitioner in the subject proceedings. - 20 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010481062025 NC: 2026:KHC:45604 CRL.P No. 10398 of 2025 11. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following: O R D E R [I] Criminal Petition is allowed. [II] Proceedings in Crime No.324/2025 registered by the Yelahanka New Town Police Station for the Offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 376, 427, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code pending before the 7th Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore, stands quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE CBC List No.: 2 Sl No.: 6