1 CGHC010348282022 2026:CGHC:42645 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4644 of 2022 Smt. Saraswati Sidar W/o Vijay Kumar Sidar Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Amlibhauna, Post Taparda, Pusour, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Through State Chief Information Commissioner, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 1st Floor, Indrawati Khand, Shashtri Chowk - Motibagh Chowk Rd, Civil Lines, Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492001. 2 - State Information Commissioner 1st Floor, Indrawati Khand, Shashtri Chowk - Motibagh Chowk Rd, Civil Lines, Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492001. 3 - First Appeal Officer Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Pussore, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 4 - Akash Bairagi S/o Parasmani Bairagi Aged About 40 Years R/o Gobarsingha Sariya, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Pravin Kumar Jain and Ms. Swarnim S. Kochar, Advocates For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate For Respondents No.3 and 4 : None YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.10.01 18:11:19 +0530 2 Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 30.09.2026 1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the order dated 22.08.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission in Second Appeal Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh, whereby a penalty of ₹25,000/- has been imposed upon the petitioner under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for brevity, “the RTI Act”). The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the records. 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the impugned order dated 22.08.2022 passed by Respondent no.2 in the Second appeal case no. A/1824/2019/Raigarh (Annexure P/1). 10.3 That this Hon'ble court may be further pleased to pass any other consequential and other orders/ writs which this Hon'ble court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Brief facts of the case, in nutshell, are that respondent No.4 submitted an application dated 18.01.2019 under Section 6(1) of the RTI Act before the petitioner, who was the Public Information Officer, seeking information regarding the books of income and expenditure of the Sarpanch, Village Tribhauna, from the date of 3 his posting till the date of the application. The petitioner supplied the information by letter dated 11.02.2019. Being dissatisfied, respondent No.4 preferred a first appeal on 28.02.2019, which was decided by respondent No.3 vide order dated 28.03.2019, observing that the information sought was not specific as the relevant date, year and name of the programme had not been mentioned. Thereafter, respondent No.4 preferred a second appeal before the State Information Commission, registered as Second Appeal Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh. 3. During the pendency of the second appeal, the petitioner subsequently came to know of the proceedings and, pursuant to the order dated 06.06.2022, submitted his reply dated 17.08.2022 before the Commission. However, without properly considering the petitioner's reply and the fact that the information sought in the original RTI application had already been supplied, the Commission, vide impugned order dated 22.08.2022, held the petitioner responsible for non-supply of information and imposed a penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. Hence, the present petition. 4. Mr. Pravin Kumar Jain and Ms. Swarnim S. Kochar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order has been passed without properly appreciating the facts and material available on record. They submit that the information sought by respondent No.4 in his original RTI application dated 18.01.2019 4 had already been furnished by the petitioner vide letter dated 11.02.2019 and, therefore, there was no wilful or deliberate denial of information on the part of the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was never served with or otherwise made aware of any subsequent application allegedly seeking additional information pursuant to the order dated 28.03.2019. It is contended that no such application was received by the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner could not have been held negligent or responsible for non-supply of information which was never sought from or brought to his notice. The Commission, according to learned counsel, has failed to consider this material aspect while passing the impugned order. 6. It is lastly submitted that the power to impose penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act is penal in nature and can be exercised only upon recording the requisite satisfaction regarding the circumstances contemplated under the said provision and after affording due opportunity of hearing. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Manohar S/o Manikrao Anchule v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2012) 13 SCC 14, learned counsel submits that the proceedings before the Information Commission are quasi-judicial in nature and are required to conform to the principles of natural justice. It is therefore contended that, in the facts of the present case, the 5 imposition of the maximum penalty of ₹25,000/- is unsustainable and the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 7. Per contra, Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner, being the Public Information Officer, was under a statutory obligation to furnish the information sought by respondent No.4 within the prescribed period. It is submitted that the information sought by respondent No.4 was not furnished in its entirety and, despite the order passed by the First Appellate Authority, the petitioner failed to provide the requisite information. The State Information Commission, upon considering the material available on record, has rightly arrived at the conclusion that there was failure on the part of the petitioner to discharge his statutory obligation under the RTI Act. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order has been passed after affording due opportunity to the petitioner and upon considering his reply dated 17.08.2022. The Commission, being vested with statutory power under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, has rightly imposed the penalty upon finding that the petitioner failed to furnish the information without reasonable cause. It is, therefore, submitted that no interference with the impugned order is warranted in exercise of the extraordinary 6 jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. Despite service of notice, respondents No. 3 and 4 have not appeared before this Court. However, a return has been filed on behalf of respondent No.3, wherein it has been stated that the order dated 28.03.2019 was passed by the respondent authorities, in the capacity of First Appellate Authority, after considering the RTI Act, the applicable Rules and administrative instructions. It is contended that respondent No.4 had sought information relating to profit and loss and Rokad Bahi for several years, which constituted different subject matters, and therefore, respondent No.4 was directed to submit a clear and specific application. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 11. The material available on record indicates that respondent No.4 submitted an application dated 18.01.2019 under Section 6(1) of the RTI Act seeking certified copies of the cash book relating to the income and expenditure of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Tribhauna, from the date of his posting till the date of the application. The petitioner, being the then Public Information Officer, responded vide communication dated 11.02.2019, stating that under the applicable Rules, the information sought was required to be specified with reference to a particular financial 7 year and subject matter, and called upon respondent No.4 to submit a fresh and specific application. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.4 preferred a First Appeal on 28.02.2019, which was disposed of by the First Appellate Authority vide order dated 28.03.2019, upholding the action of the Public Information Officer and directing submission of a clear application. 12. Thereafter, respondent No.4 preferred the Second Appeal before the State Information Commission. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner was called upon to submit his response and, pursuant thereto, submitted his reply dated 17.08.2022. The Commission, however, by the impugned order dated 22.08.2022, held that the petitioner had failed to properly deal with the RTI application, directed the existing Public Information Officer to furnish the information within 30 days and imposed a penalty of ₹25,000/- upon the petitioner under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, alleging negligence and indifference in dealing with the application. 13. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly when the petitioner had responded to the original RTI application within the prescribed period and had called upon respondent No.4 to submit a specific application, the petitioner could have been subjected to the maximum penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act without recording a specific finding that he 8 had deliberately or mala fidely denied the information or had failed to furnish the same without reasonable cause. 14. Section 20 of the RTI Act empowers the Central or State Information Commission to impose penalty where the Public Information Officer, without any reasonable cause, has refused to receive an application for information, has not furnished the information within the time specified under Section 7(1) of the RTI Act, has malafidely denied the request for information, has knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, or has destroyed information or obstructed furnishing of information. The provision thus requires consideration of the explanation furnished by the Public Information Officer and the circumstances leading to the alleged delay or non-supply of information before the penal consequence is imposed. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Manohar (supra) has held that the power to impose penalty under Section 20 of the RTI Act is not to be exercised mechanically and that the authority is required to consider whether there was reasonable cause for the failure on the part of the Public Information Officer. 16. The Division Bench of this Court in Nitin Singhvi v. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 6061, while considering the scope of Section 20 of the RTI Act and the imposition of penalty upon the Public Information Officer, after considering the judgment of the Supreme 9 Court in Manohar (supra), has held that the provisions relating to penalty and penal consequences are required to be construed strictly, having regard to the serious civil consequences which follow from imposition of such penalty. The Division Bench, in this regard, observed as under: “15. ……...Since their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), have clearly held that the provisions relating to penalty or penal consequences have to be construed strictly as it has drastic civil consequences upon the Public Information Officer who is entrusted with supplying the relevant information and in absence of any aforesaid specific finding, we are of the considered opinion that it was not mandatory on the part of the State Information Commission to impose a penalty of Rs.16,500/- upon respondent No.2 without recording a specific finding that negligence on the part of respondent No.2 was persistent and without reasonable cause. As such, Section 20(1) of the Act of 2005 cannot be held to be mandatory and in view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal and we hereby affirm the order passed by learned Single Judge.” 17. The aforesaid principle has subsequently been considered by this Court in T.A. Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 SCC OnLine Chh 8128. While examining the exercise of power under Section 20 of the RTI Act, this Court, after considering the judgment in 10 Nitin Singhvi (supra), has reiterated that the power to impose penalty is not automatic and that the statutory conditions contemplated under Section 20 of the RTI Act must be duly established before such penal consequences can follow. The relevant observations contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: “11. It is noted that the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, while considering a similar issue in Nitin Singhvi (supra), has elaborately examined the scope and ambit of imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. The Division Bench has held that the power to impose penalty is not automatic or mechanical, but is conditioned upon the existence of cogent material demonstrating that the Public Information Officer has, without reasonable cause, either refused to furnish information, caused undue delay, or acted in a malafide manner. It has been further held that mere delay or inability to furnish certain information, particularly when such information is not available on record or lies with another authority, would not ipso facto attract penal consequences. The Court has emphasized that before imposing penalty, the Information Commission is under a statutory obligation to record a clear and reasoned finding with respect to the existence of malafide intent or lack of reasonable cause, and must also afford an effective opportunity of hearing to the concerned officer. The 11 burden cast upon the Public Information Officer under the proviso to Section 20(1) is to establish that he acted reasonably and diligently; however, once such explanation is furnished and remains uncontroverted, the Commission cannot proceed to impose penalty in a routine manner. 12. It has further been observed that where the Public Information Officer has taken steps in compliance with the provisions of the Act, such as transferring the application to the concerned department under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act or furnishing such information as is available on record, the same would constitute a reasonable and sufficient cause, insulating him from penal action. The Division Bench has cautioned that the penal provisions under the Act, being quasi-criminal in nature, must be invoked with due care and only in cases where the conduct of the officer is found to be contumacious or deliberately obstructive. In light of the aforesaid principles, the Division Bench set aside the penalty imposed therein, holding that in the absence of any finding of malafide or deliberate lapse, the order of penalty could not be sustained by observing as follows :- "12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 14 has held that the State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including Imposition of 12 penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees and the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. While dealing with Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005, their Lordships have observed in para 16 as under:- "16. The State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would be in violation to the principles of natural justice." 13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have further held while dealing with initiation of departmental proceeding that the case of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission. It has also been held that "negligence" per se is not a 13 ground on which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked and the Commission must return a finding that such negligence, delay or default is persistent (meaning: continuing for a long time or happening often, especially in a way that is unpleasant or annoying) and without reasonable cause. Paras 31 and 33 of the report state as under: "31. It appears that the facts have not been correctly noticed and, in any case, not in their entirety by the State Information negligent and had not performed the duty cast upon him. The Commission. It had formed an opinion that the appellant was Commission noticed that there was 73 days delay in informing the duties. If one examines the provisions of Section 20(2) in their applicant and, thus, there was negligence while performing entirety then it becomes obvious that every default on the part of recommendation for disciplinary action. The case must fall in any the concerned officer may not result in Issuance of a of the specified defaults and reasoned finding has to be recorded by the Commission while making such recommendations. 'Negligence' per se is not a ground on which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The Commission must return a finding that such negligence, delay or 14 default is persistent and without reasonable cause. In our considered view, the Commission, in the present case, has erred in not recording such definite finding. The appellant herein had not failed to receive any application, had not failed to act within the period of 30 days (as he had written a letter calling for information), had not malafidely denied the request for information, had not furnished any incorrect or misleading information, had not destroyed any information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate the providing of information by writing the stated letters. May be the letter dated 11- 4-2007 was not written within the period of 30 days requiring Respondent 2 to furnish details of the period for which such information was required but the fact remained that such letter was written and Respondent 2 did not even bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept on filing appeal after appeal. After 4-4- 2007, the date when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission of the office at Nanded. 14. Their Lordships further held that the word "shall" appearing in Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005 before 'recommend' has to 15 be read as "may" and their Lordships observed as under: - 33. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause and persistently. In other words, besides finding that any of the stated defaults have been committed by such officer, the Commission has to further record its opinion that such default in relation to receiving of an application or not furnishing the information within the specified time was committed persistently and without a reasonable cause. Use of such language by the legislature clearly shows that the expression 'shall' appearing before 'recommend' has to be read and construed as 'may'. There could be cases where there is reasonable cause shown and the officer is able to demonstrate that there was no persistent default on his part elther in receiving the application or furnishing the requested Information. In such circumstances, the law does not require recommendation for disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the legislative mandate that Irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a given case, whether reasonable cause is shown or not, the Commission must recommend disciplinary action merely because the 16 application was not responded to within 30 days. Every case has to be examined on its own facts. We would hasten to add here that wherever reasonable cause is not shown to the satisfaction of the Commission and the Commission is of the opinion that there is default in terms of the section it must send the recommendation for disciplinary action in accordance with law to the concerned authority. In such circumstances, it will have no choice but to send recommendatory report. The burden of forming an opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 (2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the Commission.” 18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the record reveals that respondent No.4 submitted an RTI application dated 18.01.2019 seeking certified copies of the cash book relating to the income and expenditure of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Tribhauna, from the date of his posting till the date of the application. The petitioner, being the Public Information Officer, responded vide letter dated 11.02.2019, informing respondent No.4 that the information sought was required to be specified with reference to the relevant financial year and subject matter. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.4 preferred a First Appeal, which was disposed of vide order dated 28.03.2019, wherein the First Appellate Authority also directed submission of a clear and specific application. 17 19. During the proceedings before the State Information Commission, the petitioner submitted her reply dated 17.08.2022 pursuant to the direction issued by the Commission. However, vide impugned order dated 22.08.2022, the Commission held the petitioner responsible for not properly dealing with the RTI application and imposed a penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. The question, therefore, is whether the maximum penalty could have been imposed without recording the specific statutory findings necessary for exercise of power under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. 20. Section 20(1) contemplates penalty upon satisfaction of the specified statutory contingencies, including mala fide denial of information, knowingly furnishing incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, or failure to furnish information without reasonable cause. In the present case, the petitioner had responded to the original application within the prescribed period and had disclosed the reason for requiring a specific application. The impugned order does not record any categorical finding that the petitioner deliberately or mala fidely denied the information, knowingly furnished incorrect or misleading information, or obstructed its furnishing. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), has held that the power to impose penalty under the RTI Act, having civil consequences, is required to be exercised strictly in accordance 18 with the statutory requirements. Applying the said principle, this Court finds that mere dissatisfaction with the manner in which the RTI application was dealt with cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient ground for imposing the maximum penalty under Section 20(1), particularly in the absence of the requisite finding regarding deliberate or mala fide conduct or absence of reasonable cause. 22. The aforesaid principle has also been reiterated by this Court in Nitin Singhvi (supra) and T.A. Khan (supra), holding that the power under Section 20 of the RTI Act is penal in nature and cannot be exercised mechanically. Before imposing penalty, the Information Commission is required to record a clear finding regarding the existence of the statutory default and absence of reasonable cause. Mere negligence or an erroneous appreciation of the manner in which the information was dealt with, by itself, would not justify imposition of penalty unless the conduct of the Public Information Officer is brought within the specific parameters of Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. 23. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.08.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission in Second Appeal Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh, insofar as it imposes a penalty of ₹25,000/- upon the petitioner under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, is hereby quashed and set aside. The penalty shall stand annulled and no recovery pursuant thereto shall be effected. 19 24. It is made clear that this Court has examined only the legality of the penal action under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. 25. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- /- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh