[2026:JHHC:2563] 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (C) No. 5606 of 2011 ------ Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Law Officer, Mithilesh Kumar S/o Sri R.B. Choudhary, resident of Sector- II Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi officiating near Jharkhand State Electricity Board, near Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi. ... Petitioner Versus M/s. Mangalam Plastics having its work place at Hardag, Hatia through its proprietor Jacob Mathew, S/o. Sri M.P. Mathew, R/o- 3/50 Birsa Nagar, P.O. Hatia, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Ranchi, Jharkhand. ... Respondent CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD ------ For the Petitioner : Mr. O.P. Tiwari, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Dhananjay Kr. Pathak ------ 11/Dated: 21st January, 2026 1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directed against the order passed by the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum, (herein referred as VUSNF) Ranchi dated 24.02.2011 in case no. 13 of 2010 by which the bills issued for the month of November 2009 to February 2010 have been quashed and JSEB (writ petitioner herein) was directed to refund/adjust the amount charged and recovered to the tune of Rs. 83455/- with interest. Further, the quashing of the order dated 19.07.2011 passed by the Electricity Ombudsman in appeal has also been sought for by which order dated 24.02.2011 has been confirmed. [2026:JHHC:2563] 2 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition reads as: (i) The writ petitioner is a deemed licensee cum transmission utility which is engaged in the business of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity to its consumers within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand and the respondent(petitioner before VUSNF) is a consumer of the writ petitioner JSEB and had taken an electrical connection bearing Consumer no. HK 5429 under HTS-1 Mode of tariff having contract demand of 105 KVA and the supply of electricity has commenced w.e.f. 04.09.2007. (ii) The HT agreement to that effect was executed between the writ petitioner and the respondent namely M/s. Mangalam Plastics on 25.07.2007. (iii) It is the case of respondent before the VUSNF that maximum demand of consumer for the month of November, 2009 was recorded more than the 115% of the contract dermanl therefore the petitioner/JSEB charged the maximum demand on the basis of actual recorded K.V.A. i.c. 128.85 K.V.A. because if the said exceeded demand was supposed to be treated as contract demand of the respondent, the only burden which would have been imposed upon the consumer/complainant/respondent is the maximum demand/KVA charges and nothing else. (iv) It is further case of the respondent/consumer that the aforesaid [2026:JHHC:2563] 3 bill for the month of November, 2009 of consumer/respondent was arbitrarily charged Rs. 12.262/- without any basis under the heading "correction if any”. Similarly, the petitioner/JSEB in the same arbitrarily fashion has charged in the bills of December, 2009, January, 2010 and February, 2010 amounting to Rs. 22,894, Rs 21,710/- and Rs. 26,589/- respectively under the heading “correction if any”. (v) Consequently, the respondent had approached the writ petitioner/ JSEB for redressal of its grievances and the writ petitioner/ JSEB replied that the aforesaid amounts have been charged under the heading correction if any "on energy units by calculating the guarantee charges on the basis of exceeded KVA". (vi) But according to the consumer/respondent no guarantee energy charges would have been raised on that basis of the contract demand of HT consumer. According to the respondent/consumer if any consumer exceeds its sanctioned load, the exceeded load shall be treated as contract demand for the purpose of maximum demand charges for six months and its impact would come only upon KVA charges and minimum monthly charges. (vii) It is the case of the respondent that the writ petitioner/JSEB has already charged maximum demand charges on the basis of exceeded load every month from November, 2009 to February, 2010 besides the unit charges recorded in the meter and as such [2026:JHHC:2563] 4 the maximum realizable charge by way of demand charges and unit charges has already been charged from the consumer/respondent exceeding the contract demand. Therefore, there was no occasion to further charge any unit charges under the heading correction if any. (viii) It has further been stated that respondent has himself approached the petitioner/JSEB for enhancement of his contract demand which was allowed by the writ petitioner/JSEB and a fresh agreement was also executed for the same. (ix) The respondent only aggrieved with the petitioner /JSEB for charging energy charges as gurantee in the aforesaid bills which could not have been raised in view of the tariff order, 2003-04 of Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (In short to be referred as J.S.E.R.C.). (x) The consumer/respondent has taken the ground before the VUSNF that JSEB (Writ petitioner herein) has overlooked the provision of clause 16.5 of 1993 tariff as well as clause1.4 of tariff order 2003-04, because there is specific provision to deal with the situation where the HT consumer excedds its contract demand by more than 110 percent, therefore the writ petitioner/JSEB has illegally realized the amount in question by treating it unauthorized use of electricity. (xi) The writ petitioner JSEB appeared before Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum(VUSNF), Ranchi and filed its counter [2026:JHHC:2563] 5 affidavit denying the contentions raised by the consumer by taking the ground that the bills in question have been raised in accordance with law and existing tariff. Further ground has been taken that the contract demand of consumer/respondent was 105 K.V.A. and during that period the consumer has exceeded 115% of the contract demand i.e. 128.85 K.V.A., therefore charges were levied in the concerned monthly energy bills and the maximum demand of the consumer was recorded more than 115% of contract demand which comes under the category of unauthorized use of electricity and as such the consumer/complainant is liable to pay energy charges and K.V.A. charges twice the rate on the above 115% exceeded of the contract demand. (xii) The Learned VUSNF by appreciating the contention vide order dated 24.02.2011 passed in case no. 13/2010, disposed of the said petition filed by the respondent/consumer by deciding in favour of the respondent and directed the JSEB board to refund/adjust the illegal amount charged and recovered from the respondent to the tune of 83,455/- with interest as per supply code. (xiii) Then JSEB filed an appeal against the said orders dated 24.02.2011 passed in case no. 13/2010 by VUSNF before the Electricity Ombudsman and the same was registered as case no. EOJ/02/2011. [2026:JHHC:2563] 6 (xiv) The Electricity Ombudsman vide judgment dated 19.07.2011 upheld the order/judgment dated 24.02.2011 passed by VUSNF in case no. 13/2010 and the appeal filed by the appellant JSEB was dismissed and against the said orders the present writ has been preferred by the JSEB. (xv) Therefore, the instant writ petition has been filed for setting aside the above-mentioned order dated 19/07/2011 passed by the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand and the order dated 24/02/2011 passed by the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum, Ranchi. 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the respondent-consumer was granted an electric connection for 105KVA load at 11 K.V. supply voltage for running its plastic industry under HTS-I tariff. The date of commencement of supply was 04.09.2007. It has been alleged that in the month of November 2009, the maximum demand of the petitioner recorded more than 115% of the contract demand. i.e., 128.85 K.V.A. The writ petitioner, the licensee has charged recorded 128.85 K.V.A along with the extra amount of Rs. 12,262/- without any basis and contrary to the provisions of the tariff of 2003–2004. 4. Likewise, for the month of December 2009, January 2010, and February 2010, the maximum demand recorded was more than 115% of the contact demand and on the aforesaid pretext, the licensee has charged the extra amount in the bill dated 05.01.2010, 08.02.2010 and 05.03.2010. [2026:JHHC:2563] 7 5. The consumer, the respondent writ petitioner has challenged the said bills before the forum. The licensee has appeared and substantiated the bill inter alia on the ground that the Board has rightly charged the surcharge amount, on consideration of the fact that, the contract demand of the consumer exceeds 115% in the month as per Clause 16.5 of the tariff 1993, which has been saved in tariff order 2003–2004. 6. The writ petitioner, based upon the applicability of the provision of Clause 1.4 of the tariff, 1993 saved in tariff of 2003–2004, therefore has taken the ground that there is no infirmity in the bills as and as such the complaint so made on behalf of the consumer, maybe dismissed. 7. The forum, on appreciating the grounds/arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, has formulated two issues; (i) Whether the consumer is liable for payment of surcharge amount for 6 months even after he has covered MMC charges for those months in case maximum demand exceeds 115% of the contract demand. (ii) Whether the bills raised for the said months are liable to be quashed and amount so recovered are fit to be refunded/adjusted with interest. 8. The Forum has taken into consideration the tariff notification of 1993 of the Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB), as it then was, for the purpose of consideration of the Issue no. 1. [2026:JHHC:2563] 8 9. The reference of Clause 1.4 of the tariff notification of 1993, which has been saved in tariff notification 2003–2004, has been taken into consideration wherein it was provided by revising the clause of surcharge vide Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022 and has increased the limit of exceeding maximum demand from 110% to 115% and reduced months from 12 months to 6 months. 10. The Forum, based upon the applicability of the Clause 1.4 of the tariff notification 2003–2004, has come out with the conclusion that the bill raised by the respondent, the writ petitioner herein, from November 2009 to February 2010 are not as per norms of the tariff and are illegal and arbitrary. Such finding was given on the backdrop of the fact that the petitioners exceeded maximum demand in four consecutive months, i.e., from November 2009 to February 2010 and maximum KVA was recorded in the month of February 2010, i.e., 135 K.V.A. As such, 135 K.V.A. should be the revised maximum demand chargeable for six months that is from September 2009 to January 2010, as the surcharge for February 2010 has already been charged and recovered with current bill of that month. 11. The Tribunal, based upon the aforesaid reason, has interfered with the bill and the same has been quashed and set aside with the direction upon the writ petitioner to refund the amount to the tune of Rs. 83,455/- with interest as per supply code. 12. The said order has been challenged by the licensee by preferring an appeal before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has also declined [2026:JHHC:2563] 9 to interfere with the decision so taken by the Forum (VUSNF) by coming out with the conclusive finding that as per Clause 1.4, as was available in tariff notification 2003–2004, the bill which has been issued on the presumption of surcharge has rightly been interfered with. 13. Both the orders are the subject matter of this petition. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 14. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the order passed by the appellate authority as well as VUSNF is absolutely improper since the same has been passed without taking into consideration the actual consumption, as has been consumed by the consumer. 15. It has been contended that VUSNF and the Electricity Ombudsman in the impugned judgment(s) dated 24.02.2011 & 19.07.2011 have failed to appreciate that the Tariff notification of 1993 provides for raising surcharge bill when the contract demand of the consumer exceeds 110% of the contract load and the same recorded value would be the contract demand for the whole financial year and energy charge shall be payable. The same has been saved in Tariff Notification 2003-04 issued by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission in clause 1.4. It has further stated that the JSEB had subsequently revised the surcharge clause vide notification no. 5058 dated 29.08.2002 and the exceeded limit was increased from 110% to 115%. [2026:JHHC:2563] 10 16. It has been contended that the electricity ombudsman failed to appreciate that the maximum demand of the consumer was recorded more than 115 percent of the contract demand which comes under the category of unauthorized use of electricity and hence the respondent/ consumer is liable to pay the energy charges and KVA charges twice the rate on above 115 percent of the contract demand. 17. Further the VUSNF as well as appellate authority has not taken into consideration that the tariff notification issued by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission contained the saving clause for pre-existing condition contained the saving clause for pre- existing condition in clause 1.4. 18. It has further been contended that VUSNF and the Electricity Ombudsman further failed to appreciate that the respondent consumer had increased the requisite contracted load and the recorded maximum contracted load was the contract demand for the said financial year and the consumer was bound to pay the minimum monthly charges and other charges for the required period. Thus, both the courts below erred in observing that no other chargeable except the balance of K.V.A. is chargeable. Moreover, exceeding KVA beyond 115% is considered as unauthorized extraction of power. 19. On the basis of the aforesaid ground the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders dated 24.02.2011 & 19.07.2011 passed by VUSNF and the Electricity [2026:JHHC:2563] 11 Ombudsman respectively may be quashed and set-aside. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent: 20. Mr. D.K. Pathak, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has taken the following ground by defending the orders passed by the original as also the appellate authority. 21. It has been contended that there is no error in the concurrent order passed by the VUSNF as well as Appellate authority and the said orders have been passed by taking into consideration the specific provision as carved out under Clause 1.4 of the tariff notification of the year 2003–2004. 22. It has been contended, while responding to the submission/ground raised on behalf of the petitioner, that the Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of 1993 has not been taken into consideration. The submission has been made that provision has been made out in tariff notification of 2003–2004 as available in Clause 1.4 by which the condition which has been made available Clause 16.5 of the year 1993 has been saved, and as such, whatever the amount was to be charged, that is in pursuance of Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of the year 1993, and as per the provision contained therein, the billing since has not been made, and on taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the Forum has given a specific finding that the billing ought to have been made on the basis of the consumption shown made for a particular month and if it is found that the consumption is more than of the other months, then the billing is to be made on [2026:JHHC:2563] 12 the basis of highest consumption shown for a particular month of the period in question with respect to KVA charges. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent therefore has submitted that what is being contended that it is contrary to the provision as contained under Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of 1993 is not fit to be accepted, rather whatever consideration has been made by both the authorities concerned by giving a concurrent finding, the same is based only upon the tariff notification of 1993 having been saved in the tariff notification of 2003–2004, as per the provision made to that effect of Clause 1.4. 24. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the impugned order passed by the VUSNF which has been confirmed by the appellate authority requires no interference. Analysis 25. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the finding recorded by the learned Forum as also the Ombudsman. 26. We are conscious that the moment order passed by the original authority has been carried to the appellate authority, and if the appellate authority declined to interfere with the finding, then on the basis of the principle of merger, the order passed by the original authority will be said to be merged upon the order passed by the higher forum (herein electricity ombudsman). The principle of merger is well settled that the moment the order passed by the [2026:JHHC:2563] 13 lower forum is being affirmed by the higher forum, the order passed by the lower forum will lose its existence due to its merger with the order passed by the higher forum. Reference in this regard be made to judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed & Ors. Vrs. State of Kerala and Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 359, has appreciated the principle of merger wherefrom, it is evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue on doctrine of merger and after taking aid of the judgment rendered in U.J.S. Chopra Vrs. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633, wherein it has been held: "A judgment pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties... would replace the judgment of the lower court, thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the court below.'' Further reference of the judgment has been made rendered in the case of S.S. Rathore Vrs. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC 582, wherein, a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court (Seven Judges) has been pleased to hold that the distinction made between courts and tribunals as regards the applicability of doctrine of merger is without any legal justification; where a statutory remedy was provided against an adverse order in a service dispute and that remedy was availed, the limitation for filing a suit challenging the adverse order would commence not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority disposing of the statutory remedy was passed. "12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective [2026:JHHC:2563] 14 and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way -- whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. 44. To sum up, our conclusions are: (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) ------ (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. - --- 27. The decision in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (Supra) was followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724, wherein at paragraphs 23 and 24 it has been held which read hereunder as:- "23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said [2026:JHHC:2563] 15 doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. 24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court." 28. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application rather it will depend upon the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. 29. This court, in order to appreciate the argument, first needs to appreciate the applicability of the tariff. There is no dispute that the period of bill is of the month of November 2009 to February 2010, which is after coming into effect of the tariff notification of the 2003- 2004. Prior to coming into effect, the tariff notification of 2003-2004, there was tariff notification of the year 1993. The tariff notification of 1993 contains a Clause as under Clause 16.5, for ready reference the same is being referred herein which reads as under: 16.5 - "If during any month in a financial year (April to March next year) the actual maximum demand of a consumer exceeds 110 percent of the contract demand then the highest demand so recorded shall be treated as the contract demand for that financial year and the minimum base charges, both in respect of maximum demand and [2026:JHHC:2563] 16 energy charge shall be payable on that basis" 30. It is evident from aforesaid clause that during any month in financial year (April to March next year), the actual maximum demand of a consumer exceeds 110% of the contract demand., then the highest demand so recorded shall be treated as the contract demand for the financial year and the minimum base charges, both in respect of maximum demand and energy charges shall be payable on that basis, meaning thereby, in a particular financial year, the bill will be on the basis of the actual maximum demand of a consumer if exceeds 110% of the contact demand. The tariff notification of the year 1993 has been superseded by the tariff notification of the Year 2003–2004. 31. The relevant clause in the present lis is Clause 1.4, for ready reference the same is being quoted as under: “All other terms and conditions in respect of meter rent, supply at lower voltage, capacitor charge, circuit-Breaker charge, electricity duty, rebate, security deposit, surcharge for exceeding contract demand etc shall remain the same as existing in the state.” 32. Thus, from the said clause it is evident that all other terms and conditions in respect of meter rent, supply at lower voltage, capacitor charge, circuit breaker charge, electricity duty, rebate, security deposit, surcharge for exceeding contract demand, etc. shall remain the same as existing in the State. 33. The fact about the said saving clause has not been disputed reason being that there is no clause, as has been brought in force in the tariff notification of 2003–2004 in supersession to Clause 16.5 of the tariff [2026:JHHC:2563] 17 notification, 1993. 34. Thus, from aforesaid factual aspect, the seminal issue involve herein is that whether the Forum has passed the order, said to be in consonance with the Clause 16.5, as contained in tariff notification of 1993, being saved under Clause 1.4 of the tariff notification of 2003– 2004. 35. The law is well-settled that if the earlier provision is being amended by bringing the subsequent law/rule/regulation, then the amended provision, either of law/rule/regulation, will prevail upon as per the principle of supersession, but if there is no provision said to be existing in the earlier rules and regulations of the policy decision and if the new rule has come out with the saving clause, then on the principle, as provided under section 6 of the General Clause Act, will prevail even after coming into effect of the amended policy decision or the rule or the regulation, as the case may be. 36. Exactly, the case is herein, since, as provided under Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of the 1993, where it has been provided that during any month in financial year (April to March next year), the actual maximum demand of a consumer exceeds 110% of the contract demand., then the highest demand so recorded shall be treated as the contract demand for the financial year and the minimum base charges, both in respect of maximum demand and energy charges shall be payable on that basis. 37. 37. Further there is no provision formulated in the tariff notification of [2026:JHHC:2563] 18 the year 2003-2004, said to be in supersession to the provision already available in Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of the year 1993, rather, the provision which was there in Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification 1993, has been said to be same in view of the specific saving clause as provided under Clause 1.4 of the tariff notification of the year 2003-2004. 38. This Court now is proceeding to examine the consideration so made by the forum as to whether the findings so recorded by the Forum is on consideration of the Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of the year 1993 saved also in the tariff notification of the year 2003–2004. 39. It has been provided in tariff Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of 1993 saved in the notification of 2003-2004 that in case the maximum demand of a consumer exists 110%, then the billing is to be done on the basis of the increased demand on the presumption that the contract demand will be said to the electricity used to that extent. Herein, for a month it has been shown to be 135 KVA and as such, the billing ought to have been done by taking into consideration the maximum consumption treating the contract demand to be exceeded 128.85 KVA, but the billing was not in consequence with the Clause 16.5. The provision as contained in clause 16.5, however has been amended to the extent that the 110% has been shown to be exceeded to 115% and the period of 12 months have been reduced to the period of six months in the year 2002. [2026:JHHC:2563] 19 40. The whole limb of argument is that the calculation which has been made by taking the maximum contract load by treating the same to be the maximum load on the basis of the excess consumption in a particular month is to be assessed on the basis of the 12 months, as is being referred in Clause 16.5 of the tariff notification of the year 1993 but the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has failed to answer the query which has been put upon him with respect to the implication of the Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022 by which the exceeded limit was increased from 110% to 115% and the period of 12 months has been reduced to the period of 06 months. 41. It is very surprising, although the licensee is before this Court by filing this petition, but without making any pleading regarding the implication of Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022, the present writ petition has been filed while the thoughtful consideration has been given by the Forum with respect to the consequence of the Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022, as would be evident from the paragraph-6 of the order so made by the Electricity Ombudsman wherein the genuineness of the calculation of the bill has been tested by considering the implication of Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022 issued by the J.S.E.B. revising the clause of surcharge by which the exceeding limit has been increased from 110% to 115% and reduced from 12 months to 06 months. For ready reference Para-6 of the order passed by the Electricity Ombudsman is being [2026:JHHC:2563] 20 referred herein which reads as: “6. I find myself in agreement in the aforesaid contentions of the learned Counsel of consumer/respondent and I am also of the view that the appellant/JSEB has illegally raised the bills of consumer/respondent from November, 2009 to February, 2010 against the tariff and therefore the learned VUSNF has rightly quashed the aforesaid bills. I also find myself in agreement with the findings of the learned VUSNF that there is provision for raising surcharge bill in the tariff notification of 1993 where a maximum demand of a consumer exceeds 110% of the contract demand and the same recorded value will be the contract demand for the whole financial year and the minimum base charge, both in respect of maximum demand and energy charge shall be payable on that basis. This provision has also been saved in the tariff notification of 2003-04 of J.S.E.R.C in Cause 14. This is an admitted fact in between both the parties that the appellant/JSEB had revised the clause of surcharge vide notification no. 5058 dated 29/08/2002 by which the exceeding limit has been increased from 110 to 115% and reduced from twelve month to six months.” 42. The question which requires consideration is that if any consideration of any valid notification issued by the competent authority has been made the basis of adjudication, then how can the writ petition be filed without going through the proper implication of such notification as the facts of the present writ petition is. 43. The writ petitioner ought to have filed this writ petition by coming out with the specific pleading by carving out the interpretation along with the proper and just implication of the Notification No. 5058 dated 29.08.2022 which is the basis of passing of an order by the Forum (VUSNF) and that has also been taken into consideration by the Ombudsman. 44. Further from record it is apparent that consumer's/respondent’s [2026:JHHC:2563] 21 maximum demand exceeded in four consecutive months from November, 2009 to February, 2010 and maximum K.V.A. is recorded in the month of February, 2010 which is 135 K.V.A., therefore 135 K.V.A. should be the revised maximum demand chargeable for six months as the surcharge for February, 2010 has already been charged and realized from the consumer/respondent with current bill of that month. 45. The learned Electricity ombudsman taking into consideration the aforesaid factual aspect has observed that the consumer/complainant/respondent herein has covered the monthly minimum charge in all these months, therefore, no other charges is chargeable except the balance of K.V.A. charges from September, 2009 to January, 2010 and accordingly directed the writ petitioner/appellant/JSEB to revise or adjust the amount so charged and recovered from the respondent Mangalam Plastics. 46. On the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect, it is considered view of this Court that finding arrived by the learned appellate authority i.e. Electricity Ombudsman by which order passed by the Original Authority has been affirmed, is based upon the cogent reasoning and hence requires no interference. 47. Further It needs to refer herein that the issuance of the writ of certiorari, is very limited and the same can only be issued in a situation where there is any jurisdictional error of the violation of principle of natural justice or if the order suffers from error [2026:JHHC:2563] 22 apparent on the face of the of the order. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Ors Vrs. Abdul Halim & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39, wherein, at paragraph-30 it has been held as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 48. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250, it has been held as under:- “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” 49. This Court, in view of the aforesaid and considering the parameter to be followed and also applying the principle laid down in the aforesaid cases and based upon the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that neither of the condition is available so that the writ of certiorari be issued for quashing the impugned orders passed by the VUSNF and Electricity Ombudsman dated 24.02.2011 and [2026:JHHC:2563] 23 19.07.2011 respectively. 50. This Court, in view of the above and having gone through the concurrent finding recorded by the VUSNF and Electricity Ombudsman, is of the view that it is not a fit case where writ of certiorari is to be issued. 51. Accordingly, the instant writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 5606 of 2011 is dismissed and as such disposed of. 52. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) 21st January, 2026 Samarth AFR Uploaded on: 02.02.2026