- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL WRIT PETITION NO.16412/2022 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. PUTTAGANGAMMA S/O LATE JAYARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS. 2. SRI. LOHITH .J S/O LATE JAIRAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS. 3. SRI. RAGHURAM .J S/O LATE JAIRAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS. 4. SRI. MAHESH .J S/O LATE JAYARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS. 5. SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY S/O LATE RANGAPPA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS. ALL ARE R/AT HANUMANTHEGOWDANAPALYA MADANAYAKANAHALLI POST DASANAPURA HOBLI BENGALURU NORTH TALUK BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT 562 123. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. R.B. SADASHIVAPPA, ADV., FOR SMT. BHAGEERATHI L, ADV.,) Digitally signed by RUPA V Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 AND: SMT. RANGAMMA W/O LATE RAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 88 YEARS R/AT HANUMANTHEGOWDANAPALYA VILLAGE, DASANAPURA HOBLI BENGALURU NORTH TALUK BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT 562 123. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. HARSHA D. JOSHI, ADV.,) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS. SET ASIDE THE ORDER DTD.9.6.2015 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT NELAMANGALA IN MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO.1/2013 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-N AND ALSO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DTD.1.6.2022 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE II ADDITIONAL SR. CIVIL JUDGE AT NELAMANGALA IN MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO.5/2016 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-S AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE PETITION AND RESTORE THE ORIGINAL SUIT IN O.S.NO.137/1990 FOR ITS ORIGINAL STAGE TO DECIDE THE SUIT ON MERITS & ETC. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 25.08.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 CAV ORDER This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 09.06.2015 passed in Misc.P.No.1/2013 by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Nelamangala (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) and the order dated 01.06.2022 passed in M.A.No.5/2016 by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nelamangala (for short ‘the Appellate Court’). 2. Sri.R.B.Sadashivappa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that one Sri.H.Rangappa filed a suit for redemption of mortgage and the said suit came to be dismissed on 05.07.2001. It is submitted that the plaintiff-Sri.H.Rangappa died on 25.12.1996 and thereafter, the petitioner’s uncle one Sri.Srinivasamurthy took the signature of the legal representatives of the deceased H.Rangappa and filed an application to bring them on record. However, the said Srinivasamurthy died on 21.04.1998 and nobody has contested the suit. It is further submitted that the - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 petitioners got issued a legal notice to the respondent seeking for execution of a redemption mortgage deed and to the said notice, a reply was sent on 03.12.2012 and only thereafter, the petitioners came to know that late H.Rangappa filed a suit for redemption of mortgage, which was dismissed. It is also submitted that immediately after they came to know about the dismissal of the aforesaid suit, they filed a miscellaneous petition along with an application for condonation of delay. It is contended that the Trial Court has erroneously rejected the application for condonation of delay as well as the petition by incorrectly recording the finding on merits. The said order was challenged before the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court, without assigning any reasons, dismissed the appeal. It is further contended that there is no delay in filing the miscellaneous petition as the petitioners came to know about the earlier suit and its dismissal only after the receipt of the reply notice dated 03.12.2012 issued by the respondents. It is also contended that the petitioners are - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 illiterate and they have assigned detailed reasons in the application seeking condonation of delay. However, none of the aspects have been considered by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court while dismissing the petition and the appeal, respectively. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the following decisions: a) GMG ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS Vs. ISSA GREEN POWER SOLUTION AND OTHERS1 b) YAMUNAPPA Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DAVAGERE DISTRICT, DAVANAGERE AND OTHERS2 c) SMT.SHARANAMMA Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA3 3. Per contra, Sri.Harsha D Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supports the impugned orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court and submits that the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court has rightly considered the enormous delay 1 (2015) 15 SCC 659 2 2001 4 KCCR 2696 (DB) 3 2017 (3) AKR 344 - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 i.e. 17 years in filing the miscellaneous petition and proceeded to dismiss the same, which does not call for any interference. Hence, he seeks to dismiss the petition. 4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel for the respondent and meticulously perused the material available on record. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on both the sides. 5. The material on record indicates that one Sri.H.Rangappa had filed a suit in O.S.No.137/1990 seeking prayer for judgment and decree against the defendant Smt.Rangamma for redemption of mortgage dated 13.11.1967 with a direction to the defendant to execute a reconveyance deed and put the plaintiff in physical possession of the suit schedule property after receiving the amount in deposit or any other sum that the Court may decide. The plaintiff-Sri.H.Rangappa had died - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 on 25.12.1996 and thereafter, the legal heirs of the plaintiff were brought on record in the suit. The records further indicate that the suit came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on 05.07.2001. 6. Sri.Jayaramaiah, son of Late H.Rangappa issued a legal notice dated 19.11.2012 to the respondent calling upon her to execute a redemption of mortgage deed. The respondent replied to the said notice on 03.12.2012 indicating certain reasons. The reply indicates that Sri.H.Rangappa had filed a suit for redemption which was dismissed on 05.07.2001. 7. Sri.Jayaramaiah and Sri.Krishnamurthy sons of late Sri.H.Rangappa filed a Miscellaneous petition under Order IX Rule 9 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the CPC’) seeking to set aside the dismissal of the suit vide order dated 05.07.2001. Misc.P.No.1/2013 was accompanied with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Act’), seeking to - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 condone the delay in filing the petition. The Trial Court, after conducting the enquiry dismissed the petition as well as the application for condonation of delay. The petitioner herein preferred an appeal in M.A.No.5/2016 assailing the order of the Trial Court, which came to be dismissed on 01.06.2022. Both the orders are assailed in this petition. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases has laid down the law with regard to consideration of the application for condonation of delay. In the judgment in BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 11 to 15 has held as under: "11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and 4 (2013) 14 SCC 81 - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." (Emphasis supplied) 9. In the case of SHEO RAJ SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs 30 to 36 as under: 5 (2023) 10 SCC 531 - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 "30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390] , which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] where it has been held that: “an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”. 34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V. Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is one such decision apart from University of Delhi [University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] ] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above. 35. We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support of its order: 35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice. 35.2. The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail. 35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court. 35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness. 36. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not." (Emphasis supplied) 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments has taken note of its earlier judgment in the case of COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTANATH AND ANOTHER Vs. Mst. KATIJI AND OTHERS6, and held that the approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. 11. It would also be useful to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY Vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LA)7, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 26 as under: "15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory 6 (1987) 2 SCC 107 7 2024 SCCOnline SC 513 - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a - 20 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not - 21 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision." (emphasis supplied) 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments has considered its earlier judgments in the case of KATIJI and BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER referred to supra and held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice oriented approach' and 'cause for advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow the stale matter to be revived and reopened by taking shelter under Section 5 of the Act. - 22 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 Further, it has been held that no Courts would be justified in condoning such inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. 13. In the instant case, the suit in O.S.No.137/1990 was dismissed on 05.07.2001 and the miscellaneous petition is filed only in 2013 i.e. after 12 years after dismissal of the suit. The Trial Court, while recording the reasons for the impugned order has clearly noted that PW1-husband of the petitioner No.1 herein, during his cross-examination, has categorically admitted that they came to know about the dismissal of the original suit in the year 2001-02. In view of the aforesaid finding by the Trial Court, the contention that the petitioners only got to know about the dismissal of the suit after receiving the reply notice dated 03.12.2012, and that the petitioners are illiterate and could not file the petition within time, is just a casual and factually incorrect explanation which cannot be accepted. - 23 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 14. It is required to be noticed that after the death of Sri.H.Rangappa, the petitioners herein who were the legal heirs, were brought on record by filing an application through their counsel. However, the suit was subsequently dismissed for non-prosecution. It is further required to be noticed that the petitioners were brought on record as the legal heirs and also PW-1 had admitted about the knowledge of the dismissal of the suit, now the petitioners cannot plead ignorance by taking a stand that their uncle one Sri.Srinivasamurthy was attending to the case. 15. It is further to be noticed that the legal notice issued on 19.11.2012 against the respondent for redemption would also be barred by the law of limitation as the petitioners could not have filed a suit seeking redemption of mortgage deed dated 13.11.1967 in the year 2012 as the same would be after a delay of 45 years, which is clearly beyond the period of 30 years as provided - 24 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 under Article 61(a) of the Act. Hence, even on this ground, the petitioners have no case on merits and the same was rightly dismissed by the Trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court. 16. Insofar as the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the same will not aid their case, as no justifiable explanation is given and no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioners to condone the enormous delay. 17. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the Trial Court has rightly considered the material available on record and taken note of the enormous delay in filing the petition and rejected the application which was rightly upheld by the Appellate Court and the same does not call for any interference. - 25 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010368222022 NC: 2026:KHC:46749 W.P. No.16412/2022 18. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE ABK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1