01.09.2026 Ct. No. 446 Sl. No.15 akd [Rejected] C. R. M. (A) 2303 of 2026 In Re: An application for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023filed on 08.07.2026 in connection with Khardah Police Station Case No.300 of 2026 dated 09.06.2026 under Sections 126(2)/351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act and Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. And In Re: Bikash Singh @ Vikash Singh … … Petitioner Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya .. Sr. Advocate Mr. Uday Sankar Chattopadhyay Mr. Rajashree Tah Ms. Sadia Parveen … … for the petitioner Mr. Soumyajit Das Mahapatra Mr. Supriyo Das Ms. Madhurai Sinha Ms. Upasana Banerjee Mr. Bisal Roy … … for the de-facto complainant Mr. Kallol Mondal .. ld. Public Prosecutor Mr. Krishnendu Bhattacharyya .. ld. Addl. Public Prosecutor Mr. Aditya Tiwari … … for the State 1. This is an application for anticipatory bail filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in connection with Khardah Police Station Case No. 300 of 2026 dated 09.06.2026 under Sections 126(2)/351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act and Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 2. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the instant case owing to political rivalry and personal grudge. He contends 2 that the prosecution case has been deliberately framed so as to deprive the petitioner of the remedy available under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. According to him, the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is not attracted in the facts of the present case and, therefore, the application for pre-arrest bail is maintainable. He submits that the Court must exercise duecaution to ensure that the provisions of the 1989 Act are not misused to settle personal scores. He further submits that every statement cannot be construed as a casteist slur, nor can every comment be regarded as having been made with an intention to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 3. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala & Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is not absolute and that, where the complaint or FIR does not disclose any prima facie case warranting the petitioner’s arrest, the Court can entertain an application for anticipatory bail. He has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Deepak Kumar Tala v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 638, in support of the said proposition. He, therefore, submits that custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not warranted and that he may be granted pre-arrest bail. 4. Mr. Kallol Mondal, learned Public Prosecutor, produces the Memo of Evidence as well as the case diary and vehemently opposes the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner on the basis of the materials available therein. The Memo of Evidence filed in Court today is taken on record. 5. Mr. Mondal further submits that the FIR itself discloses that the petitioner made disparaging remarks against the complainant with the 3 intention of insulting and humiliating him in a public place and within public view. According to him, the petitioner, being a former Councillor of Titagarh Municipality, was aware that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. 6. He submits that the allegations made in the complaint find support in the statements of the witnesses and the victim recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, respectively. He further submits that the case diary discloses prima facie materials against the petitioner and, therefore, the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is attracted. 7. He contends that even if the application is held to be maintainable and considered on merits, the petitioner’s criminal antecedents cannot be overlooked, as he is involved in as many as 16 criminal cases. He further points out that, in the present case, it has been alleged in the FIR that the complainant was threatened at gunpoint and was warned of dire consequences. In such circumstances, according to him, custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary. 8. Mr. Mahapatra, learned Advocate appearing for the de-facto complainant, referring to Section 8 of the 1989 Act, submits that where the accused was aware of the caste or community of the complainant, the statutory presumption under the said provision would operate and the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act would consequently be attracted. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886, he submits that, at this stage, the contents and allegations in the FIR are decisive. The Court is only required to examine whether the alleged offence was committed within public view and whether a prima facie case is made out. He claims at this stage, it is neither permissible to assess the evidentiary value of the allegations or statements 4 contained in the FIR nor to conduct a mini trial. According to Mr. Mahapatra, the incident took place in public view and in the presence of independent witnesses. He, therefore, submits that the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. 9. He further submits that, if the application is considered on merits, the petitioner’s criminal antecedents ought to be taken into consideration, as 16 (sixteen) criminal cases are pending against him. He contends that the petitioner is an influential person and that there is every likelihood of his tampering with the evidence and obstructing the course of investigation. He accordingly submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the discretionary relief of pre-arrest bail. 10. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the case diary as well as the other materials on record including the Memo of Evidence. 11. Materials on record indicate that, in the FIR, it has been alleged that the de-facto complainant was known to the petitioner for a long time and that the petitioner was also aware that the de-facto complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. It has further been alleged that the complainant participated in a victory rally organised by a political party, which enraged the petitioner, a former Councillor of Titagarh Municipality. The petitioner allegedly abused the complainant in the following words, inter alia: “chotojaat, nichujaat er maal, mere mukhe mute debo. Aar Jodi beshibarabari koris, barir electricity connection aar joler line kete debo”. It has also been alleged therein that the petitioner threatened the complainant at gunpoint and threatened to disconnect the electricity and water supply to his house. 12. The expressions “chhotojaat” and “nichujaat” signify “lower caste”. The utterance of such expressions in a public place and within 5 public view prima facie appears to constitute a casteist slur, having the potential to denigrate and demean the social status and dignity of a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. 13. The 1989 Act was enacted with the object of protecting persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities from indignity, humiliation and atrocities, as defined under Section 3 thereof, and to give effect to the constitutional mandate for the abolition of untouchability. Section 18 was incorporated to expressly exclude the application of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding to Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in cases involving the arrest of a person accused of committing an offence under the Act.Subsequently, Section 18A was introduced, inter alia, providing that no preliminary enquiry shall be required for registration of an FIR and that no prior approval of the Investigating Officer shall be necessary for arrest, where warranted. It is needless to observe that the constitutional validity of both these provisions has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of decisions. 14. Undisputedly, in Shajan Skaria (supra), the Apex Court held that the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is not absolute and that the Court is required to examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of an offence under Section 3 of the said Act. The Court further explained that, where the allegations, on a prima facie consideration, do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence alleged, the statutory bar under Section 18 would not operate. Thus, the applicability of the bar under Section 18 would depend upon whether the materials placed before the Court prima facie disclose the commission of an offence under the 1989 Act. 6 15. In Kiran (supra), the Apex Court reiterated that, while considering the applicability of the bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act, the contents and allegations in the FIR are decisive. The Court is required to ascertain, on a first impression and from a plain reading of the allegations, whether the essential ingredients of any offence under Section 3 of the 1989 Act are prima facie disclosed. At this stage, the Court cannot travel into the evidentiary realm, consider other materials or undertake a mini trial. Therefore, while considering an application under Section 482 of the BNSS, the Court is required to examine whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value, prima facie disclose the commission of any offence enumerated under Section 3(1) of the 1989 Act. 16. In the present case, the alleged utterances were made near 5 No. Water Tank, in a narrow lane, in the presence of several other persons. Thus, on a prima facie consideration of the allegations in the FIR, it appears that the alleged offence was committed in a public place and within public view. In view of the aforesaid circumstance, I am of the opinion that the statutory bar under Section 18 of the 1989 Act is attracted. 17. However, since the petitioner has also urged that the application be considered on merits and both the Mr. Mondal and Mr. Mahapatra both advanced their argument on merits, I deem it appropriate to examine the merits of the prayer for pre-arrest bail as well, without prejudice to the aforesaid finding. 18. The Memo. of evidence as placed on behalf of the State indicates that the petitioner has a past criminal antecedent and 16 (sixteen) cases are pending against the petitioner. Needless to state that criminal antecedent is a significant factor in determining whether extra-ordinary discretionary relief for anticipatory bail should be granted or not. It has 7 also been alleged that the petitioner, being an influential person of the locality, a former councilor of Titagarh Municipality, pointed gun towards the complainant. Very recently, in Sharad Sehgal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 740, noticing that 22 criminal cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in granting pre-arrest to such an accused person. 19. Therefore, considering this aspect, I am of the view that it is not fit case to extend the privilege under Section 482 BNSS in favour of the petitioner. 20. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner stands rejected. 21. The application for anticipatory bail is, thus, disposed of. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)