1 CGHC010114312023 2026:CGHC:41208 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 829 of 2023 Vinod Kumar Shriwas @ Raju Shriwas S/o Ramlal Shriwas Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Sarsiwan, P.S. Sarsiwan District Sarangarh Bhilaigarh Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police of P.S. Sarsiwa, District Sarangarh Bhilaigarh Chhattisgarh 2 – X Y Z. --- Respondent (Cause title is taken from CIS system) For Petitioner : Ms. Shivali Dubey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Dy.A.G. Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Order On Board 18/09/2026 1. Petitioner has filed this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of framing charge U/s.376 (ii) (n) of the Indian Penal Code dated 03.02.2023, in Session Trial No. 08/2023 pending before the learned learned First Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Balodabazar (C.G.) and the entire criminal proceedings BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN 2 initiated against him in connection with charge-sheet filed by the Police Station Sarsiwa, District Sarangar-Bilaigarh for commission of offence under Section 366, 376 (2) (n) of Indian Penal Code arising out of Crime No.459 of 2022 registered at Police Station – Sarsiwa, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 29.11.2022, respondent No.2/prosecutrix lodged a written complaint at Police Station Sarsiwa alleging that in the year 2010, she met petitioner during marriage ceremony of her maternal uncle at Village Kotera, District Janjgir- Champa, and became acquainted with him. It is alleged that petitioner induced her on the false promise of marriage, stating that he liked her and intended to marry her. On 14.06.2013, he took her to his house at Sarsiwa but did not marry her and continued to have physical relations with her. Whenever she asked him to marry her, he avoided the matter on one pretext or another. It is further alleged that after about ten years, petitioner threw her out of house, stating that he was fed up with her and would marry another girl. It is alleged that petitioner, on the false promise of marriage, physically exploited her from 14.06.2013 to 10.02.2022. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner has been falsely implicated in this case and he has not committed any offence as alleged. Respondent No. 2 is a major woman aged about 29 years and is capable of understanding and making decisions regarding her own well-being. She accompanied the petitioner voluntarily, of her own free will and without any coercion or undue influence. It is contended that relationship between petitioner and respondent No.2 is consensual in 3 nature which continued for about 10 years i.e. from 14.06.2013 to 10.02.2022. She next contended that ingredients of offence of rape is missing in the present case and in view of their long relationship, no offence of rape is prima facie appears to be made out to proceed with the trial of the case. She also contended that there is no specific allegation or material showing that, at the inception of the relationship with respondent No.2, petitioner had no intention to marry respondent No.2 and had made promise of marriage only with intention to deceive her. She submits that subsequent failure or refusal to marry, by itself, cannot automatically establish that the promise was false from its inception. In support of his contention, she placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sonu alias Subhash Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 181 and submits that in absence of any material to establish that alleged promise of marriage was false or dishonest from its inspection, continuation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law. It is, therefore, prayed that to quash the impugned order of framing charges as well as the criminal proceedings against petitioner in the interest of justice. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for State vehemently opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner and submits that after investigation, charge sheet has been filed and charges have been framed. There are sufficient evidence against petitioner to proceed with the trial of the case and the nature of dispute in the present case requires complete trial. Whether or not the victim was induced and subjected to sexually exploited on the pretext of marriage, 4 has to be determined after recording evidence of the parties. At the stage of framing of charge or considering the petition under Section 482 of CRPC for quashing of the charges/FIR/criminal proceedings, the Court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence, but only prima facie material is to be seen to satisfy the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. There is sufficient prima facie evidence available in the charge sheet against the petitioner and this petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. On notice issued to victim/respondent No.2, she appeared before this Court on 10.08.2023 and has raised objection. Today there is no representation on her behalf. 6. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7. From perusal of complaint/FIR lodged by respondent No. 2 against petitioner, would show that respondent No.2/victim is well educated major girl. She first met with petitioner at the marriage ceremony of her maternal uncle in the year 2010, where they became acquainted. It is further alleged that petitioner thereafter allured respondent No. 2 by representing that he liked her and would marry her, and on such assurance took her to his house on 14.06.2013 and developed physical relation with respondent No.2 till 10.02.2022, during which period respondent No. 2 repeatedly asked petitioner to perform marriage in accordance with his promise, but petitioner, despite such assurances and repeated requests, never married her. 8. Statement of respondent No.2 was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. She stated that she met petitioner, became acquainted with 5 him, and thereafter they talk regularly on phone and met several times. Petitioner proposed her, and after about one and a half years, she accepted his proposal. She further stated that when her family started looking for a match for her marriage, she told them that she liked the petitioner and wished to marry him, but her family did not agree. Then she told her family that she would marry the petitioner, left her house on 14.06.2013, and went to the house of petitioner at Sarsiwa and started living there. She further stated that due to fights between them and physical assault by petitioner, she returned to her parental home and thereafter about one year, she again went back to petitioner. 9. On reading the FIR, the statements of the victim and witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and the victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., it appears that this is a case of a consensual relationship. Both parties came into contact 2010 and thereafter from 2013 remained in a relationship for about ten years, enjoying each other’s company. Respondent No.2 is a well-educated lady, who knows the pros and cons of such a relationship and entered into it with wide and open eyes based on her consent and volition. It also appears that after spending considerable period of time together, differences arose between them, leading to fights, which ultimately resulted in the lodging of the FIR against the petitioner. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517, while quashing the criminal proceedings in case of physical exploitation on false promise of marriage has held as under :- “7. The contents of the FIR as well as the statement under Section 164CrPC leave no manner of doubt that, 6 on the basis of the allegations as they stand, three important features emerge. 7.1. The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature. 7.2. The parties were in the relationship for about a period of one-and-a-half years. 7.3. Subsequently, the appellant had expressed a disinclination to marry the second respondent which led to the registration of the FIR. 8. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , while dealing with a similar situation, the principles of law which must govern a situation like the present were enunciated in the following observations : (SCC p. 618, para 16) “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it.” 9. Further, the Court has observed : (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar case [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC p. 620, para 18) “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must 7 involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” 10. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the above decision [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , we are of the view that even assuming that all the allegations in the FIR are correct for the purposes of considering the application for quashing under Section 482CrPC, no offence has been established. There is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. On the contrary, it would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave rise to the registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under Section 482CrPC on the basis that it was only the evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was established.” 11. Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1818, while quashing the FIR has observed thus :- 8 “3. The High Court while declining the prayer for quashing specifically referred to the judgment of this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 of which paragraph 24 is extracted hereunder: “24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 4. Under the IPC, the false promise of marriage was prosecuted under Section 375 read with Section 90. Therein the requirement was to find that the consent, if at all coming out from the facts, was tainted insofar as the victim having been led to believe a promise of marriage and physical relations having been permitted only on the belief that the promise will be complied with; which the promisor even at the time of giving such promise had no intention to comply with. 9 It was held in the aforesaid decision that misconception of fact cannot be alleged if the promise is made with good intention and later for unavoidable circumstances, the person is forced to resile from the aforesaid promise. The BNS by incorporating Section 69 brought in a separate offence carving out the fraudulent and deceitful conduct as spoken of therein from the grave offence of rape, while at the same time providing a penalty for the deceptive conduct alleged therein. The word employed “deceitful means or by making a promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same” brings in the same rigor of the promise having been given with an intention of never being fulfilled, which is the deceitful conduct sought to be punished. 5. In the present case, the FIR has been extracted by the High Court and it clearly indicates that the appellant and the complainant came into contact through a digital platform and a friendship developed between them, which later became a love affair. It is also stated in the complaint that the appellant communicated his desire to marry the complainant on the first physical meeting. The complainant is said to have succumbed to his entreaties and allowed sexual intercourse. This was on 12.02.2024 and again in April 2024, the victim is said to have stayed in a hotel for two days with the appellant. The statements made in the complaint clearly indicate a consensual relationship and we do not find anything to find a deceitful conduct, of, the appellant having induced the complainant into sexual intercourse, which she succumbed to only on the promise to marry. Here we reiterate that on the first occasion when they met, the complainant succumbed to the appellant's entreaties, is the specific statement 10 made without even stating that it was on the promise to marry that physical relationship was permitted. 6. On the mere communication of the desire of the appellant to marry her, we are unable to find the appellant having used any deceitful means. In any event, the very complaint is that the appellant refused to marry her later, because his mother did not permit it, which indicates that the promise was made with all good intention, if at all it was made. 7. We are unable to find any reason to allow continuation of the proceedings. We hence quash FIR bearing No. 11196030250292 dated 20.05.2025, registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, Gujarat.” 12. From overall consideration of the material available in the charge sheet and also in the light of the above decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am of the considered view that if the contents of the FIR and charge sheet are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out the offences under Sections 376(2)(n) of Indian Penal Code against petitioner. Petitioner and respondent No. 2 had a long, consensual relationship and, lived together for about 10 years, and respondent No. 2, being a well-educated adult, entered into this relationship willingly and with full understanding. FIR and statement of the respondent No.2 does not show that petitioner’s promise to marry was false from the beginning or made only to deceive respondent No.2. It is also statement of the victim/respondent No.2 that she herself went to the house of petitioner leaving her parental home. At the most, it shows that after many years, differences arose and petitioner later refused or failed to marry her. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in order to come within the meaning of 11 misconception of fact, the fact must have a immediate relevance. In the case at hand, they lived together for about 10 years. 13. For the foregoing discussions, present petition is allowed and the order framing charges against petitioner on 03.02.2023 for the offence under Sections 376(ii)(n) of the Indian Penal Code is quashed. The petitioner is discharged. Consequently, proceedings of the Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2023 pending before the learned First Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Balodabazar, District – Balodabazar (C.G.) is also quashed. 14. A copy of this order be forwarded to the trial Court for necessary steps and information. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram