1 / 11 CGHC010374062024 2026:CGHC:41308 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2919 of 2024 Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited Through Its Authorized Representative Dinesh Singh Chauhan, Son Of Shri Randhir Bahadur Singh, Aged About 42 Years, Working As Branch Manager, Jagdalpur Branch District- Bastar (C.G.). ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Vijay Raj Singh Shri Inder Pal Singh, Aged About 33 Years Resident Of Ajgarha, Police Station- Vishwavidyalaya, District- Rewa (M.P.) Presently Residing At Bihind Nagar Palika Nigam, Gandhi Nagar, Sukma, District- Sukma (C.G.). 2 - Nilesh Kumar Pandey, Shri Gopika Pandey, Aged About 41 Years R/o Jhalwar, Police Station- Dev Talab, District- Rewa (M.P.) Presently Residing At Rajiv Gandhi Ward, Frezarpur, Jagalpur, Police Station- Bodghat, District- Bastar (C.G.). 3 - Rinku Sahu, Sashibhushan Sahu, Aged About 34 Years Resident Of Village- Kisdi, Police Station- Saraipali, Chowki- Baloda, District- Mahasamund (C.G.). 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The District Magistrate, Sukma, District- Sukma (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.09.28 15:36:31 +0530 2 / 11 For Petitioner : Mr. Manish Nigam, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Sunil Pillai, Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Shreshta Gupta, Advocate For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Lukesh Kumar Mishra and Mr. Vinay Nagdev, Advocates For Respondent No.4/State : Ms. Sunita Manikpuri, Govt. Advocate S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Order on Board 22/09/2026 1. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 04.10.2024 (Annexure P-1), whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. in the pending Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 2022 was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), South Bastar, Dantewada. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this petition are that in the year 2021, respondent No. 1–Vijay Raj Singh was working as Branch Head, Sukma, in Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited. He seized approximately 39 transport vehicles financed by the Company and, without recording the same in the Company's records and without intimating the higher officials of the Company, sold those vehicles to third parties in connivance with respondent No. 3–Rinku Sahu (the then Regional Collection Head, Jagdalpur) and respondent No. 2– Nilesh Kumar Pandey (the then Regional Branch Head, Jagdalpur), thereby causing a loss of Rs. 3,00,24,960/- (Rupees Three Crores, Twenty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty) to the Company. Upon the said embezzlement being unearthed, the authorized representative of the Company lodged FIR against respondents No. 1 3 / 11 to 3 at Police Station Sukma, which was registered under Crime No. 64/2021 for offences punishable under Sections 420, 409 and 34 of the IPC. Upon completion of investigation, final report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. was filed on 19.10.2021. Respondents No. 1 to 3 were tried before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sukma, in Criminal Case No. 356/2021, and by judgment dated 23.04.2022, learned trial Court acquitted respondents No. 1 to 3 from the charges levelled against them. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, petitioner preferred an appeal, registered as Criminal Appeal No. 03/2022. State of Chhattisgarh/respondent No. 4 has also preferred an appeal against the said judgment, registered as Criminal Appeal No. 25/2023. Both the appeals are pending consideration before the learned Sessions Court, Dantewada, District South Bastar, Dantewada. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeals, Respondent No. 3 lodged an FIR against certain officials of the Company, alleging that they had deliberately fabricated documents and filed a false police complaint against him and his subordinate in July 2021. Pursuant thereto, FIR No. 244/2024 was registered against those officials of the Company for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 193 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Certain employees of the petitioner Company thereafter filed Cr.M.P. No. 1657/2024 (Sudarshan B. Holla and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others) and Cr.M.P. No. 1659/2024 (Dinesh Singh Chauhan and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others). By order dated 04.07.2024, this Court granted interim relief in favour of the petitioners therein. During the pendency of the Criminal Appeal, the Petitioner herein filed an application under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. before the 4 / 11 Appellate Court for taking further evidence on record, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 04.10.2024, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 3.Assailing legality, validity and propriety of the impugned order 04.10.2024 (Annexure P-1) learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Appellate Court erred in law in dismissing the application filed by petitioner under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate the reasons assigned by the petitioner in the said application, namely, that the offence in question was committed during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic, on account of which it was not possible to reconcile each and every document with the charge-sheet at the relevant time. It is further submitted that a perusal of the documents on record makes it evident that the said documents were not in the possession of the petitioner at the time of filing the appeal before the learned Appellate Court, and that as and when the same were collected, they were produced without any delay, along with the application. Since the material witnesses and the additional documents go to the very root of the matter, learned Appellate Court, in all fairness, ought to have allowed the application filed by the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner, being the "victim" of the crime, has suffered a huge financial loss, and a substantial right therefore accrues in favour of the petitioner to prove its case and to bring home the guilt of respondents No. 1 to 3. Therefore, this petition may be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respective respondents 5 / 11 while opposing the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, submit that the impugned order dated 04.10.2024 (Annexure P-1) has been passed by the learned Appellate Court after due consideration of the material available on record and does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. was rightly considered and rejected by the learned Appellate Court, as the petitioner failed to furnish any cogent, convincing or legally sustainable explanation for not producing the alleged additional documents and/or examining the proposed material witnesses at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. In addition, referring to reply submitted by respondent No.1, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 would further add that though the appeal was filed on 09.06.2022, the applications under Section 391 Cr.P.C., along with the documents sought to be produced, were filed belatedly on 29.06.2024 and 14.08.2024. It is submitted that the petitioner, having engaged a lawyer to assist the prosecution, had ample opportunity to raise such objections during trial, but chose not to do so, and moved the applications only at the fag end of the appeal. The learned Appellate Court has therefore rightly rejected the applications as a belated attempt to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case. 5.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with this petition. 6. Before considering the submission of counsel for the parties, it is apposite to refer to Section 391 Cr.P.C, which reads as under:- 6 / 11 “391 . Appellate court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken.-- (1) In dealing with any appeal under this chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. (2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal. (3) The Accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional evidence is taken. (4) The taking of evidence under this Section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry. 7. A plain reading of Section 391 Cr.P.C. reveals that the power conferred upon the Appellate Court to take additional evidence, or to direct such evidence to be taken, is not unbridled or automatic. The provision itself uses the expression "if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary," which pre-supposes an element of judicial satisfaction on the touchstone of "necessity" and not mere "desirability" or "relevance." The Appellate Court is further obligated to record reasons before exercising this power, which underscores that the discretion is to be exercised sparingly, judiciously, and only in the interest of a just and fair decision of the appeal — and not to enable a party to fill up gaps or lacunae left unattended during trial. 8. 8. Object of Section 391 Cr.P.C. is to enable the Appellate Court to 7 / 11 secure such additional evidence as would assist it in arriving at a correct and just decision of the appeal, in cases where such evidence, despite due diligence, could not be produced at the trial stage, or where the same is rendered necessary on account of some formal defect or omission. The provision is not intended to be used as a device to patch up weaknesses in one's own case, more particularly where the party seeking to adduce additional evidence had ample opportunity to do so during the trial and failed to avail of it without sufficient or satisfactory explanation. 9. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that Criminal Appeal No. 03/2022 was preferred by the petitioner on 09.06.2022, whereas the applications under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C., along with the documents sought to be produced, were filed belatedly on 29.06.2024 and 14.08.2024, i.e., more than two years after filing of the appeal and, significantly, when the matter had already reached the stage of final hearing and was listed for pronouncement of judgment. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner for such inordinate delay. The mere assertion that difficulties were faced during the COVID-19 pandemic cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient justification, particularly when the trial had concluded on 23.04.2022 and the petitioner had been actively assisting the prosecution throughout the trial through its counsel. The petitioner was, therefore, fully aware of the proceedings and had ample opportunity to seek examination of the witnesses now sought to be introduced, or to place the relevant documents on record, at the appropriate stage. Having failed to do so, the petitioner 8 / 11 cannot seek to invoke Section 391 Cr.P.C. at the appellate stage merely to fill the lacunae, if any, in the evidence already adduced. The provision of Section 391 Cr.P.C. cannot be permitted to be used as a means to cure such omissions or to improve the case of a party at a belated stage. 10. In case of Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2001) 4 SCC 759, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “4. Incidentally, Section 391 forms an exception to the general rule that an appeal must be decided on the evidence which was before the trial court and the powers being an exception shall always have to be exercised with caution and circumspection so as to meet the ends of justice. Be it noted further that the doctrine of finality of judicial proceedings does not stand annulled or affected in any way by reason of exercise of power under Section 391 since the same avoids a de novo trial. It is not to fill up the lacuna but to subserve the ends of justice. Needless to record that on an analysis of the Civil Procedure Code, Section 391 is thus akin to Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code.” (emphasis added) 11. In case of Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 402, Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “28. Additional evidence at the appellate stage is permissible, in case of a failure of justice. However, such power must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional suitable cases where the court is 9 / 11 satisfied that directing additional evidence would serve the interests of justice. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case as to whether such permission should be granted having due regard to the concepts of fair play, justice and the well-being of society. Such an application for taking additional evidence must be decided objectively, just to cure the irregularity. 29. The primary object of the provisions of Section 391 CrPC is the prevention of a guilty man's escape through some careless or ignorant action on part of the prosecution before the court or for vindication of an innocent person wrongfully accused, where the court omitted to record the circumstances essential to elucidation of truth. Generally, it should be invoked when formal proof for the prosecution is necessary. [Vide Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra, Anil Sharma v. State of Jharkhand, Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarar and Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)] x x x x x x 32. In view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that additional evidence can be taken at the appellate stage in exceptional circumstances, to remove an irregularity, where the circumstances so warrant in public interest. Generally, such power is exercised to have formal proof of the documents, etc. just to meet the ends of justice. However, the provisions of Section 391 CrPC cannot be pressed into service in order to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case.” 10 / 11 12.Recently, in the case of Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2024 INSC 63), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “9. At the outset, we may note that the law is well- settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that power to record additional evidence under Section 391 CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal and that non-recording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice.” 13.In the present case, learned lower Appellate Court, while considering the applications filed by the petitioner/appellant under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C., noted that the respondents had already been acquitted after a full-fledged trial, wherein 39 prosecution witnesses had been examined. It was further observed that the proposed witnesses and documents were neither shown to be necessary nor demonstrated to have been unavailable at the relevant stage, particularly when the material facts sought to be established had already been brought on record through other prosecution witnesses. The applications were also found to have been filed belatedly, after conclusion of the respondents' arguments and when the matter had been reserved for judgment, without any satisfactory explanation for such delay. Accordingly, finding no sufficient ground or necessity for permitting additional evidence, learned Appellate Court dismissed the 11 / 11 applications by a reasoned and well-considered order. 14. Upon consideration of the material available on record, this Court finds that the learned Appellate Court has considered the relevant facts and circumstances and has exercised its discretion under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. in accordance with the settled principles of law. The findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court do not suffer from any perversity, illegality, material irregularity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Court. 15.In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 04.10.2024 (Annexure P-1) does not call for any interference. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Sd/Sd Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Praveen