1 CGHC010495342025 2026:CGHC:41560 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3610 of 2025 Order Reserved on : 19.08.2026 Order Delivered on : 24.09.2026 1. Smt. Sushila Singh W/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 69 Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 72 Years) 2. Abhishek Singh S/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 38 Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 37 Years) 3. Avinash Singh S/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 39 Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 45 Years( 4. Smt. Anju Singh W/o Shri Durgesh Singh Aged About 46 Years R/o Maruti Residency Near Amlidih School, New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 48 Years) 5. Smt. Alka Singh W/o Shri Nilesh Singh Aged About 44 Years R/o Green City, Village Pal, Adajan, Surat, District- Surat (Gujrat) Wrongly Mentioned As Mugda (Gujrat) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 47 Years) 6. Smt. Anisha Agnivanshi W/o Shri Rajesh Agnivanshi Aged About 40 Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) ... Petitioner(s) versus MANISH YADAV Digitally signed by MANISH YADAV Date: 2026.09.25 11:01:52 +0530 2 1. Smt. Nirmala Agnivanshi W/o Late Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi Aged About 67 Years R/o G-5 Rajiv Nagar, Post Shankar Nagar, P.S. Mowa Raipur, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. Ms. Shruti Agnivanshi D/o Late Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi Aged About 67 Years R/o G-5 Rajiv Nagar, Post Shankar Nagar, P.S. Mowa Raipur, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 3. State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Akanksha Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) No. 1 and 2 : Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate For State : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas (CAV Order) 1. The matter is listed on consideration of interim relief, but with the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. The petitioner No. 6 is daughter-in-law of respondent No. 1, petitioners No. 2 and 3 are brothers of petitioner No. 6, petitioner No. 1 is elder sister of petitioner No. 6, petitioners No. 4 and 5 are sisters of petitioner No. 6 who have filed this criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 assailing the cognizance taken by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur (C.G.) on the complaint made under Section 12 of Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short “Act of 2005”) by the respondent No. 1 and 2 who are the mother of husband of petitioner No. 6 Smt. Anisha Agnivanshi and Ms. Shruti Agnivanshi. The petitioners have also assailed the order dated 25.06.2025 passed by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge Raipur by which their Criminal Appeal No. 244/2025 has been dismissed against the order dated 22.03.2023 by which the learned Judicial Magistrate First 3 Class has rejected the objection filed by the petitioners by recording its finding that the contentions raised by the petitioners that the petitioners No. 2 to 6 are not residing in the shared household which is a matter of evidence and same cannot be decided without recording of the evidence. 3. Brief facts, as reflected from the record are that the respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed a complaint under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short “Act of 2005”) on 11.11.2020 alleging that: (a) The marriage between son of respondent No. 1 and the petitioner No. 6 was solemnized on 24.02.2011 and from their wedlock one daughter was born and after the marriage, the petitioner No. 6 was residing in joint family with her husband, whereas the husband of the petitioner No. 6 was working in Mumbai. (b) It is also the case of the complainant that the husband of respondent No. 1 - Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi was suffering from kidney problem, therefore, he was not keeping good health, as such respondent No. 1 was looking after her husband and also requested petitioner No. 6 to take care of husband of respondent No. 1, but she has not shown any interest to look after her husband which has caused dispute between them. Thereafter, the husband of petitioner No. 6 made an attempt to console her and took respondent No. 1 and her husband to Mumbai. Since the husband of petitioner No. 6 was unable look properly her father, he has called his sister complainant No. 2 to look after their father, which was not appreciated by the 4 petitioner No. 6 and she was continuing her rude behavior with all the family members. This attitude of petitioner No. 6 compelled him to leave Mumbai and stay at Raipur, but the petitioner No. 6 was not ready for this adjustment also and left the matrimonial house on 10.05.2018. (c) It is also the case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that her son made all attempts to settle the dispute, but the petitioners have started creating pressure upon her son for divorce and lodging of the false case under the Dowry Act and all other charges have been levelled against the petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners started creating pressure upon them and abused them. On 11.08.2020 they telephoned the son of respondent No. 2, abused her and created pressure to isolate with the family. It is also the case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioners No. 1 and 2 used to beat and threaten and misbehave with them causing mental torture and agony to them. Accordingly, they have prayed for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- each and other reliefs. 4. Learned trial Court taking cognizance of that complaint has issued notice to the petitioners wherein they have raised objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint which has been rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated 22.03.2023 as the issue with regard to shared household is a matter of evidence which can be decided only after recording of the evidence of the parties. Being aggrieved with the registration of the complaint, the petitioners have preferred present criminal misc. petition which was rejected by learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge vide judgment dated 5 25.06.2025. Both these orders have been assailed by the petitioners by filing present criminal misc. petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that they are not the family members as they never lived in shared household, therefore, the complaint filed by them is not maintainable. She would further submit that even respondents No. 1 and 2 will not fall within the ambit of aggrieved persons as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 2005 and any alleged act done by the petitioner No. 6 or family members does not fall within the domestic violence as per Section 3 of the Act of 2005. Thus, she would submit that the cognizance taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class is without authority of law and it is an abuse of process of law. She would further submit that from perusal of the complaint, it cannot be said that they are having domestic relationship in absence of any specific pleadings made by them in the complaint and even they have not pleaded that they are having shared household, thus, the complaint is not maintainable and would pray for quashing of the complaint as well as the order passed by the appellate Court. To substantiate her submission, she would refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi reported in 2022 (8) SCC 90, Sunny Mathew and Others vs. State of Kerala and Another reported in 2024 SCC Online Ker 7182. 6. She would further submit that since registration of complaint under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 is nothing, but it is an abuse of process of law, as such, this Court can very well quash the entire proceedings as per law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs. Vidhi Rawal reported in 6 2025 SCC Online SC 1158 and would also refer to the judgment of High Court of Delhi in case of Vijay Verma vs. State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Another reported in 2010 (118) DRJ 520. 7. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 opposing the submission would submit that the complaint filed by the mother-in-law of the petitioner No. 6 as well as sister of husband of petitioner No. 6 is very much maintainable as they have clearly pleaded that the husband of petitioner No. 6 due to illness of his father has called upon his sister to look after and being mother of husband, she has legally right to live in house of husband and it has also been stated that the complainant and petitioner No. 6 were living together in a joint family as per the averments made in the complaint and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are suffering from mental torture and agony by the petitioner, therefore, they are aggrieved persons as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 2005. 8. He would further submit that the act committed by the petitioners will fall within the ambit of domestic violence as defined under Section 3 of Act of 2005 and to substantiate his submission he has referred to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others reported in 2016 (10) SCC 165 and would pray for dismissal of the present criminal misc. petition. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. From the submissions made by the parties, the point emerged for determination by this Court is: 7 “whether the learned trial Court was justified in taking cognizance of the complaint filed under the Act of 2005 by the mother-in-law of the petitioner No. 6 and sister of husband of petitioner No. 6 and the appellate Court was justified in dismissing the appeal against cognizance taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class under the Act of 2005.” 11. To appreciate this point, it is expedient for this Court to extract the relevant provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 2005”), which reads as under: “2(a) Aggrieved person means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent; 2(f) Domestic Relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family; 2(s) Share Household: shared household means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. Section 3. Section 3. Definition of domestic violence For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limp or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to 8 her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.” 12. Further considering the aims and objects of Act of 2005 which provides that this Act has been enacted to protect the woman from being victim of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of the domestic violence has been enacted by the parliament. This Act covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser with both parties have lived together in shared household and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship with the family members living together as a joint family or also included even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single woman or living with the abuser or entitled to legal protection under the Act of 2005. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the Act of 2005 in case of Hiral P. Harsora (Supra) has held in paragraphs 16 to 18 as under: “16. A cursory reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic violence against women is widely prevalent and needs redressal. Whereas criminal law does offer some redressal, civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. The idea therefore is to provide various innovative remedies in favour of women who suffer from domestic violence, against the perpetrators of such violence.” 13. Further considering Section 2(a) of the Act of 2005, it is quite vivid that the respondents No. 1 and 2 fall within the category of aggrieved persons as they are in a domestic relationship with the petitioner No. 6 and they are alleged to have been subjected to any 9 act of domestic violence by the petitioners. Section 3 of the Act of 2005 also defines domestic violence which includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse. The verbal and emotional abuse includes insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insult, repeated threat, caused physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved persons is interested. 14. Thus, from the perusal of the complaint, it is quite vivid that the respondents No. 1 and 2 have alleged domestic violence by the petitioners and also stated that the petitioner No. 6 was residing with the respondent No. 1 in shared household at Raipur and Mumbai. As such, prima facie the complainants are able to demonstrate that they are sufferers of domestic violence committed in a shared household, as such being aggrieved persons, they have lodged complaint under the Act of 2005. 15. Considering the prima facie material available with the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, it cannot be held that the learned trial Court has committed any illegality in taking cognizance and rejecting the objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint before it. The learned trial Court has rightly observed while rejecting the objection that the submissions raised by the petitioners required evidence which can be appreciated during the trial. Consequently, rejection of the objection by the trial Court and dismissal of the appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 is in accordance with the aims and object of Act of 2005. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the provisions of Act of 2005 in case of Prabha Tyagi (Supra) and has held in paragraphs 32, 39, 40 and 41 as under: 10 “32. The Expression “shared household” in relation to the definition of "domestic relationship" as per the definition in Section 2(s) means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which d either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the "shared household". The definition of shared household is thus an inclusive one. 39. As already noted, a domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time, lived together in a shared household. The relationship may be by: (i) consanguinity, (ii) marriage or, (iii) through a relationship in the nature of a marriage, (iv) adoption or (v) are family members living together as a joint family. The expression "domestic relationship" is a comprehensive one. Hence, every woman in a domestic relationship in whatever manner the said relationship may be founded as stated above has a right to reside in a shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Thus, a daughter, sister, wife, mother, grandmother or great grandmother, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law or any woman having a relationship in the nature of marriage, an adopted daughter or any member of joint family has the right to reside in a shared household. 40. Further, though, the expression "shared household" is defined in the context of a household where the person aggrieved lives or has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent, in the context of sub- section (1) of Section 17, the said expression cannot be restricted only to a household where a person aggrieved resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. In other words, a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, in the sense that who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence by the respondent, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household dehors a right, title or beneficial interest in the a b same. 41. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship is guaranteed under sub-section (1) of Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence. By contrast, sub-section (2) of Section 17 deals with a narrower right inasmuch as an 11 aggrieved person who is inevitably a woman and who is subjected to domestic violence shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent except in accordance d with the procedure established by law. Thus, the expression "right to reside in a shared household" has to be given an expansive interpretation, in respect of the aforesaid categories of women including a mother-in-law or a daughter-in-law and other categories of women referred to above who have the right to reside in a shared household.” 17. So far as submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that this Court while hearing the petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 can very well quash the proceedings. So far as this preposition of law is concerned, there is no quarrel with regard to power and authority of this Court, but this power has to be exercised by this Court when there is abuse of process of law or to otherwise to secure the ends of justice as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shaurabh Kumar (Supra) in paragraphs 32 and 39 as under: “32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005. 39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.” 12 18. Thus, from the preamble of the Act of 2005 and also considering the relevant provisions of Act of 2005, law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the perpetrators and abetters of such violence can in given situation be women themselves, as such cognizance of the complaint by the respondents No. 1 and 2 under the Act of 2005 cannot be held as without jurisdiction or not maintainable in the present form before the trial Court. 19. In the present case the petitioners are unable to meet out any exception case for interference or to quash the proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. Even otherwise, considering the well settled position of law that the objection regarding aggrieved persons, shared household and relationship is a matter of evidence which can be adjudicated or determined only after appreciating the material and evidence placed by the parties and in fact these are the defense of the petitioners which cannot be considered by this Court at this stage in absence of any foundation led or evidence brought on record by the petitioners. 20. Consequently, the criminal misc. petition is dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the petitioners to raise all their defense which have been canvassed by the petitioners before this Court and the learned Judicial magistrate First Class will decide the same after appreciating the evidence and material placed before it without being influenced from dismissal of present CRMP on its own merit. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Manish