1 2026:CGHC:15445 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 71 of 2026 Ganpatram S/o Late Runga Sao Aged About 54 Years R/o Village And Post Kashigarh, Tahsil Jaijepur District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Kanhaiya S/o Chheduram Aged About 53 Years R/o Village And Post Kashigarh, Tahsil Jaijepur District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Janjgir-Champa, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal) For Appellant (s) : Mr. F.S. Khare, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 06/04/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2026, application for condonation of delay in filing the First appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. The present application is filed by the appellant/plaintiff for condonation of delay of 3398 days in filing the appeal. 2. It would be appropriate to notice paragraphs 1 to 5 of the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation act, which reads as under :- JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.07 10:50:48 +0530 2 "APPLICATION FOR UNDER SECTION 5 OF LIMITATION ACT” 1. That, the appellant has challenged the impugned Judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Sakti, District- Janjgir-Champa C.G. passed in Civil Suit No. 20A/2015, whereby the learned trial court has partly allowed the civil suit filed by plaintiff/appellant, the appellant prefers this first appeal. 2. That, there is every possibility of success of appellant/plaintiff in this appeal. 3. That there is delay of 9 years, 6 months and 20 days in filing of this instant first appeal. 4. That, the appellant most humbly and respectfully submits that he along with family went to Jammu and Kashmir for earning his livelyhood, therefore he had no knowledge of final judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016. The appellant returned to village in the last month of January 2026 and he contacted his counsel than appellant got knowledge about the above judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016. The appellant requested for grant of certified copy of 3 impugned judgment and decree, which is supplied on 31.01.2026, and this instant appeal is filed before this Hon'ble Court. 5. That, the delay in filing of the first appeal is bonafide mistake and deserve to be condoned.” 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff submits that there is a delay of 9 years, 6 months and 20 days in filing the present appeal. However, the said delay has occurred due to bona fide reasons. It is further submitted that the appellant had gone to Jammu and Kashmir along with his family in search of livelihood and therefore had no knowledge about the passing of the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016. It is further submitted that the appellant returned to his native village in the last week of January, 2026 and thereafter contacted his counsel, whereupon he came to know about the said judgment and decree. Immediately he applied for a certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree, which was supplied to him on 31.01.2026, and thereafter the present appeal has been filed without any further delay. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 5. Upon consideration of the averments made in the application and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, this Court finds that the appellant seeks condonation of an 4 inordinate delay of 3398 days (9 years, 6 months and 20 days) in filing the present appeal. The only explanation offered by the appellant is that he had gone to Jammu and Kashmir along with his family in search of livelihood and therefore had no knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016. However, the appellant has not placed on record any material to substantiate such claim nor has he explained the long period of delay by assigning sufficient and cogent reasons. The explanation furnished appears to be vague and does not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. True it is that sufficient cause enumerated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally, but some cause much less sufficient cause has to be shown for condoning the delay particularly, when the delay is of more than two years. No such sufficient cause has been shown in the application for condonation of delay of 3398 days in filing this appeal. 7. In the absence of any sufficient cause, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 3398 days. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and anothers. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, has, in very categorical terms, after considering a series of judgments of Supreme Court on Section 5 of the 5 Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application of condonation of delay. Para’s 12 & 15 of the said decision read as under :- 12. It is a settled legal position that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be show period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the Court has no power to ignore the provision to relieve flowing from a statutory provision is never an 6 evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay….." 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:- 26. 15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay….." 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:- 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; 7 (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; 8 (vi) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 10. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2, application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is rejected. Consequently, the first appeal is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay of 3398 days in filing the appeal. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE Jyoti