A.F.R. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 641 of 2026 Court No. - 39 HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J. (Order on Delay Condonation Application No. 01 of 2026) 1. Heard learned counsel for the claimant/appellant. 2. The present appeal has been filed for the enhancement of the award with the delay of 1619 days. The appellant/Sushil Yadav has filed the enhancement appeal against the impugned award dated 24.08.2021 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Firozabad in M.A.C.P. No. 14 of 2019 (Sushil Yadav Versus Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited and others). 3. The claim petition was allowed for an amount of Rs. 7,87,057 alongwith interest at the rate of 6% from the date of petition. After receiving the entire amount of compensation the present appeal has been preferred before this Court with a delay of 1619 days by the claimant himself who is having the every knowledge of his claim petition which was decided on merits on 24.08.2021. 4. The appellant/claimant has filed the supporting affidavit to delay the condonation. In para 3 of the affidavit it is submitted that in the accident in question, the claimant/appellant had suffered a permanent disability of 50% in his lower limb and as such the mobility of the claimant/appellant has been adversely affected for life. Due to the above mentioned permanent disability Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Mangal Rai, Praveen Kumar Chaubey Counsel for Respondent(s) : Sushil Yadav .....Appellant(s) Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited And 2 Others .....Respondent(s) the claimant-appellant has no permanent source of income and his income potential from dairy and agriculture has also been affected and therefor huge financial loss has been suffered by the claimant-appellant. A huge sum of money has been spent in the treatment of claimant-appellant for the injuries sustained in the accident in question, therefore, the financial condition of the family of claimant-appellant has become worst. 5. Hence, in the above mentioned circumstances, the claimant-appellant could not immediately arrange for necessary expenses for filing the present appeal before this Hon'ble Court. As soon after arranging for necessary expenses and documents for filing the above mentioned appeal before, the claimant immediately came to Allahabad in March, 2026 and handed over the documents to the undersigned counsels who, after perusing the file, asked the claimant-appellant to bring certified copy of the formal order also which is necessary for filing the appeal. 6. On hearing this, the claimant-appellant went back to Firozabad and applied for a certified copy of the formal order on 26.3.2026, which was delivered to him on 4.4.2026 and he sent the same to the undersigned counsel through post, which was received by the undersigned counsels on 20.4.2026. Thereafter, the counsel prepared the appeal and filed before this Court without any delay. 7. The claimant/appellant has received the entire award amount in compliance with the award dated 24.08.2021. Hence, the plea of financial constraint for filing the appeal, or lack of awareness, does not appear to be reasonable. No details of medical treatment during the relevant period have been filed by the claimant/appellant. 8. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. Para 55 is quoted hereinbelow: "55. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of “just compensation” and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an FAFOD No. 641 of 2026 2 individual case. The conception of “just compensation” has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non- violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the tribunal to be guided by the expression, that is, “just compensation..." 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and another Versus Jasbir Kaur and others, (2003) 3 TAC 509 (SC) has held that compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. 10. It is also relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited Versus Urmila Shukla and others, (2021) 20 SCC 800. It is also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road transport Corporation (AIR 1998 SC 3191) that the compensation be just, equal and not arbitrary and cannot be bonanza. 11. It has been held by the Supreme Court in D. Gopinathan Pillai versus State of Kerala, (2007) 2 SCC 322, that in matters relating to arbitration awards, an application for setting aside the award filed with a delay of 3320 days, without any sufficient and satisfactory explanation for such delay, is not sustainable. The delay cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient and reasonable cause. 12. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 79 ALL LR 647, that where there is a delay of more than four years in filing an appeal and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is filed for condonation of delay, the same cannot be allowed in the absence of sufficient cause. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had committed FAFOD No. 641 of 2026 3 a serious error in condoning such inordinate delay by ignoring the judicially accepted parameters governing the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 13. It is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sitaram Ramcharan Etc. vs M.N. Nagarshana And Ors, AIR 1960 SC 260, that it cannot be disputed that in dealing which the question of condoning delay under s. 5 of the Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Versus Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR 577, made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay;- “In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach." 15. It is held by this Court in paras 5 and 6 of the decision in Sita Ram Versus Sri Dhar, 2006 (24) LCD 1239, that:- "5....the application given for condonation of delay, 15 days after expiry of the period of limitation, it was not mentioned as to what specific work kept the appellant engaged for which reason he could not apply for restoration of appeal. A mere cursory statement that the appellant remained busy in this school work cannot be considered sufficient reason for condonation of delay it cannot, therefore, be said that the Presiding Officer was wrong in dismissing the appellant's application. 6. Previously Courts did show lenience and latitude in dealing with applications for adjournments and condonation of delay. It is high time a changed perspective and attitude is adopted, since the Courts are already overburdened with cases resulting in inordinate delay in disposal of cases. Those days of condonation of dalliance and delay should now be over and in cases where no sufficient and proper reason is assigned for delay. the Court must adopt the stern attitude and refuse relief. That will also help in transmitting a message that the Court will no more be indulgent and parties FAFOD No. 641 of 2026 4 beware." 16. Whereas in the said matter, where the claimant/appellant has got all the award and just compensation which has been awarded to him vide award dated 24.08.2021 hence he is having complete knowledge and information as well as money in his hand. The amount in Motor Accident Claim Petition is neither a bonanza nor windfall as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Urmila Shukla (supra), Pranay Sethi (supra), Jasbir Kaur (supra) and Helen C. Rebello (supra). 17. The award has to be passed so that just compensation may be granted. The same has already been granted by the Tribunal to the claimant/appellant. The appeal for enhancement has been preferred before this Court after a delay of 1619 days, without showing any due diligence or any reasonable and sufficient cause. This is an inordinate delay. 18. Considering the entire circumstances of the claim petition, the award, and the fact that just compensation, which is the soul of a Motor Accident Claim Petition, has already been awarded, no sufficient ground exists for condonation of delay. 19. The compensation awarded is neither a windfall, nor a bonanza, nor a source of profit for all time to come in the hands of the claimant. There is neither any sufficient nor reasonable cause explaining the huge and inordinate delay of 1619 days. The explanation furnished is neither reasonable nor plausible. 20. Accordingly, the delay condonation application is liable to be rejected and is hereby rejected. (Order on Appeal) 21. The delay condonation application is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also hereby rejected. May 6, 2026 K.K. Maurya FAFOD No. 641 of 2026 5 (Abdul Shahid,J.) Digitally signed by :- KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Digitally signed by :- KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad