1 CGHC010362342026 2026:CGHC:41076 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1216 of 2026 1 - Dwarika Prasad Sahu Son of Shri Alakh Ram Sahu, Aged About 60 Years, Caste Teli, R/o Village Aruni, Post Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - Lokeshwar Prasad Sahu Son of Shri Dwarika Prasad Sahu, Aged About 34 Years, Caste Teli, R/o Village Aruni, Post Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.) 2 - Smt. Minakshi Sahu, Widow of Late Rupeshwar, D/o. Shri Ishwar Sahu, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Village Aruni, Po. Gorkapar, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.) Presently resided at Village Siyanmara, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.) 3 - The State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, District Balod (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel and Mr. Utkarsh Patel, Advocates. For State : Mr. Malay Kumar Jain, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 21-09-2026 1. The present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 25-08-2026 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Balod in Misc. Civil Appeal No.02/2026 whereby the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 17-04-2026 passed by learned Civil Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.09.25 18:20:54 +0530 2 Judge, Senior Division Gunderdehi, District Balod in Civil Suit No. 06A/2025 has been affirmed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is plaintiff before the learned trial Court who is prosecuting a suit against the defendants for declaration of title, possession, declaring the gift deed dated 19-03-2019 as null and void and also declaring the mutation order passed by revenue court null and void and also for permanent injunction with respect to the suit property total area of 0.85 hectares of three different khasra numbers recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and total area 0.88 hectare of three different khasra numbers recorded in the name of defendant No.2, situated at village Arjuni, Tahsil Gunderdehi, District Balod. He would submit that the suit property was initially owned by grand-father of the plaintiff and after his death it was recorded in the name of father of the plaintiff namely, Alakh Ram. The defendant No.1 is son of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 is the widowed daughter-in-law of the plaintiff. The defendants have got executed a gift deed from father of the plaintiff on 19-03-2019. The father of the plaintiff died on 27-05-2020 and when the defendants tried to get their names mutated into revenue records the plaintiff came to know about the gift deed and then he challenged the same before the learned trial Court. He would further submit that the gift deed executed by the father of the plaintiff has been challenged and he is praying that till pendency of the suit the defendants may not create any third party interest and shall not alienate the suit property. However, the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court rejected the application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC holding that while granting temporary injunction, it may affect the right and title of the other party. He would further submit that merely by staying alienation the property, rights of the parties shall not be affected and it is only to secure the ultimate outcome of the decree. Therefore, the impugned orders suffer from perversity and jurisdictional error and the same are liable 3 to be set aside by allowing the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the document annexed with the petition. 4. From perusal of copy of the plaint annexed with the petition, Annexure-P/3 it transpires that the defendant No.1 is son of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 is his sister-in-law. The alleged gift deed was executed by the father of the plaintiff on 19-03-2019 in favour of defendant No.1 and husband of defendant No.2, who were brothers. The said gift deed was executed on 19-03-2019 and on the basis of the said gift deed the name of both these persons were recorded in the revenue record. The husband of defendant No.2, namely, Rupeshwar died on 07-10-2023 and father of the plaintiff, namely, Alakh Ram died on 27-05-2020. After death of husband of defendant No.2 when they get their name mutated in the revenue record, the plaintiff raised objection by saying that both the defendants have got their name mutated on the basis of forged and fabricated gift deed which has been challenged by him in the suit. The defendant No.1 and the husband of defendant No.2 are not any stranger, but both of them are sons of the plaintiff, in whose favour the gift deed was executed by father of the plaintiff meaning thereby the grand-father executed a gift deed in favour of his grand-sons which has been challenged by the plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff in the application for grant of temporary injunction that the defendants may be restrained from alienating the suit property till final adjudication of the suit is squarely covered under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no need to pass any specific order for the same. The application filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the pleadings made by the respective parties. The learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court have concurrently held that the plaintiff has no prima facie case, balance of 4 convenience and irreparable loss and no temporary injunction could be granted in his favour. 5. In the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil”, 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC 141], wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and Nagendra Nath [Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398] discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 5 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC 717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898]. 43*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], a two-Judges Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and they are set out: "38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of * Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 26- 08-2010. 6 their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], SCC pp. 695-96) "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the 7 proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. 8 (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215], followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. 9 (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an 10 appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 6. In view of the settled proposition of law as has been held by the Hon’ble 11 Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and also in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and after having gone through the orders passed by the learned appellate Court as well as learned trial Court, this Court does not find any perversity or jurisdictional error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for grant of temporary injunction. 7. Accordingly, the present writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil