2026:HHC:2987 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1102 of 2025 Reserved on: 1.1.2026 Date of Decision: 9.1.2026. Ankit Thakur and others ...Petitioners Versus State of HP and others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Ms. Shikha Chauhan, Advocate. For Respondents No.1&2/State : Mr. Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have 昀椀led the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 112 of 2025, dated 3.11.2025, registered for the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2) and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) at Police Station Kandaghat, District Solan, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 HP and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR based on compromise e昀昀ected between the parties. 2. The State has 昀椀led a status report asserting that o昀昀ence punishable under Section 117(2) of the BNS was added after the investigation. 3. Heard. 4. Section 359 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) makes the o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 126(2) and 115(2) of BNS compoundable without the permission of the Court. Section 359(2) of BNSS makes the o昀昀ence punishable under Section 117(2) of BNS compoundable with the permission of the Court. Therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner has an alternate remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate and seeking the composition of the o昀昀ence. 5. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent power should not be exercised when a speci昀椀c remedy exists. It was observed: At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: 3 “(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a speci昀椀c provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.” 6. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.(corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give e昀昀ect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a speci昀椀c remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed:- “8. In order to determine the question under consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give e昀昀ect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to 4 limit or a昀昀ect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to a昀昀ord relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters speci昀椀cally covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and should not be exercised when speci昀椀c remedy has been provided under the Code. It was observed: “2. It appears that unfortunately the High Court by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) has prevented the 昀氀ow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so- 5 called misconduct of the judicial o昀케cer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give e昀昀ect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by speci昀椀c provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any speci昀椀c provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the o昀昀ence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. xxxxx 9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal, erroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the e昀昀ect that 昀椀nal judgment and order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also recorded by the trial court that as the accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings including the operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the 6 important legal aspect that the accused have a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very e昀케cacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial Judge the substantive law cannot be bypassed. 8. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was observed: “7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47] and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8) The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court: (1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a speci昀椀c provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 7 8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545] after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29) “29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a speci昀椀c provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.” 9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by speci昀椀c provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any speci昀椀c provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the o昀昀ence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided 8 in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other speci昀椀c provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. 10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for bail afresh after the o昀昀ence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and 昀椀led a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the o昀昀ence under Section 304 IPC. The e昀昀ect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an o昀昀ence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the o昀昀ence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. In the present case, the petition is silent as to why the petitioners cannot approach the learned Trial Court for compounding the o昀昀ence. Para-8 of the petition states that there is no other alternative e昀케cacious remedy available to the 9 petitioners except the present petition. This is an incorrect statement because the remedy of approaching the learned Trial Court is available to the petitioners under Sections 359(1) and 359(2) of BNSS. Therefore, there is no reason to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 10. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the parties from approaching the learned Trial Court seeking the composition of the o昀昀ence. 11. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 12. The observation made herein before shall remain con昀椀ned to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 9th January, 2026 (Chander)