1 CGHC010124782025 2026:CGHC:41850 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR THE DATE WHEN THE CASE IS RESERVED THE DATE WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED THE DATE WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS UPLOADED ON THE WEBSITE Operative Full 17.09.2026 25.09.2026 **** 25.09.2026 CRA No. 694 of 2025 Niranjan Kumar Chakradhari S/o Shri Mangal Chakradhari Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Gangouti P.S. Surajpur District - Surajpur (C.G.) ... Appellant. Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Police Chouki - Basdei Police Station Surajpur District - Surajpur (C.G.) ... Respondent. For Appellant : Mr. Anurag Singh, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Krishna Gopal Yadav, Dy. Gov. Advocate. (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) C A V Judgment 1) This Criminal Appeal is preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 65/2023. By the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court found the accused/appellant guilty and sentenced him as under: Digitally signed by AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI DN: cn=AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, ou=HIGH COURT, o=HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, st=Chhattisgarh, c=IN 2 Conviction Sentence Fine In Default of Fine Section 304-B IPC 07 Years Rigorous Imprisonment — — Section 498-A IPC 03 Years Rigorous Imprisonment 100 ₹ 06 Months Rigorous Imprisonment Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act 02 Years Rigorous Imprisonment ₹10,000 06 Months Rigorous Imprisonment (All sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2) Factual matrix of the prosecution's case is that the marriage of the deceased, Khushbu, aged about 20 years, was solemnized with the appellant, Niranjan Kumar Chakradhari, according to social rites and rituals on 21.06.2022. At the time of marriage, her father, Rajendra Prasad Prajapati (PW-9), had given various household articles, utensils, a sewing machine, a bed, a cooler, an almirah, a wristwatch, and Rs.51,000/- in cash as gifts. It is alleged that soon after marriage, the appellant began subjecting Khushbu to physical and mental cruelty, asserting that the items given in marriage were inferior quality/fake, and pressured her to ask her father to take back those articles and replace them with better quality goods. The deceased conveyed this ill- treatment to her parents over phone calls and during her visits to her parental home. It is further alleged that on 23.04.2023, while residing at her matrimonial home in village Gangouti, she consumed a poisonous substance (pesticide) Lihocin. Subsequently, she was taken to District Hospital, Surajpur, where she declared dead. Merg Intimation No. 74/2023 under 3 Section 174 Cr.P.C. was registered, inquest proceedings were conducted by Heena Tandan (PW-5), and the body was subjected to post-mortem examination. The viscera was preserved and sent for chemical analysis. Upon preliminary inquiry into the merg, Crime No. 173/2023 was registered against the appellant at Police Station Surajpur (Police Chowki Basdei). Following completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3) The case was committed to the Court of Session for trial. The learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellant. The appellant abjured his guilt and claimed for trial. 4) In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 19 witnesses (PW-01 to PW-19) and tendered 26 documents (Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-26) in evidence. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he pleaded innocence and claimed false implication. Although he expressed a desire to lead defense evidence, no witness was examined on behalf of the defense. 5) After evaluating the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, vide the impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 6) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution has completely failed to establish the basic ingredients of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He further submits that the father and mother of the deceased, namely, Rajendra Prasad (PW-9) and 4 Rekha Kumari (PW-12), have only made vague statements against the appellant regarding the low quality of articles given at the time of marriage, alleging that the appellant was harassing her for that reason, but no material evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to prove such fact. He further submits that the entire prosecution case is based on hearsay evidence. There are material contradictions between the statements of the father and mother of the deceased before the Court and their statements recorded before the Police/Tahsildar during the Merg enquiry. It is contended that the father, mother, and matternal grandfather have admitted in their cross-examination that the appellant never demanded dowry and never made any complaint to them regarding low-quality articles. It is also submitted that whatever items were given at the time of marriage were purely voluntary gifts from the parents, which do not fall under the statutory ambit of "dowry". Counsel further submits that there is no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant demanded dowry or subjected the deceased to cruelty "soon before her death". It is further submitted that the deceased used to talk over the mobile phone frequently with her parents and other relatives, which was occasionally objected to by the appellant, but such a trivial issue cannot be sufficient to establish that the appellant has committed the alleged offences. He also submits that the appellant has been languishing in jail since 07.05.2023 and has undergone a substantial part of the sentence. In view of these submissions, he prays that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges leveled against him. 7) Per contra, the learned State Counsel opposes the appeal, submitted that the deceased died within less than a year of marriage under unnatural 5 circumstances due to the consumption of poison. It is submitted that the testimonies of the parents (PW-9 and PW-12), aunt (PW-11), and maternal grandfather (PW-10) are consistent, which clearly proves that the appellant continuously harassed the deceased to replace the household articles given at the time of marriage, amounting to ongoing dowry-related cruelty. Furthermore, the deceased used to inform her mother about the physical harassment meted out by the appellant, which directly drove her to commit suicide. Hence, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is well- merited and deserves to be affirmed. 8) I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9) The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was otherwise than under normal circumstances or under unnatural circumstances, which the learned Trial Court has recorded in the affirmative. 10) PW-9 (Rajendra Prasad) is the father of the deceased. He has stated in his deposition that the marriage of his daughter Khushbu (deceased) was solemnized with the appellant on 21.06.2022, and she died on 23.04.2023. He has further stated that after the marriage, the deceased, along with the appellant, had come to their house. At that time, the deceased had told her mother that the appellant was not pleased with the quality of the articles given by them at the time of marriage. Subsequently, on account of the accidental death of his nephew and younger son-in-law (Damad), the deceased and the appellant had again come to their house for the last rites. Thereafter, they returned. After returning, the deceased again told her mother about the appellant's dissatisfaction with the articles given at the time of marriage. PW-9 further deposed that on the aforesaid counts, the 6 appellant used to assault the deceased. The aforesaid statement of PW-9 has also been supported by Jagdishwar Prajapati (PW-10), who is the maternal grandfather of the deceased, Bina Devi (PW-11), aunt of the deceased, and Rekha Kumari (PW-12), mother of the deceased. 11) Umashankar Khess (PW-1) is the Ward Boy of District Hospital, Surajpur, who supplied the Hospital Memo (Ex.P-1), informing the Police Help Desk situated at District Hospital, Surajpur, that the deceased had died on 23.04.2023, on the basis of which the Merg Report (Ex.P-2) was lodged. Ex.P-3A is the inquest report of the deceased, prepared by Executive Magistrate Heena Tandon (PW-5). Ex.P-12 is the postmortem report of the deceased, which was conducted by Dr. Harshvardhan Sharma, Medical Officer (PW-15). PW-15 has deposed in his evidence that, upon examination of the body of the deceased, he did not find any internal or external injury on the body of the deceased. He also opined that even during the postmortem examination, no definite opinion could be given regarding the cause of death of the deceased. Therefore, he preserved the viscera of the dead body and suggested that the same be subjected to chemical examination. Ex.P-27 is the FSL report of the viscera of the deceased, in which it has been reported that aluminium phosphide pesticide was found in the viscera of deceased Khushbu. 12) Rajendra Prasad, father of the deceased (PW-9); Beena Devi, aunt of the deceased (PW-11); and Rekha Kumari, mother of the deceased (PW-12), have also stated that the deceased died on account of consuming poison. 13) Thus, from the aforesaid evidence, it is very well proved that the deceased died on 23.04.2023 by consuming poison within seven years of her marriage. 7 In other words, she died under unnatural circumstances within seven years of her marriage. Hence, this Court does not find any illegality in the said finding of the Trial Court, as the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. 14) The next question would be whether the accused/appellant herein is the author of crime in question. 15) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304- B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied- * The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances. * Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. * Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband. * Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. 16) Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. 17) Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. 8 Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." 18) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. 19) As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, it would be profitable to notice the observation reported in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao,(2003) 1 SCC 217 that: “16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her 9 death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.” 20) To deal with convictions under Section 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, first it will be apt to reproduce the said provisions: "498A.-IPC Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. *** Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months." 10 21) To appreciate the arguments raised by both sides, it is apposite to refer to the legal principles settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding dowry death and cruelty under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC, and the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In Charan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , (2024) 13 SCC 649, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “13. The interpretation of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC came up for consideration in Baijnath case. The opinion was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below: ‘25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are: (i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and (ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and (iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this section exposits “cruelty” as: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or (ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with 11 any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.’ 14. As the aforesaid case was also pertaining to dowry death, presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was also discussed in detail in paras 29 to 31 of the aforesaid judgment. The same are extracted below: ‘29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith. 30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of 12 either of the abovereferred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the sections involved, lest justice is the casualty.’ 15. A conjoint reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act with reference to the presumption raised was discussed in para 32 of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted below: ‘32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113- B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana. In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.’” 13 22) The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed in paras 23 and 25 of Charan Singh (supra): “23. In the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, none of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the prerequisites to invoke presumption under Section 304-B IPC or Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death. *** 25. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the prerequisites to raise presumption under Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. The cause of death as such is not known.” 23) Keeping the afore-stated law in mind, the prosecution must first establish through direct, credible, and cogent evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused for or in connection with a demand for dowry soon before her death. Only upon discharge of this primary burden can the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act be pressed into service. 24) Coming to the material evidence adduced in the present case, the star witnesses for the prosecution regarding cruelty and dowry demand are Rajendra Prasad (PW-9, father of the deceased), Jagdishwar Prajapati (PW- 10, maternal grandfather of the deceased), Bina Devi (PW-11, aunt of the 14 deceased), and Rekha Kumari (PW-12, mother of the deceased). They deposed in their evidence that a few months after the marriage, when the deceased visited her parental home, she complained that the appellant harassed her, alleging that the articles given at the time of marriage were of inferior quality. She further alleged that he subjected her to cruelty on account of dowry demands. The mother of the deceased (PW-12) further stated that the deceased used to narrate these incidents over telephone calls. However, neither call recordings nor call detail records (CDRs) of the deceased were seized by the police. 25) Furthermore, Jagdishwar Prajapati (PW-10) and Bina Devi (PW-11) stated that they observed multiple injuries on the body of the deceased, however, this allegation did not get any support in the postmortem report (Ex. P-12) or from the deposition of Dr. Harshvardhan Sharma (PW-15). Apart from that, the aforesaid relatives did not state anything regarding injuries in their Merg Bayan, which indicates that they exaggerated their statements concerning the injuries before the Court. 26) Rajendra Prasad (PW-9), father of the deceased, admitted in his cross- examination at Para 6 & 9 that all the household goods and articles were given out of his own free will as customary gifts. He categorically admitted that the appellant never demanded any dowry or articles from him, nor did the appellant ever ask him to replace any items. He stated: “ यह कहना सही है किक आरोपी ने हमसे सीधे कभी भी कोई बात नहीं की थी... यह कहना सही है किक आरोपी ने मुझसे कभी भी मृतका को उपहार में किये गये वस्तुओं को बलने को नहीं कहा था।” 15 He further deposed that when he had gone to take Khushbu during the Chhath festival, no dispute, demand, or panchayat had ever happened regarding any transaction or articles given at the time of marriage. 27) Similarly, the mother of the deceased, Rekha Kumari (PW-12), admitted in paragraph 9 of her cross-examination that all gifts were presented willingly and without any demand: “ यह कहना सही है किक हम लोगों ने लड़की को किववाह के उपलक्ष्य में सभी ” उपहार स्वेच्छा से किये थे। She further admitted in paragraph 11 that the appellant never conveyed to them that the watch or the bed was counterfeit: “ यह कहना सही है किक आरोपी किनरंजन ने हम लोगों से कभी भी उपहार में किये ” गये घड़ी व पलंग को नकली नहीं कहा। Most significantly, she admitted in paragraph 13 that whenever Khushbu raised any concern, she spoke to the appellant over the phone, and the appellant consistently replied that there was no problem at all and everything was fine (“ ” मम्मी जी कु छ नहीं है सब ठीक हो जायेगा ). She also conceded in paragraph 10 that she never observed any injury mark on body of Khushbu before her death and never lodged any complaint with the police or community elders. 28) The testimony of Jagdishwar Prajapati (PW-10), the maternal grandfather, does not improve the prosecution’s case. There are various contradictions in his statements. He admitted that he never had any conversation with the appellant. He further admitted that the deceased never spoke to him on the phone, and no report of ill-treatment was ever lodged. 29) Bina Devi (PW-11), the aunt, was confronted with her previous statement recorded during the inquest by the Executive Magistrate (Ex. D-2). The Naib 16 Tehsildar, Heena Tandon (PW-5), categorically admitted in her deposition that in Ex. D-1 (statement of the mother) and Ex. D-2 (statement of the aunt), neither the mother nor the aunt had stated that the appellant ever made any demand for dowry, nor was there any mention of any social meeting or dispute regarding dowry: “ यह कहना सही है किक मृतितका की मां ने अपने कथन प्र.डी.-01 में आरोपी किनरंजन के द्वारा किकसी भी प्रकार की मांग किकये जाने की बात नहीं बतायी थी... यह कहना सही है किक साति3या ने प्र.डी.-01 में यह भी नहीं बताया था किक मृतितका के किववाह के सम्बन्ध में आरोपी ” ने कोई हेज मांगा था या उन्होंने हेज किया था। The allegations of dowry demand and physical torture were complete omissions and improvements introduced for the first time during the trial. 30) The investigating officer, Rajesh Joshi, SDOP (PW-18), conceded in his cross- examination at Para 12 that no complaint of harassment had ever been made prior to the incident and only stated regarding complaint over phone conversation. Further, not a single neighbour or independent resident of Village Gangoti have supported the allegation that the appellant ever subjected his wife to cruelty or harassed her. Question No.11 and answer given by PW-18 during cross-examination reproduced hereunder: “प्रश्न 11- आरोपी के पड़ोसी या किकसी भी रिरश्तेार ने आरोपी के द्वारा पीकिड़ता को प्रताकिड़त करने के संबंध में कोई भी बयान नहीं किया है? उत्तर - सही है... मृतितका के ससुराल के आसपास का कोई व्यकि: घटना के बारे में कोई ” जानकारी होना नहीं बताया है। Furthermore, Mangal Chakradhari (PW-2), Mewalal (PW-3), Suranjan Chakradhari (PW-4), and independent neighbour Dular Singh (PW-8) uniformly deposed that the matrimonial relations between the appellant and 17 the deceased were cordial and harmonious, and they lived peacefully without any dispute over dowry or property. 31) The defense, on the other hand, brought out through the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses that approximately 20 to 25 days prior to the incident, the cousin brother and brother-in-law of the deceased had tragically died in a road accident. The appellant and the deceased had attended the last rites together. Witnesses including PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, and PW-8 confirmed that after returning from the funeral rites of her close family members, the deceased was deeply traumatized, sorrowful, and depressed. 32) Even with regard to the medical and forensic evidence, Dr. Harshwardhan Sharma (PW-15), who performed the autopsy along with Dr. Pushpa Singh, found no external or internal injuries on the body of the deceased. Moreover, the prosecution case was founded on the seizure of a plastic bottle of “Lihocin” (Chlormequat Chloride) vide Ex. P-8. However, the RFSL Ambikapur report (Ex. P-27) clearly established that Exhibit ‘E’ (the seized plastic bottle of Lihocin) did not contain any chemical poison, whereas the viscera (Exhibits A and B) showed traces of “Aluminium Phosphide”. The investigating officer admitted that no inquiry was made as to where Aluminium Phosphide came from, completely rupturing the chain of circumstantial evidence linking the seized container to the alleged poisoning. 33) As settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Charan Singh (supra), the mere unnatural death of a woman in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage is not sufficient to convict the accused under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC. In the absence of cogent, consistent, and persuasive proof that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with 18 a demand for dowry soon before her death, the primary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC remain unfulfilled, and the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be activated against the appellant. 34) Further, in the recent case of Chabi Karmakar and Others Vs. State of West Bengal (2025) 1 SCC 398, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that some general statements made by the witnesses with respect to demand of dowry, not sufficient to record conviction under Section 304-B. 35) A careful perusal of the evidence reveals important facts: during the entire marriage, neither the deceased nor her family ever reported any tracas, cruelty, or dowry demand to the police, the village Panchayat, or community elders. Both the father, Rajendra Prasad (PW-9), and the mother, Rekha Kumari (PW-12), admitted in cross-examination that the marriage took place peacefully with everyone's consent, and they never filed any complaint against the appellant, apart from mentioning phone calls by the deceased about the quality of household items, whereas they have clearly stated that appellant had never complained them in this regard. Moreover, the defense brought out that just 20 to 25 days before the incident, the cousin brother and brother-in-law (jija) of the deceased died in a road accident. The deceased and the appellant attended the funeral together. Prosecution witnesses Mangal Chakradhari (PW-2), Suranjan Chakradhari (PW-4), and neighbor Dular Singh (PW-8) clearly stated that after this tragedy, the deceased was deeply upset and fell into severe depression. There is no reliable evidence to prove that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment soon before her death to the extent that she was driven to take such an extreme step. Rather, the possibility that she took her 19 own life due to profound grief over losing her family members cannot be ruled out. 36) In light of aforesaid discussion, and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be safely held that once the alleged harassment in connection with dowry is not proved, and the general allegations of cruelty are riddled with material contradictions, improvements, and omissions, the conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A IPC as well as Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act also cannot stand. The learned Trial Court fell into patent error by placing reliance solely on presumptive assumptions while ignoring the significant admissions made by the prosecution witnesses in their cross- examinations. 37) Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Section 304-B of the IPC, Section 498- A of the IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the appellant deserves complete acquittal of all the charges. 38) In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 65/2023 is hereby set aside. 39) The appellant, Niranjan Kumar Chakradhari, is acquitted of the charges framed under Section 304-B of the IPC, Section 498-A of the IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 40) The appellant is reported to be in jail. He shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other criminal case, on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.15,000/- in compliance with the provisions of Section 481 of 20 the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The fine amount, if deposited, shall be refunded to the appellant in accordance with law. 41) Let copy of this judgment along with the records be transmitted to the concerned Trial Court forthwith for necessary compliance. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Ajay