1 CGHC010146302023 2026:CGHC:41147 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 939 of 2023 1 - Smt. Annakunwar W/o Late Paikas Toppo Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Lokdaha, Post Lainga Thana Pasan, Tahsil Podiuproada District Korba Chhattisgarh 2 - Minor Prabal Toppo S/o Late Paikas Toppo Aged About 4 Years Minor Through Legal Gauardian Mother Smt. Annakunwar Toppo R/o Village Lokdaha, Post Lainga Thana Pasan, Tahsil Podiuproada District Korba Chhattisgarh 3 - Minor Pradip Toppo S/o Late Paikas Toppo Aged About 1 Years Minor Through Legal Gauardian Mother Smt. Annakunwar Toppo R/o Village Lokdaha, Post Lainga Thana Pasan, Tahsil Podiuproada District Korba Chhattisgarh 4 - Smt. Jasmani Toppo W/o Hizkall Toppo Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Lokdaha, Post Lainga Thana Pasan, Tahsil Podiuproada District Korba Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - United India Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited, Office T.P. Nagar Korba District Korba (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent For Appellants : Mr. A.L. Singroul, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. G.V.K. Rao, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Order On Board Digitally signed by HEERA LAL SAHU Date: 2026.09.23 10:15:04 +0530 2 22/09/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No.01/2023 & I.A. No. 02/2025, applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2. The appellants/claimants have preferred the present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, assailing the award dated 02.03.2019 passed by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Claim Case No.74/2018, whereby the claim petition preferred under Section 163(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation on account of the death of Paikas Toppo (owner/rider) in a motor vehicle accident, has been dismissed. 3. The Tribunal dismissed the claim petition primarily on the ground that the deceased, Paikas Toppo, owner of the motorcycle himself was riding the alleged offending motorcycle at the time of the accident and, therefore, the claim petition under Section 163(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, was not maintainable. 4. The present appeal has been filed with a delay of 1419 days. 5. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the claimants were duly represented before the Tribunal through a learned counsel. The award was passed on 02.03.2019. However, no steps were taken by the claimants to prefer the present appeal within the period prescribed under law. 6. In the application for condonation of delay, it has been pleaded that after the passing of the impugned award, the appellants went to another state for earning livelihood. It has further been 3 averred that the appellants had no knowledge of the process of filing an appeal before this Court against the dismissal; therefore, after returning from another State, the appellant No. 1 was advised for filing appeal for dismissal before this Court from his relative member. Hence, the present appeal has been filed with delay. 7. The explanation furnished by the appellants does not inspire confidence. The appellants have also failed to explain what prevented them from making timely enquiries regarding the filing of the appeal. It is, thus, evident, that the appellants remained inactive for a period of 1419 days (more than 3 and a half years), which clearly reflects a lack of due diligence in pursuing the case. Given the substantial delay of 1419 days, the appellants have not provided sufficient justification for the inaction. 8. Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy & Ors. vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs reported in (2025) 1 SCR 764 held that courts cannot use a “liberal approach” to condone inordinate & unjustified delays caused by a party’s own negligence. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below:- 13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High Courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into 4 consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time. 9. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy (supra) and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the appellants have not explained the delay properly and satisfactorily. Hence, I.A. Nos.01/2023 & 2/2025 deserve to be and are hereby rejected. 10. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. 11. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) JUDGE H.L. Sahu