27.08.2026 Ct. No.655 Sl. No. 1 Supplementary Subadip CO 32 of 2026 Mukunda Pal & Ors. Vs. Dr. Tusar Kanti Pal Mr. Animesh Das. …for the petitioners Mr. Avirup Mondal, Ms. Ahana Ghosh Mondal. …for the opposite party 1. Both the parties are represented by the learned Advocates. 2. The instant revisional application has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned order dated 14th November, 2025, passed by the learned Trial Court, whereby the application preferred on behalf of the judgment-debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. 3. It appears from the materials on record that the plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of contract against the predecessors-in-interest of the present petitioner before the learned Trial Court, being Title Suit No. 122 of 1996. The said suit was decreed ex-parte by judgment and decree dated 4th September, 2003. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred before the learned First Appellate Court, being T.A. No. 81 of 2004. The 2 said appeal was also ultimately allowed ex parte by an order dated 14th February, 2012, whereby the judgment and decree dated 4th September, 2003, passed by the learned Trial Court, was set aside. 4. By the said appellate judgment and order, the respondent/defendant was directed to execute and register the sale deed in respect of her share in the suit property in favour of the plaintiff/appellant in terms of the agreement, within sixty days from the date of the order. It was further directed that, in the event of failure on the part of the respondent/defendant to execute and register the sale deed within the stipulated period, the plaintiff/appellant would be entitled to have the same executed and registered through the learned Trial Court upon depositing the balance consideration of Rs.3,000/-. 5. At this stage, an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was taken out at the instance of the present petitioner/judgment-debtor, being Misc. Case No. 75 of 2022. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner was not aware of the pendency of the suit or of the ex parte decree passed therein and, therefore, had no effective opportunity to contest the proceedings. It is further submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner had no other remedy except to invoke the provisions of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 6. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has further contended that the decree in question is incapable of execution inasmuch as the suit for specific performance was founded upon an unregistered agreement for sale and was instituted only against Smt. Malati Pal, whereas the other heirs of Late Krishnopada @ Kestopada, who allegedly had an interest in the suit property, were not impleaded as parties to the proceeding. According to the petitioner, in view of such alleged non-joinder and the nature of the agreement relied upon in the suit, the judgment and decree cannot validly be executed against the petitioner. 7. The submissions so advanced have been considered in the light of the records and the nature and scope of the jurisdiction contemplated under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 47 CPC provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The provision is intended to ensure that matters relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of an existing decree are adjudicated by the executing Court itself and that the parties are not driven to a separate proceeding for determination of such questions. 4 8. However, the jurisdiction under Section 47 is not intended to provide a mechanism for reopening the decree itself or for adjudicating matters which properly belonged to the original suit or the appellate proceedings. An executing Court cannot, under the guise of exercising jurisdiction under Section 47, travel beyond the decree or examine the correctness, legality or propriety of the decree which has attained finality. Equally, objections which seek, in substance, to impeach the validity of the decree on grounds that were available to the party in the suit or appeal cannot ordinarily be converted into questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 9. In the present case, it is significant that the original suit was instituted as far back as in the year 1996 and the proceedings remained pending before the competent Courts for a considerable period. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court on 4th September, 2003, was carried in appeal and the learned First Appellate Court, by its judgment and order dated 14th February, 2012, passed appropriate directions concerning execution and registration of the sale deed. Thus, the decree sought to be acted upon is not an order passed in isolation at the stage of execution, but is the culmination of substantive proceedings before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 5 10. The objections now raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the alleged want of knowledge of the suit, the ex parte nature of the proceedings, the character of the agreement for sale, its registration, and the alleged non-impleadment of other heirs of Late Krishnopada @ Kestopada, essentially question the foundation and enforceability of the decree itself. Such questions, in the considered view of this Court, cannot be permitted to be raised afresh in an application under Section 47 CPC when the decree sought to be executed has already been passed by the competent Court and the appellate proceedings have also culminated in the judgment and order dated 14th February, 2012. 11. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the manner in which the decree was obtained, or if there was any legally sustainable ground for setting aside the ex parte decree or the appellate judgment, the appropriate remedy was required to be pursued in accordance with law and within the permissible period. Section 47 CPC cannot be employed as a substitute for such substantive remedies, nor can the executing Court sit in appeal over the decree. 12. On an overall consideration of the materials placed before this Court, I find that the issues sought to be raised by the petitioner do not fall within the permissible scope of adjudication under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Trial Court, 6 therefore, committed no jurisdictional error in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioner/judgment- debtor. 13. It is also well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised sparingly and only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or has committed a patent error of law or procedure resulting in grave injustice. Such jurisdiction is not intended to correct every error of fact or law or to enable a party to obtain a rehearing on matters which have already attained finality. 14. In the present case, upon perusal of the impugned order and the materials available on record, I do not find any jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or material irregularity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court warranting interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The contentions raised by the petitioner are, in substance, beyond the limited scope of Section 47 CPC and cannot be used to obstruct execution of a decree which has attained finality. 15. Accordingly, the revisional application, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 16. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 7 17. Let a copy of this order be sent down to the learned Trial Court forthwith for information and necessary action. 18. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)