1 CGHC010366432026 2026:CGHC:41463 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1235 of 2026 Dayaram Patel S/o Late Malik Ram Patel Aged About 37 Years R/o Ward No. 10, Village And Post Mana Basti, P.S. Mana Camp, Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Kamalnarayan Sahu S/o Shri Shankar Lal Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward No. 05, Village And Post Bhurka, Tahsil Gobra Nawapara, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Branch Manager Bank Of Baroda, Branch Mahavir Goushala Complex Maudhapara, Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. C. R. Sahu, Advocate. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate. For State : Ms. Supriya Upasane, Govt. Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 23/09/2026 Heard. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated 27.08.2026 passed by the learned 8th District Judge, Raipur in Misc. Civil Appeal Case No. 84/2025, whereby the Misc. Appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected and the order dated 05.12.2025 passed by Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.09.24 17:19:49 +0530 2 the learned 6th Civil Judge, Junior Class, Raipur, District Raipur in Misc. Civil Suit No. 223-A/2025 has been upheld. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is the plaintiff before the learned trial Court, who is prosecuting a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, and the defendants are claiming rights over the suit property having total area of 2.660 hectares, out of which the plaintiff has purchased the land bearing Khasra Nos. 230 and 231, admeasuring 0.56 hectare and 0.59 hectare, respectively, total admeasuring 1.15 hectare, through registered sale deed dated 15.06.2016, situated at Village Bhurka, Tehsil Abhanpur, District Raipur. The claim of the plaintiff is that he purchased the suit property through registered sale deed dated 15.06.2016 from defendant No. 1 and came into possession of the same, and his name has also been mutated in the revenue records. However, subsequently, the plaintiff came to know that defendant No. 1 had mortgaged the subject property with defendant No. 2 and, in a loan transaction, his name has been mutated and he is in possession of the same since then. Subsequently, he came to know that the subject property was mortgaged by defendant No. 1 with defendant No. 2 in a loan transaction and, since the loan account was declared NPA, respondent No. 2 initiated proceedings against defendant No. 1, in which an order has been passed in favour of defendant No. 2/bank. Since the petitioner/plaintiff had purchased the suit property through a registered sale deed and is in possession of the same, his possession may be protected during the pendency of the suit, for which he made an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has rejected the application 3 filed by the plaintiff vide order dated 05.12.2025, holding that it was a loan transaction between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 and the petitioner/plaintiff has failed to prove that a prima facie case exists in his favour and that the balance of convenience and irreparable loss are not in favour of the plaintiff. He would further submit that the learned appellate Court has also dismissed the Misc. Appeal mechanically without considering the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the impugned order may be set aside and the possession of the petitioner/plaintiff may be protected till final adjudication of the suit. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 on advance copy would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that, since the loan account of respondent No. 1 was declared NPA, a proceeding was initiated by respondent No. 2 before the DRT, which is pending, and in pursuance of the orders passed by the DRT, auction proceedings were initiated by respondent No. 2/bank, which were completed on 01.12.2025, and a certificate was also issued in favour of Mr. Yogesh Kela, who was the auction purchaser of the subject property, on 17.02.2026. The sale in favour of the auction purchaser has been confirmed and the sale certificate has been issued in his favour. The petitioner is claiming title over the suit property through the registered sale deed dated 15.06.2016, however, the seller was not having absolute right to alienate the property on that day, as it was a mortgaged property, which was ultimately auctioned under the supervision of the DRT. Therefore, the petitioner has no prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss in his favour, and the same has rightly been considered by the learned trial Court as well as the learned 4 appellate Court. In a petition under Article 227, the Court cannot consider the factual dispute between the parties and substitute its own view by setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court. Therefore, the petitioner has no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the document annexed with the petition. 5. The petitioner could not dispute that the subject property was mortgaged with defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1, which he claims to have purchased vide sale deed dated 15.06.2016. The petitioner also could not dispute that a recovery proceeding before the DRT is pending, which was initiated by respondent No. 2/bank, and in which auction proceedings were initiated under the orders passed by the DRT. The auction proceedings were completed on 01.12.2025, in which one Mr. Yogesh Kela had purchased the subject property, and the sale certificate has been issued in his favour on 17.02.2026. 6. From perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that the learned trial Court has also considered this aspect that the subject property has already been auctioned and the auction sale has been completed. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court has found that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and there is no irreparable loss in his favour. The appellate Court has also considered the factual as well as legal aspects of the case in detail and came to the conclusion that the order passed by the learned trial Court is in accordance with law and there is no need to interfere with that order. The order passed by the learned appellate Court is a well-reasoned 5 and quite detailed order, after considering the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court holding the field. 7. In the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- ““40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC 141], wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and Nagendra Nath [Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398] discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC 717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898]. 6 43*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], a two- Judges Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and they are set out: "38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], SCC pp. 695- 96) "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. * Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 26- 08-2010. 7 (6) * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. 8 (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215], followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible 9 view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in 10 the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”” 8. Upon consideration of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and the material available on record, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has rightly considered the three essential ingredients for the grant of temporary injunction, namely, existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The registered sale deed dated 15.06.2016 shows that the petitioner/plaintiff purchased the suit land from defendant No.1. however, the material placed on record prima facie indicates that the suit property had already been mortgaged by defendant No. 1 with defendant No.2/bank in the year 2014, much prior to the execution of the sale deed. The plea that the plaintiff was not informed about the mortgage and that no corresponding entry was made in the revenue records are matters which require adjudication on the basis of evidence and cannot, at this stage, establish a prima facie superior right in favour of the plaintiff. Further, no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the plaintiff would suffer such an irreparable injury, incapable of being compensated in terms of money, if the injunction is refused, nor does the balance of convenience lie in his favour. Thus, the conclusion of the learned trial Court that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury does not suffer from any perversity or patent illegality warranting interference. 11 9. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the learned trial Court, while considering the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, has examined the relevant factors, namely, existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury, and has recorded a finding against the petitioner. The learned appellate Co urt has also affirmed the said finding. The dispute as to the validity and effect of the registered sale deed dated 15.06.2016, the subsisting mortgage in favour of respondent No. 2, the rights arising therefrom and the subsequent auction and issuance of sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser are matters which would require adjudication on the basis of evidence in the pending proceedings. In such circumstances, this Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the factual material or substitute its own view merely because another view may be possible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has held that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate and that interference is warranted only where the subordinate Court has acted beyond the bounds of its authority, or where there is patent perversity, gross failure of justice or violation of the basic principles of natural justice; a mere error of fact or law, or a possible alternative view, does not justify interference. 10. Having gone through the entire material produced in the present writ petition and after perusal of the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court, I do not find any 12 perversity or jurisdictional error in rejecting the application filed by the plaintiff by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok