1 CGHC010003852016 2026:CGHC:40708 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 496 of 2016 1 - Dhaniram Panigrahi S/o Late Shri Veer Kishor Panigrahi, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Village Khokhsara, Police Station Khokhsara, District Kalahandi, Orissa., Orissa ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Amalipadar, District Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Manorama Chauhan, Advocate on behalf of Ms. Savita Tiwari, Advocate. For State : Mr. Karan Kumar Baharani, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 17-09-2026 1. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 04-02-2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Raipur (F.T.C.), in Special Sessions Trial No. 598/2015, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run all the jail sentences concurrently:- Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of the IPC R.I. for 03 years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month, U/s 366 of the IPC R.I. for 07 years with fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 3 months, U/s 376(2)(n) of the IPC R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 3 Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.09.23 11:32:26 +0530 2 months. Sec. 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’) No separate sentence has been awarded, 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, the father of the victim, PW-2 lodged a missing report that his minor daughter is missing since 18-09-2014 and her whereabouts could not be traced out and despite her search in relatives house and nearby places, she could not be recovered. The FIR Ex.- P/7 was registered by the police for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC against unknown person. During missing person enquiry the police recovered the victim from house of the appellant on 15-01-2015 and recovery panchnama Ex.-P/1 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to Community Health Center, Devbhog where PW-7 Doctor Anju Sonwani medically examined her and gave her report Ex.-P/20. While medically examining the victim the doctor has noticed no external injuries on her body, however blood stains were found present on her private part. She opined that according to the above finding sexual intercourse has been done, urine pregnancy test negative. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for its chemical examination. The victim was also referred to Radiologist for X-ray examination for age determination. Spot map Ex.-P/4 was prepared by patwari and Ex.-P/8 was prepared by police. The underwear of the victim was seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/3. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim school register Ex.-P/19 was seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/17 and after retaining its attested true copy Ex.-P/19C the original school register was returned to the school. The appellant was arrested on 16-01-2025 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Community Health Center Devbhog where he was medically examined by PW-5 Doctor S. Patel who gave his report Ex.-P/16. While medically examining the 3 appellant the doctor has found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. One Tata Indica car has been seized from the appellant vide seizure memo Ex.-P/14. The underwear of the appellant was also seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/11. The underwear of the victim, her slides and underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL, Raipur from where report Ex.-P/33 was received and in the underwear of the victim and her vaginal slide semen and sperm were found and in the underwear of the appellant no semen or sperms were found. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. has been recorded and the statement of witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. have also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 363, 366, 376 of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of POCSO Act. 3. The learned trial Court has framed the charge under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses. The statement under section 313 of CrPC of the appellant was also recorded in which he denied the material appears against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence 5. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence. No offence is made out against the appellant as alleged. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in 4 the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The victim has deposed against the appellant because of pressure of her parents. She would also submit that no injuries have been found on the body of the victim. There is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to age of the victim that she was minor on the date of incident. The school register produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law and there is no other evidence available in the record which proves that the victim was minor on the date of incident. There is no birth certificate or ossification test report of the victim produced by the prosecution and in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence her age cannot be determined that she was minor on the date of incident. She would further submit that the victim was having love affair with the appellant and she herself has made physical relation with him on her own will without raising any objection. She engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant and has not made any complaint to anyone and when their relation came into knowledge of her parents they lodged the report by pressurizing the victim for the same. She being major girl having engaged in making consensual physical relation no offence of rape is made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are sufficient evidence against the appellant in the case to convict him for the alleged offence. The victim was found to be minor on the date of incident and the school record has been proved by PW-6 who is In-charge Head Master of the school. The minor victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant. The victim being minor was not competent to give her consent and therefore, making physical relation with a minor girl itself amounts to offence of rape for which the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the victim as well as other evidences and convicted him for the alleged 5 offence. In the present case there are overwhelming evidence against the appellant and his appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court carefully. 9. The first and foremost question arose for consideration would be age of the victim as to whether on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age or not. 10. The prosecution has mainly relied upon school register Ex.-P/19C which is sought to be proved by PW-6, who is the In-charge Head Master of the school. He stated in his evidence that he is posted as In-charge Head Master of the school since 2007. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim the police has seized the school register vide seizure memo Ex.-P/17 and the original school register is Ex.-P/19 and its attested true copy is Ex.-P/19C. The police has returned the original register to him which he has brought today. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 12-02-1998 and she was admitted in the school in Class 6. In cross- examination he stated that he posted in the school where only Class 6 to 8 are running. The admission of the victim in his school was made on the basis of her mark sheet and transfer certificate of Class 5th.. He admitted that they do not take any separate document with respect to age of the students and it was required at the time when the student was to be admitted in Class 1. The date of birth recorded in the school register Ex.-P/19 is correct or not is to be told only by parents of the student. 11. From the evidence of this witness it transpires that he is the In-charge Head Master of the school where the victim was admitted in Class 6. However, there is no document of her initial schooling and even the transfer certificate of her primary school has not been filed by the prosecution. There is no document of her initial schooling or of any Anganbadi Center to prove the date of birth of the victim. Notably that the date of birth of the victim is 6 recorded in the school register as 12-02-1998 and the alleged date of incident is 18-09-2014 and according to the school register the age of the victim comes about 16 years and 7 months on the date of incident. 12. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 13. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584] held as follows:- 7 "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 14. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial 8 burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 9 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 15. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : ““14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the 10 concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2022 (8) SCC 602] this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [2019] 9 SCR 735] that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal 11 authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal [(2012) 9 SCR 224], this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim PW-1 has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 12-02-1998. In cross-examination she admitted that the age gap between her and her elder sister is about 3-4 years and her elder sister is having a son aged about 6-7 years. She also attained the age of marriage and proposals are regularly coming for her marriage. The age gap between her and her elder brother is also 1 and ½ year and he is two years elder than her elder sister. Her father had gone to school for her admission. She further admitted that the date of birth which she disclosed in the Court is disclosed on the basis of her mark sheet and her actual age is to be disclosed by her father only. 17. PW-2 is father of the victim. He stated in her examination in chief that the victim is aged about 18 years and he did not know the date of birth of the victim and also did not know the date of birth of any of his children. When the victim specifically stated that it is only her father who can know her date of birth and her father stated that he did not know her date of birth, it cannot be 12 said that the date of birth which is recorded in the school record is correct date of birth. There is no other document produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. Further, the PW-2, father of the victim has admitted that the victim was taken to school by his brother and he on assumption got her date of birth recorded in the school record. In such piece of evidence it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the age of the victim that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 18. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, I again examine the evidence of the victim, PW-1 and evidence of other witnesses. 19. PW-1 has stated in her evidence that the appellant used to come to her brother-in-law who were worked together. She did not know what transpired between the appellant and her brother-in-law. Her brother-in-law insisted her to make conversation with the appellant. On the instance of her brother-in- law the appellant took her with him and kept her in his house. He not permitted her to go outside of the room and when she protested the appellant disclosed that he purchased her from her brother-in-law. The appellant regularly committed rape upon her for about four months. After about four months the appellant made a telephonic call to her brother and asked her to talk to him. Since her parents have suspected upon the appellant, they made report against the appellant that he kidnapped her. Subsequently, the appellant was detained by police and upon interrogation he disclosed that he kidnapped her and then she was recovered from the house of the appellant. At this stage, she was declared hostile and in cross-examination by the prosecution she denied that she disclosed in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement and police statement that she was having love affair with the appellant and she on her own will resided with him. In cross-examination she denied the suggestion given by the defence that she on her own will accompanied the appellant and made consensual physical relation. 13 20. From perusal of her 161 Cr.P.C. statement Ex.-P/5 and her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Ex.-P/6, there is no such allegation that the appellant forcefully kidnapped her and kept her away from her lawful guardianship against her will. From her 164 Cr.P.C. statement Ex.- P/6 it transpires that she had a telephonic call with the appellant on 18-06- 2014 at about 6:00 p.m. and at about 9:00 p.m. the appellant came to village by his car and as per their settlement she accompanied the appellant who took her to village Khokhsara and they were residing together in the house where other female members were also present and she too was residing in that house. In that house the appellant was making physical relation with her on her own will and on 28-08-2014 she had a telephonic call with her brother from the mobile phone of the appellant and she disclosed that she was at Bangalore. The appellant took her on the pretext that he will marry her and kept her in separate house, however, he did not keep her in separate house, but he kept her in jointly. The evidence of the victim is contradictory with the statement made by her under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. In Court statement she disclosed that the appellant forcefully took her with him, however, as per her 164 Cr.P.C. statement, she voluntarily accompanied the appellant and she made voluntarily physical relation with him, whereas, in the Court statement she disclosed that she was subjected to rape by the appellant forcefully. These two contradictory statement makes her evidence suspicious and could not be held reliable to convict the appellant for the offence in question. She resided with the appellant in his house for about four months and there is no evidence that from the date of incident she raised any alarm or made any complaint to anyone that the appellant forcefully took her with him and committed rape upon her. Even when the appellant was taking her with him she has not raised any alarm. All these conduct of the victim clearly demonstrates that she was a consenting party in eloping with the appellant and making physical relation with him and as has been found earlier, the 14 prosecution has failed to prove that the victim is minor and less than 18 years of age, she being major and having engaged in elopement with the appellant and making physical relation on her own will, no offence either of kidnapping or rape is made out. 21. The offence of kidnapping and eloping with accused have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:- “9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design 15 not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 22. Recently in the matter of Tilaku alias Tilak Singh Vs. the State of Uttrakhand, the judgment passed in the matter of S. Varadarajan (supra) has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.183 of 2014 decided on 06.02.2025. 23. In view of the aforesaid evidence of the victim, she cannot be put in the level of sterling witness as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, 2020 (3) SSC 443, wherein it has been observed that: “5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu [Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21], this Court had an occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under: “22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give 16 room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 24. The evidence of PW-2, father of the victim relates to the lodging of missing report and when the victim was recovered she disclosed that she was kidnapped by the appellant and subjected to rape by him. In cross- examination he admitted that his daughter has made a telephonic call to his son that she was at Bangalore and Hyderabad and she is residing happily. He also admitted that the victim asked him to take the case against the appellant back. He also admitted that he repeatedly had gone to the house of the appellant, but the victim did not want to meet them and got herself hide from them. After recovery of his daughter when he asked her about the incident she disclosed that the appellant took her after applying witchcraft and she lost her mental balance. He further admitted that till the time when 17 his daughter resided with the appellant she has not made any complaint and has not lodged any report. He also admitted that his daughter is already married with the appellant and resided with with the appellant as his wife and he has no objection in it also. The appellant has not committed any forceful act with his daughter. 25. PW-3 is brother of the victim, he turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case. 26. Though certain blood stains have been found on the private part of the victim while she was medically examined by PW-7 Doctor Anju Sonwani, however, considering her consensual act and residing with the appellant for about four month, even if blood stains have been found in her private part that does not have much significance to hold that she was kidnapped and raped by the appellant. 27. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts, which prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 28. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts against the appellant and therefore, by giving benefit of doubt to the appellant the present appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of 18 conviction and sentences are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the alleged offences. 29. The appellant is reported to be on bail, his bail bonds shall continue for a further period of six months as provided under Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 30. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil