Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Sandip Kumar De WPLRT 163 of 2026 Nishi Kanta Bhaumik and others Vs. The State of West Bengal and others For the petitioners : Mr. Supratim Dhar, Snr. Adv., Mr. Santimoy Bhattacharyya, Ms. Aloka Bhattacharyya For the State : Mr. Nilanjan Bhattacharjee, SSC, Ms. Jayita Dhar Chakraborty, Mr. Joy Ranjan Dhar Heard on : 28.08.2026 Judgment on : 28.08.2026 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. There is a chequered history to the matter. Initially one Dwijendra Nath Bhaumik, predecessor-in-interest of the present writ petitioners, purchased several plots of land totalling about 8.18 acres in Mouza – Haripur, PS – Namkhana, District: South 24 Parganas through three registered deeds of conveyance from the original owner one Gopal Chandra Hait. Thereafter, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners got the lands mutated in his name and revenue receipts were granted in his favour by the Block Revenue Office. 2 2. Subsequently, in the year 1969, a Big Raiyat Case bearing no. 548/III of 1969 was initiated by the Revenue Officer against Gopal Chandra Hait, the vendor, without notice to the present petitioners’ predecessor, thereby vesting the entire land without giving ceiling benefits. 3. Subsequently, the said one Dwijendra Nath Bhaumik died intestate, leaving behind his widow and two sons, being the present petitioners. 4. The petitioners made a representation to the B.L. & L.R.O., Namkhana for mutation in their names in the year 2001. The B.L. & L.R.O. having not acted upon the same, the petitioners moved the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, which directed the B.L. & L.R.O, Namkhana, vide Order dated August 16, 2001, to consider the representation and pass a reasoned order within three months and, more importantly, directed status quo to be maintained as regards possession of the lands. 5. However, the B.L. & L.R.O., Namkhana contravened the said order and issued rayati patta to third parties on April 18, 2002, upon which the petitioners lodged a General Diary, bearing Entry no. 712/02, at the Namkahana Police Station. 6. On August 12, 2002, the learned Tribunal, in M.A. 242/2002 (LRTT), directed the B.L. & L.R.O not to give effect to settlement of patta until further orders (thereby effectively stalling the handing over of possession to the settlees in terms of the pattas). 3 7. Subsequently, the learned Tribunal set aside all orders passed in proceeding no. 548/III of 1969 and directed the B.L. & L.R.O to examine the case and pass final order. Again, the Tribunal directed the B.L. & L.R.O to comply with the previous order dated March 26, 2003 as narrated above, by an order dated September 10, 2003, within fifteen days. 8. Subsequently, on November 04, 2003, the B.L. & L.R.O. initiated Case No. 25/2003 and held that due to non-submission of B form, the entire land had vested in the State and the petitioners are post- vesting purchasers, thereby not entitled to any benefits. 9. The matter went up to the learned Tribunal which observed, vide order dated January 09, 2004, that the retention point is factual and cannot be decided by the Tribunal, granting liberty to the petitioners to make a reference to the SDL & LRO, Kakdwip under Section 57B(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short “the 1953 Act”). 10. Pursuant thereto, a proceeding was initiated on October 11, 2004 under Section 57B(3) of the 1953 Act. By an order dated October 18, 2004, the SDL & LRO, Kakdwip disposed of the said Reference Case, bearing No. 10 of 2004, allowing the intermediaries to retain 25 acres including the 8.18 acres purchased by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. 4 11. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners, through their learned Advocate, applied for correction of the records of rights in their names based on the order dated October 18, 2004. Such application dated March 02, 2005 not being adjudicated, the petitioners were constrained to file O.A. 2750/2005 (LRTT), which was disposed of by the learned Tribunal on September 21, 2005, directing the B.L. & L.R.O to treat the main application as representation and dispose it of within six months. 12. Subsequently, on July 04, 2006, the ADM & D.L. & L.R.O, South 24 Parganas, asked the B.L. & L.R.O, Namkhana to initiate proceeding under Section 49(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (for short “the 1955 Act”) for annulment of the patta, which is primarily the genesis of the present litigation. 13. Several steps later, on November 11, 2010, the B.L. & L.R.O. submitted a report before the Tribunal to the effect that Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 2010 had been drawn up, upon which the Tribunal directed the SDO, Kakdwip to adjudicate the proceeding under Section 49(2) within three months. On February 28, 2012, the SDO, Kakdwip initiated Case No. 2/12 of 2012 for annulment of pattas. 14. Importantly, on April 26, 2013, the SDO, Kakdwip annulled all pattas granted vide RS Case No. 9/NAM/96-97 and RS case 2/NAM/2001- 02. 5 15. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners again applied for correction/mutation of the LR records in their favour on December 03, 2013. In view of the B.L. & L.R.O. sitting tight over the matter again, O.A. 762 of 2014 (LRTT) was preferred before the Tribunal by the writ petitioners, in connection with which the Tribunal directed the B.L. & L.R.O to take appropriate action for correction of the LR records of rights within 3 months vide order dated June 16, 2014. 16. Ultimately, the petitioners had to file O.A. 645 of 2017 (LRTT), in which the Tribunal directed the B.L. & L.R.O again to conclude the proceeding initiated in compliance with the order dated June 16, 2014, this time vide order dated September 11, 2017. 17. The petitioners, however, had to run from pillar to post, being constrained to file O.A. 1319/2022 (LRTT) seeking mutation and implementation of the earlier orders. In the meantime, the applicant no. 1 Narayan Chandra Bhaumik died and was substituted by his legal heirs. 18. On June 06, 2023, the learned Tribunal disposed of O.A. 1319 of 2022 as infructuous, against which WPLRT 104 of 2023 was preferred, which was allowed, setting aside the order of the Tribunal disposing of O.A. 1319 of 2022 as infructuous and remanding the O.A. for hearing on merits within 6 months, by an order of a Division Bench of this Court dated October 03, 2023. 6 19. On June 28, 2024, the learned Tribunal directed the B.L. & L.R.O., Namkhana to correct the LR records of rights and record the petitioners’ names within two months and directed that the B.L. & L.R.O was to ensure compliance of such order. Alleging violation of the said order, the petitioners filed a contempt application, bearing M.A. 1682 of 2024 (LRTT). Simultaneously, the State-respondents filed an application, bearing M.A. 311/2025 (LRTT), for review of the order dated October 28, 2020. The learned Tribunal allowed the contempt petition and directed the B.L. & L.R.O to mutate the names of the petitioners by October 27, 2025, whereas rejecting the review application of the State, all vide Order dated September 15, 2025. 20. The State preferred WPLRT 195 of 2025 against the said order, which was disposed of by this Court affirming the order dated June 28, 2024 but expunging certain caustic remarks made in the order dated September 15, 2025, also extending the time for compliance till December 10, 2025. 21. After several further orders, the State filed M.A. 1820 of 2025 for recalling/reviewing the order dated December 05, 2025 whereby the Tribunal had directed the B.L. & L.R.O to prepare the records of rights in favour of the petitioners without delay. 22. On December 17, 2025, the learned Tribunal disposed of the contempt application by modifying the order dated December 05, 2025, observing that the learned Tribunal’s orders merged with the 7 judgment of this Court in WPLRT 195 of 2025 and, as such, contempt should lie before this Court. 23. A Special Leave Petition was preferred, which was dismissed on January 23, 2026. 24. Thereafter, the petitioners filed WPLRT 33 of 2026 and a coordinate Bench set aside the order dated December 17, 2025, directing the Tribunal to dispose of M.A. 1820/2025 and M.A. 1682/2024 within two months. 25. Thereafter, by the present impugned order dated June 30, 2026, the learned Tribunal disposed of the contempt proceeding by accepting the compliance report of the B.L. & L.R.O, Namkhana and refusing to direct delivery of possession to the petitioners, holding that recovery of possession is alien to the 1955 Act and only the civil court can grant such relief. 26. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioners, assailing the said order dated June 30, 2026, submits that the learned Tribunal failed to take into consideration that the B.L. & L.R.O, in his report, had only indicated that the LR records of rights had been corrected, thereby mutating the names of the petitioners, however, without indicating compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 49, which mandates the Revenue Officer, upon making an order under sub- section (2) of Section 49 annulling settlement, to enforce delivery of 8 possession of the land to the Collector by using such force as may be required after evicting the person in actual occupation of the land. 27. By placing reliance on Urmila Halder & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at (1998) 1 Cal LJ 171, learned senior counsel argues that within the contemplation of Section 49(3) of the 1955 Act, restoration of possession to the Collector tantamounts to restoring back possession to the petitioners in order to uphold the rule of law and correct the records of rights, inasmuch as the State and its Officers cannot take advantage of their own wrong. It was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the said judgment that if the State and its Officers have delivered the possession to the respondent under some misconception that the lands have vested, they should evict the respondent also so as to uphold the judgment and decree passed by a competent Civil Court as also for the purpose of upholding the rule of law. 28. Learned senior counsel next contends, by placing reliance on a coordinate Bench judgment in Pashupati Das & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at 1999 (1) CLJ 123, that if the lands cannot be contended to be vested lands, the transaction of settlement in favour of the appellants therein was void ab initio, and the question of any reasonable opportunity in compliance with Section 49(2) does not arise. Section 49(2), in the opinion of the Division Bench, would be attracted in cases where there is scope for an enquiry where a cancellation is made, but not with regard to transactions of lands 9 which were not at all at the disposal of the State Government for settlement through patta. 29. For the same proposition, learned senior counsel also cites the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of Sri Baneswar Jana vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at 1992 (1) CLJ 489. 30. By relying on the said judgment, learned senior counsel seeks to impress upon the Court that in the event patta has been granted to third parties under the erroneous impression that the land had vested in the State, the same can be nullified under Section 49(2) of the 1955 Act. 31. Dwelling on the scope of the contempt jurisdiction, learned senior counsel cites Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari vs. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (deceased) represented by LRS and others, reported at (2023) 17 SCC 545, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed inter alia that although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be termed as void ab initio, yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court can definitely declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the contemnor for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified. This may include issuance of directions either for reversal of the transactions by 10 declaring such transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or any one claiming under him. The beneficiaries of any contumacious transaction, it was held, have no right or locus to be heard in the contempt proceedings on the ground that they are bona fide purchasers. 32. For similar contention, learned senior counsel cites Monoj Roy vs. Premanshu Mondal and others [SLP(C) No. 12318/2025], where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if there is any other document executed or acts of omission/commission by the contemnors which is related or relatable to the order under contempt, the same shall also be withdrawn/reversed to restore the position as was existing prior to the date of the order. In support of the self-same contention, learned senior counsel also cites Celir LLP vs. Sumati Prasad Bafna and others, reported at (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3727. 33. Thus, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the learned Tribunal ought to have directed the restoration of possession as a component of its contempt jurisdiction. 34. Learned Senior Standing Counsel, appearing for the State, submits at the outset that the appropriate course of action before the writ petitioners was to take out a separate proceeding under Section 49(3) of the 1955 Act to obtain possession. However, during the course of 11 arguments, learned Senior Standing Counsel does not press such line of argument further. 35. Secondly, it is contended by the State that in contempt jurisdiction, the Court or the Tribunal cannot extend the scope of such jurisdiction by passing further orders, thereby adding to the parent order which is under contempt. 36. In support of such contention, learned Senior Standing Counsel cites a coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of Keshab Narayan Banerjee vs. Srijit Dutta Gupta & Ors., reported at (2007) 4 CHN 996, wherein the Division Bench observed inter alia that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. However, it was further laid down that it is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties and the contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such deliberate act is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction, it was held, is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in 12 the judgment or order, the violation of which is alleged by the applicant. 37. In line with such proposition, learned Senior Standing Counsel vociferously argues that in view of the compliance report filed by the concerned B.L. & L.R.O., from which it is evident that the records of rights were corrected in consonance with the order of the learned Tribunal dated June 28, 2024, nothing further was left for the Tribunal to do in its contempt jurisdiction, but to hold that the contempt proceedings had been rendered infructuous. It is thus submitted that the Tribunal was well within its jurisdiction to observe that to obtain recovery of possession, the petitioners had to take recourse to the appropriate provision of law. 38. Upon considering the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we find substance in the submissions of the writ petitioners. 39. It would be profitable in this regard to reproduce the relevant provisions, which are as follows: “Section 49 … … (2): If a Revenue Officer, on his own motion or an application made to him in that behalf, after hearing the person with whom the land was settled and in the case of any subsequent transfer, the transferee as also the person who is, for the time being in actual occupation of such land and after making such enquiry as may be prescribed, is satisfied that settlement of such land was made by mistake or obtained under any provision of this section by practice of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or otherwise or that a transfer of any land has been made in 13 contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1A), he may, by order in writing, annul the settlement or both the settlement and the transfer, as may be deemed necessary. (3) When a Revenue Officer makes an order under sub-section (2) annulling settlement or both the settlement and the transfer of any land, as the case may be, the Revenue Officer shall enforce delivery of possession of such land to the Collector by using such force as may be required after evicting the person in actual occupation of such land. (3A) For the purpose of enforcing delivery of possession of any land and evicting any person in actual occupation of such land under sub- section (3), any such Revenue Officer may send a written requisition in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the officer-in- charge of the local police station or to any police officer superior in rank to such officer-in-charge and on receipt of such written requisition, the police officer concerned shall render all necessary and lawful assistance for enforcing delivery of possession of such land. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (2) may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal to such authority as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify and the order passed by such authority in appeal shall be final.” 40. From the scheme of the aforesaid provisions, it is evident that sub- sections (2) and (3) of Section 49 are in the nature of conjoined twins, inseparable from each other. For the sake of convenience, the Legislature has classified the said two provisions in two different sub- sections. However, in effect, the two provisions are inextricable from each other. The procedure laid down in sub-section (3) automatically follows from and is a corollary to an order being passed under sub- section (2) of Section 49. 14 41. As per sub-section (3) of Section 49 of the 1955 Act, when a Revenue Officer makes an order under sub-section (2) annulling settlement, the Revenue Officer “shall” enforce delivery of possession of such land to the Collector by using such force as may be required after evicting the person in actual occupation of such land. Under sub-section (3A), for the purpose of enforcing such delivery of possession and eviction, a written requisition may be sent by the Revenue Officer to the Officer-in-Charge of the local police station or to any police officer superior in rank to such Officer-in-Charge and on receipt of such written requisition, the police officer concerned shall render all necessary and lawful assistance for enforcing delivery of possession of such land. 42. Thus, upon an order being passed under Section 49(2), there is no further option left before the Revenue Officer but to take recourse to sub-sections (3) and (3A) and ensure that delivery of possession is given, upon evicting any occupants of the land. No further application is required to initiate such action, nor is any further opportunity for hearing contemplated at that stage. 43. Conspicuously, sub-section (4) of Section 49 of the 1955 Act provides for an appeal against an order passed under sub-section (2), whereas no such further challenge is provided for in the statute against action taken under sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 49, thus making it abundantly clear that sub-sections (3) and (3A) are but parts of sub- section (2) and are not isolated therefrom. The statute does not 15 envisage any further or separate proceedings to be undertaken or application to be filed for setting the ball contemplated under sub- sections (3) and (3A) in motion. 44. Hence, it is implicit in a direction to comply with Section 49(2) of the 1955 Act that such action shall also be coupled with possession being handed over upon evicting occupants of the concerned land within the paradigm of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 49. 45. Seen thus, the direction on the B.L. & L.R.O in the order under contempt dated June 28, 2024 to comply with Section 49(2) incorporated within its purview the necessary consequential action under sub-sections (3) and (3A) as well. Moreover, the parent order, contempt of which has been alleged, even apart from the direction to correct the records-of-rights, contained a further direction “to ensure compliance of such order”, which brought it within the contemplation of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 49. 46. Seen from a different perspective, there is a grey area between deliberate and contumacious violation of an order of a Court or Tribunal and the powers of the Court or Tribunal under contempt jurisdiction. Whereas the B.L. & L.R.O might have complied with the direction of the Tribunal, to the letter and according to his perception, by effecting the necessary corrections in the records of rights by incorporating the names of the petitioners, much was left to be done, inasmuch as the B.L. & L.R.O also had to consequentially ensure that 16 possession was handed over to the petitioners by evicting the holders of the pattas, which had been rendered unlawful by cancellation. 47. Having not done so, although we can grant benefit of doubt to the B.L. & L.R.O insofar as deliberate and wilful violation of the direction is concerned, simultaneously, the Tribunal could not have shut its eyes to the non-compliance of sub-sections (3) and (3A), which we have already held to be virtually a part of sub-section (2), by not directing eviction of the occupants of the subject land and handing over of possession thereof to the writ petitioners. 48. Learned Senior Standing Counsel also insinuates that sub-section (3) envisages possession to be handed over to the Collector, and not to the petitioners. However, in the light of the ratio laid down in Urmila Halder & Ors. (supra), which succinctly lays down the law on the issue, the State cannot take advantage of its own wrong in having granted pattas in favour of third parties in respect of the land which was not vested in the State in the first place. Thus, under contempt jurisdiction, the learned Tribunal had ample power to set right the wrong committed by granting pattas in respect of retained land, of which the State was not the owner, by ensuring that possession was handed over to the writ petitioners, who are lawfully entitled to such possession. 49. In the present case, the pattas having already been annulled, there was no further course of action open to the appropriate authority designated under the 1955 Act but to take recourse to sub-sections 17 (3) and (3A) of Section 49 of the 1955 Act and ensure that meaningful effect was given to the correction of the records of rights and the annulment of the settlement in favour of third parties by handing over possession, if necessary by use of reasonable force and evicting the persons in actual occupation of the land, in favour of the writ petitioners. 50. 50. The Tribunal, sitting in contempt jurisdiction, had ample power to grant such relief to nullify the effect of the contumacious act and properly implement the order under contempt. Such proposition finds support in the propositions consistently laid down in Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari (supra), Monoj Roy (supra) and Celir LLP (supra). 51. In the light of the above observations, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in relegating the petitioners to the Civil Court which, in any event, does not have jurisdiction in view of Section 49(3) of the 1955 Act in that regard, and refusing to direct the B.L. & L.R.O. to correct the wrong done to the petitioners, as a necessary corollary of the order of annulment of the pattas and correction of the records of rights in the name of the petitioners, by ensuring eviction of the unlawful occupants and handing over possession of the subject land to the writ petitioners. 52. Accordingly, WPLRT 163 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment dated June 30, 2026 passed by the Second Bench of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy 18 Tribunal in M.A. 1682/2024 and M.A. 1820/2025 (O.A. 1319/2022) (LRTT) and directing the respondent no. 4, that is, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kakdwip, to enforce delivery of possession of the subject plots to the petitioners, by using such force as may be required, after evicting the persons in actual possession of the lands, within the purview of Section 49, sub-sections (3) and (3A), of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Such exercise shall be concluded by the respondent no.4 within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order to the said respondent. 53. The parties and all concerned shall act on the server copy of this order, duly downloaded from the official website of this Court, for the purpose of compliance, without insisting unnecessarily upon prior production of a certified copy thereof. 54. There will be no order as to costs. 55. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Sandip Kumar De, J.) AD-07 TN