1 CGHC010007602025 2026:CGHC:41262 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 27 of 2025 Reserved for orders on 09/07/2026 Order delivered on 22/09/2026 Smt. Radha Bai W/o Nain Singh Aged About 39 Years Caste- Satnami, R/o Mathura Nagar, Magarload, Tahsil- Magarload, District- Dhamtari, C.G., Mo. No. 6266405412 (Judgment Debtor) ... Petitioner versus 1 - Vijay Kumar Sinha S/o Gahur Singh Sinha Aged About 50 Years Caste- Kalar, R/o- Ganpati Chowk Magarload, Tahsil- Magarload, District- Dhamtari, C.G. (Decree Holder) 2 - Chief Executive Officer Nagar Panchayat Magarload, District- Dhamtari, C.G. (Respondent) 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Dhamtari, District- Dhamtari, C.G. (Respondent) … Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Arjun Lal Singroul, Advocate For Respondent No.3/State : Ms. Richa Sahu, Panel Lawyer VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.09.22 18:57:20 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Justice R avindra Kumar Agrawal C.A.V. Order 1. The petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the legality, validity and propriety of the orders dated 23.09.2024 and 10.12.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kurud, District Dhamtari (C.G.), in Execution Case No. 3/2018, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”), has been dismissed and possession warrant has again been issued against the petitioner. 2. The dispute arises out of the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kurud, District Dhamtari (C.G.), in Civil Suit No.3-A/2012, instituted by respondent No.1, Vijay Kumar Sinha, against the petitioner and other defendants. By the said judgment and decree, respondent No. 1 was declared to be the valid lease-holder of 2.5 dismil of abadi land forming part of Khasra No. 600, situated at Village Magarload, P.H. No. 16, Tehsil Magarload, District Dhamtari, and the petitioner was permanently restrained from causing interference or making construction over the said suit land. Thereafter, on 13.04.2018, respondent No.1 initiated Execution Case No. 3/2018 for execution of the said decree. During the execution proceedings, the petitioner appeared and preferred an application under Order 21 Rules 99 to 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was dismissed by the learned Executing Court on 28.08.2024 with a direction for issuance of a possession warrant. The said order was 3 challenged by the petitioner before this Court in W.P.(227) No. 790/2024, which came to be dismissed on 12.09.2024. 3. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned Executing Court, contending that the decree in question was declaratory and injunctive in nature and, in the absence of any decree for possession, the petitioner could not be dispossessed in execution proceedings. It was further contended that respondent No. 1 had not disclosed any specific date, manner or circumstances of his alleged dispossession from the suit land after passing of the decree and, therefore, the alleged factum of dispossession required proper adjudication and could not be presumed in execution proceedings. The petitioner accordingly sought appropriate adjudication by recording evidence. However, by order dated 23.09.2024, the learned Executing Court dismissed the application under Section 151 CPC and further observed that the petitioner had no right to defend in the execution proceedings. Subsequently, on 10.12.2024, the learned Executing Court again directed issuance of a possession warrant and directed the Tahsildar, Magarload, to take steps for handing over possession of the suit land to respondent No.1. 4. In pursuance of the said direction, the revenue authorities conducted demarcation of Khasra No. 600 on 08.10.2024 and identified the land said to comprise the suit property. However, respondent No. 1 declined to take possession of the land identified during the said proceedings, whereupon a Panchnama was prepared, and the revenue authorities submitted their report to the Tahsildar on 10.10.2024, followed by a 4 compliance report before the learned Executing Court on 15.10.2024. The demarcation itself demonstrates that the property claimed by respondent No. 1 and the property in the petitioner's possession are distinct, inasmuch as the property of respondent No. 1 is stated to be Khasra No. 1631/1क, measuring 33 x 33 sq. ft., whereas the suit property under the decree is 2.5 dismil forming part of Khasra No. 600. Despite the aforesaid report, the learned Executing Court proceeded further for recovery of possession and, consequently, on 30.12.2024, the Tahsildar directed the Revenue Inspector to initiate proceedings for recovery of possession, which, according to the petitioner, may result in demolition of the construction standing over Khasra No. 1631/1 क and dispossession of the petitioner. The learned Executing Court has travelled beyond the scope of the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2018 by directing recovery of possession, although no decree for possession was passed in favour of respondent No. 1. It is further contended that, in the absence of any specific pleading or proof regarding the date and manner of alleged dispossession, the learned Executing Court could not have proceeded to dispossess the petitioner merely on the basis of the decree for declaration and permanent injunction. The petitioner also disputes the identity of the property sought to be delivered in execution and submits that the revenue authorities are, under the guise of execution, proceeding against a property different from the suit land. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 23.09.2024 and the consequential proceedings for issuance and execution of the possession warrant. 5 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 23.09.2024 and the consequential order dated 10.12.2024 passed by the learned Executing Court in Execution Case No. 3/2018 are contrary to the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2018 and the settled principles governing execution proceedings. It is submitted that the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 3-A/2012 merely declared respondent No. 1 to be the valid lease-holder of 2.5 dismil of abadi land forming part of Khasra No. 600 and permanently restrained the petitioner from interfering with the said land; significantly, there is no decree for recovery or delivery of possession in favour of respondent No. 1. Despite the absence of any such relief in the decree, the learned Executing Court has issued possession warrant and is proceeding to dispossess the petitioner. Learned counsel would place reliance upon the order dated 10.11.2016 passed by this Court in W.P.(227) No. 45/2014, Krishna Kumar Dubey Vs. Sevakram & others, to contend that an executing Court cannot grant a relief which was not granted by the decree itself. 6. Learned counsel would further submit that the jurisdiction of an executing Court is confined to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and it cannot travel beyond the terms of the decree or modify, enlarge or alter the relief granted therein. In support of the said proposition, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deepa Bhargava Vs. Mahesh Bhargava, (2009) 2 SCC 294. It is argued that, by directing delivery of possession to respondent No.1, the learned Executing Court has, in substance, enlarged the decree by granting a substantive relief which was never 6 granted by the Trial Court. Such an exercise is impermissible in execution proceedings and amounts to travelling behind the decree. 7. He would next submit that the decree being one for permanent injunction, its execution is governed by Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the said provision, where the judgment-debtor has had an opportunity of obeying an injunction decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the manner prescribed therein. However, respondent No. 1 has not disclosed any specific date, circumstance or manner in which the petitioner allegedly violated the decree or dispossessed respondent No. 1 from the suit land after passing of the decree dated 08.02.2018. In the absence of such foundational facts, the learned Executing Court could not have presumed disobedience of the injunction decree and proceeded to issue a possession warrant. The question whether the petitioner is in possession of the suit land or whether she is in possession of a different parcel of land is a disputed question of fact which could not have been summarily decided without permitting the parties to lead appropriate oral and documentary evidence. The revenue proceedings conducted pursuant to the possession warrant materially support the petitioner's case that the land over which the petitioner is in possession is different from the suit land. The Tahsildar, Magarload, after conducting demarcation, identified the 2.5 dismil of land forming part of Khasra No. 600 and called upon respondent No. 1 to take possession thereof. Respondent No. 1, however, refused to take possession, whereafter a Panchnama was prepared, and the revenue authorities submitted their report before the Tahsildar, which was thereafter 7 communicated to the learned Executing Court. Despite such report and the fact that respondent No. 1 declined to take possession of the land identified during demarcation, the learned Executing Court proceeded to issue further directions for recovery of possession from the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner would lastly submit that the learned Executing Court acted with material irregularity in dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 151 CPC without considering the substance of the objection and thereafter closing the petitioner's right to defend the execution proceedings. The petitioner had specifically sought adjudication of the factual dispute regarding possession and identity of the property with reference to the revenue records, demarcation report, Panchnama and other documentary material. When the petitioner asserts possession over Khasra No. 1631/1क, whereas the decree concerns 2.5 dismil forming part of Khasra No. 600, it requires consideration in accordance with law. The impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional error and material irregularity, as the learned Executing Court has exceeded the scope of the decree and is attempting to effect dispossession without there being any decree for possession. Therefore, the impugned orders dated 23.09.2024 and 10.12.2024 be set aside, and appropriate directions be issued to the learned Executing Court to proceed strictly in accordance with the decree and the provisions of the CPC. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 would oppose the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submit that the four corners of the suit property have been specifically 8 mentioned in paragraph 1 of the judgment dated 08.02.2018, which forms part of Khasra No. 600, admeasuring 2.5 dismil. It is further submitted that the plea of the petitioner that the suit property forms part of Khasra No. 1631/1 क was specifically considered and adjudicated upon by the learned Trial Court in paragraph 15 of the said judgment after duly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, and thereafter the decree was passed in favour of respondent No. 1. Learned counsel would further submit that, after passing of the decree, respondent No.1 was dispossessed from the decretal property, compelling him to initiate Execution Case No. 3/2018 on 13.04.2018. During the execution proceedings, the petitioner preferred an application under Order 21 Rules 99 to 101 of the CPC, which was dismissed by the learned Executing Court vide order dated 28.08.2024 with a direction for issuance of possession warrant. The said order was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in W.P.(227) No. 790/2024, which came to be dismissed on 12.09.2024, wherein this Court held that the Executing Court has jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a prohibitory injunction in terms of the Explanation to Order 21 Rule 32 CPC. The said order has not been challenged before any higher forum and, therefore, has attained finality. It is submitted that the decree is required to be executed with reference to the description and four corners of the decretal property, particularly when the petitioner herself had admitted the identity of the said property in her evidence before the learned Trial Court. The petitioner is now, in collusion with the revenue authorities, attempting to show the decretal property at a different location with a view to obstruct execution of the decree and protect the 9 property actually in her possession. Since the suit property is clearly identifiable by its four corners and the same stands adjudicated by the competent Court, the possession thereof is required to be delivered in execution of the decree. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Executing Court has rightly dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 151 CPC and proceeded with execution of the decree, and the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition and considered their rival submissions. 11. The controversy, relates to the execution of the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2018 passed in Civil Suit No. 3-A/2012. By the said decree, respondent No. 1 was declared to be the valid lease-holder of 2.5 dismil of abadi land forming part of Khasra No. 600 and the petitioner was permanently restrained from interfering with or making construction over the said land. The first and foremost aspect which requires consideration is the identity of the decretal property. On perusal of the judgment dated 08.02.2018, it is apparent that the suit property has not been left vague or incapable of identification. The same has been specifically described in paragraph 1 of the judgment by reference to its location, Khasra number, area and, significantly, its four corners. The learned Trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, recorded its finding regarding the identity of the suit property and thereafter granted the decree in favour of respondent 10 No. 1. In para 1 of the judgment dated 08.02.2018, it has been observed that:- “(1) वादी द्वारा यह वादी नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख०न ० 600 क टुकड़ा 2.5 डिडसमिमलो भूमिम जि#सक$ पंवा% म& तलोबा, पंश्चि(म म& मख्य मग%, उत्तरा म& दिदीलो-पं सिसन्ह औरा दीश्चि1ण म& डमरा डिहरावान- क इलो$क्ट्रॉ6डिनक दुकन स्थित ह8 ( जि#स$ आग$ वादी भूमिम कह #वा$ग) पंरा स्वात्वा क; घोषण औरा य- ” डिनष$धाज्ञा बाबात@ प्रडितवादीगण क$ डिवारूद्ध प्रस्तत डिकय गय ह8। 12. Once the identity of the suit property has been adjudicated upon by the competent Court and the decree has attained finality, the said issue cannot be permitted to be reopened by the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings. The executing Court is required to execute the decree as it stands and with reference to the property which has been adjudicated upon in the decree. In the present case, the petitioner is attempting to contend that the property over which she is in possession is Khasra No. 1631/1 क and not the land forming part of Khasra No. 600. However, this very objection regarding the identity and location of the suit property had already been considered by the learned Trial Court, as is evident from paragraph 15 of the judgment dated 08.02.2018, which is as under:- “(15) प्रडितवादी राधा बाई न$ वादी द्वारा दीर्शा%य$ गय$ चाGहद्दी क; भूमिम क स्वाय क ख०न ० 1631/1 क म& स$ पंट्टे$ म& प्रप्त 33x33 वाग%फी;टु भूमिम हन बातय ह8 औरा इस- आर्शाय क कथन प्रडितपंरा-1ण क; कस्थिMडक 11 म& करात$ हुए कथन डिकय ह8 डिक उसक; भूमिम क$ उत्तरा म& दिदीलो-पं सिसन्ह क हटुलो, दीश्चि1ण म& डमरा डिहरावान- क इलो$क्ट्रॉ6डिनक दुकन, पंवा% म& तलोबा तथ पंश्चि(म म& राड ह8। …… ...” 11 13. In this context, the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhaga and Others v. Shobha and Others, 2006 (5) SCC 466, is also relevant. In the said judgment, while considering the question of identification of the disputed property, it has been held that where there is a conflict between the survey number and the boundaries, the description by boundaries would prevail. It has been held that:- “5. We find that a commission was issued for demarcating the suit plot No. 1301/1 Ba and the Commissioner showed the disputed area in the map prepared by him. The lower appelate court while considering the question of identification had referred to the description of the boundaries in the plaint, the admissions of one of the defendants as DW1 and the report and plan submitted by the Commissioner. That Court also noticed that the plaintiff had given specific boundaries of the suit land and it was clear from the sketch prepared by the Commissioner that the disputed constructions lay in the suit land and that it belonged to the plaintiff. This was the basis of the affirmance of the decree in favour of the plaintiff by the lower appelate court. In Second Appeal, the learned Judge of the High Court, after referring to the description of the boundaries in the plaint, simply discarded the sketch prepared by the Commissioner in the presence of the parties after ascertaining the plots lying as boundaries of the suit property. It also appears to have taken the view that without a survey of the adjoining plots, it cannot definitely be said that the disputed structure lies in the plot belonging to the plaintiff, namely, plot No. 1301/1 Ba. We think 12 that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of the lower appelate court and in discarding the identification made by the Commissioner. It must be noticed that the suit had been remanded twice for the purpose of identifying the suit property and such identification had been done by the Commissioner and such identification had been accepted by the trial court and the first appelate court in the light of the admissions of DW1. The vague and general reasons given by the High Court for interfering with the decision of the first appelate court are clearly insufficient to upset the finding on identification. There was nothing to show that the Commissioner had not properly identified the suit property. 6. The High Court has also upheld the title claimed by the plaintiff over the plot, Plot No. 1301/1 Ba. Once we accept the identification made by the Commissioner as was done by the first appelate court, it is clear that the plaintiff has the right to have the disputed construction removed and the wel filed up. That a property can be identified either by boundary or by any other specific description is wel established. Here the attempt had been to identify the suit property with reference to the boundaries and the Commissioner had identified that property with reference to such boundaries. Even if there was any discrepancy, normaly, the boundaries should prevail. There was no occasion to spin a theory that it was necessary in this suit to survey al the adjacent lands to find our whether an encroachment was made in the land belonging to 13 the plaintiff. In this situation, we are satisfied that the judgment and decree of the High Court cals for interference. We are also satisfied that the lower appelate court was justified in affirming the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff on the pleadings and the evidence in the case.” 14. The said principle assumes significance in the present case because the decretal property is specifically identifiable by its four corners in the judgment itself. Thus, even if the petitioner seeks to rely upon a subsequent revenue description or a different Khasra number to create an apparent discrepancy, such subsequent description cannot displace the identity of the property which has already been adjudicated by the competent Civil Court with reference to its boundaries. The execution has necessarily to proceed on the basis of the property which was the subject matter of adjudication and decree. 15. It is equally significant that the petitioner had earlier participated in the execution proceedings and had preferred an application under Order 21 Rules 99 to 101 CPC, which came to be dismissed by the learned Executing Court vide order dated 28.08.2024. The said order was thereafter assailed by the petitioner before this Court in W.P.(227) No. 790/2024, and the petition was dismissed on 12.09.2024. In the said proceedings, the jurisdiction of the learned Executing Court to enforce the prohibitory injunction in terms of the Explanation to Order 21 Rule 32 CPC was considered. The said order has not been shown to have been challenged before any higher forum and, therefore, the petitioner cannot once again raise the same objection in the present proceedings 14 in order to obstruct execution of the decree. It is held by the learned Executing Court in its order dated 28.08.2024 that:- “ डिनणPतऋण- द्वारा आवा$दीन अं तग%त आदी$र्शा 21 डिनयम 99 स$ 101 व्य.प्र.स . प्रस्तत करा डिनवा$दीन डिकय डिक न्ययलोय द्वारा मलो व्यवाहरा वादी म. न . 03 अं/2012 म& दिदीन क 08.02.2018 क डिनण%य एवा डिडक्री; पंरिरात क; थ- # डिक इस प्रकरा हV- 1. वादी नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख.न . 600 क टुकड़ा 2.5 डिडस. भूमिम क वा8धा पंट्टेधारा- ह8। 2. प्रडितवादी न . 1 क वादी भूमिम क$ स बा धा म& डिकस- प्रकरा क व्यवाधान उत्पंन्न करान$ स$ य- रुपं स$ डिनष$मिधात डिकय #त ह8। 3. अंमिधावाक्त र्शाल्क प्रमश्चिणत हन$ पंरा य सचा- अंनसरा # भू- कम ह दी$य हग। 4. उभूय पं1करा अंपंन अंपंन वादी व्यय स्वाय वाहन करा&ग$। डिनण%य एवा डिडक्री; दिदीन क 08.02.2018 म& न्ययलोय न$ डिकस- वादी नक्शा क उल्लो$ख नह[ डिकय ह8 सथ ह- डिनण%य म& नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख.न . 600 क टुकड 2.5 डिडस. भूमिम क कब्# डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 / प्रडितवादी न . 1 स$ दिदीलोय$ #न$ क$ बारा$ म& कई आदी$र्शा नह[ दिदीय गय ह8। न्ययलोय म& प्रस्तत वादी पंत्र म& डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी न$ उक्त भूमिम क$ कब्#$ क; म ग नह[ क; थ- उस बाबात न त न्ययर्शाल्क अंदी डिकय गय थ औरा न ह- कब्#$ क$ स बा धा म& अंनतष म ग गय थ। डिडक्री;धारा- क$ पं1 म& क$ वालो नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख.न . 600 क टुकड 2.5 डिडस. भूमिम क वा8धा पंट्टेधारा- हन$ क$ बारा$ म& आज्ञाप्तिप्त दी गई ह8। डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 जि#स भूमिम पंरा कडिबा# ह8 उस भूमिम क ख.न . 1631/1 क ह8, जि#सक राकबा 33 फी;टु x 33 फी;टु ह8। डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 अंपंन$ कब्#$ क; भूमिम पंरा मकन बान करा कडिबा# ह8। अंपंन- उक्त स पंश्चित्त पंरा डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 न$ भूरा- लोगत लोगकरा मकन बानय ह8 एवा दुकन बानई ह8 जि#सम& उसक$ डिकराय$दीरा कडिबा# ह8। डिडक्री;धारा- न$ डिबान डिकस- न्ययलोय-न आदी$र्शा क$ एवा डिबान डिकस- अंमिधाकरा क$ न्ययलोय क$ द्वारा पंरिरात डिनण%य क$ डिवारुद्ध कय%वाह- करात$ हुए डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 क$ कब्#$ क; ख.न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु X 33 फी;टु क कब्# प्रप्त करान$ क$ सिलोय$ कय%वाह- क; ह8 तथ नयबा तहस-लोदीरा मगरालोड क$ द्वारा उक्त स पंश्चित्त क कब्# लो$न$ क 15 प्रयस करा राह ह8। व्यवाहरा वादी म. न . 03 अं/2012 म& पंरिरात डिनण%य एवा डिडक्री; म& खसरा न बारा 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु x 33 फी;टु क कब्# डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 दिदीलोय$ #न$ क$ बारा$ म& कई आदी$र्शा नह[ हन$ क$ कराण डिडक्री;धारा- डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 क$ डिवारुद्ध उक्त स पंश्चित्त क कब्# प्रप्त करान$ क$ सिलोय$ कय%वाह- करान$ क अंमिधाकरा- नह[ हV। डिनणPतऋण- न . 1 अंपंन$ स्वामिमत्वा एवा कब्#$ क; #म-न ख.न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु X 33 फी;टु पंरा डिनर्मिम`त मकन म& डिनवासरात ह8 तथ दुकन म& उसक$ डिकराय$दीरा कडिबा# ह8। इस स पंश्चित्त क डिडक्री;धारा- स$ कई भू- स बा धा नह[ ह8। डिनणPत ऋण- न 1 न$ डिडक्री;धारा- क पंट्टे$ पंरा प्रप्त स पंश्चित्त खसरा न . 600 क टुकड राकबा 2.5 डिडस. पंरा कई भू- हस्त1$पं नह[ डिकय ह8। डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी न$ व्यवाहरा वादी रिराक्त भूमिम क स्वाम- घोडिषत डिकय$ #न$ क; घोषण क पं$र्शा डिकय थ जि#स बारा$ म& डिनण%य म& डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी क आज्ञाप्तिप्त प्रप्त हुई ह8 डिक डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख8.न . 600 क टुकड़ा 2.5 डिडस भूमिम क वा8धा पंट्टेधारा- ह8। डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी न$ वादी म& ऐस कई अंनतष नह[ म ग थ डिक उस$ ख .न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु x 33 फी;टु पंरा डिनर्मिम`त मकन क तड़ाकरा उसक कब्# दिदीलोय #वा$। ख.न . 600 क 1$त्रफीलो 1.781 ह$. ह8। उतन$ बाड़ा$ 1$त्र म& डिडक्री;धारा-/ वादी क पंट्टे$ पंरा कGन स- #म-न प्रप्त हुई ह8 यह वादी म& स्पष्ट नह[ हुआ ह8 क्यdडिक वादी न$ ख.न . 600 क बाटु कन न बारा #नबाझकरा वादी म& नह[ दीर्शा%य ह8, इस कराण #बा तक ख.न . 600 क स-म कन नह[ डिकय #त ह8 तबा तक यह तथ्य प्रकटु नह[ ह सकत ह8 डिक डिडक्री;धारा- / वादी क पंट्टे$ पंरा कGन स- #म-न प्रप्त हुई ह8। डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 न$ तहस-लोदीरा मगरालोड क$ सम1 आवा$दीन प्रस्तत कराक$ मगरालोड स्थित #म-न ख.न . 600 राकबा 1.781 ह$. क; Location क$ बारा$ म& #नकरा- म ग- थ-। हल्क पंटुवारा- क$ द्वारा लो डिनरा-1ण करान$ क$ उपंरान्त यह #नकरा- प्रदीन क; गई डिक हलो डिक मगरालोड स्थित #म-न ख.न . 600 राकबा 1.781 ह$. अंश्चिभूलो$ख म& आबादी दी#% ह8, पंरान्त मGक$ उस #म-न पंरा वात%मन म& तलोबा ह8। इसक$ अंलोवा डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 न$ यह भू- #नकरा- म ग- थ- डिक वाह स्वाय कGन स- #म-न पंरा कडिबा# ह8 इसक$ उत्तरा म& हल्क पंटुवारा- क$ द्वारा यह #नकरा- प्रदीन क; गई डिक राधाबाई/ डिनणPत ऋण--न . 1 मगरालोड म& स्थित 16 #म-न ख.न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु X 33 फी;टु पंरा कडिबा# ह8। डिडक्री;धारा- न्ययलोय-न आदी$र्शा न हत$ हुए भू- डिवाधा- डिवारुद्ध तरा-क$ अंपंनत$ हुए राधाबाई/ डिनणPत ऋण- न . 1 क$ द्वारा मगरालोड म& स्थित #म-न ख.न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु X 33 फी;टु पंरा डिनर्मिम`त मकन जि#सम& राधाबाई क$ डिकराय$दीरा भू- कडिबा# हV उसक कब्# लो$न$ क प्रयस करा राह ह8 #बाडिक डिडक्री;धारा-/ वादी क$ वालो ख. न . 600 क टुकड राकबा 2.5 डिडस क$ स बा धा म& स्वाम- हन$ क; घोषण क; आज्ञाप्तिप्त प्रप्त डिकय ह8। न्ययलोय न$ डिनण%य म& डिडक्री;धारा- क$ द्वारा वादीपंत्र क$ सथ प्रस्तत नक्शा$ क डिडक्री; क अं ग हन नह[ दीर्शा%य ह8 तथ वादी नक्शा क$ अंनरुपं डिडक्री;धारा- क कब्# प्रप्त करान$ क अंमिधाकरा- हन$ क आदी$र्शा भू- पंरिरात नह[ डिकय ह8। न्ययलोय क$ आदी$र्शा क; अंवाह$लोन करात$ हुए डिडक्री;धारा- न$ वादी नक्शा क डिडक्री; क अं ग हन बातत$ हुए उस अंनसरा आदी$र्शा न हत$ हुए भू- कब्# प्रप्त करान$ क; कय%वाह- क; ह8। # डिक पंण%तg डिवामिधाक प्रडिक्रीय क दुरुपंयग ह8। अंतg डिडक्री;धारा- क$ द्वारा राधाबाई/ डिनणPतऋण- न . 1 क$ डिवारुद्ध मगरालोड म& स्थित #म-न ख.न . 1631/1 क क$ राकबा 33 फी;टु X 33 फी;टु पंरा डिनर्मिम`त मकन जि#सम& डिकराय$दीरा भू- कडिबा# हV, उस पंरा कब्# प्रप्त करान$ क$ सिलोय$ #रा- कब्# वाराMटु क डिनरास्त डिकय #वा$। उक्त आवा$दीन क पंरिरार्शा-लोन डिकय गय। आवा$दीन क$ पंरिरार्शा-लोन स$ दीर्शिर्शा`त ह8 डिक डिनणPतऋण- राधा बाई क$ द्वारा उक्त आवा$दीन म& व्यवाहरा वादी क्रीम क 3 अं/2012 म& घोडिषत डिनण%य एवा डिडक्री; 08.08.2018 क$ स बा धा म& उक्त डिडक्री; क$ डिनष्पंदीन क; कय%वाह- क डिनरास्त करान$ ह$त यह आवा$दीन प्रस्तत डिकय ह8 एवा उल्लो$ख डिकय ह8 डिक उक्त वादी म& जि#स वादीग्रस्त भूमिम क$ स बा धा म& डिनण%य एवा डिडक्री; घोडिषत डिकय गय ह8, उसक$ आधारा पंरा डिनणPतऋण- राधा बाई क$ कब्#$ क; #म-न क कब्# करान$ क प्रयस डिकय # राह ह8। उक्त आवा$दीन क$ आलोक म& प्रकराण क अंवालोकन डिकय गय, जि#सस$ दीर्शिर्शा`त ह8 डिक न्ययलोय द्वारा डिनण%य दिदीन क 08.02.2018 क$ आधारा पंरा वादी क नगरा पं चायत मगरालोड स्थित आबादी भूमिम ख.न . 600 क टुकड़ा 2.5 डिडसमिमलो भूमिम क वा8धा पंट्टेधारा- हन$ एवा प्रडितवादी क्रीम क 01 क वादी भूमिम क$ स बा धा म& डिकस- प्रकरा क 17 व्यवाधान उत्पंन्न करान$ स$ य- रुपं स$ डिनष$मिधात डिकय$ #न$ क आदी$र्शा डिकय गय ह8, जि#सक$ स बा धा म& डिनष्पंदीन प्रकराण लो डिबात ह8। उक्त डिनण%य म& डिनणPतऋण- राधा बाई भू- पं1करा थ- एवा उक्त आदी$र्शा प्रकराण क$ सभू- पं1कराd क सनवाई क अंवासरा दिदीय$ #न$ क$ पं(त@ गणदीष क$ आधारा पंरा डिनराकk त डिकय # चाक ह8। उक्त डिनण%य दिदीन क 08.02.2018 क$ डिवारुद्ध डिनणPतऋण- स धा बाई द्वारा कई अंपं-लो अंथवा पंनरा-1ण प्रस्तत डिकय #न भू- प्रत-त नह[ हत हV, जि#सस$ उक्त डिनण%य दिदीन क 08.02.2018 अं डितम ह चाक ह8। उपंराक्त पंरिरास्थिडित म& उक्त वादी भूमिम क$ स बा धा म& पंनg डिकस- भू- प्रकरा क; आपंश्चित्त क डिनराकराण डिनष्पंदीन क$ स्तरा पंरा डिकय #न उसिचात प्रत-त नह[ हत ह8। इसक$ अंलोवा वात%मन म& उक्त वादी क$ स बा धा म& इस न्ययलोय क$ सम1 मत्र डिनष्पंदीन क; कय%वाह- क$ स बा धा म& प्रकराण लो डिबात ह8, जि#सस$ वादी भूमिम क$ स बा धा म& कई भू- डिनष्कष% इस न्ययलोय क$ द्वारा दिदीय #न उसिचात प्रत-त नह[ हत ह8। उपंराक्त पंरिरास्थिडित म& प्रस्तत आवा$दीन अंस्वा-करा करा डिनरास्त डिकय #त ह8।” 16. The submission that the decree does not contain an express direction for delivery of possession also does not, in the facts of the present case, warrant interference. The decree is admittedly one for declaration coupled with permanent injunction, and the execution proceedings have been initiated alleging disobedience of the injunction decree. Order 21 Rule 32 CPC specifically provides the mechanism for enforcement of an injunction decree, and the Explanation appended thereto makes it clear that the provision is not confined merely to decrees which contain a positive direction to perform an act. Where the decree-holder asserts that, after the decree, the judgment-debtor has acted in breach of the injunction and thereby deprived the decree-holder of the benefit of the decree, the executing Court is competent to take appropriate steps for enforcement of the decree. In the present case, the earlier order 18 passed by this Court in W.P.(227) No. 790/2024 has already recognized the jurisdiction of the Executing Court to enforce the prohibitory injunction in terms of Order 21 Rule 32 CPC. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that the Executing Court is wholly without jurisdiction merely because the decree does not contain a separate clause couched in the form of “delivery of possession”. It is necessary here to note the provision of Order 21 Rule 32 of CPC, which is as under:- Order 21 Rule 32 of CPC “32. Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction.— (1) Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both. (2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the 19 civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention. (3) Where any attachment under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) has remained in force for six months, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold; and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the judgment-debtor on his application. (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of six months from the date of the attachment no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease. (5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court 20 may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “the act required to be done” covers prohibitory as well as mandatory injunctions.” 17. The subsequent demarcation proceedings conducted by the revenue authorities on 08.10.2024 also do not furnish any ground for interference in the present petition. The said demarcation was undertaken in the course of execution for identifying the land described in the decree. The fact that respondent No. 1 did not accept possession of the land identified during the said proceedings cannot have the effect of nullifying or altering the decree passed by the Civil Court. The revenue authorities, while executing the directions of the Civil Court, cannot substitute a different property for the decretal property; equally, the petitioner cannot rely upon a subsequent revenue exercise to reopen the identity of a property which has already been adjudicated by the Civil Court. If the decree describes the property by its four corners and such description is capable of identifying the property on the spot, the execution has to be carried out with reference to that description. 18. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on Krishna Kumar Dubey v. Sevakram & others, W.P.(227) No.45/2014, decided on 10.11.2016, and Deepa Bhargava v. Mahesh Bhargava, (2009) 2 SCC 294, does not supported the case of the petitioner. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that an executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or grant a relief which is wholly foreign to the decree. However, the present case is distinguishable on facts. The 21 learned Executing Court is not determining afresh the title or identity of an altogether new property; rather, it is proceeding to enforce the decree in respect of the property whose identity was already adjudicated by the Trial Court and specifically described by its four corners. The execution, therefore, cannot be said to amount to enlargement or modification of the decree merely because consequential steps are required for enforcing the permanent injunction. 19. The four corners mentioned in the judgment dated 08.02.2018, coupled with the finding recorded by the Trial Court regarding the identity of the suit land, provide sufficient basis for identifying the decretal property. The principle stated in Subhaga (supra) further supports the proposition that where the description of area and boundaries creates an apparent inconsistency, the boundaries assume greater significance for identification of the property. The petitioner, having failed to establish any legal infirmity in the decree itself and having already failed in her earlier challenge to the order passed in execution, cannot invoke Section 151 CPC merely to reopen the concluded issue of identification and thereby obstruct enforcement of the decree. 20. Consequently, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity in the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the learned Executing Court dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 151 CPC, or in the consequential order dated 10.12.2024 directing issuance of possession warrant in accordance with the decree. 22 21. Accordingly, the present petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 22. The interim order stands vacated. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved