1 / 16 CGHC010359662022 2026:CGHC:40326-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA(MAT) No. 242 of 2022 • Jugal Kishore Banjare S/o Ashok Banjare Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Magarchaba, Thana And Tehsil Baloda Bazar, District Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara (C.G.) Mobile No. 6263062637 ... Appellant/ Applicant versus • Smt. Sarita Banjare W/o Jugal Kishor Banjare Aged About 23 Years Present Address- Indian Handloom (Praudyogiki) Training Institute, Lacchanpur Chowl Mandawa Road, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) Current Resident- Gauradih (Senduras) Bhattgaon Thana Bhattgaon, Tehsil Bilaigarh, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent/ Non-applicant For Appellant : Mr. T.K. Tiwari, Advocate along with appellant For Respondent : Mr. A.S. Rajput, Advocate along with respondent Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Hon'ble Smt. Sushma Sawant, Judge JUDGMENT ON BOARD Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge 15/09/2026 1. This appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short “Act of 1984”) is filed by appellant questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit H.M.A. No. 91- A/2022 dated 24.09.2022 by learned Judge, Family Court, Baloda Bazar (C.G.), whereby the suit/ application filed by appellant under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “Act of 1955”) seeking decree of divorce was dismissed. PAWAN KUMAR JHA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR JHA Date: 2026.09.21 18:25:00 +0530 2 / 16 2. Brief facts of the case, necessary for disposal of the present appeal, projected by the appellant/ plaintiff before the Family Court are that marriage of appellant/plaintiff with the respondent/defendant was solemnized on 25.06.2019 according to Hindu rites and customs at village Gauradih, Police Station Bhatgaon, District Baloda Bazar. After the marriage, respondent started residing with the appellant at his parental village, Magarchaba. According to the appellant, soon after the marriage, the conduct and behaviour of the respondent towards him and his family members became harsh and unbearable. She allegedly used abusive language, quarrelled over trivial matters and made disparaging remarks about the appellant and his family. The appellant further alleged that the respondent frequently remained engaged in conversations on her mobile phone for long periods and, whenever he or his family members tried to advise or persuade her, she stated that she wanted to live independently and that she had been brought up with an independent outlook. 3. It was further pleaded by the appellant that the respondent had studied up to Class XII and, at her request, appellant and his parents arranged for her admission to the Indian Institute of Handloom Technology, Champa, for training, and the expenses thereof were borne by the appellant. She was also permitted to reside in the hostel attached to the institution. According to the appellant, despite the facilities and support extended to her, respondent started living independently and did not discharge her obligations as a wife. The appellant alleged that his attempts to persuade her to discharge her matrimonial obligations did not yield any result, as she refused to accept his advice. It was further pleaded that the respondent made false and fabricated allegations against him at the Indian Institute of Handloom Technology and also allegedly conspired to cause an accident to him. It was further alleged that she went to Raipur without informing the 3 / 16 appellant or his family members and started living separately. According to the appellant, during this period, the respondent made various posts and comments on Facebook and WhatsApp concerning the appellant and his family members, thereby causing harm to their social and personal reputation. The appellant treated such conduct on the part of the respondent as mental cruelty. 4. Appellant further pleaded that in December 2020, when the respondent came to his residence at village Magarchaba, a dispute arose regarding her manner of living at the educational institution and the advice being given to her by the appellant and his family members. The respondent insisted on returning to the educational institution. In an attempt to save the matrimonial relationship, the appellant permitted her to return to the said institution at Janjgir-Champa, where she continued her studies. According to the appellant, thereafter the respondent informed him over the telephone that she did not wish to continue living with him, whereupon a meeting was convened between the family members of both sides. According to the appellant, during the said meeting, the respondent and her parents agreed to the dissolution of the marriage by divorce. It was also pleaded by the appellant that he and the respondent last lived together as husband and wife in December 2020 and that, thereafter, the respondent had been living separately from him. According to the appellant, although he made repeated efforts to bring her back and resume matrimonial life, the respondent did not return. The appellant further stated that, he sent a registered legal notice through his counsel to the respondent on 15.03.2021 requesting her to resume matrimonial life, but no reply thereto was received. It was also alleged that the respondent subsequently threatened the appellant with dire consequences over the telephone, in respect of which he lodged a complaint at Police Station Kotwali, Baloda 4 / 16 Bazar, on 05.06.2022. On the aforesaid pleadings, appellant sought a decree of divorce by filing civil suit before learned Family Court under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955, principally alleging that the conduct of the respondent amounted to mental cruelty 5. Respondent/ defendant did not appear before the Family Court and the written statement is also not filed on her behalf, she has been proceeded ex parte. 6. Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made has formulated as many as four issues for consideration and upon considering the evidence brought in record by the respective parties, has dismissed the suit by the impugned judgment and decree. 7. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that learned trial Court fell into error in dismissing the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff without appreciating the evidence brought in record by the appellant/plaintiff in appropriate manner. It is submitted that the learned Family Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence adduced by the appellant in support of the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Appellant examined himself before the Family Court, and reiterated the material averments made in the plaint and specifically stated about the conduct of the respondent which caused him continuous mental agony and deprived him of matrimonial companionship. Learned counsel would further submit that the parties have been living separately for the last several years and there has been no cohabitation or matrimonial relationship between them for more than three to four years. Appellant on many occasions has expressed his willingness to take the respondent back to the matrimonial home, but she refused to accompany him. Respondent repeatedly left the matrimonial home, failed to discharge her matrimonial obligations and continued to live separately despite the 5 / 16 efforts made by him to restore the matrimonial relationship. He submits that such prolonged and unjustified separation and denial of conjugal relationship caused the appellant mental agony and amounted to matrimonial cruelty. He would submit that from December, 2020, respondent did not resume matrimonial life with the appellant. Learned counsel would contend that the long separation between the parties, absence of cohabitation, repeated matrimonial disputes and despite social meetings, failure of the efforts demonstrate that the matrimonial relationship between the parties has practically ceased to exist and there remains no reasonable possibility of restoration of normal matrimonial life. The Family Court, therefore, ought to have considered these circumstances cumulatively while deciding whether the conduct complained of constituted cruelty and desertion within the meaning of Sections 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. He would contend that mental cruelty has to be assessed from the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances of the matrimonial relationship and that conduct causing such mental pain and suffering as would make it unreasonable for the parties to continue living together may constitute cruelty for the purpose of dissolution of marriage. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that the learned trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove the ground of cruelty as raised in his application. It is submitted that the allegations levelled by the appellant are wholly unsubstantiated and have not been proved by any cogent or reliable evidence. In absence of supporting evidence, cannot constitute a valid ground for dissolution of marriage. He submits that the respondent has neither deserted the appellant without reasonable cause. Respondent has 6 / 16 always been willing to reside with the appellant and to continue the matrimonial relationship. However, due to the conduct of the appellant and his family members allegedly caused to her, she was compelled to reside separately at her parental home. The appellant has failed to establish that the respondent had any intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial relationship. It is also submitted that mere long separation or absence of cohabitation, by itself, would not establish either cruelty or desertion unless the essential ingredients of the statutory grounds pleaded by the appellant are proved by evidence. Learned Family Court has considered the entire material placed before it, including the pleadings, oral testimony and documentary evidence of the parties, and has recorded a reasoned finding that the appellant failed to establish the grounds on which dissolution of marriage was sought. Such findings being based on appreciation of evidence. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record available before this Court. 10. Appellant in support of application under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955 filed before the trial court has examined himself as PW-1, and mother of appellant Shashi Banjare as PW-2, submitted affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC and filed copy of marriage card as Ext. P-1, legal notice sent through advocate as Ext. P-2, complaint lodged by appellant against the respondent in the police station Baloda Bazar as Ext. P-3, another complaint against respondent in the police station dated 05.05.2022 as Ext. P-4, information regarding crime ineligible for police intervention was given by Police Station Balodabazar on 06.08.2020 as Ext. P-5. Apart from this, appellant has filed documents related to WhatsApp chatting between both the parties which is in 10 pages. 7 / 16 11. The appellant sought dissolution of marriage mainly on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. He also pleaded that the respondent had deserted him and had been living separately since December, 2020. The learned Family Court, upon consideration of the evidence, recorded a finding that the appellant failed to prove the allegations of cruelty and further held that the petition on the ground of desertion was filed before expiry of the statutory period of two years. 12. The expression "cruelty" occurring in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955 has to be understood in the context of the matrimonial relationship. There cannot be any fixed formula for determining mental cruelty. The Court has to consider the nature of the conduct complained of, the circumstances in which it occurred, its effect upon the other spouse and the matrimonial relationship as a whole. 13. Appellant examined himself as PW-1 and his mother Smt. Shashi Banjare as PW-2. Both the witnesses have supported the case of the appellant regarding the conduct of the respondent. However, except their statements, no reliable supporting material has been brought on record to establish the specific allegations made against the respondent. Appellant alleged that the respondent used to quarrel with him and his family members, used abusive language, behaved in an inappropriate and inhuman manner and made several posts and comments against him and his family members on Facebook and WhatsApp, thereby tarnishing their social reputation. However, no such document in this regard like Facebook or WhatsApp posts have been produced in evidence to establish the nature or contents of the alleged comments. Similarly, no complaint or other material has been produced to establish that the respondent had spread false rumours against the appellant in the educational institution. It is true that the appellant has produced certain WhatsApp conversations 8 / 16 between appellant and respondent on record. However, mere production of such selective conversations, without establishing the context and the circumstances in which they were exchanged, cannot by itself establish the allegation of mental cruelty. The appellant was required to establish by cogent evidence that the conduct complained of was of such nature that it caused such mental pain and suffering as would make it unreasonable for him to continue the matrimonial relationship. 14. It is a well-settled principle of law that burden of proving allegation of cruelty lies squarely on the parties who seeks dissolution of marriage on that ground. Mere making of allegations in the pleadings is not sufficient; the party asserting cruelty must establish the same by leading clear, cogent, reliable, and legally admissible evidence before the Court. The standard of proof in such cases is based on the preponderance of probabilities; however, the evidence produced must be of such nature that it inspires confidence and is capable of convincing the Court that the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty within the meaning of law. Vague assertions, general allegations, or unsubstantiated statements, without supporting material, cannot form the basis for granting a decree of divorce. 15. The appellant has also alleged that the respondent was not discharging her matrimonial obligations and did not behave like a married woman. The learned Family Court has rightly observed that merely because the respondent did not dress or adorn herself in a particular manner expected by the appellant or his family members, such conduct, by itself, cannot be treated as an act of mental cruelty. A matrimonial relationship cannot be dissolved merely on the basis of differences in personal choices, lifestyle or manner of dressing, unless such conduct, considered in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, is shown to have caused serious mental suffering or otherwise constitutes cruelty in law. 9 / 16 16. It is also well settled that matrimonial disputes are civil in nature and the facts alleged by a party are required to be established on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, has held that the word "satisfied" occurring in the matrimonial statute means satisfaction on a preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has to examine whether the circumstances brought on record, taken collectively, are sufficient to reasonably establish such allegations. 17. In the present case, the allegations made by the appellant are general in nature and the material allegations regarding abusive conduct, spreading of rumours, publication of objectionable comments on social media and other acts of harassment have not been sufficiently established by independent or supporting evidence. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, being substantially on the same lines, does not by itself establish that the conduct of the respondent amounted to mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. Cruelty, particularly mental cruelty, has to be determined upon consideration of the entire matrimonial relationship and the cumulative effect of the conduct complained of. Ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life or mere incompatibility between the spouses would not, by itself, be sufficient to grant a decree of divorce. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC 301 observed thus: “16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be precedent for a fairly lengthy period where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, one party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party no longer may amount to mental cruelty. Making certain statements on the spur of the moment and expressing certain displeasure about the behaviour of elders may not be characterised as cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, 10 / 16 quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant and the respondent being highly qualified persons, the appellant being Principal in ITI College, the respondent working as a Librarian in a government institute, an isolated friction on some occasion like festival of lohri even in the presence of others cannot be a valid ground for dissolving the marriage.” 19. The fact that the respondent did not appear before the Family Court and was proceeded ex parte would not automatically entitle the appellant to a decree of divorce. Even in an ex parte proceeding, the appellant was required to establish the statutory ground pleaded by him by producing acceptable evidence. Plaintiff has to stand on his own legs and he/she cannot take advantage of weakness of respondent. The learned Family Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any error in examining the evidence produced by the appellant and determining whether the allegations of cruelty were proved. 20. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the parties have remained separately for a considerable period and that there has been no matrimonial relationship between them for several years also does not, by itself, furnish a ground for granting a decree under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. The relief sought by the appellant has to be considered on the ground pleaded in the petition and on the evidence led in support thereof. The Court cannot grant a decree of divorce merely because the parties have been living separately, unless the statutory ground relied upon is established. 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415 held thus: 11 / 16 “27. In all the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in order to do complete justice to the parties when faced with a situation where the marriage ties had completely broken and there was no possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming together again. In such a situation, this Court felt that it would be a travesty of justice to continue with the marriage ties. 28. It may, however, be indicated that in some of the High Courts, which do not possess the powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, this question had arisen and it was held in most of the cases that despite the fact that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, the same was not a ground for granting a decree of divorce either under Section 13 or Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 29. In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion throws up two propositions. The first proposition is that although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of divorce, the said doctrine can be applied to a proceeding under either of the said two provisions only where the proceedings are before the Supreme Court. In exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court can grant relief to the parties without even waiting for the statutory period of six months stipulated in Section 13-B of the aforesaid Act. This doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not available even to the High Courts which do not have powers similar to those exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Neither the civil courts nor even the High Courts can, therefore, pass orders before the periods prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act or on the grounds not provided for in Sections 13 and 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.” 22. We may also notice that the learned Family Court, while considering the issue relating to the parties living separately since December, 2020, has observed that the petition was filed before completion of two years. The requirement of continuous separation for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition is a requirement specifically prescribed for the ground of desertion under 12 / 16 Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955. In the present case, however, the divorce petition was specifically presented under Section 13(1)(i-a) on the ground of cruelty. Therefore, the question of the statutory period prescribed for desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) does not independently arise for consideration in this appeal. Nevertheless, the fact that the parties have been living separately since December, 2020 may be noticed only as one of the circumstances appearing from the record. Such circumstance cannot substitute the requirement of proving cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955, in the facts of the case and evidence available. 23. The jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 requires consideration of the correctness of the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court on the basis of the material available on record. On such consideration, we find that the learned Family Court has appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the appellant and has recorded a finding that the allegations of cruelty were not proved. The said finding is based upon the evidence available on record and no material has been shown to us which would warrant interference with the same. 24. In order to examine the cruelty, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, would be a relevant guideline wherein the Court has indicated certain illustrative instances at para 101 whereby the inference of mental cruelty can be drawn. Para 101 reads as under :- “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as 13 / 16 would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it 14 / 16 extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” 25. In Samar Ghosh’s case (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and may depend upon social status, customs, tradition, religious belief, human values and value system. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. 26. In the facts of the present case, the evidence brought by the appellant does not establish conduct of such nature as would constitute matrimonial cruelty within the meaning of provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act of 1955. 27. In the aforementioned facts of the case, we are unable to accept the contention that merely because the marriage has become strained and the parties have been living separately for several years, a decree of divorce 15 / 16 must necessarily follow. The jurisdiction of the High Court in an appeal under the Act has to be exercised on the statutory grounds available under Section 13, and the appellant is required to establish the ground on which dissolution of marriage has been sought. 28. Upon an overall consideration of the pleadings and evidence, we find that the learned Family Court has properly appreciated the material available on record. The findings recorded by it that the appellant failed to establish cruelty and the other grounds pleaded for dissolution of marriage are neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence. No material evidence has been shown or proved to establish that learned trial Court has escaped consideration of any material fact. 29. In the light of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, if we examine facts of instant case, we find that whatever conduct/ behaviour of respondent-wife has been alleged as cruelty by appellant-husband, is not found to be proved by the appellant to that of a degree to grant decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. 30. Consequently, we are of the considered view that the appellant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference with the impugned judgment and decree insofar as his prayer for dissolution of marriage has been rejected. 31. So far as the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent on 07.07.2026 of the appellant having relation with another woman and birth of child from that relationship, is specifically denied by the appellant present in the court. 32. For the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the finding arrived at by learned Family Court dismissing the suit filed under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955 seeking decree of divorce, is based on proper appreciation of the facts, evidence and law applicable, therefore, it does not call for any 16 / 16 interference. The judgment and decree dated 24.09.2022 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Baloda Bazar (C.G.) in Civil Suit H.M.A. No. 91-A/2022 are affirmed. 33. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and it is hereby dismissed. 34. All pending applications are disposed off. 35. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 36. Parties to bear their respective cost. Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sushma Sawant) Judge Judge pwn