CWP-23757-2026 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 120 CWP-23757-2026 (O&M) Date of decision: 13.08.2026 Jagdish Singh ....Petitioner Versus State of Haryana and others ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR Present: Mr. Satbir Singh Gill, Advocate with Ms. Riya, Advocate, Ms. Pushpa, Advocate Mr. Navraj, Advocate and Mr. Jayteg Singh Kang, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Rahul Dev Singh, Addl. A.G., Haryana. HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral) 1. Prayer in the present writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 (Annexure P-7), whereby the claim of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Social Studies Master was rejected. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought, directing the respondents to consider and promote the petitioner to the post of Social Studies Master from the date his juniors were promoted vide order dated 12.12.2010, with all consequential benefits including seniority, pay fixation and arrears. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed as JBT Teacher on contractual basis on 01.01.1998 MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 2 and joined on 03.01.1998 as discernible from Annexure P-1. Subsequently, he was selected through regular recruitment and appointed on regular basis on 05.10.2000 (Annexure P-2). In the year 2010, the respondent/Department undertook the process of promotion of JBT Teachers to the post of Social Studies Master. The petitioner's case was forwarded by the competent authority vide letter dated 06.05.2010 (Annexure P-3), as he fulfilled the eligibility conditions prescribed under the then existing Rules. However, his case was allegedly ignored on the ground that only those teachers who had been regularized under the Government Policy dated 01.10.2003 would be considered for promotion and since the petitioner was regularly appointed in the year 2000, his case could not be considered. Vide order dated 12.12.2010 (Annexure P-5), as many as 134 JBT Teachers, who were admittedly junior to the petitioner in regular service, were promoted to the post of Social Studies Master. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner served a legal notice dated 26.05.2025 (Annexure P-6) requesting that he be promoted from the date his juniors were promoted. However, instead of examining the petitioner's entitlement under the Rules applicable in the year 2010, respondent No.2 passed the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 (Annexure P-7), by holding that the petitioner does not possess 50% marks under the Haryana School Education (Group-C) State Cadre Service Rules, 2012 (in short ‘the Rules of 2012’) and the Amendment Rules, 2023. Hence, this writ petition. MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 3 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, inter alia, contended that the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 (Annexure P-7) suffers from patent illegality as the competent authority has rejected the claim of the petitioner by ignoring the relevant facts and statutory provisions, i.e., the Haryana State Education School Cadre (Group-C) Service Commencement Rules, 1998, which governed the petitioner's claim. It is contended that the entire foundation of the impugned order (Annexure P-7) is based upon the Rules of 2012 and the Amendment Rules of 2023 whereas the petitioner's claim pertains to the promotional exercise undertaken in the year 2010, when vacancies admittedly existed and juniors of the petitioner were promoted. It is argued that the petitioner acquired a valuable right to be considered for promotion when the vacancies arose and the respondent/Department undertook the promotional exercise in the year 2010 and such accrued right could not have been taken away by subsequently framed Rules unless such Rules were expressly retrospective in operation. It is further submitted that the petitioner specifically pleaded in his legal notice that he was regularly appointed on 05.10.2000; his case had been forwarded for promotion in 2010; he possessed the requisite qualification under the then existing Rules; as many as 134 persons junior to him had been promoted vide order dated 12.12.2010 and he was entitled to promotion from the date his juniors were promoted. However, none of these issues has been examined, and the competent authority has merely reproduced the opinion of the Departmental Verification Committee without MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 4 independently adjudicating the petitioner's claim. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the petitioner’s claim for promotion was illegally ignored on the ground that only teachers regularized under Government Policy dated 01.10.2003 would be considered and the communication dated 18.08.2010 (Annexure P-4) was never served upon the petitioner and he only came to know about the same later on, when his juniors were promoted. 4. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the prayer made by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly 16 years from the date of the promotional exercise undertaken in the year 2010 and the promotion of his juniors which took place on 12.12.2010. It is contended that the petitioner slept over his rights and remained indolent for a considerable period and he cannot be permitted to wake up a stale and dead issue after such a long lapse of time. Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner served a legal notice only in the year 2025 and filed the present writ petition in the year 2026, whereas the cause of action, if any, had arisen in the year 2010 itself. It is further submitted that the claim of the petitioner for promotion cannot be considered on the basis of the Rules which existed in the year 2010 as he does not possess the requisite educational qualifications of 50% marks in the relevant subjects, which is a mandatory requirement under the Haryana School Education (Group-C) State Cadre Service Rules, 2012 and the Amendment Rules, 2023. It is further argued that the MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 5 respondent/Department has verified the promotion case of the petitioner through the Departmental Document Verification Committee (DVC), and as per the report of the DVC, the petitioner is not eligible for promotion on the said post for want of the requisite qualification. As such, the claim of the petitioner is devoid of merit and is hit by the vice of delay and laches. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case with their able assistance. 6. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the promotional exercise in question was undertaken in the year 2010 and the petitioner's juniors were promoted vide order dated 12.12.2010 as is evident from Annexure P-5. Furthermore, the department has not initiated the promotion on the post of TGT SS since the year 2012. Moreover, the petitioner, despite being aware of the said promotion order, did not challenge the same or agitate his claim for promotion at that relevant point of time. He chose to remain silent for nearly 15 years and served a legal notice only on 26.05.2025 (Annexure P-6), followed by the filing of the present writ petition on 17.07.2026. No plausible or satisfactory explanation has been furnished by learned counsel for the petitioner to justify such inordinate delay in approaching this Court. The cause of action, if any, had arisen in the year 2010 itself, and the petitioner cannot be permitted to revive a stale and dead issue after such a long lapse of time. MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 6 7. It is trite law that the delay in approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be condoned if sufficient cause is indicated or a reasonable explanation is provided for the same. However, the facts of the matter at hand indicate otherwise. Learned counsel petitioner has failed to specify any compelling or extenuating circumstance which prevented the petitioner from approaching this Court for such a long time. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and Others vs. Ram Gopal (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein, the following was held: “16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence- sitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, this Court observed thus: MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 7 “17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". .... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.” (emphasis added) 8. The principle of delay and laches carries a particular weight in service law, especially in matters of promotion and seniority, where each year that passes without challenge is a year in which the legitimate expectations of other officers become more firmly established. Because the law, in the end, does not punish delay; it merely declines to disturb what delay has already allowed to become just. The position of law has been settled by a two-Judge Bench Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu 1995 (1) SCC 152, wherein the Court, speaking through Justice A. Aligiriswami, has held as follows: “2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2nd respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the 2nd respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge,. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957 after the two representations made by him MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 8 had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellants' case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his bead should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 9 should, therefore have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” (Emphasis added) 9. Furthermore, in State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed P.S. Sadasivaswamy (supra), holding that a junior promoted over a senior’s head must be challenged within six months to a year. It was held that repeated representations do not keep a stale seniority or promotion dispute alive, whether or not those representations were eventually decided or decided pursuant to a court direction. The issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such order passed. It was further observed that delay and laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in a situation of that nature, will not be attracted as it is well settled that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. 10. Reference can also be made to the judgment rendered by a two-Judge Bench Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 wherein reliance has been placed on the judgments in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 798, M.R. Gupta v. MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 10 Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 and Shiv Dass v. Union of India, 2007(2) SCT 72. Speaking through Justice R.V. Raveendran, the following observations were made: “5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (Emphasis added) 11. Furthermore, reaffirming the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadasivaswamy (supra) and Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. R. Sasipriya, 2026 INSC 446, while speaking through Justice R. Mahadevan, has held as follows: “25.2. This Court finds him to be a fence-sitter. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be permitted to raise a dispute MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 11 relating to seniority and consequential promotion or challenge the validity of an order after the matter has concluded. No party can claim relief as a matter of right, and one of the well-recognised grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and laches. A court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage the agitation of stale claims, particularly in matters of seniority and promotion, where the rights of third parties have crystallised in the interregnum [See Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471]. Therefore, no relief can be granted to the impleading applicant. (Emphasis added) 12. Moreover, reference can be made to the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab, (1998) 2 SCC 523 and Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25. 13. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of nearly 16 years from the date of the promotional exercise undertaken in the year 2010 and the promotion of his juniors on 12.12.2010. The petitioner, having been aware of the said promotion order, did not challenge the same or agitate his claim at that relevant point of time. He allowed the matter to rest for a considerable period, and served a legal notice only in the year 2025. The question of delay and laches has to be examined with reference to the original cause of action i.e. the year 2010 and not with reference to the date of the legal notice or the impugned order as has been authoritatively held in Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari’s case (supra) and M.K. Sarkar’s case MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. CWP-23757-2026 12 (supra). Repeated representations will not keep the issues alive and no plausible explanation has been offered by learned counsel for the petitioner for the delay in filing the present petition. The rights of the 134 promotees, who were promoted in the year 2010, have crystallized over a period of more than a decade and thus, it would be wholly unjust and inequitable to disturb the settled position, at this belated stage. 14. In view of the above discussions, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. 15. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE 13.08.2026 yakub Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No MOHD YAKUB 2026.08.20 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh.