9-BA-3288-26.doc rsk IN IN THE THE HIGH HIGH COURT COURT OF OF JUDICATURE JUDICATURE AT AT BOMBAY BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION BAIL APPLICATION NO.3288 OF 2026 Lavish Mahendra Sotta .. Applicant Versus The State of Maharashtra .. Respondent ....................  Ms. Shubhangi Parulekar for Applicant (through VC).  Mr. Sukanta A. Karmarkar, APP for Respondent-State.  Mr. Akshay Patil, PSI, Uttamnagar Police station, Pune City. ................... CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J. DATE : AUGUST 25, 2026 P.C. : 1. Heard Ms. Shubhangi Parulekar, learned counsel for Applicant (through VC) and Mr. Sukanta A. Karmarkar, APP for Respondent-State. 2. This is an Application under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Bail in connection with C.R. No.41 of 2026 registered with Uttam Nagar Police Station, Pune for offences punishable under Sections 109, 351(2) read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 3. The Applicant is a young offender. The charge against the Applicant is that he along with his three friends assaulted the injured victim Krish Singh with fist and kick blows. He is also accused of having inflicted a blow on the victim’s head by a cement block. The 1 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc learned Prosecutor has heavily relied upon the medical report, which is prepared on 21 April 2026, inter alia reflecting two simple and four grievous injuries of CLW and multiple contusions. First informant is an eyewitness to the incident who is a fruit juice vendor where injured victim was having juice with his friend. 4. Prima facie statement of the injured victim, a copy of which is placed at page 70, reflects that two months prior to the date of the incident, the injured victim had slapped and insulted the Applicant in view of Applicant having sent a WhatsApp message to a female friend of the injured victim and therefore Applicant was baying for revenge since then. The injured victim himself has stated that thereafter the issue had subsided but on the date of incident, the Applicant along with his three friends who are arraigned as accused Nos.2, 3 and 4 in tandem assaulted him when he visited the Applicant’s area for having watermelon juice along with his friend. 5. Initially the Applicant and accused Nos. 2 and 3 were only persons who confronted the injured victim, but later on accused No.4 also joined them. Giving abuses and threats in view of the previous incident is the prima facie motive which is seen from the statement recorded of the injured victim. However, it is seen that there is no pre- meditation for committing the crime in question, nor there is any conspiracy hatched. Though learned Prosecutor would persuade me to consider otherwise on account of grievous injuries having been 2 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc inflicted by the cement block, the statement of the injured victim itself states that the cement block was picked up from the road as it was lying nearby to inflict blow on his head. The Applicant is a young offender of 19 years. Applicant is arrested on 17.04.2026. He is in prison for 4 months pending trial. 6. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the accused is likely to appear before the court for trial. There are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents which are required to be considered in such cases. 7. In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson1, the Allahabad High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut 1 AIR 1931 ALL 356 3 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc Conspiracy case. 7.1. Justice Mukerji writing for the Bench held as under:- “9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek. The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. This being my reading of the law, I proceed to see whether this is a case in which the applicants ought to be let out on bail. On general principles, and on the principles on which sections 496 and 497 (as amended in 1923) are framed, the grant of bail should be the rule and refusal of bail should be the exception. In the case of a bailable offence, the law expressly says that if the accused person applies for bail he shall be released (section 496). Section 497 applies to cases of non-bailable offence and there it is said that the accused person shall be released on bail except where there appears to be a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of a very heinous offence, namely one which may be punished by either death or by transportation for life : section 497(1). Again it is laid down that where, at any stage of the investigation or trial, there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person has committed a non-bailable offence, but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be released on bail : section 497(2). The principle to be deduced from sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, is that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. (emphasis underlined) That this must be so is not at all difficult to see. An accused person is presumed under the law to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. It goes without saying that an accused person, if he enjoys freedom, will be in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. One of the complaints made by the applicants in this case is that their letters sent from the custody have been opened and inspected and censored, and, therefore, they were not in a position to conduct their defence with the aid of such friends as may he outside the prison. As I have said, it is obvious that a presumably innocent person 4 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc should have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence. This being the rule, there may, of course, be exceptions. I will not attempt to lay down any cases of exceptions, because these cases before us are not exceptions and I do not want to say anything which will be only in the nature of an obiter dictum.” 7.2. Justice Boys writing a concurrent view held as under:- “As to the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the trial, it has been stated that the object is not punishment; that to keep an accused person under arrest with the object of punishing him on the assumption that he is guilty, even if eventually he is acquitted, is improper. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be served by keeping a person under trial in detention are to prevent repetition of the offence with which he is charged, where there is apparently danger of such repetition, and to secure his attendance at the trial. The first of these purposes clearly to some extent involves an assumption of the accused's guilt, but the very trial itself is based on a prima facie assumption of the accused's guilt and it is impossible to hold that in some circumstances it is not a proper ground to be considered. The main purpose, however, is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused.” 8. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation2, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail, principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the judgment reads as under:- “Prevailing situation 6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women. 2 (2022) 10 SCC 51 5 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other. Definition of trial 7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would obviously be different between these two stages. In the former stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among other factors. 8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on suspension of sentence. Definition of bail 9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police or by the investigating agency. 10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as: “A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in court at a future time.” 11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as: “to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required, in order that he may be safely 6 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.” Bail is the rule 12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] , held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24) “19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30) ‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479- 80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases” observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down 7 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence. 28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that : (SCC p. 242, para 1) “1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. … After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure established by law”. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.” 29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p. 129, para 29) “29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.” 30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated: “Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and 8 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.” It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’ * * * 24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .” 13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras 21-23) “21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. 22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any 9 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. 23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.” Presumption of innocence 14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and enlargement on bail is to be denied. 15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is proven guilty.” 9. Considering Applicant’s age, if he is enlarged on bail Court is hopeful that his family will undoubtedly do their duty to make every effort and attempt to reform and aid the Applicant in leading a reformed life while on bail rather than keep him in prison and expose him to criminal outlook and life in prison. However on the flip side, if a chance is given to the Applicant because of his young age by enlarging him on bail, there is a possibility that he will be remorseful and repent in retrospect. This is a chance required to be taken by the Court because punishment has to be believed to be inflicted for a reformative result rather than being punitive in nature. 10 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc 10. Undoubtedly the trial will determine the complicity of Applicant in the offence. While considering Bail Application in such facts, Court feels that reform and rehabilitation of the under trial accused needs to be considered especially when age of the accused person is young so that he gets an opportunity / or is given an opportunity to reform, rehabilitate and earn his livelihood honorably from the perspective of social integration. This is a chance which the Court must take considering the young age of accused person. The age of the Applicant is very young. If the Applicant is incarcerated in prison further, there is every possibility that he might lose faith in the institution and society at large and may tread the path of criminality or would waste his life. Incarceration in prison exposes many youth to abuse as is shown statistically. 11. There are several harms of incarceration which are inflicted disproportionately on the youth. This is the reason why Court feels that any / every semblance of a chance towards a reformative approach in punishment should be adopted, especially in the case of young offenders. Hence every opportunity or to that extent risk should be constructively taken by the Court in the case of young offenders – accused before committing such accused to further custody and give such accused an opportunity to become a good citizen in the Society. 11 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc These observations are only in the view of the young age of the Applicant before me and it is only a means to explore an alternative to incarceration so that the Applicant can become a good citizen. 12. Applicant is incarcerated for 4 months. Hence, in view of my aforesaid prima facie observations and judicial pronouncements, Bail Application is allowed subject to the following conditions:- 13. Hence, Bail Application of Applicant is allowed subject to the following terms and conditions:- (i) Applicant is directed to be immediately released from prison in connection with Crime No.41 of 2026; (ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs.20,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand only) each with one or two surety of the like amount; (iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at concerned Police Station, once every month on the first Sunday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. until commencement of trial; (iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments, if they does so it will entitle the prosecution to apply for revocation of this order; 12 of 13 9-BA-3288-26.doc (v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without prior permission of the Trial Court; (vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses or tamper with the evidence in any manner; (vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed of their current address and mobile contact number and / or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time, as applicable; and (viii)Any infraction of the conditions shall entail cancellation of bail granted to the Applicant. 14. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are limited for the purpose of granting bail only and I have not made any observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being uninfluenced with any of the prima facie observations made hereinabove in this order. 15. Bail Applications is allowed and disposed of in the above terms. rsk [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ] 13 of 13 HARSHADA HANUMANT SAWANT Digitally signed by HARSHADA HANUMANT SAWANT Date: 2026.08.26 14:17:32 +0530