1 CGHC010149122026 2026:CGHC:40344-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA(MAT) No. 136 of 2026 Rahul Gupta S/o Pawan Kumar Gupta Aged About 43 Years R/o M-20 Sector- 1 Avanti Vihar, Raipur- 492001 (Chhattisgarh) Mo. No. 9039622335 --- Appellant versus Radhika Gupta Alias Renu Mittal D/o Rajendra Mittal Aged About 42 Years R/o B.W. 08, Vasundhara Kundla City, Behind Agrasen Bhawan, Ambikapur District- Surguja - 497001 (Chhattisgarh) Mo. No. 9752037827 --- Respondent ____________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Rahul Gupta, Appellant-in-person For Respondent : Mr. D.K. Gwalre, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Hon'ble Smt. Sushma Sawant , Judge Judgment On Board Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J 15.09.2026 1. This appeal is filed under Section 19 (1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 (In short ‘the Act, 1984’) read with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (In short ‘the Act, 1955’) against the order dated 11.03.2026, passed on the registration of the case by learned Family Court. 2. Learned counsel for respondent has submitted written preliminary objection on maintainability of this instant appeal. BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN 2 3. Learned counsel for respondent would submit that order, which is under challenge will fall within interlocutory order, therefore, in view of the provision under Section 19 (1) of the of the Act, 1984, the order is exception to the order against which the appeal would lie, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. He submits that the word interlocutory order used in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, 1984 means that if the Family Court while exercising its power passes an order in a way allowing further action to continue subject to fulfillment of a direction in a suit for proceeding before it then such order would be termed as interlocutory order and on the other hand if an order passed by Family Court the lis between the parties is finally stands disposed of and nothing is left to be decided further, in that case, such order would be termed as final order and would be appealable under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984. He contended that the order which is challenged in appeal is only a proceedings recorded directing appellant herein for payment of ad- valorem court fee. The Family Court by order, subject matter of appeal has not considered or decided any application preferred by appellant. He also contended that the application filed before the Family Court will not fall within the scope of Section Section 27 of the Act, 1955 as it is not a case of appellant seeking return of any property presented at or about the time of marriage but has raised monetary claims for recovery of amount of Rs.2,50,13,326/- and Rs.10,00,000/- damages from the respondent and prays for dismissal of this appeal to be not maintainable. 4. Appellant-in-person would oppose the submission of learned counsel for respondent and would submit that order which is subject matter of appeal is an interim order, therefore, it is appealable. In support of his 3 contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in case of Babulal Yadav Vs. Sonu Yadav, in F.A.(MAT) No. 40 of 2022, decided on 04.07.2023. He also placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in case of Smt. Devika Joshi Vs. Shri Deepak Joshi, in FAM No.61 of 2026, decided on 22.07.2016 to support his contention. He also submits that Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered the maintainability of appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 against the demand of ad- valorem court fee. Referring the decision in case of Manish Aggarwal Vs. Seema Aggarwal, reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4816, it is argued that bar under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 will not apply to the intermediate orders affecting the vital civil rights. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. In the facts of the case, consideration of this Court is whether the order passed by the Family Court on 11.03.2026 at the stage of registration directing appellant to file requisite ad- valorem court fee would fall within the terms of order appealable as provided under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984. 7. Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 is extracted below for ready reference. “19. Appeal.- (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. 2. * * * 4 3. * * * 4. * * * 5. * * * 6. * * *” 8. There is specific bar of filing of an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 against the interlocutory order of Family Court to the High Court both on facts and law. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 had occasioned to distinguish the final order and interlocutory order and held that intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI, (2017) 14 SCC 809, while considering intermediate order and interlocutory order has observed thus :- “27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition— such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of para 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in 5 the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 CrPC. 28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them—para 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of the learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, 1980 SCC (Cri.) 695 have again considered the order to be the interlocutory order and observed thus : “24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in 6 the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : (1978) 1 SCR 749] clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term “interlocutory order” as used in Section 11(1) of the Act. WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON (14th Edn., p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus: “An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.” Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act. * * * 32. These principles apply to civil as also to criminal cases as pointed out by Kania, C.J. in the case of S. 7 Kuppuswami Rao v. King [1947 FCR 180 : AIR 1949 FC 1 : 49 Cri LJ 625] . We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by Mukerjea, J. which is based on English cases as also the view taken by the Judicial Committee and the Federal Court. * * * 34. There is yet another aspect of the matter which has to be considered so far as this decision is concerned, to which we shall advert when we deal with the last plank of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. Suffice it to say at the moment that the case referred to also fully endorses the view taken by the Federal Court and the English decisions viz. that an order is not a final but an interlocutory one if it does not determine or decide the rights of parties once for all. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the following propositions emerge: “(1) that an order which does not determine the right of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order; (2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order; (3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue, because, in our opinion, the term ‘interlocutory order’ in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi- final orders; 8 (4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter; (5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.” 12. Division Bench of High Court of Bombay in case of Smt. Amishi Milan Honawar Vs. Shri Milin Bhavanishankar Honawar, (2005) 3 MhLJ 984 has observed thus : “9. After taking stock of the Supreme Court decisions on the subject of interlocutory order, the Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Hansraj's case (supra) has held that: "Upon review of various decisions of the Supreme Court we may sum up that the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought, but not a final decision or judgment in the matter in issue." Undoubtedly, the decision in Sunil Hansraj's case (supra) was in relation to the order regarding interim maintenance. It was clearly laid down in the said decision that such order being interlocutory, the appeal 9 was not maintainable under Section 19(1) of the said Act. 10. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Swarna Prava Tripathy's case (supra) was also in relation to order of interim maintenance. However, while dealing with the point relating to the meaning of the expression "interlocutory order" under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, it was was held thus: "Interlocutory orders are of various kinds; ;some like orders of stay, injunction, or receiver, are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of the parties to the litigation, the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if application were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of, the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. An order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another. The expression 'interlocutory order' as used in restricted and not in any broad or artistic sense, denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties, in Webster's Third 10 International Dictionary, the expression 'interlocutory' has been defined as, 'not final or definite, made or done during the progress of an action; intermediate, provisional'. The emphasis is, therefore, at the stage when the order is passed. Interlocutor stage is decidedly the state between the cognisance taken by the Court and the judgment pronounced. The interlocutory order is supplemental proceeding which is a means to an end and not an end itself. The word 'interlocutory' means according to the import of the dictionary 'intermediate' and the interlocutory order is one passed during the progress of the proceeding that is to say, interlocutory order must be an order passed after the initiation of the proceedings and before the final order disposing of the matter." 11. The above rulings unequivocally lay down the law that the expression 'interlocutory order' used in the said provision of law refers to the orders passed during the pendency of the main proceedings and which relate to any dispute which is sought to be resolved or put to rest, temporarily and pending the disposal of the main proceedings. An order which cannot have existence or an order which do not subsist on conclusion of the main proceedings, unless it is specifically protected while disposing the main proceedings, will, for all purposes, be an interlocutory order within the meaning of the said expression under the said provision of law. Being so, any order which is passed during the pendency of the proceedings which does not amount to a final decision on any point relating to the rights of the parties and which has been passed either to maintain status quo or to facilitate the disposal of the main proceedings or for the purpose of the progress of the main proceedings, either in relation to the marital relationship or other 11 disputes which can be dealt with by the Family Court in terms of the provisions of the said Act, would be an interlocutory order and, therefore, no appeal would lie under Section 19(1) against such order. Whether such an order can be assailed by way of a Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or not is a totally different question with which we are not concerned in this appeal. 12. It is also to be noted that it is well settled law that right to appeal depends upon the statutory provisions in that regard. There is no inherent right to the litigant to file an appeal against an order passed by the Court or authority having original jurisdiction, unless the statute dealing with the procedure relating to the matter in controversy or the proceedings before such Court or authority, specifically provides for an appeal against the order passed by such Court or authority. Besides, the right to appeal can always be restricted or regularised by the statutory provisions. Once Section 19(1) of the said Act specifically provides that an appeal would lie against every judgment and order of the Family Court except interlocutory order and when sub-section (5) of Section 19 specifically bars appeal against any order other than the order which is made appeal able under sub-section (1) of Section 19, the intention of the legislature is made very clear that the orders which have no finality are not to be subjected to an appeal under the said Act. 13. In case of S. Muralidharan v. Neelam G.M. Sheera & Ors., AIR 2022 KARNATKA 134, the Division Bench of High Court of Karnatka has considered whether the appeal is maintainable under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 against the order of issuance of notice and held thus :- “2. Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for appeal from orders. It is pertinent to mention here that 12 the impugned order is an order which is appealable under Order 43, Rule (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The order dated 05.03.2022 passed by the Family Court issuing emergent notice as well as suit summons to the respondent on I.A.No.2/22 is not an order within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1894. Therefore, the appeal is not maintainable and the same is dismissed” 14. If the facts of the case in hand is to be considered in light of the aforementioned decisions, it is apparent that the order dated 11.03.2026 is at the time of registration of the case filed and Court after taking note of the fact that court fee has not been filed has ordered appellant herein to deposit ad valorem court fee. It has not decided the rights of parties nor reversal of the order would conclude the proceedings. 15. The decision which is relied upon by appellant in person in case of Smt. Devika Joshi (supra) is on different facts. In that case, the Court has considered the objection with regard to maintainability, however, recorded that “for the time being office objection/default No.3 is ignored”, which is with regard to maintainability of appeal. When the said case came up for hearing on other date, the Court has decided the case finally and considered that issue involved in that case is with regard to return of streedhan. 16. Case at hand is not with regard to prayer for return of streedhan but it is a suit filed with prayer that restitution of property and issuance of direction to respondent therein to return back the amount of Rs.2,50,13,326/- given by appellant and further claimed interest @ 13 12% on the said amount from 09.03.2023 as also damages of Rs.10,00,000/-. 17. The decision in case of Manish Aggarwal (supra) relied upon by appellant-in-person is also distinguishable on facts, wherein in the order granting interim maintenance was put to challenge and the Court came to conclusion that the said order to be intermediate order. 18. It is not a case that appellant is remediless. Appellant if aggrieved can file appropriate proceedings in accordance with law but appeal would not lie because the proceedings which is under challenge will not fall within the purview ‘order’ as mentioned in Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 and there is specific exclusion made to the interlocutory order. 19. For the foregoing discussions we are of the considered view that appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 1984 would not be maintainable against the impugned procedural order whereby the Court after taking note of the fact that appellant has not paid requisite court fee has directed to pay requisite court fee only before registration of the case. 20. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sushma Sawant) Judge Judge Balram