RAJNIKANT DAHABHAI PATEL POA HOLDER JATIN H . PATEL v. HARISHBHAI MAGANLAL HUDLANI
CR.A/1861/2026 · 2026-09-08
Hemant M Prachchhak
Criminal Appealbody2026
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 3604 (GUJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 3604 (GUJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1861 of 2026 ========================================================== RAJNIKANT DAHABHAI PATEL POA HOLDER JATIN H . PATEL Versus HARISHBHAI MAGANLAL HUDLANI & ANR. ========================================================== Appearance: NIMIT Y SHUKLA(8338) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2 ==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 08/09/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. The appellant – original complainant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 04.03.2025 passed by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara (hereinafter be referred to as “the appellate Court”) in Criminal Appeal No.440 of 2022 whereby, the appellate Court has allowed the appeal and set aside the order of conviction passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”) in Criminal Case no. 13925 of 2019 dated 01.12.2022.
2.
Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant is the sole and absolute owner and possessor of immovable property situated at 45, Cractors Park Society, Abhilasha Char Rasta, Nizampura, Vadodara, registered with Sub-Registrar Vadodara. That, the said property, specifically two rooms along with a bathroom and toilet on the ground floor, was let out to the accused under a rent agreement for a period of 11 months starting from
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 01/01/2013 to 30/11/2013, at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/-. That, the rent agreement was executed on 31/01/2013 and was notarized on 02/02/2013, Registration No. 3208. Both parties accepted and agreed to the terms and conditions of the said agreement. That, as per the agreement, upon expiration on 30/11/2013, the accused was required to vacate and hand over the possession of the rented premises to the complainant without dispute. The premises were rented solely for business purposes under the trade name "Bhavya Collection." That, despite the expiration of the rent agreement, the accused illegally retained possession of the premises and also defaulted in payment of rent. That, the accused neither renewed the agreement nor paid the agreed monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/- for the period thereafter. That, the net payable by the accused stands at Rs. 3,72,760/-. That, upon repeated demands, the accused issued a cheque bearing No. 000139 dated 14/12/2018 for Rs. 2,50,000/- drawn on UCO Bank, Uma Co-op Branch, in favor of the complainant. The cheque was presented on 22/01/2019 in Bank of India, Fatehgunj Branch, Account No.
250510100015729. That, the said cheque was dishonored and returned with a return memo dated 22/01/2019 citing the reason
"Stop Payment." That, upon dishonor, the accused failed to provide any explanation or repayment. Therefore, a legal notice dated 20/02/2019 was issued which was received by the accused on 21/02/2019. That, despite receiving the notice, the accused has neither made payment of the cheque amount nor replied to the notice.
2.1 That, the appellant had filed an application under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter be referred to as “NI Act”), 1881, before J.M.F.C., Vadodara, which was registered as Criminal Case No. 13925 of 2019 whereby, the respondent was
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 convicted for the aforesaid offence vide judgment and order dated 01.12.2022 wherein the trial court has passed order awarding simple imprisonment of 1 year along with the penalty of amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to be given to the complainant/appellant as compensation and in default of the payment, further imprisonment of two months to be followed. That, being aggrieved with the above
judgment and order, the respondent preferred an appeal before the concerned appellate court being Criminal Appeal no. 440 of 2022 which came to be allowed and the conviction passed in Criminal Case no. 13925 of 2019 was set aside vide judgment and order dated
04.03.2025.
3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order dated 04.03.2025, the appellant – original complainant has preferred this appeal.
4. Heard Mr. Nimit Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant at length.
5. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel has submitted that the appellate Court has committed serious error of law and facts while reversing the
judgment of the JMFC, Vadodara whereby the respondent – accused was ordered to be convicted for offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. He has submitted that the appellate Court has erred in allowing the evidence and arguments regarding a supposed property sale which were neither part of the original pleadings nor supported by admissible documents, thus causing prejudice to the complainant. He has submitted that the appellate Court failed to appreciate the fact that the claim of the accused that the cheque was part of a property deal, while also asserting it was not meant to be presented, is
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 inherently contradictory which should have rendered the defence unreliable. He has submitted that the appellate Court has erred in not considering that “Stop Payment” instructions do not constitute a valid defence under section 138 of the NI Act. Over and above the
contentions raised in the memo of appeal, learned counsel has urged that the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned
judgment and order recorded by the appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and the order of conviction and sentence imposed by the JMFC be restored in the interest of justice.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the materials available on record. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel has submitted a copy of the paper book of the concerned Court. Upon perusal of the deposition of the complainant, certain material facts emerge. The appellant had issued a legal notice to the respondent at Exhibit 39, which was replied to by the accused. It appears that another notice had also been issued, which was likewise replied to by the respondent wherein the details regarding the property, which was agreed to be sold to the respondent by the original owner for a
consideration of Rs.54,00,000/-, were specifically referred to. The present complaint was lodged by the appellant in his capacity as the power-of-attorney holder of the original owner of the property. It appears that the respondent had already paid more than Rs.20,00,000/- towards the sale consideration; however, since there was a dispute regarding the documents of the property, which were not supplied to the respondent and which were required by him for obtaining a bank loan, the respondent instructed his bank to stop payment of the disputed cheque and on the basis of that the present proceedings came to be initiated by the complainant. It appears that during his cross-examination, the complainant admitted before the
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 concerned Court that the aforesaid facts were not mentioned in the notice issued by the complainant. Upon perusal of the evidence produced by the appellant, the relevant portion of the cross- examination of the complainant is reproduced hereinbelow:
“It is true that the complaint which was instituted by me has been instituted by me on the basis of the Power Of Attorney Deed. It is true that the deeds and the transactions pertaining to the property had been executed between the accused Harish and Rajnikantbhai. It is not true that I do not have any direct information about the translations. It is true that prior to the complaint, the accused had been served a notice on 13/11/2018 through Advocate Shri Yogesh I. Rana. It is true that a copy thereof is not produced in the case on hand. I am willing to produce the notice. It is true that, there is no mention about the notice either in the complaint or in the affidavit qua the Examination-in-Chief. It is true that the accused had given me a reply of the notice on 17/12/2018. It is true that a copy of the reply given by the accused is not produced in the present case, however, I am willing to produce the same. It is true that I have not stated about the aforesaid reply in my complaint or the affidavit of the Examination-in-Chief. It is true that in the aforesaid reply, the accused has denied all the facts stated by us in the notice. It is true that, thereafter, we had sent other two notices to the accused on 18/02/2019.
It is true that I have produced in the present case only one notice, out of the aforesaid two notices. I am willing to produce the second notice. The notices which had been served were regarding the cheque return and vacating of the premises. It is true that in both the notices, I have demanded the amount of the dishonored cheque. It is true that I have not stated, in the complaint or in the affidavit for the Examination-in-Chief, as to when did the accused give me the cheque complained of. I am shown the cheque produced at Exhibit 11. After examining the same, I state that the cheque is dated 14/12/2018. It is true that I had deposited the cheque into my bank account on 21/01/2019. It is not true that the accused had clearly communicated to us in the notice that the cheque ought not to be deposited. It is true that, in the Bank-Return Memo produced by we the Complainant, the reason for dishonoring of cheque is stated as “payment stopped by drawer”. The complained cheque has been deposited in the account of the original complainant, i.e. Rajnikantbhai. I am willing to produce last four years’ Bank Statement of the account. Page 5 of 12
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 It is true that the due amount stated in the complaint has been stated by me, in my complaint as well as the affidavit qua the Examination-in-chief, as the outstanding dues towards the rent of the property. It is true that there is no outstanding rent amount due to the accused. It is true that it was agreed, on 11/01/2018, to convey the rented part of the property to the accused on selling basis against the consideration of Rs. 54 Lakh. It is true that the original complainant and the owner of the property, i.e. Ranjnikantbhai, had executed an informal agreement in writing in favor of the accused on 11/01/2018, for conveyance of the property on selling basis against the consideration of Rs. 54 Lakhs in my presence.
The witness states voluntarily that merely the price was agreed at Rs. 54 lakhs and the same was communicated to me through a WhatsApp message. I am willing to state the mobile (WhatsApp) number of the original complainant before the Hon’ble Court. It is +0018173077650. After the selling price was agreed, the accused has rendered to the complainant about Rs. 17 Lakhs, till date. It is true that the above stated amount of Rs. 17 lakhs is still with we the Complainant. At this stage, pursuant to an Adjournment Application by the Ld. Advocate for the accused, further cross examination has been adjourned. It is true that the Bank Statement produced by me at Exhibit 40 is the Bank Account Statement of the original complainant Rajnikant Dahyabhai Patel. It is true that there are seven entries pertaining to deposit of Rs. 9300/- by the accused towards the monthly rent. The entries are dated from 16/06/2017 to 21/12/2017. It is true that it was agreed to convey the rented premises on selling basis against the consideration of Rupees fifty four lakhs. It is true that a deed for conveyance was executed on a paper and its copy was sent to me through a WhatsApp message. I am shown Mark 41/1. After examining the same, I state that it is a copy of whatsapp chat containing the deed executed by the complainant. It is true that the complainant used to send the acknowledgments from time to time from U.S.A. of receiving monies as and when the amounts were remitted by the accused in parts. I am shown the WhatsApp text of Mark 41/1. The facts stated therein are true. It is true that in each of the pages of the document in the WhatsApp Chat shown at Mark 41/1, it is stated at the top of the pages that ‘Rent amount Rs. 9300/- is pending for the month January 2018’.
It is true that, in the WhatsApp chat produced at Mark 41/1, it is not mentioned that any rent prior to January 2018 was due. It is true that the accused has rendered, till date, Rupees twenty lakh and twenty two thousand to the complainant towards consideration of the property and the same amount is with the complainant even as on today. I am shown Mark 41/2. It is the Bank Account Statement of the Accused, wherein the
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 sums of Rs. 9300/- are seen as deposited to the complainant’s account. As Mark-41/1 and 41/2 have been referred to during the Cross Examination and the same have been admitted by the witness, both the documents are assigned Exhibit 42 and 43, respectively. The notice produced at Exhibit 37 is the notice sent on 04/11/2018. It is true that, at Para-4 of Exhibit 37, it has been stated that, until a Sale Deed of the property is executed, you the accused have agreed to take the property from our client on rental basis against the rent of Rs. 10230/-, starting from January 2018. It is true that, even in the stated notice, it is not mentioned that any rent amount pertaining to a period prior than January 2018 is due. It is true that it has been stated, in the complaint as well as in the deposition, that the accused has not paid any rent for a period from 01/01/2013 to 31/12/2018. It is true that in my complaint, the rent amount, as shown credited in the Bank Account Statement produced at Exhibit 40, have not been stated as having been credited. It is true that, in our complaint, it has been stated that the accused ceased to be our tenant as per law on expiry of the Rent Agreement on 30/11/2013. It is true that the accused used to remit the rent amount to us even in cash.
It is not true that the complained cheque was given by the accused to us as a part of sell-consideration. It is not true that, as the accused wanted to avail a loan from a bank for paying the remaining consideration amount, he had demanded the legal documents of the shop from us. However, it is true that the accused had asked for the legal documents of the shop. It is true that we the complainant have not given the legal documents of the shop to the accused before instituting the present complaint. It is not true that as we had not given the accused the documents of shop, the accused had stopped honoring of the complained cheque. It is true that before the cheque complained of was deposited in the bank, the accused had given a reply as well as a cross-notice, through his advocate on 17/12/2018, wherein the accused had stated that, “please give me the legal documents of the property so that I can avail a loan from the bank and remit the remaining consideration amount.” It is not true that, though there was no outstanding rent amount, the cheque which was given for the purpose of sell-consideration was misused to institute the present complaint which is wrongful and illegal. Cross Examination over.”
7. Considering all the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is evident that the present appellant has failed to establish the existence of any legal enforceable debt insofar as the alleged rent is concerned. It appears that the original complainant, in the Whatsapp
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 chat produced before the concerned Court, has admitted the relevant
facts. A copy of the said Whatsapp chat was produced before the concerned Court, from which it is revealed that no rent was due and payable by the respondent prior to the year 2018 and thus, the defence was raised by the respondent that the cheque was issued towards the sale consideration of the property. The respondent has specifically contended that since the documents relating to the property were not supplied to him, he was unable to obtain finance from the bank for purchasing the said property and to pay the remaining amount of the sale consideration. It appears that all these
facts were not stated by the complainant in his notice and the same is admitted by the complainant in his cross-examination. These facts and circumstances clearly show that the appellant has failed to establish any legal enforceable debt as alleged against the respondent.
8. After considering all these facts, the appellate Court, in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of its judgment, has recorded its findings and recorded its conclusions in paragraphs 16 and 17 and passed the impugned order. I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the appellate Court, which reversed the
judgment of the trial Court convicting the respondent. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the appellate Court has not committed any error of facts and law in passing the impugned judgment and
order and there is no any illegality and infirmity found in the judgment and order.
9. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
10. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the
judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which they are charged.
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
11. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.
12. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a
judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. Page 10 of 12
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos.
1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered
judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
R/CR.A/1861/2026(GJHC240345672026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
13. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
14. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the appellate Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. Even on re- appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the appellate Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.
15. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the appellate Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) ANUSRI Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: ANUSRI VASU(HC02352), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 14/09/2026 17:56:34