1 CGHC010354262026 2026:CGHC:40368-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2412 of 2026 Shreyanshu Kaushik S/o Shri Roshan Kaushik Aged About 25 Years R/o Gulmohar Park, Behind Shubham Vihar, Ward No. 1, Police Station - Civil Lines, Tahsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Note - As Per F.I.R. And Cause Title Of Trial Court Name Of The Present Petitioner Is Wrongly Mentioned As Shreyansh And Shreyanshud In The Impugned Order) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarkanda, Tahsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 2 - Kaushilya Thawait W/o Chandrashekhar Thawait Street No. 13, Gitanjali City, Phase-2, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Akash Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General. DB: Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas & Hon’ble Shri Justice Sudhir Kumar Order on Board 16.09.2026 Per Narendra Kumar Vyas, J 1. The petitioner has filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous 2 Petition seeking quashing of FIR bearing Crime No. 760/2025 dated 26.05.2025, registered at Police Station Sarkanda, Tahsil and District Bilaspur (C.G.), and the consequential charge-sheet bearing No. 381/2026 dated 19.04.2026, arising out of the said FIR, for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’). 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant, Kaushilya Thawait, resident of Sarkanda, Bilaspur, lodged an FIR alleging that he had purchased land bearing Plot No. 17/25, situated at Village Khamtarai, Bilaspur (C.G.), bearing Khasra No. 559/1/थ/6, admeasuring 1,500 sq. ft., from Nadeem Ahmed through the original owner, Vishwanth Rai, on 30.03.2022, for a sale consideration of Rs.18,75,000/-. Thereafter, he moved an application for mutation, which came to be rejected by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer on the ground that the land is recorded as “Chote-Bade Jhad Ka Jangal” in the revenue records and, without the permission of the Collector, the same could not have been sold. It is further alleged that Vishwanth Rai, the seller, along with his associate Nadeem Ahmed and other accused persons, cheated the complainant by representing the said land to be their own and selling the same, despite the fact that it was Government land. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, the FIR for the aforementioned offences was registered against the petitioner and two other accused persons. 3 Hence, the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has no vital role to play in the alleged offence and that he was merely an attesting witness to the sale deed. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioner ought not to have been arrayed as an accused in the present case. Learned counsel accordingly prays for quashing of the proceedings against the petitioner. To substantiate his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRMP No. 2360 of 2019, in the matter of Nishant Agrawal and Another v. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, and has referred to paragraph 19, which reads as under: “19. Similarly, in the matter of Pandurang Krishnaji (supra), it has been held by the Privy Council that attestation of a deed by itself estops man from denying nothing whatsoever expecting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed. It conveys, nor by neither directly implication, any knowledge of the contents of the document and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that the transaction which the man consented to document effects.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the dispute in question is purely civil in nature and that the complainant has an efficacious remedy of instituting a civil suit 4 and by lodging the FIR, the criminal law has been set into motion, and therefore, the present case warrants interference by this Court, thus he would pray for allowing the CRMP. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State would oppose the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and submit that, as the land is recorded as “Chote-Bade Jhad Ka Jangal”, it is Government land and could not have been sold. It is further submitted that, in the written report, it has also been mentioned that the petitioner is a partner of S.N. Group, which executed the sale deed, therefore, there is prima facie material available on record indicating the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offences. It has also been informed by the State that, as borne out from the record, the complainant is repaying the loan and, as such, it cannot be said that the complainant has not only been deprived of the land but is also bearing the financial liability, therefore, he would prays for dismissal of the present CRMP. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. From perusal of the FIR and the documents annexed with the charge-sheet, it prima facie appears that the land sold to the complainant is recorded as “Bade Jhad Ka Jangal” and, if the said land is Government land, the same has been sold to the complainant by representing it to be privately owned land. It is further apparent from the sale deed that the land has been 5 represented as belonging to the vendors. These circumstances, prima facie, indicate the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Further, considering the fact that the nature and status of the land were allegedly within the knowledge of the petitioner and the other accused persons, and despite the same, the petitioner signed the sale deed as an attesting witness, his involvement in the alleged offence cannot, at this stage, be ruled out. Accordingly, a prima facie case indicating the involvement of the petitioner in the crime in question is made out. 8. It is well settled position of law that it is not necessary that the Court in a pure civil dispute should stop the criminal law motion at the threshold as it is dependable upon facts and circumstances of each case which has to be looked into by the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Accamma Sam Jacob vs. The State of Karnataka & Another Etc. reported in 2026 INSC 362, has examined and has held that the High Court while exercising its inherent jurisdiction should not travel the allegations contained in the complaint and material placed by the complainant by delving into the defense sought to be projected by the accused and has held in paragraphs 52, 54 and 56 as under:- “52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse complainant the and application examine filed whether by the facts disclosed 6 therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in interfering with such an exercise of power and ought to intervene only where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice. 54. The facts in the case at hand manifest that the High Court proceeded to examine documents relied upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same as determinative of the dispute and observed that the sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first, before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section 482 of CrPC. Consideration of defence material, including sale deeds or other title documents would necessarily involve adjudication on disputed questions of fact, which fall squarely within the domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of CrPC would amount to conducting a mini- trial and would be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence material to be weighed at the threshold would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an investigation by the police. 56. In the facts and circumstances noted above, it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.” 9. A prima facie case for the commission of the alleged offences is made out. Even if it is a civil dispute, from the contents of the FIR 7 and the material collected by the prosecution, it prima facie appears that the petitioner, along with the other accused persons, intended to cheat the complainant and, despite being aware that the land did not belong to them, participated in the execution of the sale deed. Therefore, we are of the view that the present petition deserved to be dismissed. 10. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Sd/- (Sudhir Kumar) Judge Akhil