R. Binu, S/o. Ramdas v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Represented By Its Chairman And Managing Director
2026-03-12
Basant Balaji, Devan Ramachandran
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. While the appellant was serving the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (‘KSRTC’) as a driver, he was proceeded with departmentally - after being placed under suspension on 01.03.2023; which finally led to Ext.P1 order, terminating him from service. He filed Ext.P2 Appeal before the 2 nd respondent – Chairman and Managing Director; which has now culminated in Ext.P3 order, confirming Ext.P1. 2. The specific contention of the appellant is that the entire enquiry proceedings are vitiated because, as evident from Ext.P7, the 2 nd respondent – Chairman and Managing Director, had controlled the enquiry right from its inception, until he obtained an outcome he wanted, namely, to terminate him from service. He argues that, therefore, the enquiry can only be seen to be vitiated; and, consequently, that all further orders, edificed on the same, have been rendered inept and incompetent. 3. The learned Single Judge refused to enter into the merits of the contentions, but relegated the appellant to the alternative remedy, of filing a revision before the Statutory Tribunal; against which, he has filed this Appeal. 4. Sri.Deepu Thankan – learned Standing Counsel for the ‘KSRTC’, argued, referring to Ext.P1, that the misconduct alleged against the appellant is so grave that it cannot be taken lightly, particularly because his proven reckless driving caused the death of two young college-going individuals. He argued that the 2 nd respondent did not interfere with the enquiry proceedings at all, but was only monitoring it, as any head of an Institution would - which finally led to the appellant being found guilty, leading to Ext.P1 order, thus terminating him from service. He contended that, in any event, by the time Ext.P2 Appeal had been filed by the appellant, the incumbent Managing Director - who had made the endorsements in Ext.P7 - had been replaced by the present incumbent, who then issued Ext.P3, thus the allegation of bias, either direct or indirect, in his actions being wholly illogical. He prayed that, therefore, this Appeal be dismissed. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at the stage of admission, with their specific consent that we can dispose of this matter at this stage itself, since all materials and documents, as are relevant, are already available. 6.
He prayed that, therefore, this Appeal be dismissed. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at the stage of admission, with their specific consent that we can dispose of this matter at this stage itself, since all materials and documents, as are relevant, are already available. 6. It is conceded that the appellant was proceeded against disciplinarily for having caused an accident; as also that he was placed under suspension with effect from 01.03.2023. An enquiry was, thereafter conducted, which culminated in Ext.P1; against which, an Appeal was filed before the 2 nd respondent, which has been dismissed through Ext.P3. 7. The afore facts are not in dispute and therefore, do not require us to expatiate. 8. The controversy in this case, however, has arisen on the underpinning of five ‘notings’ available in Ext.P7 - which the appellant says he has obtained invoking the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act). 9. There are three notings relevant in Ext.P7, namely that dated 11.07.2023 – which is on internal page 7; that dated 12.09.2023 – which is on page 12 thereof; and that dated 26.10.2023 – which is available on page 16 of it. 10. The first endorsement reads as under: “why delay in getting detailed enquiry report. Inform Enquiry Officer to submit. take n/a to terminate the driver.” (sic) 11. The second endorsement dated 12.09.2023 is in Malayalam, to the following effect: 12. Finally, the endorsement dated 26.10.2023 is to the following effect: “Terminate from the service.” This endorsement, however, also has a struck off portion, namely: “Readmit. Disciplinary procedure shall continue” (sic) 13. It is relevant and pertinent that, at the time when the first of the afore endorsements was made by the 2 nd respondent, not even the enquiry report had been submitted; but that he still ordered that the necessary action to terminate the driver (appellant) be taken. 14. It is here that the matter certainly becomes embroiled in controversy. The enquiry report dated 13.07.2023, is stated to have been submitted by the Enquiry Officer immediately thereafter; and the second of the aforementioned endorsements becomes crucial at this stage because, on 12.09.2023 - which is even before Ext.P1 order had been issued by the competent Disciplinary Authority - the 2 nd respondent – Chairman and Managing Director orders that he be informed after the appellant is terminated.
In the same vein, going by the endorsements on 26.10.2023, the 2 nd respondent again orders that the appellant be terminated from service. 15. As said above, Ext.P1 was issued by the Disciplinary Authority much later on 16.02.2024. 16. The question before us is two folded: (a) whether the enquiry report dated 13.07.2023 and Ext.P1 order dated 16.02.2024 can be seen to be directly influenced by the command of the 2 nd respondent – Chairman and Managing Director; and (b) if Ext.P3 is vitiated because, it has been issued by the same Authority who made the afore endorsements. 17. On the first limb, there is great force in the submissions of Sri.V.Premchand – learned counsel for the appellant, because, as said above, even before the enquiry report had been finalized, the 2 nd respondent ordered that necessary actions to terminate the driver (appellant) be taken. It is crucial that two days later, the enquiry report is stated to be finalized and submitted; but Ext.P1 order came slightly later on 16.02.2024. 18. It is in the midst of this, that the 2 nd respondent makes the afore two further endorsements, thus ensuring that the appellant is terminated from service. 19. True, the incident alleged against the appellant is grave; but the acme question is, if he was responsible for the accident, which can only be proved through a proper enquiry. No person can be condemned without a proper procedure having been followed; and hence it is our obligation, under the constitutional scheme, to verify whether this has been done. 20. That apart, going by the well established tenets of Administrative Law, this Court is not expected to go into the merits of the decision of the Administrative Authority, but to verify whether the prescribed decision-making process has been complied with. 21. To paraphrase, we are not here to verify the correctness of Exts.P1 or P3 on its merits per se, but whether they have been issued after following due procedure. 22. We must say that we cannot find favour with the opinion of the learned Single Judge because, as said several times before, even the enquiry report was settled by the Enquiry Officer, a few days after the first of the afore endorsements were made by the 2 nd respondent.
22. We must say that we cannot find favour with the opinion of the learned Single Judge because, as said several times before, even the enquiry report was settled by the Enquiry Officer, a few days after the first of the afore endorsements were made by the 2 nd respondent. It would be unnecessary to expatiate that, when such an endorsement has been made - particularly in a recriminating tone as to why there is a delay in getting a detailed enquiry report from the Enquiry Officer - it can only fall to suspicion that the said Authority also thought that it was necessary to file a report in such manner, as would lead to the termination of the appellant, as had been required by the 2 nd respondent. When the enquiry report itself, therefore, cannot find our favour, it would not be necessary for us to speak on the orders impugned; but for the purpose of completeness, we proceed to record our opinion on them also. 23. As indited above, the two further endorsements made by the 2 nd respondent were on 12.09.2023 and 26.10.2023 respectively. In both these, there is a clear directive that the appellant shall be terminated from the service. 24. It is after the afore, that the Disciplinary Authority issued Ext.P1 order dated 16.02.2024, terminating the appellant from service. For this reason, we are persuaded not to find favour with the said order either, since it can only be seen, at least from the standpoint of a reasonable mind, that the Disciplinary Authority was influenced by the command made on the files by the 2 nd respondent – Chairman and Managing Director. 25. Coming to the challenge to Ext.P3, though it would be wholly unnecessary for us now to deal with it, we must answer the submissions of Sri.Deepu Thankan, that it has been issued by the present incumbent, distinct from the person who made the aforesaid endorsements. 26. We are afraid that this, by itself, would not make any change because, the action has been taken institutionally and the Managing Director has been acting in such capacity. The change of incumbent would not really alter the nature of the order expected from an institutional head. 27.
26. We are afraid that this, by itself, would not make any change because, the action has been taken institutionally and the Managing Director has been acting in such capacity. The change of incumbent would not really alter the nature of the order expected from an institutional head. 27. That apart, there is something more vital, which has caught our attention, namely that, after the third aforesaid endorsement, there is a further endorsement by the 2 nd respondent, namely, “agreed” and this is dated 11.12.2023. 28. Sri.Deepu Thankan explains that this endorsement is with reference to the proposal that finally lead to Ext.P1. If this be so, the matter is far more exacerbated because, even at that stage, the 2 nd respondent appears to have been involved, thus rendering the Disciplinary Authority to be not in a position to take an independent decision on the Statutory Appeal of the appellant. 29. Consequently, when a further Appeal is presented before the 2 nd respondent - whether it be the incumbent, or a different person - Ext.P3 order would also concede to be one vitiated peremptorily. 30. In such perspective, we are certain that the appellant is entitled to relief. In the above circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment; consequently, setting aside Exts.P1 and P3 orders. After we dictated this part of this judgment, Sri.Deepu Thankan, intervened to request that his client be reserved liberty to continue the enquiry from the stage of the Charge Memo since, this Court has only found the proceedings from the enquiry report to be vitiated. Sri.V.Premchand - appearing for the appellant, opposed the afore request arguing that, when Exts.P1 and P3 are found inept by this Court, no particular liberty can be reserved to the ‘KSRTC’ and that such is not permissible. We have given the request of Sri.Deepu Thankan some thought; and are of the view that, if the ‘KSRTC’ has any liberty available to them in law, it would surely be open to them to act as per it.